

ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
DE DIVISIONE LIBER

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JOHN MAGEE (ED., TR. & COMM.)

ANICII MANLII SEVERINI BOETHII
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CRITICAL EDITION, TRANSLATION, PROLEGOMENA,
AND COMMENTARY

BY

JOHN MAGEE



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ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AL</i>	Aristoteles Latinus
<i>CAG</i>	Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca
<i>CCL</i>	Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina
<i>CLA</i>	Lowe, <i>Codices Latini Antiquiores</i>
<i>CLCAG</i>	Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum
<i>CSEL</i>	Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
<i>DK</i>	Diels-Kranz, <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , 6th ed.
<i>DL</i>	Diogenes Laertius, <i>Vitae philosophorum</i>
<i>FDS</i>	Hülser, <i>Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker</i>
<i>GG</i>	Grammatici Graeci
<i>GL</i>	Keil, <i>Grammatici Latini</i>
<i>LHS</i>	Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr, <i>Lateinische Grammatik</i>
<i>LSJ</i>	Liddell-Scott-Jones-McKenzie et al., <i>A Greek-English Lexicon</i> , 9th ed.
<i>MGH</i>	Monumenta Germaniae Historica
<i>OLD</i>	Glare, <i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i>
<i>PG</i>	Migne, <i>Patrologia Graeca</i>
<i>PL</i>	Migne, <i>Patrologia Latina</i>
<i>RE</i>	Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll-Mittelhaus, <i>Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>SVF</i>	von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta</i>
<i>TLL</i>	<i>Thesaurus Linguae Latinae</i>

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De institutione musica libri quinque. Ed. G. Friedlein. Leipzig 1867. Pp. 175-371.
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De differentiis topicis libri quattuor = *De topicis differentiis καὶ οἱ βυζαντινὲς μεταφράσεις τῶν Μανουὴλ Ὀλοβόλου καὶ Προχόρου Κυδώνη: Παράρτημα / Anhang: Eine Pachymeres-Weiterbearbeitung der Holobolos-Übersetzung: Boethius' De topicis differentiis und die byzantinische Rezeption dieses Werkes*. Ed., intr. D.Z.

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Jul. Martianus Rota = *Anitii Manlii Severini Boethi ... Opera omnia*. Ed. Henricus Loritus Glareanus et al. Basel 1570. Pp. 638-48. = *Manlii Severini Boetii opera omnia*. *PL* LXIV (Paris 1891) 875d-92a.

A. Smith = *Porphirii Philosophi Fragmenta*. Edd. A. Smith, D. Wasserstein. Stuttgart-Leipzig 1993. Pp. 164-95 (169F).

***De divisione*, Commentaries:**

Peter Abelard = *Pietro Abelardo: Scritti filosofici: Editio super Porphyrium - Glossae in Categorias - Super Aristotelem De Interpretatione - De divisionibus - Super Topica glossae*. Ed. M. Dal Pra. Rome-Milan 1954. Pp. 155-203.

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L. Pozzi. Ed., trans., intr., adn. *Boezio: Trattato sulla divisione*. Padua 1969.

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PROLEGOMENA

DATE OF *DE DIVISIONE*

Samuel Brandt was the first (1903) to undertake a comprehensive investigation of the chronology of Boethius' writings, and his contribution remains fundamental even today.¹ Although persuaded at first by E.K. Rand's stylometric analysis, the focus of which was somewhat limited, Brandt eventually came to reject both its method and conclusions. In its stead he advanced a systematic study of the cross-references within the Boethian corpus. As his starting points Brandt took (a) the years 480-82 as being the most probable ones for Boethius' date of birth and (b) an indirect reference at *In Categoriais* 201b1ff. to the year 510.² And taking the *Institutio arithmetica* as the first published of Boethius' works³ (ca. 500) and the *Consolatio* as the last (523-24), Brandt attempted to establish the order and chronology of all that came in between them.

As to *De divisione*, he regarded the words *sicut pleraque* at 4,12 as a sign of Boethius' having previously translated the *Prior Analytics* and *Peri Hermeneias* and further postulated that *De divisione* arose as an offshoot of work on the *Posterior Analytics*, i.e. toward the end of the period dominated by logic proper, or just before the rhetorical phase devoted to the *Topics* and *Sophistici elenchi*.⁴ This would put *De divisione* in the later part of what Brandt identified as the third of four general stages of activity, i.e. sometime after 511.⁵

In 1907 Arthur Patch McKinlay published a study that marked a return to Rand's stylometric method.⁶ But whereas Rand's findings were based exclusively on corresponsive particles with *quidem* (= μέν / δέ) and on the relative frequency of *ergo*, *igitur*, and *itaque*,

¹ On the state of the problem before Brandt, see his "Entstehungszeit" 141ff. Cf. further, Chadwick, *Boethius* 164; Cappuyns, "Boèce" 371, etc.

² Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 146f.; Bagnall et al., *Consuls* 554f. (an. 510).

³ *Inst. ar.* praef. 4 (3,25f.): *Ita et laboris mei primitias doctissimo iudicio consecrabis*. I do not think that this is just another way of referring to the work as newly completed (cf. *noui operis rudimenta*, *ibid.* [3,23]): Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 153; McKinlay, "Tests" 146.

⁴ "Entstehungszeit" 264f.; 260f.

⁵ "Entstehungszeit" 267f. DeRijk is skeptical regarding *sicut pleraque* ("Chronology" 48). With Brandt I would restrict the meaning to works already completed, although not necessarily to those he postulated. Cf. Obertello, *Sev. Boez.* I 323f.

⁶ On which see Obertello, *Sev. Boez.* I 297ff.

McKinlay expanded the scope by generating statistics for numerous other expressions situated throughout the whole corpus. Now there is a catch to the manner in which McKinlay applied the method. He had access to Brandt's conclusions, which with two exceptions⁷ he accepted, so that from the very start he spoke in terms of Boethius' "first" and "later" periods of activity.⁸ Nevertheless, McKinlay's vagueness concerning the relation between Brandt's and his own discoveries leaves the reader to suspect the fallacy that tends to haunt such methods: with a preconceived notion of what-comes-when the scholar charts the stylistic effects of each phase of an author's career, only to turn around and prove that one work must follow or precede another precisely because of the stylistic differences between them. In fact McKinlay provided himself a way out of the dilemma, in that he conceived of his method as a means of *confirming* Brandt's conclusions; and yet it emerges that he was also modifying those conclusions. For if (he thought) his stylistic data generally support Brandt's research, then they may also be used to *further* it. Thus McKinlay finally announced that he was leaving Brandt behind, to establish on independent grounds four distinct stages in the growth and development of the Boethian corpus.⁹

⁷ The quadrivial works and *Intr. cat. syll.* On the titles of the two monographs on the categorical syllogism, see DeRijk, "Chronology" 38ff.; 161f.; Magee, "Text" 5, n. 10. I refer to them by the titles under which they appear in the ancient index transmitted by our oldest MSS (on which see below, lix), not by those in Migne: *Liber ante praedicamenta* (for *Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos*), and *Introductio in categoricos syllogismos* (for *De syllogismo categorico*).

⁸ "Tests" 126.

⁹ Confusion reigns throughout (emphasis added): "The method is of little value unless *corroborated* by considerations other than stylistic" ("Tests" 124); "In fact, I consider it the strongest *corroboration of my method*, that my conclusions are exactly the same as Professor Brandt's, except in the case of works concerning which there is a reasonable doubt ... Taking the works the relative dates of which are *positively known*, I propose to show first that works of a given period markedly agree and that divergencies can be largely explained (*sic*); if this is not the case, the whole method rests on a sandy foundation and discourages further inquiry" (130f.); "Hereafter I shall no longer follow Brandt in classifying the works of Boethius according to subject matter, but shall use *the system which my results seem to demand*—a classification according to stylistic peculiarities" (137); "... *basing my study on Professor Brandt's researches as a framework*, I have shown that works of a given period agree and works of a different period disagree. Then I classified them stylistically, *giving up Professor Brandt's classification*, based on subject matter. I have shown that my criteria fit in exactly with all the arguments, inductive and deductive, that Professor Brandt has formulated" (153).

There are at least two fatal difficulties in McKinlay's method. First, it had already been pointed out that the Boethian texts in Migne's *Patrology* teem with errors.¹⁰ McKinlay's astonishing silence concerning this fact alone is sufficient to put all his results into doubt. Second, McKinlay naively ignored the facts that a given particle or conjunction is rarely restricted to a single sense and that context must inevitably inform any attempt to date works on the basis of stylistic data. Analysis of this kind works only when it is known that whereas work *a* favors expression *x* where *y* would have served just as well, work *b* consistently favors *y* over *x* in the same situation. Now like Rand, McKinlay made much of various particle combinations involving *quidem*, although without distinguishing between their different senses. So while it is probably true that Boethius favors *quidem* / *uero* over *quidem* / *sed* in the *Consolatio*,¹¹ even a quick glance at the text indicates that he generally favors *uero* (with or without *quidem*) for contrasting ideas of the *bonus* / *malus* type. The questions *now* are: whether Boethius in the *Consolatio* or elsewhere substitutes *autem* or *sed* in similar contexts, and whether he uses *uero* in other senses as well. But these issues were ignored by McKinlay. There are other criticisms as well, some of which Brandt anticipated.¹² McKinlay effectively ignored the sources which undoubtedly influenced Boethius' style at every stage of work.¹³ Nor did he take into account literary genre: Are there common stylistic traits to or differences between, say, *In Isagogen* I (especially the first book) and the *Consolatio*, Boethius' only dialogues? Does Boethius vary the pace and tone of his interlocutors' speech in accordance with changing subject matter? Does he adopt a different style in his logical monographs from those of his

¹⁰ Schepss, "*Opuscula*;" Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 147, n. 2.

¹¹ McKinlay, "Tests" 138. It is a mystery to me why McKinlay was silent about *quidem* combinations involving *tamen*, *uel*, *rursus*, etc., and why he ignored the solitarium occurrences. Even worse, he overlooked the wide range of meanings attaching to *autem* (in particular).

¹² "Entstehungszeit" 270ff.

¹³ "Tests" 146 (emphasis added): "Professor Brandt ... has suggested that this disagreement is due to the fact that the sources of the two works are different ... I had already noticed that with a new subject new words and constructions would come in ... *These criteria ... are not the kind on which I rely*, criteria such that when they have started, appear on almost every page of a work." It is amazing that such "criteria" did not suggest to McKinlay just the *opposite* conclusion, for with the advent of new sources or new subject matter the stylistic method is bound to be at its weakest. Cf. Asztalos, "Transmitter" 368, n. 2.

commentaries, translations, and mathematical writings? Does his style shift when he writes for advanced students as opposed to beginners? And so on.¹⁴

McKinlay held that “practically every test” stamps *De divisione* as a transitional work, situated between the period that ended with *In Perihermeneian* II and the one that began with *De institutione musica*.¹⁵ He claimed that in it *quidem* occurs 12 times with *uero* and 18 times with *autem*, whereas I count 9 and 6 respectively. What is the cause of this discrepancy, different editions, errors in tabulation, or both? And the problem is systemic, since wherever McKinlay’s tabulations happen to be correct Migne’s text could be in error and vice versa.¹⁶ The result is that the accurate statistics are virtually indistinguishable from the inaccurate ones and the method collapses entirely.

In 1928 Alfred Kappelmacher entered the discussion with, not a new chronology, but arguments to the effect that Brandt’s analysis of the cross-references cannot sustain the burden of their inconsistency. He claimed, for example, that the backward references to the *Prior Analytics* at *Introductio in categoricos syllogismos* 812a6, 816b2/c5f., and 822b6 cannot be brought into accord with the forward reference at 829d12ff. by interpreting (with Brandt) *exprimemus* as equivalent to *expresserimus*. Kappelmacher himself conjectured editorial revision as an alternative explanation.¹⁷ He sought further to show that the famous “programmatic” passages, from which Brandt had drawn certain assumptions, are neither original to Boethius nor adhered to over the course of his career. Indeed, Kappelmacher held, the plan itself underwent change and was in one case abandoned, since Boethius evidently worked on the *Physics* before having completed *In Perihermeneian* II, i.e. before having completed the logic, which stood first in the order of study.¹⁸

Now it is undoubtedly true that the cross-references sometimes

¹⁴ Cf. Obertello, *Sev. Boez.* I 270; Micaelli, *Studi* 32.

¹⁵ “Tests” 138ff. Note that McKinlay silently shifts between references to Boethian “periods” and “classes” of works—which, however, do not imply the same thing.

¹⁶ E.g., McKinlay (“Tests” 138f.) was at the mercy of Migne regarding *itaque*, 40,9, but actually overlooked the *quia* at 14,18 (where Migne is unreliable for other reasons).

¹⁷ “Plan” 220f.; Brandt, “Entstehungszeit” 252f. I find Brandt’s suggestion plausible, and his analogue (253, n. 8) lends support. Another possibility is that *exprimemus* is a clumsy substitute for *inuenientur* (cf. the *disputabitur* at *Diff. top.* I 1,2).

¹⁸ “Plan” 224; B., *In Perih.* II 190,13; cf. Brandt, “Entstehungszeit” 237; below, xxx.

contradict one another, although matters are not always as simple as they might at first appear. At *Introductio in categoricos syllogismos* 795b14, 797b10f., and 810a16f., for example, Boethius refers to *In Perihermeneian* in the past tense then at 797c5 speaks of affirmation and negation as “parts” of *enuntiatio*, which, in light of *In Perihermeneian* II 18,18ff., sounds odd (cf. on *quodammodo species*, 34,18f.). But the first book of the *Introductio* is plagued by many unexplained peculiarities, and we cannot be sure that the text in Migne is sound. Similarly, at *In Perihermeneian* I 32,3 Boethius refers to the second edition in the future (*expediat*), whereas at I 31,7 he speaks of it in the past (*suppleuimus*). Seen in the light of I 32,4 (*lector exspectet*), however, the problem vanishes: there is a shift in emphasis, from what Boethius “has done” (which in itself must not be taken too literally) to what the *reader may expect*, from the “historical” to the systematic. Other problematical passages will undoubtedly be subject to similar considerations: Boethius (or an editor) may have adjusted some of the cross-references;¹⁹ he may speak of still unwritten works in the past tense because he fully expects to complete them and wishes to emphasize the systematic order; some inconsistencies could indeed stem from the Greek sources; others could be the result of scribal error.²⁰ In a word, the unreliability of some of the cross-references is insufficient grounds for discrediting all of them.

Nor is Boethius’ “plan” the problem Kappelmacher made it out to be. At *In Isagogen* I 12,19ff. Boethius, in rehearsing the didascaliae to Porphyry’s *Isagoge*, arrives at the taxonomy, *Isagoge* - *Categories* - *Peri Hermeneias* - *Prior Analytics* - (?) *Posterior Analytics* - (?) *Topics*. Contrary to what Kappelmacher maintained, Boethius is not repeating a traditional argument over whether the *Posterior Analytics* should precede or follow the *Topics* but is arguing that both come after the *Prior Analytics*.²¹ And, again contrary to Kappelmacher, at *In Categorias* 162c7ff.

¹⁹ B. solicited editorial revisions from Symmachus and John the Deacon before making his own changes (on which see more generally “Text” 7, n. 18): *Inst. ar.* praef. 4 (3,16ff.); *CEut.* praef. 49ff. + *Trin.* praef. 4f. (*tum ... censenda* ~ Symmachus, cf. *Inst. ar.* praef. 1 [1,15/21f.]; 2 [2,24f.]; 4 [3,25]). Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1107c5ff. With *Div.* matters are complicated by an anonymous ancient editor (see below, lviii ff.).

²⁰ A candidate here may be the *facinus* (= *faciemus*) at *In Perih.* II 251,9 (with 12 and 15f.), on which, however, see Brandt, “Entstehungszeit” 257f., with n. 14; De Rijk, “Chronology” 37, n. 7.

²¹ Kappelmacher, “Plan” 222. Note in I 12,23-13,14 the systematic reversal of *Top.* (“dialectical”) and *An. post.* (“apodeictical”); also, the *uel* at I 13,5 and 13. And if the *genus ... apodictici et dialectici* at I 13,7f. is of any significance, then for B. there is no inherent priority anyway (cf. *In Perih.* II 17,28ff.).

Boethius is not really concerned with the order, *Topics* - *Posterior Analytics*, but is following an old argument against giving the title *Ante Topica* to the *Categories*.²² "For why," he asks, "should the *Categories* not be called instead *Ante Perihermeneian* or *Ante Resolutorios*? After all, these works come before the *Topics*." Thus Kappelmacher's criticism of Brandt, that if Boethius had indeed worked on the *Posterior Analytics* before the *Topics* he ought to have noticed and mentioned the contradiction to the "programmatic" passages, hits wide of the mark: (a) In neither passage does Boethius trouble over the question of whether the *Topics* comes before or after the *Posterior Analytics* but is at pains to put both after the *Prior Analytics*.²³ (b) In both passages Boethius is discussing the systematic order, not the order according to which he himself works, and there is nothing to preclude one order's disagreeing with the other or Boethius' having devoted prolonged intermittent work to some translations and commentaries. Indeed, given that Kappelmacher (with Brandt!) recognized that Boethius' early acquaintance with the *Physics* signals a break with the systematic order of study, and given his conclusion that it was therefore *nur ein ephemerer Plan, kein bindendes Programm* ("Plan" 224), why did he think it appropriate to remark that if Brandt's assumption were right then Boethius would have departed from the school dogma—*was an und für sich nicht wahrscheinlich ist* (ibid. 222)?

As to *In Isagogen* I 131,22ff., also discussed by Kappelmacher, there really is no problem at all. The Boethius of the *mise-en-scène* promises to see his interlocutor Fabius through Aristotle's *disciplina logica*, which however is not meant to constrain Boethius the writer to the same plan. Hence Kappelmacher was mistaken in thinking that the programme outlined at *In Perihermeneian* II 79,9ff. constitutes a new departure.²⁴ The difference there is simply that Boethius is speaking *propria persona* and about his own work: he will devote himself to Plato as well as to Aristotle, and to the latter's physics and ethics as well as to his logic. Indeed, one of these Stoic symptoms, the logic - ethics -

²² Porph., *In Cat.* 56,23ff.; Ammon., *In Cat.* 14,18ff.; cf. B., *In Cat.* 263b1ff.

²³ *In Isag.* I 13,3-5/11-14 (each time with the *uel* mentioned above, n. 21); *In Cat.* 162c11f. (*cum primi Resolutorii ante Topica legantur* implies priority of *Top.* to *An. post.*, although that is not the point of the remark). Cf. Solmsen, "Organon" 70: "the *Analytica Priora* must precede both the *Posteriora* and the *Topics*."

²⁴ "Plan" 218. Cf. *In Isag.* I 132,1 (*fortasse ... si uita suppetet*), with *In Perih.* II 79,10 (*si potentior diuinitatis adnuerit fauor*) and II 80,6 (*si uita otiumque suppetit*).

physics division,²⁵ had been intimated already in *In Categorias*.²⁶ Finally, the hint that Boethius will put the whole corpus into some kind of order (*In Perih.* II 79,14f.) is echoed in *De divisione*, so that the plan, whether original or borrowed, is more consistently formulated than Kappelmacher supposed.²⁷

Enter finally L.M. DeRijk (1964), with an enlightening study devoted exclusively to Boethius' logical writings, one merit of which is its lack of addiction to the pursuit of method for its own sake. DeRijk utilizes all of the relevant tools and criteria: cross-references, stylistic considerations, source criticism, doctrinal differences. As an indication of possible posteriority to *In Isagogen* II he adduces the use of the words *partitio* and *discretio* at *De divisione* 8,26ff.:

Et nominis quidem per significationes proprias diuisio *aequiuocationis partitio* nuncupatur, orationis uero in significationes proprias distributio *ambiguitatis discretio* est, quam Graeci amphiboliam dicunt

He observes that *partitio* is absent from *In Isagogen* I (22,14f.), that in *De divisione* it is "defined" as above, and that at *In Isagogen* II 154,23 it is not reserved for equivocation in particular but covers the whole of division *secundum se*. His assumption is that Boethius' differentiation of equivocation and ambiguity is reflected in a technical use of the two terms. But there are two problems: (a) As DeRijk remarks, at *De divisione* 48,14 Boethius uses *partitio* for *secundum se* divisions generally.²⁸ (b) DeRijk himself points out that the subclassifications of the

²⁵ Cf. Cic., *Acad.* I 5,19. Cicero also rehearses the (Antiochean) thesis of the unity of Plato and Aristotle (I 4,18; II 5,15), another point informing Boethius' programme.

²⁶ *In Cat.* 161b13ff.: *Haec quoque nobis de decem praedicamentis inspectio et in physica Aristotelis doctrina et in moralis philosophiae cognitione perutilis est*; cf. *In Perih.* II 79,18ff.: *ut si quid ex logicae artis subtilitate, ex moralis grauitate peritiae, ex naturalis acumine ueritatis ab Aristotele conscriptum sit*. Overlooked by Kappelmacher is the discrepancy between this division, which Sextus (*AM* VII 16) ascribes to Xenocrates, the Peripatetics (cf. Arist., *Top.* 105b19ff.), and the Stoics (cf. *DL* VII 39), and the Peripatetic or Neoplatonic division of *In Isag.* I 8,1ff. and *Trin.* II 5ff. (cf. *In Isag.* II 140,20f.; *CPh.* I 1,4). It is appropriate to note that Littig (*Andr. v. Rh.* I 17; II 17f.; III 10ff.) traced Olympiodorus' division of the sciences back to Andronicus while having the latter under the influence of Posidonius and the Stoics. This evidently owing to Littig's conviction that the two systems are essentially the same. Moraux was a little more cautious (*Aristotelismus* I 77). Cf. Aët., *Plac.* I, praef. 2f.; and below, xxxviif., n. 8.

²⁷ Kappelmacher also failed to point out that although Boethius' plans as a commentator were undoubtedly influenced by tradition, the project of translation was original (Cicero and Victorinus are not to be reckoned as "sources" in this respect).

²⁸ "Chronology" 45, n. 1.

division of *uox* (8,22ff.), precisely what is alluded to in the passage quoted above, are absent from *In Isagogen* II, where, however, only an abbreviated exposition is intended. In light of the latter consideration it is impossible to say how *De divisione* agrees with or differs from the commentary on this point. As Pozzi has noted, Boethius is imprecise in his use of *diuisio* / *diuidere* and their alternatives, and no technical distinction follows from his switching from one term to another.²⁹

At 34,16-36,34 Boethius explains how diaeresis applies to the science of definition, and he chooses for purposes of illustration the definiendum *nomen*. The definition is Aristotelian (*Peri H.* 16a19f.; cf. *Poet.* 1457a10ff.):

Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνῇ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου,
ἥς μὴδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον.

De divisione 36,24ff. has:

nomen est uox significatiua secundum placitum sine tempore, cuius
nulla pars *extra* significatiua est³⁰ *separata*,

while Boethius' translation omits *extra* (*AL* II 1, p. 6,4ff.):

Nomen ergo est uox significatiua secundum placitum sine tempore,
cuius nulla pars est significatiua separata,

as do the lemmata at *In Perihermeneian* I 46,1f. and II 52,29f. DeRijk points out that in the commentaries *separatum* = κεχωρισμένον and *extra* = χωρίς whereas in *De divisione* the adverb *extra* renders both (by which DeRijk probably meant to note the pleonasm), from which he concludes that the latter antedates the commentaries. We cannot be sure, however, that *extra* functions in precisely this way, for Porphyry in his *Sophist* prolegomena, the probable source of *De divisione*, may well have altered Aristotle's definition.³¹ Note that at 36,22f. Boethius

²⁹ *Studi* 33ff.; cf. Talamanca, "Schema" 123, n. 386. The following will serve to illustrate the point: *Distributio*, *distribuere* = genus / species (12,12), whole / parts (6,21), spoken sound / significations (12,5), division *secundum accidens* (10,32). *Sectio*, *secare* = genus / species (12,17; 16,25f.), spoken sound / significations (6,22), accident / subjects (10,5), accident / accidents (6,26). *Separatio*, *separare* = genus / species (22,3), whole / parts (10,21; 40,5), spoken sound / significations (12,1), subject / accidents (6,24), accident / accidents (10,13). *Partitio*, *partiri* = division generally (4,11), division *per se* (48,14), spoken sound / significations (8,27; 10,19).

³⁰ DeRijk could not have known that the MSS do not have *significat* here, and the point is unimportant in any case ("Chronology" 46).

³¹ Cf. the commentary on IV.E.2. 34,16-36,34.

writes only *extra* but at 36,25f./32 uses the redundant expressions *extra ... separata* and *separatae extra*.

Two other points concerning the same definition require consideration. (a) Boethius uses *secundum placitum* in both the continuous translation and lemmata of the commentaries, whereas in *De divisione* he uses *secundum positionem* as well.³² DeRijk says that the latter tendency is characteristic of *In Perihermeneian* I, with which *De divisione* ought therefore to be considered nearly contemporaneous (the second edition has only *placitum*). But compare *In Perihermeneian* II 54,31f. (also II 92,30):

secundum quandam positionem placitumque ponentis,
and II 59,6f.:

omne nomen positione³³ designat, idcirco dictum est secundum placitum,

which suggest that Boethius is in the end heedless of the terminological difference.³⁴ (b) That *In Perihermeneian* II 53,12ff. entails a more elaborate exposition than *De divisione* 34,16-36,34³⁵ has to do with the fact that whereas the commentary is intended for advanced students and must therefore give extended treatment to what Aristotle announces in the opening line as a fundamental piece of business (16a1), *De divisione* uses *nomen* only for purposes of illustration (indeed *homo* might have been expected instead), and the whole point is simplicity and clarity (cf. 32,19ff.; 34,16). On the other hand, DeRijk is probably right to conclude that the predilection for *designatiua ad* over *significatiua secundum* in *Introductio in categoricos syllogismos* (794d9ff.) marks that work as earlier than both *De divisione* and the commentaries.³⁶ In brief, DeRijk's conclusion that *De divisione* follows *In Isagogen* I and (probably) II (both discussed below) as well as *Introductio in categoricos syllogismos* is plausible; but that it precedes *In Perihermeneian* I

³² *Secundum placitum*: 36,5; 36,14; 36,25; 36,29; *secundum positionem*: 34,29; 36,3; 36,6f.; 36,8; 36,16; 36,21.

³³ = θέσει (cf. *Div.* 36,2). Cf. Engels, "Origine" 101.

³⁴ Pace Obertello, *Sev. Boez.* I 322f. See the commentary on *secundum positionem ... placitum*, 34,29-36,5.

³⁵ DeRijk, "Chronology" 46.

³⁶ De Rijk, "Chronology" 46; cf. 7; 10f. Not however by much, as DeRijk thinks that both *Intr. cat. syll.* and *Div.* could have been written as early as 505. Nor can *Div.* on his reckoning be much later than *In Isag.* II, since he holds that both could have been written as late as 509 ("Chronology" 159ff.).

and II is uncertain. I shall discuss presently DeRijk's view of its date relative to that of *In Categorias*.

Let us turn now to the cross-references. Secure evidence for a *terminus ante quem* of ca. 521 is furnished by *De differentiis topicis* II 9,8f.:³⁷

Fit autem uniuersa diuisio uel generis in species uel totius in partes uel uocis in proprias significationes uel accidentis in subiecta uel subiecti in accidentia uel accidentis in accidentia, quorum omnium rationem in eo libro diligentius explicaui quem *De diuisione* composui.

For the *terminus post* we have seven references in *De diuisione* itself to consider:

(1) 4,6f.: et in Platonis libri qui *Sophistes* inscribitur commentariis a Porphyrio, etc.

Since there is no evidence that Boethius ever translated or commented on Plato's *Sophist*, we are entitled to conclude only that the reference here probably stems from Porphyry's lost commentary and is therefore irrelevant to the date of composition of *De diuisione*.

(2) 4,7f.: et ab eodem [*sc.* Porphyrio] per hanc *Introductionis* laudata in *Categorias* utilitas.

These words usher in a paraphrase (4,8ff.) of *Isagoge* 1,3ff.:

Dicit enim necessariam fore generis, speciei, differentiae, proprii, accidentisque peritiam cum propter alia multa tum propter utilitatem quae est maxima partiendi,

which Boethius translated from the Greek as follows (*AL* I 6, p. 5,2ff.):

Cum sit necessarium, Chrisaorie, et ad eam quae est apud Aristotelem *Praedicamentorum* doctrinam nosse quid genus sit et quid differentia quidque species et quid proprium et quid accidens, et ad definitionum adsignationem, et omnino ad ea quae in diuisione uel demonstratione sunt utili hac istarum rerum speculatione, etc.

Two preliminary points: (a) In both of the *De diuisione* passages above Boethius is speaking *proprio Marte*, for Porphyry cannot have cited himself thus in the *Sophist* commentary. Porphyry undoubtedly spoke

³⁷ On the date of *Diff. top.*, see Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 264; DeRijk, "Chronology" 153f. I say "ca. 521" in order to allow for time prior to what seems to have been the latest possible date of completion (sometime in 523). On the title, see Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 263, n. 16; Nikitas, ed. *Diff. top.* xxxiiiff. I use the form preserved by the ancient index of monographs (see below, lix).

of Andronicus' treatise, Plato's dialogue, etc.; Boethius in turn recognized that Porphyry highlighted the utility of his own *Isagoge* with reference to diaeresis, and so paraphrased the *Isagoge* to that effect. Hence Boethius must have read the *Isagoge* before embarking upon *De divisione*. Two items in Victorinus' translation of *Isagoge* 1,3ff. approximate more closely the wording of *De divisione* than does Boethius' own translation (*AL* I 6-7, App. I, p. 63, with Monceau's edition, ap. P. Hadot, *Victorinus* 371):

<u>VICTORINUS</u>	<u>DE DIVISIONE</u>	<u>BOETHIUS</u>
ad ... <i>Categorias</i>	in <i>Categorias</i>	ad eam ... <i>Praedicamentorum</i>
		doctrinam
quorum utilitatis	utilitatem	utili hac ...
est magna<e>	quae est maxima	speculatione.

On the other hand, elsewhere in *De divisione* Boethius substitutes *Praedicamenta* for *Categoriae*, and Minio-Paluello daggered the second Victorinus rendering (reading *magna*), so that we cannot safely conclude from these passages that *De divisione* is nearest in time to *In Isagogen* I, the commentary based on Victorinus' translation. (b) Although at *In Isagogen* II 150,7f. Boethius writes, *et in ceteris quam sit utilis iste tractatus* [sc. the *Isagoge*], *cum de diuisione et demonstratione disputabitur, apparebit*, the reference is not to *De divisione* but to *In Isagogen* II 154,9ff., where Boethius follows up on Porphyry's reference to diaeresis (*Isag.* 1,6).

More telling is *In Isagogen* I 22,14f.:

sed omnis diuisio duplex est, aut cum totum corpus in diuersa disiungis
aut cum genera per species distribuis,

which makes it perfectly clear that this work antedates *De divisione*: four classes of division and the crucial *per se* / *secundum accidens* dichotomy are absent, omissions which cannot be explained away as mere concessions to the beginners for whom Boethius intended the commentary (cf. *DL* VII 61f.; Cic., *Top.* VIII 33; Mart. Cap. IV 354, etc.). The second commentary, however, is in close accord with *De divisione* on this matter, and even shares with it some of the same illustrations.³⁸ There is further evidence to the same effect. At *In Isagogen* I 109,16ff. Boethius makes species prior to individuals in just the same way that genera are prior to species: the species destroys the individuals but not vice versa. At *De divisione* 8,13ff., on the other

³⁸ *In Isag.* II 154,9ff.; cf. DeRijk, "Chronology" 44f.

hand, he points out that the species is to individuals not as a genus to species but as a whole to parts and at 12,24ff. that the whole is *posterior* to the parts. At *In Isagogen* II 303,17ff. and II 305,15ff. we encounter a more nuanced treatment than that of the first commentary, and once again the explanation does not seem to lie in the introductory nature of the latter: Boethius says that every genus and species is a *whole* and that destruction is of that which is contained by that which contains. He goes on to explain why.

The doctrine of differentiae is central to the *Isagoge* as it is to *De divisione*. But whereas the *Isagoge*, followed by both Boethian commentaries, first specifies three classes then subjects them to two dichotomic diaereses, *De divisione* suppresses the trichotomic and one dichotomic formulation.³⁹ Now, the question is whether *De divisione* was written before or after *In Isagogen* II. If we assume the former and that the doctrine of differentiae in *De divisione* is a development of the one in *In Isagogen* I, then there remains the problem of the difference of *De divisione* to *In Isagogen* II (barring the absurd hypothesis of a “palinode”); on the other hand, if *De divisione* was composed after *In Isagogen* II, then we must wonder why there is no allusion to the “earlier” system of the commentaries. The most reasonable hypothesis is that there was a difference of emphasis between the two Porphyrian sources (*Sophist* commentary, *Isagoge*) from which *De divisione* and the commentaries separately descend, a difference whose rationale can in fact be gleaned from *De divisione* itself, wherein *per se* divisions are raised to a position of special prominence. And since in *De divisione* Boethius was concerned to keep the exposition as brief as possible, it was unnecessary for him to point out that Porphyry had multiple formulations of what is in fact a single system of differentiae.⁴⁰ Doctrinal differences do not appear to reveal the date of *De divisione* relative to that of *In Isagogen* II.

(3) 6,14ff.: Qui uero huius operis ... ordo sit cum *De ordine Peripateticarum disciplinarum* mihi dicendum esset diligenter exposui.

In Perihermeneian II 79,14f. and 21 suggest that Boethius was still planning some treatment of the taxonomy of the Aristotelian corpus. I believe he wrote a separate work on the subject; it apparently came

³⁹ Porph., *Isag.* 8,8; 8,18ff.; 9,7ff. (with B., *In Isag.* I 85,20ff.; II 240,14ff.); B., *Div.* 18,4ff.

⁴⁰ The system in *Div.* corresponds to the one at *Isag.* 8,18ff.

after *In Perihermeneian* II (ca. 515-16) but before *De divisione*.⁴¹ There remains the problem that *De ordine Peripateticae disciplinae* evidently treated of the τὰξις of *De divisione* before the latter was in existence. In all probability Boethius was merely anticipating later work.⁴²

(4) 24,13 + 26,4: hoc uero nos iam *Praedicamenta* docuerunt ... sicut est in *Praedicamentis* ab ipso quoque Aristotele dispositum, etc.

It is convenient to consider together these references to two separate doctrines from Aristotle's treatise. Concerning the second Boethius remarks, *sed haec (hoc) alias* (20,24; 26,2), which DeRijk connects with *In Categorias* 274b8-277c7, noting however that Boethius' vagueness suggests that the commentary was not yet complete at the time of *De divisione*.⁴³ Three observations: (a) The specific point at issue is indeed discussed at *In Categorias* 274d9-277c7 (cf. 255d2ff.). (b) The vagueness of *sed haec alias* may only mean that Boethius declines to trouble the reader with a detail that is strictly irrelevant to *De divisione*.⁴⁴ Indeed, 26,2ff. suggests precisely that: for the moment Boethius is content to follow Aristotle (12b26ff.) in treating of contrariety and privation as two distinct classes of opposition. (c) Although *alias* could have future sense, in light of *nos iam ... docuerunt* that possibility looks considerably diminished.⁴⁵ Thus we obtain one firm datum beyond the *terminus ante* (ca. 521): *De divisione* was written after the extant *In Categorias*, i.e. after ca. 511. Now this could be construed as presumptive evidence for a date of composition after *In Isagogen* II as well, since *In Isagogen* II 325,4ff. has the appearance of a forward reference

⁴¹ On the date of *In Perih.* II, see Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 269; DeRijk, "Chronology" 143ff.; 159ff.

⁴² Here we encounter a difficulty concerning the transmission of *Div.* It seems that the passage in which Boethius refers to *De ord. Perip. disc.* dropped out of the pre-archetype and was reintegrated at the wrong place in the archetype (see below, lxiii), which opens the door to the possibility of its being an authorial (*exposui*) revision. *But:* (a) The two sentences of which the one under consideration is the second probably fell out of the pre-archetype through a *mechanical* error (homoioarkhton). (b) The hypothesis does not explain the error in respect of the *first* sentence, which appears to be an integral part of the immediately preceding idea as it was originally conceived.

⁴³ "Chronology" 45f.

⁴⁴ Cf. Obertello, *Sev. Boez.* I 322. It may even be that Boethius has in mind the second commentary (*In Cat.* 160a8f.) as well; on which see Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 149; 275; P. Hadot, "Fragment;" DeRijk, "Chronology" 133ff.; 140f.; Chadwick, *Boethius* 141f.; Asztalos, "Transmitter" 378ff.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Diff. top.* I 1,2; *In Cat.* 162a14 (possibly referring back to *Inst. ar.* II 41,3f.; Chadwick, *Boethius* 77f.; Asztalos, "Transmitter" 382; *In Perih.* II 489,10f.

to *In Categorias* 272c4-d7 while *In Categorias* 159a1f. apparently presupposes the existence of the *Isagoge* commentaries. But Asztalos has made a strong case for *In Isagogen* II postdating *In Categorias*, and these considerations do not affect our deliberations in any case, since *De divisione* in all probability postdates *In Perihermeneian* II.⁴⁶

(5) **24,18f.**: hoc quoque Aristoteles testatur, in *Physicis*.

This is a reference to Aristotle's text, with no strong implication as to the existence of a Boethian translation or commentary. It could derive from Porphyry. *In Categorias* 289c4 (cf. *In Perih.* II 458,27) may hint at some prior study of the *Physicis*; *In Perihermeneian* II 190,13 implies a commentary on the same; and *Consolatio* V 1,12, although irrelevant for present purposes, at least conveys the impression of first-hand knowledge. Boethius apparently translated and commented on the *Physicis* by ca. 515-16 and may have studied it prior to ca. 511. The reference under consideration therefore has meaning only indirectly, if *De divisione* in fact postdates *In Perihermeneian* II, or if Boethius' study of the *Physicis* in fact antedates *In Categorias* (cf. on [3] and [4], above).

(6) **32,21f.**: et quaecumque de ea subtilius in *Postremis analyticis* ab Aristotele tractata sunt, praetermittam, etc.

Once again the reference is only to Aristotle's work, not to a commentary, and could come from Porphyry. As mentioned earlier, Brandt dated *De divisione* to the end of the period when Boethius was preoccupied with categorical propositions and the syllogism, and regarded it as an offshoot of work on the *Posterior Analytics*. As evidence thereof he cited *De divisione* 14,27ff. and 32,16ff., which he took to be signs of Boethius' acquaintance with *Posterior Analytics* II 5 and 13.⁴⁷ But given the vagueness of the allusion above and the fact that the Porphyrian source from which Boethius may have taken it is lost, Brandt's conclusion would be certain only if Boethius' work on the *Posterior Analytics* proved datable in relation either to *De divisione* itself or to other works whose dates relative to that of *De divisione* were ascertainable—both impossibilities, owing to the fact that the *Analytics* translation and commentary have not survived.

⁴⁶ Asztalos, "Transmitter" 368ff.

⁴⁷ "Entstehungszeit" 265. Obertello tentatively lumps this reference to *An. post.* together with those to the *Isag.* and *Cat.* (*Sev. Boez.* I 323).

(7) **44,17**: Aristoteles enim hoc in *Topicis* diligenter praecepit, etc.

Once again the possibilities range from Boethius' merely cribbing the reference from Porphyry to his having previously translated or even commented on the *Topics*. The tense of *praecepit* is probably little more than a variation on the present tense of *testatur* in (5); it need not be taken as on a par with the *nos iam ... docuerunt* of (4). Both Brandt and DeRijk would put all of the work on topical theory late in Boethius' career (? ca. 520+).⁴⁸ By an accident of transmission *De divisione* is linked with a fragment of what appears to be Boethius' own revised translation of the *Topics*, but that has to do only with circumstances affecting the composition of the pre-archetype (discussed below, lxiiif.). The reference is consequently of no use.

Finally, DeRijk remarks the mature tone of *De hypotheticis syllogismis* I 1,1:

Cum in omnibus philosophiae disciplinis ediscendis atque tractandis
summum in uita positum solamen existimem,

and *In Ciceronis topica* 1107c5ff.:

Huc accedit quod, ut quaeque in mentem uenerint, iniudicata atque etiam incastigata promuntur, quando quidem [*Orelli-Baiter*] apud cari pectoris secretum nihil est periculi proferre quod sentias ... Nosti oblatrantis morsus inuidiae, nosti quam facillime in difficillimis causis liuor iudicium ferat,

which he takes to be something more than mere literary artifice.⁴⁹ Brandt drew attention⁵⁰ to Boethius' heartfelt ruminations on Philosophy from the time of *In Isagogen* I⁵¹ right up to the *Consolatio*, and Boethius himself tells us of the enormous labor involved in bringing

⁴⁸ Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 260f.; 268; DeRijk, "Chronology" 151ff.; 159ff.

⁴⁹ "Chronology" 147; 152 (dating them to ca. 516-22 and sometime before 522 respectively). *Hyp. syl.* has also a hint of the isolation and reserve (I 1,2 [204,14ff.]). I do not fully grasp DeRijk's reasoning, since the note of fear would seem to push *In Cic. top.* in the direction of *CPh.* (cf. I 4,15ff.), i.e. toward ca. 523, whereas B.'s royal panegyric and his sons' consulships (*CPh.* II 3,8) suggest that in 522 matters were still relatively calm. Still, DeRijk may be right. By 522 B.'s relations with Theoderic were probably becoming strained, while the sheer size of *In Cic. top.* would seem to require some time in advance of 522, especially if *Diff. top.* was still under way in 523 (cf. above, n. 37). At any rate, *Diff. top.* I 1,5 (*uel his septem*) indicates that the incomplete state of *In Cic. top.* is not a symptom of B.'s premature death.

⁵⁰ "Entstehungszeit" 270.

⁵¹ *In Isag.* I 7,12ff. Cf. even earlier, *Inst. ar.* I 1,5.

Greek wisdom to the Romans.⁵² Did his long years of toil in the end leave a feeling of embitterment? In some cases his work must have been warmly received,⁵³ but in others it evidently was reviled; and matters cannot have been helped by the fact that Boethius never concealed his contempt for the *vulgus*.⁵⁴ In the proem to *In Isagogen* II he intimates the hope (not without a note of anxiety) that his efforts may meet with appreciation,⁵⁵ but in other writings he obviously anticipates criticism.⁵⁶ *Consolatio* I 3,5ff. is telling. Philosophia has perpetually had to ward off the ignorant mob—a touch, perhaps, of Boethian autobiography (cf. *sarcinam ... sustulisti*, 4, and the strange *nostra ... dux*, 13), given that she is recalling to her self-pitying interlocutor things he has forgotten (cf. I 4,4), above all himself (I 2,6; I 6,17). So it appears that Philosophy, what inspired the *scholarly* industry in his earlier years, came increasingly to be perceived by Boethius as a source of consolation in his tumultuous later ones.

In light of these observations the elaborately wrought proem to *De divisione* proves of some interest. (a) The phrase, *id quoque sicut pleraque, omnia Romanis auribus tradens*, suggests that Boethius already has a significant body of work behind him, although it is impossible to say precisely how much (*pace* Brandt). Of course there is a risk of reading too much into such remarks, but Boethius seems unlikely to have written something which, if not seriously intended, would inevitably mislead; especially so, in that it concerns a matter of great importance to him, his unique role as a transmitter of Greek learning. (b) Boethius is obviously preoccupied with the *liuor* of detractors and manifests a haughty disdain toward the aggressive ignoramus, which suggests a date of composition at a time when he has already made a name for himself and has come to expect the sting of professional (if not political) rivalry.

⁵² *Hyp. syll.* I 1,2f. (206,18ff.); *In Cat.* 201b1ff.; *In Perih.* II 4,13f.; II 79,1ff.; II 421,2ff.; *Div.* 6,3ff.; *In Cic. top.* 1107c1ff.; cf. *CPh.* I 4,7.

⁵³ So at least it would appear from Theoderic's letter, ap. Cass., *Var.* I 45,3ff. (49,15ff. F.). And there is presumably some kernel of sincerity in Ennodius' hyperbolic fawnings: *Ep.* VII 13,2 (236,25ff. V.); VIII 1,4 (268,16ff.); *Opusc.* VI 21 (314,40ff.). For contrasting views on this question see Kirkby, "Scholar" 57ff., and Courcelle, *Writers* 322f., with n. 3.

⁵⁴ *In Cat.* 230c6ff.; *Trin.* praef. 8ff.; *CEut.* praef. 31ff.; *Hebd.* 8ff.; cf. *CPh.* I 1,10; I 3,12.

⁵⁵ *In Isag.* II 135,5ff.

⁵⁶ *In Perih.* II 251,4ff.; II 421,6ff.; II 453,10ff.; *Intr. cat. syll.* 793d3ff. = *Antepr.* 761c9ff.

Conclusions. McKinlay's findings may be dismissed without further ado, while Kappelmacher ventured no date of composition, relative or absolute, for *De divisione*. That leaves Brandt and DeRijk. Both agree⁵⁷ that *De divisione* postdates *In Isagogen* II, which DeRijk dates to ca. 507-09 but Asztalos would put after *In Categorias* (i.e. after ca. 511).⁵⁸ We have seen that posteriority to *In Isagogen* II, whatever its date, *can* be established, but only indirectly. Brandt and DeRijk also agree that *De divisione* antedates *De differentiis topicis* (ca. 521). They differ, however, over its date relative to *In Categorias*. DeRijk would have *De divisione* before (ca. 505-09), whereas Brandt would have it after (? ca. 515-21). Although on this point DeRijk is probably in error, he is right to point out that Brandt's taking *sicut pleraque* as guaranteeing a date after Boethius' work on both the *Analytics* and *Peri Hermeneias* is mere conjecture. The only clue supporting Brandt's contention comes in connection with *De ordine Peripateticae disciplinae*, apparently written between *In Perihermeneian* II (ca. 515-16) and *De divisione*. Boethius' references to the *Physics*, *Posterior Analytics*, and *Topics* are too vague to be of any use. Finally, for what it is worth, the prooemium implies a later rather than earlier date. All things considered, the period between 515 and 520 seems a safe surmise.

⁵⁷ DeRijk with hesitation ("Chronology" 47; 159), hence "between 505 and 509" (ibid. 161).

⁵⁸ Brandt dated *In Isag.* II to ca. 507-08 ("Entstehungszeit" 149; 152).

BOETHIUS, PORPHYRY, AND ANDRONICUS

Like all of Boethius' writings, *De divisione* looks both back to Antiquity and ahead to the Middle Ages.¹ It was copied with great frequency for use in the medieval schools, the MSS in which it is preserved being outnumbered only, among Boethius' works, by those of *De differentiis topicis* and the *Consolatio*. And in addition to the commentaries of Peter Abelard, Albert the Great, and Antonius Andreae, there is a wealth of glossed MSS, florilegia, and indirect evidence to suggest that *De divisione* proved of enduring interest to medieval students from the later tenth century on. This would have pleased Boethius, who in the proem evinces particular concern for the *utilitas* of the treatise in the context of the Latin-speaking world. As for Antiquity, there is an important lost tradition underlying *De divisione*. More precisely, in the proem and conclusion Boethius mentions two works which are otherwise completely unattested: a "book" on diaeresis by Andronicus of Rhodes (1st c. BC)² and a "commentary" on Plato's *Sophist* by Porphyry (b. AD 232/3).³ The lost ancient tradition is the concern of the present discussion, and I begin with the relevant passages. In the proem and conclusion Boethius indicates:

(1) that *Andronicus* published a book on diaeresis, in which he (Andronicus) remarked (a) that diaeresis is a method of great utility and (b) that the Peripatos (before Andronicus) had always held the method in high esteem: *Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia diuidendi quamque apud Peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia, docet et Andronici diligentissimi senis De diuisione liber editus (4,3ff.);*

(2) that *Plotinus* approved of or recommended Andronicus' book: *et hic idem a Plotino grauissimo philosopho comprobatus (4,5f.);*

¹ The following is based on my "Boethius ... and Andronicus;" points of detail are treated in the commentary.

² The complicated issues of Andronicus' precise dates and scholarship I pass over here. One may consult, among others, Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 45ff., with Tarán's review, esp. 731ff., and Gottschalk, "Commentators" 55ff.

³ Smith, ed. *Porph. fr.* xf., and "Studies" 750, treats the "bulk" of *Div.* as a Porphyrian fragment (169F). Although preferable to treating it as an Andronicean one, this entails complications of its own.

(3) that *Porphyry* (consequently) adapted Andronicus' book for his commentary on Plato's *Sophist*: *et in Platonis libri qui Sophistes inscribitur commentariis a Porphyrio repetitus* (4,6f.);

(4) that the *later Peripatos* (a) distinguished between diaeresis in the essential and incidental senses and (b) made subdivisions of each: *Posterior quidem Peripateticae secta prudentiae differentias diuisionum diligentissima ratione perspexit et per se diuisionem ab ea quae est secundum accidens ipsasque inter se disiunxit atque distribuit* (48,26ff.);

(5) that, by contrast, the *earlier Peripatetics* indiscriminately employed accidents in place of genera, species, and differentiae: *antiquiores autem indifferenter et accidente pro genere et accidentibus pro speciebus aut differentiis utebantur* (50,1f.); and

(6) that the promiscuous "earlier" usage drove *Boethius* to explain how the various kinds of division are (a) similar to and (b) different from one another: *unde nobis peropportuna utilitas uisa est et communiones harum diuisionum prode et eas propriis differentiis disgregare* (50,2ff.).

As to what Boethius actually says or omits to say, two points call for attention. First, the proem, (1)-(3), and conclusion, (4)-(6), differ markedly in their respective emphases, although the fact that each is concerned with the history of diaeresis in the Peripatetic tradition is a clear indication that they are intended to shed light on one another. So whereas the proem names authors and works, in chronological order (Andronicus, Plotinus, Porphyry), the conclusion favors instead a general distinction between the earlier and later Peripatos. Whence the following questions arise: Who are the later Peripatetics, Andronicus, Porphyry, or both?⁴ Who introduced the earlier / later Peripatos distinction? Was the later Peripatetic development a corrective to the earlier error? If so, then why does Boethius make the corrective more comprehensive than the error? That is, does the system of diaeresis in *De diuisione* go back in any way to the *earlier* Peripatos or was it entirely an innovation of the later? Second, in the proem Boethius is vague as regards the two mentioned works. He

⁴ That B. thinks of neither of them as a later Peripatetic seems impossible; Plotinus he does not regard as a Peripatetic at all. See the commentary on a *Plotino grauissimo philosopho comprobatus*, 4,6; and "Boethius ... and Andronicus" 535, with nn. 44f.

does not tell us which, if either, he actually has to hand or give any clear indication of their structure or contents: Was Andronicus' book a revision of some earlier Peripatetic treatise on diaeresis? Was Porphyry's commentary only that or did it include prolegomena resembling the extant *Isagoge*?

To answer these questions it is obviously necessary to give very careful consideration to what Boethius says, and yet precisely because he is our authority for this information there is an inherent risk of circular reasoning in the undertaking: from Boethius we derive conclusions concerning the lost works of Andronicus and Porphyry, then turn around and isolate the points at which Boethius *diverged from* his predecessors. Two cautionary notes must therefore be sounded. First, we are dealing with significant but unknown changes that arose with each new stage in the tradition. From some body of inherited material Andronicus worked up a *Peripatetic* exposition of diaeresis; Porphyry, evidently encouraged by his teacher Plotinus, made use of Andronicus' book in the course of composing a commentary or prolegomena to a commentary⁵ on a *Platonic* dialogue; Boethius wrote a *Peripatetic* handbook intended for Romans at an advanced level of study generally but just beginning the study of diaeresis. Second, the truth and what Boethius considers to be the truth about the older tradition may or may not be the same. Consider the possibilities: his source (or sources) may have been both accurate and accurately interpreted by him; alternatively, it may have been accurate but inaccurately interpreted, or vice versa; or it may have been both inaccurate and inaccurately interpreted. The first scenario is obviously the most desirable, the last the most desperate, but given the limitations of our perspective there is almost no way of determining which one reflects the facts of the matter. For no matter which scenario happens to state the facts, Boethius is our primary medium of perception and as such is incapable of providing an infallible *nota* as to either his own or his source's validity. Explicit evidence of his knowledge of Andronicus comes down to only three passages: *In Categorias* 263b1ff., on

⁵ The commentary / prolegomena difference will be discussed below. Apart from what B. says this commentary is unknown. That it included prolegomena seems probable; that the prolegomena were intended to complement the introduction to Aristotle's *Cat.*, i.e. to introduce Platonic philosophy by way of the *Soph.*, appears unlikely. There is no evidence to suggest, at any rate, that the *Soph.* stood first in the systematic ordering of Plato's dialogues as the *Cat.* did in the ordering of Aristotle's treatises. See "Boethius ... and Andronicus" 532, with n. 28.


the so-called *Postpraedicamenta* and the title of the *Categories*,⁶ *In Perihermeneian* II 11,13ff., on the athetesis of the *Peri Hermeneias*,⁷ and statement (1) above. In the case of the first two it is possible to compare other commentators, but with the third Boethius stands alone. Instead, for the tradition of diaeresis otherwise there are only scattered and occasional discussions, none of which mentions Andronicus or the “later” Peripatos. To complicate matters, the extant fragments of Andronicus himself shed very little light on *De divisione*, and the *Isagoge*, which *De divisione* resembles in both structure and contents, sheds only indirect light on Porphyry’s lost *Sophist* commentary. So it is clear that if we hope to recover any of the lost Andronicean and Porphyrian material we are bound to rely above all on what Boethius says; it is also clear, however, that we must use the non-Boethian evidence to control our interpretation as far as possible.

Boethius’ system of diaeresis⁸ is as follows (6,17ff.):

⁶ Cf. Simpl., *In Cat.* 379,8ff. Also, Porph., *In Cat.* 56,23ff. (with B. 162c7ff.); Ammon., *In Cat.* 14,18ff. (Brandis, ed. *Scholía* 39b22ff.); Philop., *In Cat.* 168,3ff.; Gigon, ed. *Arist. fr.* 385a41ff.; Magee, “Boethius ... and Andronicus” 549f., n. 2; Pfligersdorffer, “Andronikos;” Shiel, “Andronicus;” Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 99ff.; Plezia, *De Andr. stud.* 9f.; Littig, *Andr. v. Rh.* III 27f.

⁷ Cf. Ammon., *In De int.* 5,24ff.; Alex. Aphr., *In An. pr.* 161,1; Philop., *In De an.* 27,21ff.; 45,8ff.; Brandis, ed. *Scholía* 94a21ff. (Littig, *Andr. v. Rh.* III 29; Busse, ed. Ammon., *In De int.* xxiii); Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 117f.; Courcelle, *Writers* 292f.; Tarán, ed. *Commentary* viii, n. 10; Magee, *B. on Signification and Mind* 31, n. 84.

⁸ In structure this resembles the division of sciences at *In Isag.* I 8,1ff. (cf. *Trin.* II 5ff.). Aristotle at *Met.* 993b20f. makes the theoretical / practical division and at 1026a19 subdivides the theoretical into physics, mathematics, and theology. At *Top.* 145a15f. and *EN* 1139a26ff., however, he recognizes the productive arts as a third division, and it is clear from 1094a26ff. that he does not regard ethics, economics, and politics as coordinate branches of the practical. B.’s division of the sciences is not, therefore, strictly Aristotelian. Is it Andronicean? Ammonius (*In Cat.* 5,4ff.), Philoponus (*In Cat.* 4,35ff.), Olympiodorus (*In Cat.* 7,30ff.), Simplicius (*In Cat.* 4,22ff.), and Elias (*In Cat.* 115,15ff.) divide the Aristotelian αὐτοπρόσωπα (ἀκροαματικά) into the *theoretical* (theology, mathematics, physics), *practical* (ethics, economics, politics), and *instrumental* (propaedeutic, apodeictic, subsidiary), in which Moraux (*Aristotelismus* I 70ff.) and Gigon (ed. *Arist. fr.* 211b22ff.) see a reflex of Andronicus. With Düring (*Biogr. Trad.* 444ff.) and Tarán (rev. of Moraux 736ff.), I am dubious. In any event, B. clearly downplays logic as a third branch. At *In Isag.* I 9,23ff. and II 140,13ff. he mentions it only to discuss the part (Stoic, note the polemical *indubitanter*, II 140,20) vs. tool (Peripatetic) controversy and at I 8,1f. states that there are two species of philosophy (theoretical, practical). The latter accords with *CPh.* I 1,4 (cf. I 3,7; III 9,32; V 1,12; *In Perih.* II 80,1ff.). And given the quadripartition of mathematical sciences at *Inst. ar.* I 1,4 (cf. *In Isag.* I 9,21f.), the system resembles Ammonius, *In Isag.* 11,6ff., and David, *Prol.* 55,17ff. + 57,26ff., rather than the *Cat.* commentators above. The sources do not cohere, and since we do not know exactly how Androni-



Now it is clear from statement (4) above that Boethius believes that the later Peripatos introduced the primary bifurcation (*per se diuisionem ab ea quae est secundum accidens ... inter se disiunxit*) as well as the subordinate tripartitions (*ipsasque ... atque distribuit*). And from passage (1) it is evident that he regards Andronicus as a later rather than earlier Peripatetic, for although he depicts Andronicus as an ancient (*senis*), he depicts him as looking back upon earlier developments (*semper ... fuerit*) within the school (*apud Peripateticam disciplinam*). Moreover, we can hardly fail to notice Boethius' application of the same epithet to both Andronicus (*diligentissimi*), in (1), and the later Peripatos (*diligentissima ratione*), in (4). I conclude that Boethius' intention is to locate Andronicus, for him the originator of the system of diaeresis above, at the threshold of the later Peripatos, looking back upon his predecessors, who held diaeresis in high esteem but erroneously employed accidents in place of genera, species, and differentiae. If this interpretation is correct, then in Boethius' mind the older Peripatos extends from about Straton to the generation before Andronicus, while the newer one is Andronicus and his successors. How did Boethius come by this information, and what are the chances of its being historically correct? There are four possibilities:

Boethius had direct access only to Andronicus. Fatal to this hypothesis is the evidence of (2) and (3), since it is impossible that from Andronicus Boethius learned about Plotinus and Porphyry. But beyond that, numerous doctrinal and formal parallels between *De diuisione* and the *Isagoge* suggest that Boethius had access to Porphyry, and it would be perverse to explain the parallels on the supposition that the *Isagoge* too was copied from Andronicus. For if Porphyry bothered to

cus divided the sciences anyway (cf. above, xxiii, n. 26), I see no point in declaring B.'s division Andronicean. Hence I am unprepared to declare his system of *diaeresis* Andronicean just on the basis of its similarity to the division of sciences.

mention Andronicus in the *Sophist* prolegomena, why did he not mention him in the *Isagoge*, the context of which is Peripatetic? But τὰ παρὰ τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις at *Isagoge* 1,8 (cf. 1,15) could mean almost anyone, including Aristotle, and forms a striking contrast with the *Posterior* ... *Peripateticae secta prudentiae* (i.e. Andronicus) in statement (4).

Boethius had direct access to both Andronicus and Porphyry. For this hypothesis we have to go on probabilities. On balance it appears extremely unlikely that Boethius had a copy of Andronicus' book on diaeresis. For although Porphyry probably was accessible to him and was the single most important influence on his Peripatetic writings,⁹ even Simplicius, who was much closer to the ancient material, appears constrained to second-hand information about Andronicus. The extant Andronicean fragments stem mostly from Simplicius' *Categories* commentary and do not indicate that he had a copy of Andronicus' paraphrase to hand.¹⁰ Of course this involves an *argumentum ex silentio*, but a reasonable one given Simplicius' clarity about such matters (e.g. *In Cat.* 3,2; 334,2f.; *In Phys.* 144,28). On the other hand, the fact that Porphyry had access to the *Categories* commentary of Boethos of Sidon, who was a near contemporary of Andronicus, perhaps even his pupil, gives force to the surmise that he had access to works of Andronicus as well.¹¹ At any rate, it is hard to imagine that Boethius either fabricated or misconstrued the point in (2) about Porphyry's teacher Plotinus, and it is significant that Porphyry furnishes the most important evidence for Andronicus' edition and *pinax* of the Aristotelian corpus.¹² Hence,

Boethius had direct access only to Porphyry. As will become clear in the course of the commentary, in regard to general structure, terminology, and doctrine *De divisione* aligns itself more closely with the *Isagoge*

⁹ *In Cat.* 160a5; 233b8ff.; 263b15ff.; 284a5; *In Perih.* II 7,5ff.; II 11,10; II 17,24ff.; II 18,18f.; II 26,17f.; II 33,20f.; II 37,15ff.; II 40,9f.; II 77,13ff.; II 88,28ff.; II 106,19f.; II 121,26; II 123,5ff.; II 201,2ff.; II 219,17f.; II 272,29f.; II 276,8f.; II 293,27ff.; II 354,25; II 383,5f.; *Intr. syll. cat.* 829d13f.; cf. Bidez, "Boèce et Porphyre" 193ff., with however Shiel, "Commentaries" (1990), 351f.; 359. According to Ammonius (*In De int.* 252,8ff.), Porphyry did not comment on *Peri H.* 14; so it may seem noteworthy that in his own commentary on the same (*In Perih.* II 464,5ff.) B. cites no pre-Porphyrian authority. On the other hand, the same could be said of ch. 13 (*In Perih.* II 414,25ff.), on which Porphyry presumably did comment. The citation of authorities in fact drops off after II 412,19 (Diodorus), while it is obvious in any event that B. had access to some post-Porphyrian material (see below, n. 14).

¹⁰ Cf. Tarán, rev. of Moraux 732; Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 97f.

¹¹ Cf. Tarán, *ibid.*, with n. 34; 733f.

¹² *V. Plot.* 24.

than with any other extant work, Porphyrian or otherwise. It would be most useful to be able to compare *De divisione* against the *Isagoge* in connection with known doctrines of Andronicus, for if *De divisione* sometimes sided with Andronicus against the *Isagoge* we might be tempted to leave open the possibility of Boethius' not being reliant upon Porphyry alone for his knowledge of Andronicus. But the extant evidence affords no such opportunity, and even if it did we could not be certain that Boethius had not found Andronicean opinions in Porphyry's *Sophist* prolegomena which he in some instances preferred to those of Porphyry himself—a somewhat unlikely scenario, given Boethius' preference for Porphyry over the earlier commentators, but a possible one nevertheless. In the absence of stringent proof we are compelled to fall back on common sense. Andronicus was little more than a venerable name to the commentators of the sixth century, and at almost every step in his Peripatetic writings Boethius relied upon Porphyry as his guide.¹³ It is highly probable, therefore, that Boethius adapted *De divisione* too from Porphyry. The parallels with the *Isagoge* additionally suggest that he adapted it from Porphyry's prolegomena to the *Sophist* commentary, not from the commentary proper.

Boethius had direct access to neither Andronicus nor Porphyry, but to an unnamed intermediary. Do Andronicus and Porphyry exhaust the possibilities just by virtue of the fact that they are mentioned? There are two implications to this question. The first concerns authorities whose names Boethius might have concealed. Now in the proem to *De divisione* Boethius begins with what he *knows* about the older tradition, and in general he seems far more likely to mention authorities, even ones about whom he has only heard, than to suppress them.¹⁴ So although there is no necessity to the assumption that for *De divisione* he had direct access to the named authorities Andronicus and Porphyry, there is some probability to the assumption that he would have mentioned others had he known of or had access to them. And given that Boethius may reasonably be expected to have suppressed

¹³ See above, n. 9.

¹⁴ Thus at *In Perih.* II 4,3ff. he says that he cannot locate a copy of Albinus (cf. Pfligersdorffer, "Zu Boëthius"). At II 4,2f. he notes that Themistius is the basis of Praetextatus' translation, and at II 321,20ff. that he follows Syrianus (cf. II 18,26f.; II 87,30ff.; II 324,15). At *In Cat.* 160a4f. he mentions his dependency on Porphyry but in other passages acknowledges later authorities: 162a10 (Themistius); 162a9; 224d3; 225b4 (Iamblichus); 257a14ff. (*quidam ... quorundam Platoniorum*, cf. 255d4). In other words, B. does not hesitate to discuss such matters if he can.

the names of later authorities such as Ammonius,¹⁵ it is noteworthy that *De divisione* has not a single allusive *quidam* or *alii*. This entails an *argumentum ex silentio*, but again a tolerable one. At the very least there is the consideration of economy to contend with: the difficulties presented by two lost works that are mentioned are compounded by the supposition that unnamed sources too are at play. And how many concealed sources are we entitled to suppose? In the event, phantom sources could be invented to unravel almost any perplexity *De divisione* might present, but the chances of their leading to rather than away from the truth appear very slim indeed: *auctores non multiplicentur praeter necessitatem*. The second implication concerns the medium of transmission. More precisely, James Shiel has maintained that for the logical writings Boethius translated scholia in the margins of his Greek codex or codices.¹⁶ Is *De divisione* a case in point? Concrete evidence to support Shiel's theory is slim, and the extant codex he has in mind as a model, Vat. Urb. Gr. 35, is considerably later than Boethius. Nevertheless, it may be that such annotated MSS reflect their late antique exemplars, and Marinus reports that Proclus himself, with whose school Shiel would like to connect Boethius' scholia,

¹⁵ Cf. *B. on Signification and Mind* 54, with n. 14.

¹⁶ Esp. "Commentaries" (1990) 368ff. (others in the Bibliography). Despite my belief that scholia are not the issue here, I regard Shiel's contributions as extremely important. The theory is resistant to refutation, since it is impossible to prove that Greek scholia were never available in the West (the *An. pr.* translations in fact suggest otherwise). The schematic argument of *Div.*, it could be argued, comports with the scholia thesis, as is implied by Shiel ("Commentaries" [1990] 366). On the other hand, the facts that *Div.* is very close in length and structure to Porphyry's *Isag.* and that it emphasizes brevity (4,13ff.; 50,5), as does the *Isag.* (1,7ff.), suggest that Porphyry's *Soph.* prolegomena too were of similar proportions. At any rate, I do not think that *libri huius ... obscura orationis series obscurissimis adiecta sentiis* at *In Perih.* II 250,20ff. is a reference to scholia (Shiel, "Commentaries" [1990] 361, with n. 40), but to Aristotle's obscure "speech" as complicated by his even more obscure thought. Hence the *θεωρία* (*sententia*) καὶ *λέξις* (*series orationis*) style of commentary: II 294,9f.: *sequentis textus ordinem sententiamque uideamus*; II 349,22f.: *sensus ergo totus sese ita habet, hoc modo autem ordo uerborum*; II 372,20f.: *sensus quidem huiusmodi est, ordo autem se sic habet*; II 398,18ff.: *sed quoniam commentationis uirtus est non solum uniuersaliter uim sensus expromere, uerum etiam textus ipsius sermonibus ordinique conectere*; II 438,10f.: *omnis quidem sententia est talis, ordo autem sermonum huiusmodi est*; II 446,8ff.: *ordo sermonum ... sententiae ratio totius*; II 449,14f.: *et tota quidem sententiae uis talis est, nunc quis sermonum ordo sit explicetur*; II 450,3ff.: *hoc ita cogitans facilius quis agnoscit, quid ipsius textus uerba denuntient, cum etiam adminiculari quis debeat obscuris sensibus patientia atque consensu, quod ad sententiam potius dicentis expectet, etsi se sermonum ratio ita non habeat*. Cf. "Boethius ... and Andronicus" 555f., n. 49; Ebbesen, "Boethius as ... Commentator" (1990) 375f., with n. 15; Barnes, "Study of Logic" 79f.; Cass., *Inst.* II 3,11, with Mynors ad loc. 114,21.

recorded information in the margins of his commentaries.¹⁷ But the possibility of scholia does not entail their probability or necessity, and the crucial question is whether the theory is capable of advancing our inquiry. We are already faced with many unknowns in regard to what Porphyry and Boethius did; in my opinion the putative scholia only promise to confuse matters further. Suppose the scholia accurately transmitted Porphyry and Boethius accurately recorded the scholia: the facts would be the same as if Boethius had copied directly from Porphyry, and yet the general theory would not make *us* any more certain of them. Indeed, in some circumstances it would actually raise new doubts. For example, if an external source happened to disagree with *De divisione* on some point of interest we would then have to consider not only whether *De divisione* or the other source deviated from Porphyry but whether the scholia did so. And how could we decide? Any criterion for determining how information passed from Porphyry to Boethius is bound to be somewhat arbitrary, but it becomes unnecessarily so with the supposition of unnamed intermediaries, be they complete works or mere scholia.

For this investigation I have adopted four working assumptions: (a) For *De divisione* Boethius followed Porphyry's prolegomena to his *Sophist* commentary, not the lost work of Andronicus, scholia, or unnamed authorities. At the very least, *De divisione* 34,16ff. must have been copied from someone other than Andronicus, since it presupposes a definition from the *Peri Hermeneias*, which Andronicus athe-
tized.¹⁸ My hesitations regarding unnamed intermediaries and scholia have been outlined above. That *De divisione* is a distillation of prolegomena serves as a corollary to the assumption and is founded on the parallels with Porphyry's *Isagoge*. Boethius may or may not have possessed a copy of Porphyry's *Sophist* commentary proper.¹⁹ (b) Boethius faithfully reproduced what Porphyry said about Andronicus and the later Peripatos. The best evidence for this supposition is Boethius' extant *Categories* commentary, which despite some post-Porphyrian material was written *Porphyrium sequens* (cf. 160a5) and affords useful points of comparison with Porphyry's "question and answer"

¹⁷ *V. Procli* 27. The Terence scholia may be another candidate for comparison, although their confused state of transmission would probably tend only to weaken Shiel's thesis. Cf. Aug., *Retr.* II 13.

¹⁸ See the commentary on IV.E.2. 34,16ff.

¹⁹ The fact that B. does not specify prolegomena is to be explained on the supposition that his reference to the commentary includes, perhaps even means, prolegomena.

commentary. Comparison indicates that Boethius was both capable of and intent on an accurate interpretation of Porphyry.²⁰ The reason for Porphyry's having discussed an ancient Peripatetic tradition of diaeresis in prolegomena to a commentary on *Plato* is twofold: diaeresis is a central concern of the *Sophist*, and Porphyry was addicted to the project of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle, as is evident from (e.g.) *Isagoge* 6,13ff., where Plato's authority is invoked despite the Aristotelian context.²¹ (c) Despite his fidelity to Porphyry, Boethius nevertheless reorganized the Porphyrian source to some extent, since he was writing, not prolegomena to a Platonic dialogue or to Platonic philosophy generally, but an introductory handbook on diaeresis intended for Romans already advanced in the study of Peripatetic logic. Thus in the proem and conclusion he inserted certain remarks recognizably his own, with an eye to warding off critics and furnishing a place for himself in the Peripatetic tradition extending back to Andronicus. In the course of this reorganization he also replaced Porphyry's Greek illustrations with Roman ones of his own device. This assumption tends to undermine (b), but it is unavoidable. (d) From *De divisione* alone we cannot determine the veracity of Porphyry's historical remarks. Boethius was led by Porphyry to trace the system of diaeresis back to Andronicus, i.e. he took his cue from Porphyry in connecting the later Peripatetic developments with Andronicus. But the accuracy of Porphyry's information remains a separate consideration.

It is necessary to test the assumptions, and the questions to keep in mind are whether the connection between the system of diaeresis and Andronicus is really only a matter of Boethius' *inference* from what Porphyry said, and, if not, whether Porphyry had an accurate understanding of the facts. In order to feel absolutely certain that Boethius' system is indeed Andronicean we should keep an eye out for explicit confirmation, from a pre- or non-Porphyrian source, to the effect that Andronicus, or the "later" Peripatos, distinguished between *division per se* and *secundum accidens*. Let us turn to the evidence outside of *De divisione*.

²⁰ Cf. Bidez, "Boèce et Porphyre" 196; more generally, Levet, "Philologie" 61f.

²¹ Cf. (e.g.) *Suidas* IV 178,21f. A. (Porph. 2T S.); B., *In Perih.* II 80,1ff. (presumably under Porphyry's influence). Porphyry followed an older tradition dating back to Antiochus, who, says Donini (*Scuole* 83f.; 91f.; cf. Merlan, "Peripatos" 115), may have influenced Andronicus. Witt actually supposed Antiochean influence on *Div.* (*Albinus* 62). About such theories I decline to speculate.

Pre-Porphyrian Sources

ALCINOOS, *Didasc.* 5. Alcinoos omits the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy and the accident / accidents mode, and does not mention either Andronicus or the (later) Peripatos.²²

GALEN, *Plac.* IX 9,43ff. Galen omits the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy and all but (possibly) one incidental mode. He does not name Andronicus or the (later) Peripatos but speaks of “the dialecticians,” “certain philosophers,” and “some” instead. Moreover, unlike Boethius Galen or his source makes genus / species diaeresis a metaphorical application of the whole / parts trope (noting that some confuse the two), mentions a separate matter / form trope, and discountenances division into faculties or powers. It is clear that Galen’s remarks are keyed to the whole / parts trope (note κυρίως, 43), i.e. that he consulted more than one source and was not simply following his teacher Alcinoos for this information.²³

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, *Strom.* VIII 6,19. Clement has the genus / species, whole / parts, and (?) subject / accidents modes but recognizes only the first as legitimate. He does not mention Andronicus, the (later) Peripatos, or the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy.²⁴

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS, *Pyrr. hyp.* II 213ff. Sextus explicitly designates a fourfold (τετραχῶς) system of diaeresis, adding species / individuals division to what Boethius calls the *per se* tropes (Boethius subsumes species / individuals under whole / parts diaeresis).²⁵ Sextus does not mention Andronicus, the (later) Peripatos, or the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy.²⁶

Between these four sources there is no significant coherence.²⁷ More-

²² Cf. Talamanca, “Schema” 74.

²³ Cf. Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 330; Talamanca, “Schema” 68f.

²⁴ Cf. Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 81 (“of the *differentiae*” is a slip); Talamanca, “Schema” 74f.

²⁵ *Div.* 8,14ff.; cf. Porph., *Isag.* 6,13ff.

²⁶ Cf. “Boethius ... and Andronicus” 558f., n. 77; Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 125ff.; Talamanca, “Schema” 64f., n. 224; 66, with n. 224a (on DL VII 61f.).

²⁷ There is near agreement only in connection with what B. calls the *per se* tropes, which is no reason to conclude that Andronicus is the common source; for the study of diaeresis was very ancient and widespread. Cf. [Pl.], *Ep.* XIII 360b8; Iambl., *Protr.*

over, not one of them is consistent with Boethius: none has precisely his six modes or the *secundum se* / *accidens* distinction, and none mentions Andronicus or the (later) Peripatos. I conclude that the earliest evidence does not serve to link Boethius' system of diaeresis with Andronicus (later Peripatos).

Post-Porphyrian Sources

[ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS], *Quaest.* IV 8 (cf. 28) + *In Top.* 532,19ff. These are extracts or later redactions of some kind.²⁸ Both recognize the three *secundum se* tropes (not so designated), the first possibly with a splitting of whole / parts division along the lines of the homo- and heterogeneous, as in Boethius.²⁹ The first acknowledges the ἁπ' ἐνός / πρὸς ἓν difference (not in Boethius's system). Neither mentions Andronicus, the later Peripatos, Porphyry, or the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy.

SOPATER, *Schol. ad Herm. stat.* 24 (Rhet. Gr. IV 62,13ff. W.). Sopater resembles Alcinoos but adds a species / individuals trope. He does not mention the accident / accidents trope, the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy, Andronicus, the (later) Peripatos, or Porphyry.

PROCLUS, *In Tim.* I 224,17ff. Proclus matches Alcinoos, i.e. omits the accident / accidents trope and the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy. He does not mention Andronicus, the (later) Peripatos, or Porphyry, but credits "some" (ὁ θρυλεῖν εἰώθασί τινες, possibly an allusion to Alcinoos).

5; DL III 80ff.; IV 5/13; V 22ff./46; Arist., *Gen. et corr.* 330b15f. (with Philop. 226,16ff.); *Part. an.* 642b11f.; *Met.* 1019a4; (?) Arist., *EE* 1218b32ff.; Simpl., *In Cat.* 65,5; Gigon, ed. *Arist. fr.* 318b10ff.; 323b11ff.; 359a25ff.; 368b19ff.; 386a35ff.; 404b19ff.; 723b1ff.; Mutschmann, ed. *Divis. arist.* vff.; Cherniss, *ACPA* ch. 1; Tarán, *Speusippus* 61; 64ff.

²⁸ Bruns, ed. *Quaest.* xiv; Wallies, ed. *In Top.* xiv. Pace Madigan, "Ethical Problems" 1262, I do not regard it as certain that the first is genuine; and the evidence of the *Suidas* (Wallies) is inconclusive. At the very least, any authentic material will have been tampered with by the redactors. Cf. Alex. Aphr., *In An. pr.* 161,33f. (probably not exhaustive).

²⁹ *Div.* 14,15ff.; 40,3ff. At "Boethius ... and Andronicus" 547 (560, n. 85) I was imprecise. The non-Boethian sources do not differentiate between discrete and continuous quanta, but that distinction is presupposed by B.'s differentiation of homo- and heterogeneous wholes.

AMMONIUS, *In De int.* 15,16ff. + *In Cat.* 38,1f. + *In Isag.* 81,17ff. We are obliged to emphasize the first source, which is not a *reportatio*.³⁰ It furnishes the first hint of the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy, referring to what Boethius calls the *per se* tropes as diaeresis κυρίως.³¹ The *Categories* and *Isagoge* commentaries list the same three tropes, but without the κυρίως. Also, the *Peri Hermeneias* and *Isagoge* commentaries subdivide, as Boethius does, the whole / parts trope along the lines of the homo- and heterogeneous. Ammonius is, therefore, our first significant point of comparison. Like Boethius he forms part of the Peripatetic tradition after Porphyry, hints at the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy, and subdivides the whole / parts trope. But he does not mention Andronicus, the later Peripatos, or Porphyry (as originator of a system of diaeresis).

[GALEN], *Hist. phil.* 14. The text is corrupt but clearly includes the *per se* modes (not so designated). There may be a hint of either subject / accidents or species / individuals diaeresis, possibly both or neither. There is no mention of Andronicus, the (later) Peripatos, Porphyry, or the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy.³²

BOETHIUS, *In Isag.* I 22,14ff. + II 154,11ff. The first commentary is anomalous (cf. above, xxvii); the second matches precisely the system of *De divisione*, although without mentioning Andronicus, the later Peripatos, or Porphyry (as originator of a system of diaeresis).

PHILOPONUS, *In Isag.* 195,38ff. + *In Cat.* 53,19ff. The Syriac redaction of the *Isagoge* commentary has Boethius' six modes and the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy, also a separate species / individuals trope (rejected). It subdivides the whole / parts trope as Boethius does but the spoken sound / significations mode and the *secundum se* classification³³ differently than Boethius. The *Categories* commentary mentions only the three *secundum se* modes (not so designated). There is no reference

³⁰ *In De int.* 8,26ff.; cf. *In Isag.* ad loc. 1,1 and *In Cat.* 1,1 (ἀπὸ φωνῆς).

³¹ *In De int.* 15,16. Cf. Steph., *In De int.* 4,11; David, *Prol.* 66,24; 67,32; 68,4; [Elias], *In Isag.* XXXV 29; Georg. Choer., *Pros.* 133,31; 134,36; Blemm., *Epit.* 704a15.

³² Cf. below, liv; "Boethius ... and Andronicus" 558, n. 73; Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 329.

³³ ὡς πρῶγμα / ὡς φωνή, possibly a Stoic echo (DL VII 43; cf. Posid., fr. 189 E.-K.). B. has only the tripartition.

to Andronicus, the later Peripatos, or Porphyry (as originator of a system of diaeresis).³⁴

ELIAS, *In Isag.* 67,23ff. + 70,18ff. + 72,26ff. Elias has Boethius' six modes, also separate species / individuals (which he rejects) and ὅφ' ἐνός / πρὸς ἓν tropes.³⁵ He subdivides the whole / parts mode but does not mention Andronicus, the later Peripatos, Porphyry (as originator of a system of diaeresis), or the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy.³⁶

DAVID, *Prol.* 65,14ff. + *In Isag.* 154,22ff. In the *Prolegomena* David has Boethius' six modes and the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy, also separate species / individuals and ὅφ' ἐνός / πρὸς ἓν tropes, which, along with the three incidental modes, he rejects. He splits whole / parts diaeresis, as Boethius does, but also the *secundum se* classification as in Philoponus. In the *Isagoge* commentary David replaces the accident / accidents with the species / individuals trope, splits the whole / parts trope, and omits the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy. In neither work does he mention Andronicus, the later Peripatos, or Porphyry (as originator of a system of diaeresis).

[ELIAS] (Ps.-DAVID), *In Isag.* XX 2ff. + XXXV 27ff. The commentator has Boethius' six modes and the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy, also separate species / individuals and ὅφ' ἐνός / πρὸς ἓν tropes. The species / individuals and three incidental tropes he rejects; the whole / parts mode and (as in Philoponus) *secundum se* classification he subdivides. He does not mention Andronicus, the later Peripatos, or Porphyry (as originator of a system of diaeresis).

STEPHANUS, *In De int.* 4,11ff. Stephanus matches Ammonius on the same treatise of Aristotle: the three *secundum se* modes with a hint (κυριώτατοι) of the related dichotomy; splitting of the whole / parts trope; no mention of Andronicus, the later Peripatos, or Porphyry (as originator of a system of diaeresis). The Syriac redaction of Philoponus (*In Isag.* 196,36f.) notes that Stephanus rejected the species /

³⁴ Talamanca, "Schema" 67, with nn. 225a/c, notes two further pieces of evidence for Philoponus, both as in Sextus (the three *per se* plus species / individuals tropes).

³⁵ Cf. Arist., *EN* 1096b26ff.

³⁶ Cf. Talamanca, "Schema" 77ff.

individuals trope, which suggests something beyond the occasional and derivative treatment in the *Peri Hermeneias* commentary.

JOHN DAMASCENE, *Dial.* 6 (*fus.*) = 12 (*brev.*). John has Boethius' six modes and the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy, also separate species / individuals (by "some" rejected) and ἅφ' ἐνός / πρὸς ἓν tropes. He splits the whole / parts and spoken sound / significations (differently than Boethius) tropes and the *secundum se* classification (as in Philoponus). He does not mention Andronicus, the (later) Peripatos, or Porphyry.³⁷

GEORGE CHOEROBOSCUS (PORPHYRY THE GRAMMARIAN), *Pros.*, GG I 3, p. 131,35ff. George (Porphyry) has Boethius' six modes (whole / parts subdivided), also separate species / individuals and ἅφ' ἐνός / πρὸς ἓν tropes, which, along with the three incidental tropes, he rejects (cf. *Schol. Marc.* 330,17f.). He does not mention Andronicus, the (later) Peripatos, Porphyry (the philosopher), or the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy but does name Philoponus (135,4).

NICEPHORUS BLEMMYDES, *Epit. log.* 2 (PG CXLII 701a3ff.). Blemmydes has Boethius' six modes (whole / parts subdivided) and the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy (subdivided as in Philoponus), also separate species / individuals and ἅφ' ἐνός / πρὸς ἓν tropes. But he dubs only the *secundum se* modes as diaeresis κυρίως. He does not mention Andronicus, the (later) Peripatos, or Porphyry.

The only one of these sources to replicate Boethius' system is his own *In Isagen II*, for which Porphyry's *Sophist* prolegomena were undoubtedly consulted. The next closest thing is Ammonius on the *Peri Hermeneias*, where indications as to the origins of the system are absent and it is unclear how many non-κυρίως modes are intended. The fact that the Platonists Alcinoos and Proclus omit the accident / accidents trope and *secundum se* / *accidens* difference suggests a tradition independent of Boethius' rather than shared derivation from Andronicus (*pace* Talamanca, "Schema" 75). In the later sources there is an obvious tendency toward more broadly conceived systems: mention of the three incidental modes, the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy, and separate species / individuals and ἅφ' ἐνός / πρὸς ἓν

³⁷ Cf. Richter, *Dialektik* 92ff.; Talamanca, "Schema" 80.

tropes. There is also a tendency to subdivide the whole / parts mode into the homo- and heterogeneous and the *secundum se* class into the ὡς πρᾶγμα and ὡς φωνή. Yet the later writers are by no means in agreement with one another; some are in disagreement even with themselves. Hence they do not betray a common source, Porphyrian or Andronicean.

Boethius is the most informative witness, in that he alone points to Andronicus, the later Peripatos, and Porphyry, although he provides no indication of the extent of Porphyry's influence on the tradition. (a) If Boethius' system of diaeresis is really Porphyrian and Boethius merely inferred its Andronicean origins, then the manifest tendency after Ammonius to imply or mention the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy is easily explained: the dichotomy originates with Porphyry and the bulk of the evidence is Porphyrian in some sense. (b) If the system is in fact Andronicean and Porphyry explicitly indicated as much, then the silence apart from *De divisione* is a mere accident of survival: no pre-Porphyrian source acknowledging the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy and tracing it back to Andronicus (later Peripatos) happens to have survived, while none of the post-Porphyrian ones, most of which recognize the dichotomy, happens to trace it back to Andronicus (later Peripatos).³⁸

Which is the more reliable guide, the complete silence of pre-Porphyrian or partial silence of post-Porphyrian sources? The first hypothesis above, (a), has to explain two things, Boethius' false inference from Porphyry and the failure of the post-Porphyrian sources to identify the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy as Porphyrian. The second, (b), has to explain the failure of all non-Boethian sources to identify the dichotomy as Andronicean. It is difficult to choose between the alternatives, and *De divisione* cannot be invoked as a criterion, since it is the very thing in question. If we give Boethius the benefit of the doubt and assume that he accurately interpreted Porphyry's words, there still remains the question of Porphyry's reliability, which, given the state of the evidence, is an unknown.

So much for the ancient testimonia. What about modern interpreters? From Boethius' proem and conclusion Friedrich Littig concluded that Andronicus at the end of his book on diaeresis referred to

³⁸ David (*Prol.* 65,16), Philoponus (*In Isag.* 196,35), and John Damascene (*Dial.* 6 [67,125 K.]) merely mention "some," as Proclus does (see above), while [Elias] mentions "the sophists" (*In Isag.* XX 15). On Galen, see above.

the confused practices of his predecessors, whence Porphyry derived the earlier / later Peripatos distinction.³⁹ In support of this interpretation Littig adduced similar distinctions in Strabo and Plutarch, for whom he hypothesized a common Andronicean source. Further, Littig connected Boethius' differentiation of *per se* and *secundum accidens* diaeresis with a doxographical notice in Simplicius, who says that Xenocrates and Andronicus reduced the categories to the καθ' αὐτό and πρὸς τι, which others reformulated as an οὐσία / συμβεβηκός dichotomy.⁴⁰

Now it seems indisputable that the tendency to differentiate between two stages in the history of the Peripatos is very old, and it may be that Andronicus recognized such a distinction. But that Boethius' version of it points back exclusively to Andronicus is uncertain. In his work on diaeresis Andronicus may indeed have mentioned his own contribution in respect of errors committed by those before him and thereby given Porphyry a basis for distinguishing between an older and newer Peripatos. But it is also possible that he mentioned "later" members of the school who corrected the errors of *their* predecessors.⁴¹ The fact that Cicero describes the Stoics as outrunning the Peripatetics in dividing and defining mental disturbances hints at an early tradition of downgrading the Peripatos that arose independently of Andronicus (whom Cicero never mentions).⁴² At the same time, discrepancies between Strabo and Plutarch argue against reliance upon a common source, especially Andronicus, for Strabo does not mention Andronicus at all, while Plutarch does not link him with a "later" Peripatos.⁴³ As to Andronicus' reduction of the categories, it is to be observed that neither of the divisions mentioned by

³⁹ *Andr. v. Rh.* II 12ff.; cf. III 33f. Although Pozzi, Striker, Courcelle, Prantl, Kneale, Obertello, Chadwick, Shiel, Gersh, Mansfeld, Gottschalk, Donini, D'Onofrio, Talamanca, etc., have discussed *Div.*, their observations are mostly occasional and are therefore considered at appropriate places in the commentary. The same can be said of the medieval commentators Abelard, Albert, and Antonius Andreae, who are ignorant of the relevant ancient material. Talamanca and Mansfeld furnish the most comprehensive general discussions.

⁴⁰ Simpl., *In Cat.* 63,22ff. Cf. 157,18ff.; 165,32ff. (*SVF* II 403; *FDS* III 833); 202,3ff.; Dexipp., *In Cat.* 31,11ff.; Hippol., *Ref.* I 20,1.

⁴¹ Note that the error B. attributes to the earlier Peripatetics echoes Aristotle's charge against Speusippus (Tarán, *Speusippus* 401). The problem may have been perceived as a very old one that had been corrected at different times.

⁴² *Tusc.* IV 5,9 (*SVF* III 483, the Peripatos gave greater emphasis *ad placandos animos*); cf. *Acad.* I 9,33f.; *Fin.* III 12,41; V 5,13f.; *Top.* I 3 (neglect of Aristotle).

⁴³ See the commentary on *Posterior ... Peripateticae secta prudentiae*, 48,26.

Simplicius matches the one in Boethius but a combination of them does.⁴⁴ And given the fact that at *Isagoge* 9,11 Porphyry employs the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy, why should we not conclude that he used it in the *Sophist* prolegomena as well? But the point is that the dichotomy is so ancient and general that it could have originated almost anywhere.⁴⁵

In response to Littig Marian Plezia devised a subtler interpretation.⁴⁶ He maintained that neither Andronicus nor Boethius introduced the earlier / later Peripatos distinction, since Andronicus cannot have ascribed the developments that he himself initiated to a “later” Peripatos, while Boethius was too far removed from the relevant placita literature to have known about Andronicus and the later Peripatos. Thus Porphyry elevated the later and downgraded the earlier Peripatos. But Porphyry did not introduce the *utilitas* theme in statement (6), since by his time the earlier Peripatetic error was a dead issue and would have made a pointless piece of doxography in a *Sophist* commentary. That is, according to Plezia Andronicus really criticized the *posteriores* and praised the *antiquiores*, noting the utility of restoring the ancient practice, whereas Porphyry elevated Andronicus’ school (later Peripatos) and thereby left a contaminated source: statements (4) and (5) are Porphyry’s misinterpretation or revision of Andronicus, whereas (6) is pure Andronicus.⁴⁷ Whence Plezia concluded that *De divisione* 10,28ff., on the *communiones* and *differentiae* alluded to in (6), is Andronicean.⁴⁸ The rest of *De divisione*, he added, is no longer recognizably Andronicean, owing to Porphyry’s intervention.

⁴⁴ Littig (*Andr. v. Rh.* II 13) was led by Simplicius (*In Cat.* 63,24f.) to the accident = relation equation, ignoring the conjectural *πὺς δοκοῦσι*. Cf. “Boethius ... and Andronicus” 530, with nn. 23f.; Tarán, rev. of Moraux 741f.; Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 59ff., n. 8; 61, n. 10. A similar fourfold reduction (substance / accident, universal / particular) is common in the commentators (B., *In Cat.* 169c9ff.; Porph., *In Cat.* 71,19ff.; Ammon., *In Cat.* 25,5ff., etc.).

⁴⁵ Cf. (e.g.) Theophr., fr. 40 G. (Alex. Aphr., *In Top.* 55,24ff., etc.). On the supposition that Andronicus favored trichotomy Littig sought Andronicean symptoms in B.’s tripartite illustrations (*Andr. v. Rh.* II 14f.; cf. III 6). But from *Div.* 26,4ff. (8,11f.; 10,5f.) it is obvious that B. favors dichotomy. Cf. “Boethius ... and Andronicus” 530, with n. 25.

⁴⁶ *De Andr. stud.* 10ff.; 44ff. Followed by Düring, *Biogr. Trad.* 383f.

⁴⁷ *De Andr. stud.* 14.

⁴⁸ Both Plezia (*ibid.*) and Moraux (*Aristotelismus* I 124, n. 21) take 6,17 to be the beginning of the section to which (6) refers; in fact, it is 10,28.

Plezia's argument is inconclusive and on at least one point self-contradictory. In the first place, although *De divisione* 10,28ff. could conceivably go back to Andronicus, there is no evidence to indicate that it does. Indeed, *Isagoge* 13,10ff. suggests that it is Porphyrian.⁴⁹ Thus Plezia was in the awkward position of maintaining both that the Porphyrian intermediary obscured most of the original Andronicean material⁵⁰ and that the passage most nearly resembling Porphyry's *Isagoge* descends from Andronicus. The only way out of this dilemma would have been for Plezia to explain the similarity on the assumption that the *Isagoge* too was copied from Andronicus—an absurd stratagem that would reduce things to a desperate state of ἀπαράλλαξία. Plezia's interpretation of passage (6) is simply wrong: there it is Boethius who is speaking, although it is possible that he is at the same time echoing Porphyry.⁵¹ In the second place, Plezia failed to see that his interpretation of (6) is doomed on another account. If indeed Porphyry revised (or misconstrued) Andronicus' words as in statements (4) and (5), then why did he copy (6) without adjusting (or distorting) it as well? And how is it that Boethius too failed to see that the *nobis* (ἡμῖν) in (6) was not in fact his own reference to himself?⁵² Thirdly, Plezia gave no serious consideration to the possibility of Andronicus' having implicitly or explicitly recognized separate phases in the history of the Peripatos, as in (4) and (5), or of Porphyry's having introduced the *utilitas* theme, as in (6). Had he considered the latter, he might have noted the same theme at *Isagoge* 1,6, part of the very passage paraphrased in the proem to *De divisione*.

Like both Littig and Plezia, Paul Moraux believed that Boethius had direct access only to Porphyry; unlike them, he sought to unearth the Andronicean stratum in Boethius' text through the identification of pre-Porphyrian material.⁵³ Moraux reckoned statements (5), the

⁴⁹ Of course the general procedure antedates Porphyry, but it also antedates *Andronicus* (e.g. Pl., *Soph.* 253b8ff.; Arist., *Cat.* 3a21ff. 4a10f.; 12b16ff.). The parallels between *Div.* and the *Isag.* are what draw attention. Cf. Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 127f.

⁵⁰ *De Andr. stud.* 15; 45.

⁵¹ See below, lvf., and the commentary on *nobis*, 50,2.

⁵² Cf. Littig, *Andr. v. Rh.* II 13: "Porphyrios aber kam darauf, weil Andronikos am Schlusse seiner Abhandlung den Zweck derselben in seiner freimütigen Art dahin zusammengefasst hatte, er wolle der Verwirrung, die früher geherrscht habe, ein Ende machen. Dass ihm dies gelungen, stellte Porphyrios mit Vergnügen fest;" Barnes, "Study of Logic" 80, noting *In Perih.* II 121,25f. (a point missed by Porphyry, but not by B.).

⁵³ *Aristotelismus* I 120ff.

downgrading of the earlier Peripatos, and (6), the *utilitas* theme, to be strictly conjoined and probably Andronicean. By contrast, the praise of the later Peripatos, (4), and the final words of *De divisione*, which emphasize the introductory nature of the treatment, he traced to Porphyry. Moraux was the first to recognize that 34,16ff., on the definition of *nomen*, is probably Porphyrian, since it presupposes the *Peri Hermeneias*, which Andronicus athetized.

Moraux's approach is more balanced and thorough than those of Littig and Plezia, and of Plezia's interpretation in particular Moraux was duly skeptical.⁵⁴ One advance was his assumption, based on the parallels between *De divisione* and the *Isagoge*, that Boethius utilized Porphyry's *Sophist* prolegomena rather than his commentary.⁵⁵ Where Moraux ran into difficulty was in his handling of the non-Boethian sources discussed above, i.e. in his hasty reduction of everything pre-Porphyrian to Andronicus. In general, it does not follow that anything recognizably pre-Porphyrian in *De divisione* is necessarily Andronicean, for Porphyry must at least have consulted some non-Andronicean or Platonic material for the *Sophist* prolegomena. Also, in his eagerness to retrieve the Andronicean *Urquell* Moraux distorted the evidence. Thus he took Alcinoos' silence about the accident / accidents trope as a case of intentional omission, which led him to suppose that Alcinoos must have recognized the same six tropes as Boethius does and to conclude that both Alcinoos and Boethius therefore reflect Andronicus. Where is the necessity in such an assumption?⁵⁶ And how are we to explain the fact that Alcinoos never mentions the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy, the cardinal tenet in what Boethius regards as the Andronicean system?⁵⁷ The

⁵⁴ *Aristotelismus* I 123; I 125, n. 27; I 129, n. 53.

⁵⁵ Cf. Magee, "Boethius ... and Andronicus" 533f., with nn. 38f.; 550f., n. 13.

⁵⁶ Moraux's argument would be more plausible if Alcinoos gave some indication that he is ignoring something. But the facts that Proclus too omits the accident / accidents trope (the unique nature of which B. remarks at 10,18ff.), i.e. does not fill in the gap, and that Alcinoos fails to mention the *secundum se* / *accidens* difference, suggest (*pace* Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 74, n. 54) that his is a different tradition from B.'s. Alcinoos' and Proclus' system may resemble B.'s, and Alcinoos and Proclus may even have been cognizant of a system such as his (as Mansfeld points out, *ibid.* 79f., Alcinoos' scheme has some Aristotelian traits), but neither possibility warrants the conclusion that their system and B.'s are the same.

⁵⁷ Moraux effectively ignored other discrepancies as well. Alcinoos' division of soul is a Platonic tripartition (*Rep.* 436a9f.) as reduced to a bipartition (rational / passionate, passionate = spirited / appetitive) whereas B.'s is an Aristotelian tripartition (rational, sentient, vegetative, 38,26f.; 40,21ff.; Arist., *De an.* 413b12f.). Their illustra-

pseudo-Galenic *History of Philosophy* Moraux treated as though it were pre-Porphyrian evidence, maintaining that its author somehow acknowledged the *secundum se* / *accidens* dichotomy (*Aristotelismus* I 125): "In Galens Philosophiegeschichte werden die drei Teilungsformen, die Boethius *secundum se* nennt, ausdrücklich genannt, und der heute korrupte Teil des Textes enthielt zweifellos Angaben über die akzidentielle Teilung." Two problems: (a) Moraux implies that the *secundum se* tropes are treated as a class, for which there is no evidence in the text. (b) Diels 607,4f. is undoubtedly corrupt. It is tempting to emend to, καὶ γένη εἰς εἶδη ἢ⁵⁸ διαφορὰς (καὶ εἶδη) εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον καὶ [εἰς] συμβεβηκότα, bringing the text into conformity with Sextus. But note that this would actually remove the hint of incidental tropes, implying instead the accidental nature of species / individuals diaeresis.⁵⁹ The point is that any restoration merely begs the question, and given that the *History* dates to some time near Boethius, not Andronicus, even if Moraux's interpretation proved to be correct it would add little to what we already know from other post-Porphyrian sources.⁶⁰ Boethius' difference to Sextus Moraux explained on the supposition that Sextus II 219ff. both removes the troublesome species / individuals trope from consideration and implies the *secundum accidens* classification, i.e. puts Sextus or the source he criticizes into accord with Boethius and thereby points back to Andronicus. But again, Sextus explicitly says that diaeresis is fourfold. And given that his intention is to undermine diaeretic method, for which one system ought to be as good as another as a point of attack, there would be no point in supposing that he reconfigured a scheme like Boethius' just so as to tear it down as another piece of dogma-

tions of accident / subjects diaeresis are not identical, as B. omits, at both 10,6 (see commentary ad loc.) and *In Isag.* II 155,2f., the external goods. And the fact that 10,2f. with 28,3f. could be construed as recalling Alcinoos' illustration of the subject / accidents trope connects *Div.* to neither Alcinoos nor Andronicus, as the basic idea is very old (Pl., *Grg.* 467e2f.; cf. the commentary on *indifferentia*, 28,3f.).

⁵⁸ Cf. *Div.* 28,25ff.; 50,2; *Gal.*, *Plac.* IX 9,43f.; more generally, Talamanca, "Schema" 77f., n. 241.

⁵⁹ Cf. the commentary on *particularem*, 38,24.

⁶⁰ Cf. Diels, *Dox. Gr.* 258. Moraux did not indicate whether he thought [Galen's] doctrine in fact goes back to Galen of Pergamum. Galen's own words (discussed above) suggest that it does not. Diels had already argued that [Galen] and Sextus are not in agreement (*Dox. Gr.* 247).

⁶¹ Note that Sextus' illustrations are foreign to B. The system looks eclectic: II 219/222f. imply the Stoic-Skeptic debate; II 225 entails an Aristotelian distinction, etc. Striker's claim (rev. of Pozzi 282f.) that Sextus is in general accord with the

tism.⁶¹ Finally, the pseudo-Alexandrian *Quaestio* Moraux treated as he did pseudo-Galen, i.e. as pre-Porphyrian evidence.⁶² In short, Moraux's analysis is determined by the assumption that the pre-Porphyrian texts necessarily imply an Andronicean source, and it forces the discovery of parallels that are really no parallels at all. The first is an error of method, the second of fact.

Conclusions. To return, then, to the four working assumptions outlined earlier. (a) I share with Littig, Plezia, and Moraux the belief that for *De divisione* Porphyry was the authority whose work Boethius actually had to hand, and with Moraux the conviction that that work was Porphyry's prolegomena to his commentary on Plato's *Sophist* (as opposed to his commentary proper, a copy of which Boethius may nevertheless have possessed). (b) I join with Littig, Plezia, and Moraux also in maintaining that the proem and conclusion of *De divisione* are reliable indications of what Porphyry said about Andronicus and the "later" Peripatos. The corresponsive particles *quidem* (μέν) and *autem* (δέ) linking statements (4) and (5) I take to imply that Porphyry described the later Peripatetic (Andronicean) development as a *corrective* to the earlier Peripatetic error in genus / species divisions. Whether or not the earlier Peripatos erred also in respect of other tropes and Porphyry merely suppressed that fact owing to his own preoccupation (one clearly reflected in *De divisione*)⁶³ with genus / species diaeresis, which leads to definition in the strict sense, cannot be determined. I regard it as certain, however, that Plezia's interpretation of (4) and (5) is unsustainable and that in (6) Boethius' re-touching of his Porphyrian source is discernible. Which leads to (c). Porphyry probably alluded to the *utilitas* (χρήσιμον) theme, as in the *Isagoge*, but I do not see how the *nobis* in (6) can be divorced from the *expressimus* in the final sentence of *De divisione*. Which sentence, by virtue of its obvious connection with the proem, wherein Boethius stresses the *utilitas* of his contribution in the Roman context, can only be Boethius speaking *proprio Marte*. If Boethius could not claim the

commentators is not quite accurate. B. does take species / individuals to be a special case of whole / parts diaeresis, but what Porphyry (whom Striker cites) says at *Isag.* 7,27ff. is most closely reflected by *Div.* 38,1ff., which is not about species / individuals diaeresis.

⁶² Cf. above, n. 28. The fact that [Alexander] and B. cite the same definition of virtue is inconclusive (see on *virtus est*, 30,25f.), while Moraux's other parallels (*Aristotelismus* I 126, n. 37) are far too general (one does not even concern *Div.*).

⁶³ Cf. Plezia, *De Andr. stud.* 12.

later Peripatetic corrective for himself, he could at least claim to have made a useful doctrine known in the West.⁶⁴ Thus Plezia's interpretation of (6), which he held to be Andronicus' *ipsissima verba* in Latin dress, collapses. Littig was right, on the other hand, to identify the Roman illustrations as Boethian contributions. (d) The divergent conclusions of Littig, Plezia, and Moraux are an excellent illustration of the difficulties inherent in the attempt to recover multiple layers of source material from a single witness like *De divisione*. In the end our understanding of the implications of Boethius' proem and conclusion comes down to common sense and the bits of evidence outside of *De divisione*. As to what constitutes common sense, scholars are bound to disagree. Plezia regarded his interpretation as an advance on Littig's, as Moraux regarded his on Plezia's. And although Moraux and Littig may be closer to one another than either is to Plezia, they nevertheless differ markedly in their appeals to the non-Boethian evidence. Littig sought confirmation of the Andronicean origins of Boethius' system in what Simplicius says about Andronicus' reduction of the categories; Moraux sought it in the pre- and, to a lesser extent, post-Porphyrian classifications of divisions.⁶⁵

In my opinion only the emergence of new or hitherto neglected evidence will make it possible to prove conclusively that Boethius' precisely formulated system of diaeresis is Andronicean rather than Porphyrian in origin. I do not deny the possibility, indeed likelihood, of Boethius' having inherited Andronicean material from Porphyry, only the validity of efforts that seek to prove, in the absence of reliable independent evidence relating directly to Andronicus, that one or another section of *De divisione* must be Andronicean.⁶⁶ So although my periodic remarks in the commentary to the effect that a passage or doctrine of *De divisione* shows no discernible connection with Andronicus are not intended as arguments to the effect that Andronicus cannot be the (indirect) source, they are intended to highlight the fact that on the strength of the extant evidence the points at issue cannot be proved to be Andronicean. It is in fact much easier to say what is probably not Andronicean in *De divisione* than to say what is. The

⁶⁴ See on *id quoque*, 4,12, and *unde nobis*, 50,2; also, Albert 90,7f.: *et communiones dictarum diuisionum prodere latinis*. B. implicitly acknowledges handing down the later Peripatetic system, with the echo of 48,26f. (*differentias diuisionum*) at 50,3f. (*diuisionum ... differentiis*).

⁶⁵ Littig, *Andr. v. Rh.* II 13f.; Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 128ff.

⁶⁶ Cf. Talamanca, "Schema" 75, n. 238.

proem and conclusion bear pellucid signs of Boethius' own invention but also some Porphyrian and, in statement (1), Andronicean echoes. The excursus on opposition (20,20ff.) may or may not be Andronicean, since Andronicus did not actually athetize the so-called *Postpraedicamenta* as he did the *Peri Hermeneias*. On the other hand, 34,16ff., on the definition of *nomen*, is, like 10,28ff., on the common and differentiating properties between tropes of diaeresis, almost certainly Porphyrian. Which leaves significant portions of *De divisione* for which it is either difficult or impossible to judge.

TEXTUAL TRADITION OF *DE DIVISIONE*

I. *The Lost Tradition*

The textual tradition of *De divisione* stems from an ancient edition and archetype which have left distinctive marks on the earliest extant MSS.¹ Preeminent among them are titles and colophons preserving the name of an editor of the series of logico-rhetorical monographs of which *De divisione* originally formed a part. The most complete evidence comes from a title in *A* and concerns *De divisione*:

Anicii (-tū a.c.) Mallii Seuerini Boetii .ūc. et illst. excoñs. orđ. patricii,
liber diuisionum incipit ualde necessarius. Martius Nouatus Renatus
ū.č. et sp. relegi meum.

In Paris n.a.l. 1611 (originally the second half of *A*)² further evidence is appended to a subscription to *De hypotheticis syllogismis*:

Contra codicem Renati .ū.č. correxi, qui confectus ab eo est Theodoro
antiquario qui nunc Palatinus est.

Renatus' book was written by the scribe (*antiquario*) Theodorus and "edited" or proofread by Renatus himself (*relegi meum*). At a time when Theodorus was still alive (*qui nunc Palatinus est*) someone anonymously corrected another book against the *codex Renati*. The anonymous corrector evidently gathered into a single volume the complete suite of Boethian monographs (nos. I-II, VII-IX in the table below), along with three extracts from *De differentiis topicis* and one from some other source (nos. III-VI), which he then prefaced with a table of contents; he appears to have corrected and subscribed the extracts as well.³ The index is here edited from *A B D* and Monte Cassino 191 (*L*, 11th c.):

¹ I have previously discussed this subject at length ("Text") and provide annotation here only in order to supplement or correct earlier findings. The results of fresh autopsy collations are recorded at appropriate points in the commentary.

² "Text" 4, with n. 8; below, n. 20.

³ "Text" 4; 5, n. 9; 8. On a deteriorated version of the index see: "Text" 5, n. 9; Nikitas, ed. *Diff. top.* liif. (Brussels 5439/43); lviii (Vienna 2269). The version above corrects errors in "Text" 5 (cf. Schepss, "Subscriptionen" 21; DeRijk, "Chronology" 5f.; Nikitas, ed. *Diff. top.* lif.; Obertello, *Sev. Boez.* I 349ff.; Cuissard, *Catalogue* 130;

Quae sint in hoc codice Anicii Mallii Seuerini Boetii ū. 7. et iiii. excoñs.
ord. :

- | | | |
|----|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
| | I. | De differentiis topicis libri IIII |
| | II. | De diuisione |
| 5 | III. | Communis speculatio de rethoricae cognatione |
| | IIII. | Locorum rethoricorum distinctio |
| | V. | De multifaria praedicatione |
| | VI. | Quomodo argumentorum uel unde colliguntur loci |
| | VII. | Liber ante praedicamenta |
| 10 | VIII. | Introductio in catheticos syllogismos, libri II |
| | VIIII. | De ypotheticis syllogismis libri III |
- 1f. Quae ... codice *om. B L* || Anit- *L* || Mallii ... Boetii] Manilii (*sic*) *D* || u.]
uiri *A* || et *om. D* || iiii. *ego scr.* : illustris *A* : in¹ *L* : in. id est *B* : pat. *D* ||
excoñs. ord. *om. A*
- 3 I.] in *D* || libri IIII *om. B L*
- 4 II. *om. D* || diuisione] tres libri, sita (*sic*), tituli indicant isti *add. D*
- 5 III. *om. D* || rethoricae *B D* : -ce *L* : rhetorica *A* || cognit- *L*
- 6 IIII. *om. D* || locorum *A B L* : lib. *s.l. B'* : de *praem. D* || rethoricorum]
rhetoric- *A* (-ric- *p.c.*) || distinctio] -one libri V *D*
- 7 V. *om. D* || praedicatione *B L* : pred- *D* : predica- (*sic*) *A*
- 8 VI. *om. D* || colligantur *D* || loci] id est (*a.c.*) topica *add. A*
- 9 VII. Liber] libri *D* || praedicamenta *B L* : VIII *add. D* : pred- *A*
- 10 VIII. *om. D* || catheticos *A* : cate- *B L* : -thericos (*sic*) *D* || syllogismos
D : sill- *B L* : syllogi (*sic*) *A* || libri *D* : lib. *B L* : *om. A* || II *om. A*
- 11 VIIII. *om. D* || ypotheticis *A D'* (to- *inc.*) : ippotet- *B'* (ipo- *a.c.*), *L* ||
syllogismis libri *A D* : sill- lib. *B L* || III] tercius *L*

Since the particulars of the archetype are a matter of some importance, I have recorded orthographical variants and differences in abbreviation. The divide is obviously between *B L* and *A D*, and given two apparent omissions in the former (1, 3) it may be that *A D* are to be preferred where it is otherwise difficult to decide, although *A* too has its faults (esp. 1, 8, 10) and *D* positively teems with errors. Three details can be recovered with certainty (*Mall- Boeti-* [1], *reth-* [5f.]), but they tell us almost nothing about the time and place of the archetype (on which more below).

Renatus can be identified as a man with ties to Boethius' circle in Ravenna, while Theodorus is almost certainly the same as the scribe who copied out Priscian's (his teacher's) grammar, in Constantinople,

Delisle, "Notice" 392; Olsen, *L'étude* I 243, etc.). And to "Text" 7, n. 18 I add the observation that *D* has the *conditor operis emendauit* subscription, on fols. 44v and 49v.

in the mid-520s.⁴ Thus it appears that from Theodorus Renatus commissioned (or obtained) and then proofread a copy of the monographs, in Constantinople, sometime after Boethius' death.⁵ The anonymous corrector evidently introduced the excerpts from *De differentiis topicis*, as well as a fragment of Boethius' (assuming it was his) revised Latin version of Aristotle's *Topics* (discussed below), into the series of monographs. There are several indications that he worked at Vivarium: (a) Three of the extracts are closely aligned with passages of *De differentiis topicis* that were excerpted for Cassiodorus' *Institutiones*. (b) On the basis of mechanical errors that affected the quires, one of them being the interpolated *Topics* fragment mentioned above, Lorenzo Minio-Paluello was able to reconstruct the ancient book described by the index, and his reconstruction guarantees the *ab initio* presence of all four extracts.⁶ (c) The index itself comports with known practices at Vivarium.⁷ That is, the signs that point to Vivar-

⁴ "Text" 8; Minio-Paluello, "Formation" 137.

⁵ The EYTYXOC (for -ΩΣ) that appears in some MSS of *Div.* ("Text" 4) forms part of a constellation of symptoms thought by Lowe in another context to point to Constantinople ("Symptoms" 284ff., with *CLA* III 295). Theodorus obviously worked in Constantinople, and Cassiodorus (on whom more presently) was there in the 540s. Cf. further Cavallo, "Circolazione" 217ff. It may be worth noting in this connection that *Diff. top.* and *Hyp. syll.* were translated and commented on in Byzantium (Nikitas, ed. *Diff. top.* and *Uebersetzung*): did copies (of *CPh.* too) remain in Constantinople, or were they later imported by Planudes and Holobolos?

⁶ "Text" 6, n. 11. Minio-Paluello left unbridged the gap between the lost Constantinopolitan and extant medieval traditions and inclined toward the view that the extracts are B.'s own notes ("Formation" 139ff.; "Impulsi" 758f.). But see my "Text" 5, n. 9; 7, with n. 17.

⁷ "Text" 10, n. 32. Also, the *ualde necessarius* in *A* is paralleled by one of Cassiodorus' reference signs for the Psalms (*hoc in dogmatibus ualde necessariis*, *CCL* XCVII 2); and since the title in *A* is written in two hands it is possible that the *ualde necessarius* derives independently of Renatus' *relegi meum*, i.e. derives from Vivarium. Troncarelli argues for links between a Cassiodorian edition of *CPh.* and the ancient tradition of the suite of monographs (*Aetas* 71; 108ff.; cf. *Tradizioni* 90, with n. 18 [some facts incorrectly reported]), although, following Obertello, he holds that Cassiodorus was probably ignorant of the *codex Renati* (*Aetas* 111, with n. 23). But Obertello notes, correctly, only that the Ω redaction of the *Inst.* is incognizant of the monographs; he does not rule out Cassiodorus' being connected with the ΦΔ redactions, which take into account *Diff. top.* and *Hyp. syll.* (*Sev. Boez.* I 366f.; cf. Cass., *Inst.* II 3,14/18, ad. locc. 124,22 and 128,21f. M.). According to Courcelle, Cassiodorus had *Hyp. syll.* but the Φ redactor later discovered *Diff. top.* ("Brouillon" 85). It seems to me more likely that Cassiodorus possessed the *codex Renati* but never fully digested its contents ("Text" 10, n. 29). We are in the dark. But if the Vivarian supposition is sound, then there has also to be some explanation for the connection with Constantinople, as implied by the anonymous corrector's reference to Theodorus. That Cassiodorus brought the *codex Renati* to the West seems the most natural assumption.

ium also point to the codex described by the index. Furthermore, it seems highly unlikely that Renatus either made the extracts himself or allowed any binding errors to go uncorrected, although both phenomena would easily be explained on the assumption that monks at *Vivarium* edited and in some sense reorganized the Boethian corpus.⁸ Again, the anonymous corrector worked on Boethius' text when Theodorus was still alive, which, coupled with the demise of *Vivarium* that evidently set in soon after Cassiodorus' death, would indicate a *terminus ante quem* of ca. 590.⁹ A confusion of *fit* and *sit* that may stem from the archetype hints at a codex in half-uncials, possibly with titles and divisions of the text in capitals.¹⁰

The other significant fact attending the early period of transmission is the intercalated *Topics* fragment mentioned earlier. As Minio-Paluello demonstrated, at some point a bifolium of Boethius' revised translation was inserted in a quinion of an ancient codex in such a way that the fragment was later copied into the text of *De divisione* in two parts of equal length, at 38,26 and 46,13.¹¹ In the MSS *Topics* 122a10ff. stand between *constat* and *ut* (38,26), and 122a36ff. between *retinet* and *ut* (46,13). (The *ut* appears to be coincidental.) Of the MSS used for the present edition only *FGJN* omit the fragment, while *ADP* expunge it. In some cases there was tampering in order to effect the transition out of the first half of the fragment back into the text of *De divisione*, and then out of the text of *De divisione* into the second half

⁸ "Text" 7, with n. 16; 10, nn. 31f.; 12; 34f., with n. 60. Cf. Cass., *Inst.* II 3,18 (and ad loc. 129,5ff. M.): *auctoritatem uero eorum librorum in unum codicem non incompetenter fortasse collegi, ut quicquid ad dialecticam pertinet, in una congesione codicis clauderetur. expositiones itaque diuersorum librorum, quoniam erant multiplices, sequestratim in codicibus fecimus scribi; quos in una uobis bibliotheca Domino praestante dereliqui.*

⁹ "Text" 8, n. 21; Courcelle, *Writers* 361f.; O'Donnell, *Cassiodorus* 237. If Cassiodorus died in 576 and Theodorus was (say) twenty in 527 (*GL* II 451; II 597; III 208f.; Bagnall et al., *Consuls* 588f. [an. 527]), then Theodorus was at least seventy, and a *Palatinus*, when the anonymous corrector edited B.'s monographs—assuming that was after Cassiodorus' death. The evidence takes us no further than conjectures, but to my mind there is some probability to the last one, for the carelessness with which the monographs were handled suggests the period of decline at *Vivarium*.

¹⁰ "Text" 10f.; 32f. (for "unlikely" read "less likely") and the commentary on *sit*, 22,1; cf. *CLA* III 358 and VII 1005, for sample scripts. The *f* in all but *FG* (and Vat. Regin. lat. 1649, all of which, I believe, emend) suggests that the scribe of the archetype grasped that *feri* was the expected idiom (what he had copied many times already), saw what looked like *fit* (i.e. *sit*) in the pre-archetype (on which more below), and thus substituted an indicative for a subjunctive. But this is highly speculative.

¹¹ "Text" 22ff.; Minio-Paluello, "Impulsi" 751 (in addition to works cited at "Text" loc. cit.).

of the fragment. After the first half of the fragment (*est*¹, *AL* V 2, p. 184,7) *A*² *C* *E*² add the phrase, *praedicaretur, totum uero quod genus non est non ita*, whereas *E* *K* add only *praedicaretur*. For *ut* (38,26) *E* then writes, *cum autem dicimus*. Again, after *retinet* (46,13), *A*² *C* *E* write, (*et C*) *ambigua est et dicitur graece amphibola, ut cum dico Graecos* (om. a.c. *E*) *uicisse Troianos* (*Romanos C*). *Nunc ista sufficiant, ad reliqua transeamus. Genus autem.*

Given that his main concern was the interpolated text, it was natural for Minio-Paluello to have seized upon this as the defining symptom of the textual tradition of *De divisione*. There are, however, two considerations to which he gave insufficient attention. First, our earliest MSS stem from schools of the later 10th century and show signs of contamination owing to collation, correction, and glossing; no pristine witness of an earlier age has come to light. Second, there is a MS, Vat. lat. 8591 (*H*, 11th c.), which lacks the *Topics* fragment yet is demonstrably a copy, as Minio-Paluello himself knew, of *A*, which merely expunges it. *H* proves that by incorporating corrections found in an exemplar it was possible for a MS to conceal its line of descent as far as the *Topics* fragment is concerned, and that it is therefore necessary to pay strict attention to the relations between witnesses as reflected in the text proper of *De divisione*. But here things become extraordinarily murky, as no consistently defined families emerge from amidst the confusion, much less families formed along the lines of the *Topics* fragment. Instead there is a constant shifting of allegiances, so that the absence of the *Topics* fragment from some of the earliest extant MSS would appear to be a reflex of corrections effected after the archetype, not evidence of an ancient tradition completely untouched by the interpolation.¹²

That at least has been my working hypothesis, and there is one point on which it requires revision. I have previously maintained that the archetype was the book anonymously corrected against the *codex Renati*, as in it there were transcriptional errors, omissions, and interpolations which cannot reasonably be expected to have escaped Renatus' attention. Moreover, it contained the extracts, which do not seem to have been Renatus' work. I now believe that between the *codex Renati* and archetype there was an intermediary or pre-archetype. This conviction rests on the evidence of one wrongly situated passage and four interpolated glosses.

¹² "Text" 34ff.

After *diuisio*, 24,6, there is a passage which needlessly intrudes upon the train of thought but suits perfectly the context of the proem if moved to 6,10, after *displicendi*. Most significant is the amount of text separating these two points in *De divisione*: 328 lines in Migne, or very nearly the equivalent of a complete gathering, a quinion, on Minio-Paluello's reconstruction (ca. 360 lines). The most plausible surmise seems to be that in the *pre-archetype* the passage was omitted and later reinstated as a marginal correction in the quinion after the one in which it ought to have been. The omission may have been a case of *saut du même au même* (*Sed*, 6,10/16), and since the misplaced passage echoes key words earlier in the proem, there may have been an added force driving the scribe ahead of himself.¹³ The lack of variation, in the MSS, as to the location of this phrase indicates that it stood in the text proper, not the margin, of the *archetype*. Support for this assumption is found in the varying placement, in the MSS, of Renatus' collation note, the EYTYXOC colophon, and text divisions: in the archetype these symptoms stood outside the text proper, so that with repeated copying they tended to drift about before disappearing altogether.¹⁴ How did the omitted phrase come to be reintegrated in the wrong place?

We must assume that Minio-Paluello's reconstruction reflects the foliation and quinions of the *pre-archetype*. No doubt both transcriptional errors and symptoms of disturbance in the gatherings would have carried over from the *pre-archetype* to the *archetype*, but the foliation itself would not have, and that is the point of concern. According to Minio-Paluello, *De divisione* began on fol. 66, at the medial fold of the seventh quinion.¹⁵ But it may have begun on fol. 65v, since from the incipit to 6,10, where the misplaced sentence should be, comprises just over 29 lines in Migne, which, allowing for the title, means two sides.¹⁶ I submit the following hypothesis, but without precluding competing alternatives. The *pre-archetype*, from which the phrase was originally omitted, was produced at Vivarium.

¹³ *anxietas* = *anxietas* (4,15); *facilem* = *facillimaque* (4,11); *Peripateticae disciplinae* = *Peripateticam disciplinam* (4,4); *diligenter* = *diligentissimi* (4,5).

¹⁴ "Text" 4f., with nn. 7 and 9; 11.

¹⁵ Minio-Paluello, "Nota X" 104; *AL* V, p. xxxviii. Minio-Paluello was imprecise about the book reconstructed, calling it both an "archetype" and "hyparchetype:" "Text" 12, with n. 38; cf. 5f., n. 11 (for the statistics on *Q* read "side(s)" in place of "folio(s)").

¹⁶ Each folio held the equivalent of ca. 36 lines in Migne (Minio-Paluello, "Nota X" 102f.; *AL* V, p. xxxvii).

It included the extracts by design but acquired the *Topics* bifolium when the gatherings were assembled for binding (which was perhaps after collation against the *codex Renati*). When the anonymous corrector collated the pre-archetype against the *codex Renati* he discovered the omission at 6,10 and either gave instructions or made a mental note to reintegrate the phrase "in the margin, at the medial fold of the first gathering," meaning the proem of *De divisione*, or fol. 66. But the phrase was copied into the margin of fol. 76, the medial fold, not of the first gathering, but of the first one devoted entirely to *De divisione*. Later, a new copy—the archetype, along with the anonymous corrector's collation note, as carried over from the pre-archetype—was made and the omitted phrase acquired its present location. The anonymous corrector was careless in many respects, and it may be that after having corrected the pre-archetype he did not bother to ensure that the archetype was in accord with the *codex Renati*. Or, the archetype may have been made somewhere else, e.g. at Bobbio or Verona, when the *codex Renati* was no longer available for consultation.


The pre-archetype was evidently glossed as well, for two explanatory comments introduced by *id est* found their way into the text, at 6,14 and 44,26, as did two illustrations introduced by *ut*, at 20,8f.¹⁷ These must originally have been marginal or interlinear, although their uniform placement in the MSS suggests that they stood in the text proper of the archetype.

Was this intermediary just the *codex Renati* newly annotated and rebound? If so, then (a) the four extracts formed part of it either originally or after rebinding, and (b) the misplaced passage discussed above was omitted by Theodorus and later copied in the margin by Renatus or the anonymous corrector. As to (a), it seems unlikely that the extracts were in the *codex Renati* in its original state, since Theodorus presumably copied, and Renatus sought, only the authentic works of the recently murdered compatriot Boethius. Cassiodorus and his monks, on the other hand, plundered *De differentiis topicis* for the *Institutiones* and no doubt did just the same for the newly organized series of monographs. Yet the extracts did not enter through rebinding, since they ran from the end of the ninth through the beginning of the eleventh quinion, i.e. were a planned part of the codex. As to (b), we come back to nearly the same considerations,

¹⁷ Cf. "Text" 22.

since the transposed (omitted) passage too presupposes Minio-Paluello's codex in quinions, which included the Vivarian extracts. The *codex Renati* was the anonymous corrector's touchstone, the closest thing to Boethius himself, but Cassiodorus' own *Institutiones* prove that at Vivarium even a *codex archetypus ad cuius exemplaria sunt reliqui corrigendi* was no safeguard against mishandling and error.

Thus the earliest developments would appear to have been as follows. Boethius' monographs were removed to Constantinople, where Renatus commissioned or obtained a copy from Theodorus. Renatus verified his copy, and Cassiodorus later brought it to Vivarium, where it was used to generate and then correct the pre-archetype. The pre-archetype introduced the extracts and *Topics* fragment, had a wrongly bound bifolium and gathering, and omitted a phrase which was later added in the margin of the quinion after the one in which it belonged. It also had the anonymous corrector's collation note and table of contents. The archetype then brought the marginalia into the text proper, evidently without a fresh collation against the *codex Renati*. With the possible exception of the archetype, these developments arose between ca. 525 and 590 at the outside. Although the overall hypothesis awaits testing against the other texts in the series, *De divisione* appears at least to provide decisive confirmation of Minio-Paluello's reconstruction of the lost codex, i.e. pre-archetype, in ca. 285 folios or 28 and a half quinions. Here is a revised stemma¹⁸ for the lost tradition:



The final split will be explained presently.

¹⁸ Cf. "Text" 24.

II. *The Extant Tradition*

De divisione survives, complete or in part, in at least 197 MSS, seven of which I have used for reconstituting the text.¹⁹ With minor exceptions the readings of the seven are reported *perpetuo more*, in either the critical apparatus or Appendix:

- A Orléans, Bibl. Mun., 267.** Parchment. 99 pp. (numbered 2-75, 78-79 *ter*, 80-99), long lines, 40-42 to the side. 310 x 220 mm. Probably second half of the 10th c. Origin Fleury-sur-Loire. **1.** Anon., Logical notes, tables, and diagrams, pp. 2-5. **2.** Boethius, *In Isag.* II, pp. 6-57. **3.** Index of Boethian titles + Boethius, *Diff. top.*, pp. 57-88. **4.** Boethius, *Div.*, pp. 88-99 (*Top.* fr., pp. 96-97, 98-99). Originally conjugate with Paris, Bibl. Nat., n.a.l. 1611.²⁰
- C Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 6400E.** Parchment. 89 + 2 (blank and unnumbered) fols., long lines, 42 to the side. 250 x 165 mm. 11th-12th c. Origin Italy. **1.** Boethius, *In Perih.* II 178,9ff., fols. 1-56v. **2.** Boethius, *Hyp. syll.*, fols. 57-76v. **3.** Boethius, *Div.*, fols. 76v-83 (*Top.* fr., fols. 81-81v, 82v). **4.** Victorinus, *Def.* (to 26,5 S.), fols. 83-89v.²¹
- E Leiden, Bibl. der Rijksuniv., B.P.L. 84.** Parchment. 103 fols., long lines, 36-37 to the side. 260 x 150 mm. 11th c. Origin uncertain. **1.** Boethius, *Div.*, fols. 1-7v (*Top.* fr., fols. 6, 7). **2.** Victorinus, *Def.*, fols. 8-16v. **3.** Boethius, *Hyp. syll.*, fols. 17-44v. **4.** Boethius, *Intr. cat. syll.*, fols. 45-67. **5.** Boethius, *Antepr.*, fols. 67v-89v. **6.** Alcuin, *Dial.*, fols. 90-103v. Two initial quaternions missing.²²
- F Bern, Burgerbibl., 300.** Parchment. 64 fols., long lines, 42 to the side. 255 x 170 mm. 11th c. Origin (?) France. **1.** Boethius,

¹⁹ To "Text" 45, between nos. 31 and 32, should be added the fragment, no. 168, in Gibson-Smith, *Codices* 183f.

²⁰ Cuissard, *Catalogue* 130f.; Delisle, "Notice" 391ff.; *Libri et Barrois* 59ff.; Mostert, *Library* 160; Samaran-Marichal, *Catalogue* IV 1, p. 195, with pl. 4; VII 570; Van de Vyver, "Oeuvres" 131f.; Olsen, *L'étude* I 243; Minio-Paluello, "Formation" 136ff.; *AL Codd. Suppl.* 2055 + 2080.

²¹ Melot, *Catalogus* 239 (dating to the 15th c.); Avril-Zaluska, *Manuscripts* I 68, with pl. 46; *AL Codd. Suppl.* 581.

²² Molhuysen, *Bibliotheca* 45; *AL Codd. Suppl.* 2026. Minio-Paluello corrected Molhuysen's errors, adding some of his own.

Diff. top., fols. 1-3 (first two quaternions missing). **2.** Boethius, *Div.*, fols. 3-8v, 17. **3.** Boethius, *Antepr.*, fols. 17-24v (ending missing). **4.** Boethius, *Intr. cat. syll.*, fols. 25-32v, 49-50v (beginning missing). **5.** Boethius, *Hyp. syll.*, fols. 50v-56v, 9-16v, 57-60. **6.** Apuleius, *Peri H.*, fols. 60v-64v. **7.** [Augustine], *Dec. cat. (Paraphr. themist.)*, fols. 64v, 33-43. **8.** Victorinus, *Def.*, fols. 43-48v (ending missing). The order of gatherings should be: 1, 3-4, 7, 2, 8, 5-6.²³

G Vatican City (Rome), Bibl. Apost. Vat., Ottob. lat. 1406. Parchment. 2 + 176 (48 bis) + 1 fols., long lines, 30 to the side. 270 x 170 mm. Late-11th c. Origin Monte Cassino. **1.** Porphyry, *Isag.*, fols. ii-10v. **2.** Aristotle, *Cat.* + diagrams, fols. 10v-32. **3.** Aristotle, *Peri H.*, fols. 32v-43v. **4.** Cicero, *Top.*, fols. 44v-57v. **5.** Boethius, *Diff. top.*, fols. 58-94v. **6.** Boethius, *Intr. cat. syll.*, fols. 94v-125. **7.** Boethius, *Hyp. syll.*, fols. 125-163. **8.** Boethius, *Div.*, fols. 163v-176.²⁴

K St Gall, Stiftsbibl., 830. Parchment. 490 pp. (numbered 3-490), long lines, 28-32 to the side. 230 x 185 mm. First third of the 11th c. Origin (?) Mainz. **1.** Boethius, *In Perih.* II, pp. 3-264. **2.** Cicero, *Top.*, pp. 265-282. **3.** (?) Boethius + [Boethius], *Geom.*, pp. 283-310. **4.** Boethius, *Diff. top.*, pp. 311-353. **5.** Boethius, *Div.*, pp. 353-369 (*Top.* fr., pp. 364-365, 367-368). **6.** [Boethius], Rhetorical excerpts, pp. 369-376. **7.** Boethius, *Antepr.*, pp. 376-408. **8.** Boethius, *Intr. cat. syll.*, pp. 408-444. **9.** Boethius, *Hyp. syll.*, pp. 444-488. **10.** Ekkehard IV, Verses on Boethius, p. 488. **11.** Ekkehard IV, Allegory on the Seven Liberal Arts, p. 490.²⁵

Q Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibl., Phill. 1786. Parchment. 107 fols., long lines, 10-19 to the side. 125 x 105 mm. 10th-11th c. Origin France. **1.** Anon., Astrological excerpt, fol. 1. **2.** Boethius, *In Perih.* II 7,18ff. + II 469,10ff. (adapted), fol. 1v. **3.** Anon. rhetorical extracts + Alcuin, *Rhet.* (extract) + anon. verses, fols. 2-4v. **4.** Victorinus, *Def.*, fols. 5-60v. **5.** Boethius, *Div.*, fols. 61-107v

²³ Hagen, *Catalogus* 318f.; Delisle, *Cabinet* II 162 ("Laurencius des Caisneis"); II 201; III 57, no. 8; Olsen, *L'étude* I 21; *AL Codd. Suppl.* 2120. Hagen conflates (3) and (4).

²⁴ Pellegrin et al., *Manuscripts* I 548f.; Lowe-Brown, *Beneventan* I 17; I 73; I 151, n. 3; II 166; Olsen, *L'étude* I 293; *AL Codd. Suppl.* 2184.

²⁵ Scherrer, *Verzeichniss* 281f.; Hoffmann, *Buchkunst* I 256f.; Bruckner, *Scriptoria* 118; Olsen, *L'étude* I 286; *AL Codd. Suppl.* 1165.

(*Top. fr.*, fols. 94-96, 102v-104v). Originally conjugate with Phillips 1787.²⁶

The readings of five others are reported only sporadically:

B Paris, Bibl. Nat., n.a.l. 1478. Parchment. 91 fols., long lines, 29 to the side. 275 x 180 mm. Late-10th c. Origin Cluny. **1.** Anon., Notes on Boethius' life and works, fols. 1-1v. **2.** Boethius, *CPh.*, fols. 2-55v. **3.** Index of Boethian titles + Boethius, *Diff. top.*, fols. 56-80v. **4.** Boethius, *Div.*, fols. 80v-90 (*Top. fr.*, fols. 87v, 89-89v). **5.** Anon., Notes, fols. 90v-91v. Composite codex, the division being at (3). Cited once in the critical apparatus (22,1).²⁷

D Valenciennes, Bibl. Mun., 406. Parchment. 149 fols., dual columns / long lines, 33-34 to the column / side. 290 x 225 mm. 10th-11th c. Origin France. **1.** Juvenal, *Sat.* III 309ff., fol. 1-1v. **2.** Cicero, *Top.* + Boethius, *In Cic. top.*, fols. 2-51. **3.** Apuleius, *Peri H.*, fols. 51v-57. **4.** *Historia comitis Balduini*, fol. 57-57v. **5.** Index of Boethian titles + Boethius, *Diff. top.*, fols. 58-80. **6.** Boethius, *Div.*, fols. 80-88v (*Top. fr.*, fols. 86-86v, 87v-88). **7.** [Boethius], Rhetorical excerpts, fols. 88v-91v. **8.** Boethius, *Antepr.*, fols. 91v-107. **9.** Boethius, *Intr. cat. syll.*, fols. 107-124v. **10.** Boethius, *Hyp. syll.*, fols. 124v-149. Composite codex, the divisions being at (2) and (5). Cited twice (14,18; 18,22).²⁸

J Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 11127. Parchment. 215 fols., long lines, 32 to the side. 245 x 175 mm. Probably late-10th c. Origin Echternach. **1.** Boethius, *In Perih.* I, fols. 1-46. **2.** Aristotle, *Peri H.*, fols. 46v-53. **3.** Apuleius, *Peri H.*, fols. 53-58v. **4.** [Cicero], *Orat. in Sallustium*, fols. 58v-61. **5.** [Sallust], *Orat. in Ciceronem*, fols. 61-62. **6.** *Controversia Deoderici metensis episcopi in Karolum*, fols. 62-63. **7.** Cassiodorus, *Inst.* II 3,17f. (127,27ff. M. = PL LXX 1202c13ff.), fol. 64. **8.** Boethius, *Div.*, fols. 64v-74. **9.** Boethius, *Diff. top.*, fols. 74-101. **10.** [Boethius], Rhetorical excerpts, fols. 101-105. **11.** Boethius, *Antepr.*, fols. 105-123v. **12.** Boethius, *Intr. cat. syll.*, fols. 123v-145v. **13.** Boethius, *Hyp. syll.*, fols. 145v-170v. **14.** Hyginus,

²⁶ Rose-Schillmann, *Verzeichniss* I 389f.; Barker-Benfield, rev. of Olsen 291; 293.

²⁷ Delisle, *Chuni* 160ff.; Samaran-Marichal, *Catalogue* IV 1, p. 338 (note "Beda Venerabilis" and the omission of *Div.*); *AL Codd. Suppl.* 2079. My original dating, "Text" 1, has been adjusted.

²⁸ Lièvre, *Catalogue* 367f.; Olsen, *L'étude* I 26; *AL Codd. Suppl.* 2085.

Astron., fols. 170v-201. **15.** [Alexander], *Epist. ad Aristotelem*, fols. 201-215v. Composite codex, the division being at (7). Cited once (30,32).²⁹

N Chartres, Bibl. Mun., 498. Parchment. 246 fols., dual columns, 47 lines to the column. 430 x 365 mm. Mid-12th c. Origin Chartres. **1.** Arist., *Soph. el.*, fols. 2-12. **2.** Boethius, *Antepr.*, fols. 12-22. **3.** Boethius, *Intr. cat. syll.*, fols. 22-33v. **4.** Apuleius, *Peri H.*, fols. 33v-37. **5.** Boethius, *Hyp. syll.*, fols. 37-52. **6.** Cicero, *Top.*, fols. 52v-58. **7.** Boethius, *Diff. top.*, fols. 58-73. **8.** Boethius, *Div.*, fols. 73-78. **9.** Victorinus, *Def.*, fols. 78v-85. **10.** Boethius, *Inst. ar.*, fols. 86-114. **11.** Anon., Notes on Boethius, *Inst. ar.* + extracts from Martianus Capella, *Nupt.* VII, fols. 114v-122. **12.** Anon., Arithmetic, fols. 122-124v. **13.** Boethius, *Inst. mus.*, fols. 125-140v (to II 21). **14.** Adelard of Bath, *Eucl. geom.* XIV 8ff., fol. 141-141v. **15.** (?) Boethius, *Geom.*, fols. 141v-143 (fragment). **16.** Anon., Excerpts on measurement, fols. 143-153. **17.** Excerpt from Euclid, fol. 153. **18.** Gerbert, *Geom.*, fols. 153-154v (fragment). **19.** (?) Boethius, *Geom.*, fols. 155-166. **20.** Gerlandus, *De abaco*, fols. 166v-169v. **21.** Hyginus, *Astron.*, fols. 170v-173v. **22.** Ptolemy, *Praecep. can.*, fols. 174-184. **23.** Anon., Astronomical tables, fols. 184v-246. Second volume of Thierry's "Hepta-teuch." Perished in 1944 (microfilm in Toronto, Louvain). Cited four times (10,28f.; 18,27; 42,20; 46,15).³⁰

P London, Lamb. Pal., 339. Parchment. 2 + 174 fols., long lines, 28-29 to the side. 260 x 170 mm. 12th c. Origin England. **1.** Porphyry, *Isag.*, fols. 1-10v. **2.** Aristotle, *Cat.*, fols. 10v-28. **3.** Aristotle, *Peri H.*, fols. 28v-38v. **4.** Victorinus, *Def.*, fols. 39-55 (ending missing). **5.** Boethius, *Div.*, fols. 55v-68v (*Top.* fr., fols. 65, 67-67v). **6.** Boethius, *Diff. top.*, fols. 68v-101. **7.** Cicero, *Top.*, fols. 101v-113. **8.** Boethius, *Intr. cat. syll.*, fols. 113v-139. **9.** Boethius, *Hyp. syll.*, fols. 140-172v. **10.** Anon., Notes on logic, fols. 173v-174. Cited twice (46,9).³¹

²⁹ Delisle, *Inventaire* I 111; Viré, "Transmission" 238; Olsen, *L'étude* I 25; *AL Codd.* 618 (incomplete). At "Text" 6 I overlooked (12), i.e. no. VIII in the ancient index.

³⁰ Omont et al., *Catalogue* 212ff.; Folkerts, ed. *Geometrie* 8f.; Grabmann, *Geschichte* II 67f.; Jauneau, "Prologus;" Viré, "Transmission" 227f., with nn. 1f.; Olsen, *L'étude* I 163; *AL Codd. Suppl.* 475. As far as I can tell, Folkerts' description of this highly fragmented miscellany is truer than Omont's.

³¹ James-Jenkins, *Catalogue* 445f.; Olsen, *L'étude* I 219; Gibson-Smith, *Codices* 162f. (no. 146); *AL Codd. Suppl.* 287. James and Lacombe make two works of (9).

Of all twelve MSS only *A B J K* record Renatus' name in the incipit, while *A B D* preserve the ancient index before *De differentiis topicis*. All but *F G J N* include the *Topics* fragment, and (again) *A² C E²* are related in their efforts to adjust the first half to context, as are *E K*, while *A² C E* are related in their efforts to adjust the second half to context.

The extant tradition is an open one, which effectively prevents the detection of *descripti*. Moreover, there is at every point in the process of *eliminatio* the risk of removing a MS which, although appearing hopelessly contaminated on first inspection, might prove less so if considered in the light of a smaller or different group of witnesses. My aim has been to adopt those MSS which, despite contamination, give signs of reaching back to a primitive stratum of error while at the same time furnishing the highest possible number of correct or plausible readings. To judge from our MSS the archetype had nine certain errors (not counting the interpolated *Topics* fragment), and there are 19 others apparently of the same origin.³² The most striking characteristic of the tradition is witnessed in the patterns of filiation emerging from comparisons drawn in pairs.³³ *A Q* head the list with 50 shared errors. It seems that they are *gemelli*, since there are differences between them which admit of no explanation on the assumption of one's being an apograph of the other, and they sometimes select independently from corrections and glosses in what was evidently a common exemplar.³⁴ Thereafter follow *F G*, with 35 conjunctive errors.³⁵ Which leaves *C E K*. Now it is evident that *C E* form a coherent pair of some kind, and when groups of consentient witnesses are drawn three at a time *K* emerges as a member of the most


³² *Certain*: 4,12; 6,10/14; 12,24; 18,5; 20,8f. twice; 32,26; 44,26. *Apparent*: 10,9/24/28f.; 14,18; 16,18; 18,22 twice/25/27; 30,30/32; 32,17; 34,29; 38,22; 42,20; 46,9 twice/14f. twice. Cf. above, n. 10.

³³ In the following tabulations I include variants that are evidently cognate but not identical, and give relatively little attention to MSS after correction. Only a few of the correctors active in the main MSS can be followed with consistent precision.

³⁴ *Pace* Barker-Benfield, ap. Reynolds, ed. *Texts* 231. *Shared errors*: 4,6f.; 6,3; 8,11/21; 12,3/4 twice/22; 14,11f. twice/17; 16,3; 18,25; 20,8/28; 22,16 twice; 24,16/26; 26,1/13/21; 28,11 twice; 30,8/9/16/31; 32,14; 34,6/13/16 twice/19f. twice; 36,7f.; 38,3/7; 40,7/14/24/28f. twice; 42,23/29; 44,21; 48,2/18/23f.; 50,1.

³⁵ 4,6f.; 6,4; 8,1f.; 10,11; 12,1f./6/26; 14,15/19; 16,11/13; 20,12; 22,14/32; 24,22 twice; 26,6/25/27; 30,23/30; 32,7/20; 34,3/5/17 twice; 38,8f.; 42,29; 46,5; 48,4f. thrice/8/15.

prominent triad, *A K Q*.³⁶ Within this triad *A K* agree six and *K Q* three times, and in four instances we encounter the split, *A K Q* - *C E* - *F G*. Seven times *A C E K Q* stand in error against *F G*, as do *A F G K Q* four times against *C E*, but *C E F G* never agree in error against *A K Q*.³⁷ Which suggests the following stemma:



wherein δ mediates γ and ϵ , and ϵ marks the first full removal of the *Topics* fragment.

But the stemma fails to hold up, since it cannot explain the consentient pairs, *C F*, *C G*, *E F*, *E G*, *E K*, or the larger groups, *A E F Q*, *A C E G Q*, *A C F G Q*, all of which are in evidence.³⁸ There are indeed no fixed families, only broken allegiances.³⁹ And although *A K*

³⁶ *C E*: 4,8; 8,21 twice; 10,8/19; 12,16; 20,7/28; 24,16/25; 26,2/19/21; 28,17; 32,20; 38,22; 40,29; 46,5/13; 48,21. *A K Q*: 6,2f. twice/5; 8,8; 12,16; 18,19; 22,8/26; 26,19; 30,32; 36,7; 38,8f./10; 42,24f.

³⁷ *A K*: 16,14; 24,8; 36,23; 42,28f. twice; 46,2. *K Q*: 34,6; 38,9; 44,19. *A K Q* - *C E* - *F G*: 12,16; 26,19; 38,8f.; 42,29. *A C E K Q*: 12,26; 14,18; 22,1; 34,11/21/29 twice. *A F G K Q*: 22,14; 36,13; 46,15 twice. (12,16 may imply the split *C E F G* - *A K Q*, but if so, it is *A K Q* that are in error.)

³⁸ *C F*: 10,16; 12,8; 16,9-11 thrice; 18,16; 22,19f./30; 34,6; 40,14. *C G*: 16,19; 22,10f.; 34,1; 36,15; 40,26; 44,23/26; 46,3/16; 48,9. *E F*: 8,24; 26,9; 48,7. *E G*: 10,33; 18,18; 22,9/13; 24,15 (? by homoeoteleuton); 26,16; 34,1/26; 36,1/22. *E K*: 4,5; 6,22/24; 10,8; 12,26f.; 14,16f. twice/23; 16,6f.; 18,7/22; 20,6; 26,13f. twice/17; 28,4/21; 30,4f./8/19; 34,7/24; 40,27; 46,5; 48,22f. *A E F Q*: 18,24; 34,15; 42,3; 44,17; 46,1/6/18f. twice/20f./24; 48,15. *A C E G Q*: 42,22; 44,26. *A C F G Q*: 4,10; 34,10; 46,9.

³⁹ Cf. further: *A E*: 26,7; 44,21; 46,22; 48,9. *C K*: 20,15/17; 34,23; 42,4/26. *F Q*: 28,32; 32,3/24; 38,22. *G K*: 8,25; 16,27; 26,6; 30,24; 34,29; 38,4; 48,12.

Q either singly or *en bloc* more easily commingle with *C E* and *F G* than the latter do with one another, it is my strong suspicion that the two pairs are in larger measure dependent upon the trio *A K Q* than it is upon either of them. Be that as it may, the readings of the archetype ω are inaccessible through strict recension. Instead, we must judge readings according to their merits.

If my analysis is correct, then something like the following must have happened.⁴⁰ The archetype survived into the 9th century, when there was renewed interest in Boethius, and men like Lupus of Ferrières and the monks of St Gall made a practice of collating and editing MSS.⁴¹ Either copies of *De divisione* were first made from the archetype with the *Topics* fragment intact, the deletions later arising independently in different schools and monasteries, or the *Topics* fragment was expunged in the archetype but in some instances the expunction signs were observed while in others they were ignored, so that there was an initial dissemination of two species of text. Either way, over the course of the 9th and 10th centuries the corpus of monographs, along with the ancient index, collation notes, etc., began to disintegrate as individual works were selected for copying and others were left out. In the case of *De divisione* in particular, MSS that had the *Topics* fragment along with expunction signs would have generated some copies with the fragment and others without it, while owing to contamination various errors, corrections, and glosses pertaining to the text proper would have begun to move about independently of the *Topics* fragment. For to adopt or reject the fragment would not necessarily entail adopting or rejecting all (or any) of the other elements of an exemplar: a scribe could always select randomly. By ca. 970 any lines separating families were already blurred. The *Topics* fragment had not yet disappeared, and symptoms of the

A E Q: 4,3; 24,2; 30,15/22; 32,1; 42,26; 44,11. *A F Q*: 10,15; 14,23; 16,12; 20,7; 36,15; 40,2/5/20/26/30; 42,17. *F G Q*: 8,5/12/22; 12,12; 18,6 thrice; 20,24; 22,32; 24,3; 34,3. *A C E Q*: 10,13; 14,2; 28,10; 32,20/26; 40,28. *A C K Q*: 6,12; 18,7; 46,15. *A E K Q*: 12,3; 28,1/4; 38,9/14; 40,26f.; 48,14.

⁴⁰ Cf. "Text" 35.

⁴¹ Alcuin (*MGH, PLAC* I 204, v. 1547) does not say whether the monographs were at York, and the occasional insular symptoms in our MSS are not proof of an insular intermediary. For once insular practices had become established in a continental scriptorium, they could be applied to texts that had not actually descended through insular traditions. Even the survival of a 9th-c. caroline witness with a strong predilection for Irish abbreviations would be very suggestive, but no such thing is known to me. Cf. Bischoff, *Palaeography* 123.

archetype still survived in the subscriptions, table of contents, etc., but there were some cases in which copyists eliminated the *Topics* fragment owing to corrections they either inherited or intuited, others in which they left the fragment intact, possibly even others in which they incorporated it (supposing a scribe consulted two exemplars, one of which included the fragment). There would have been little or no pattern to the manner in which scribes made their choices. One might retain the fragment but ignore the Renatus evidence (cf. *C E Q*); another might remove the fragment and combine readings from traditions that were unrelated in regard to both the fragment and text proper (cf. the split allegiance of *F*, with both *A Q* and *G*), and so on. But by the 12th century the Vivarian symptoms had pretty well vanished, and the text of *De divisione* itself was badly mongrelized. Our earliest MSS give us a kind of snapshot of the various changes in progress.

It appears, then, that the *Topics* fragment was first removed from *De divisione* in the Middle Ages, and that there was no independent ancient tradition untouched by it. In the absence of witnesses of the 9th century and before, much necessarily remains in doubt, but there are two errors in *F* and three in *F G* which suggest that these two MSS at least, which omit the fragment, are not in fact emissaries of a more ancient or authoritative tradition: (a) *F* has the *duplex lectio* at 6,3 (*aequum*), apparently incorporating a marginal variant from its exemplar (cf. the marginalia in *A*). (b) At 46,13 *F* omits the phrase, *ut supra iam dictum est*, which follows hard on the heels of the second half of the *Topics* fragment. Noteworthy here is the fact that the corrector of *D* expunges just the same phrase, as though it formed part of the fragment.⁴² (c) At 48,4f. *F G* incorporate three spurious phrases which show up also in *D* and Vat. lat. 8591 (*H*). But note that whereas *D H* record the phrases as interlinear variants, *F G* bring them into the text, as do *N P* later.⁴³ *H* (following the corrector of *A*) and *N*, it may be recalled, have removed the *Topics* fragment, while *D P* merely expunge it. The unique virtue of *F G* appears to be their preservation of some necessary readings which are otherwise unattested. But whether those readings actually descend from *Boethius*, and not from a brilliant medieval emendator, remains uncertain.

⁴² "Text" 36.

⁴³ "Text" 32.

The printed editions of Martianus Rota (Venice 1543, 1547, 1559) and Henrichus Loritus "Glareanus" (Basel 1546, 1570) combine to form the basis for Migne (*PL* LXIV, Paris 1847, 1860, 1891) and are inferior to the *editio princeps* (*Pr*).⁴⁴ Pozzi's edition is simply *Pr* as controlled by Padua, Anton. Scaff. XXII 553 (12th c.), while Smith's is based on Glareanus, *Pr*, *A* (Smith's *O*), and Munich Clm. 6372 (10th-11th c., Smith's *A*).⁴⁵ Reported in the present edition are some readings from *Pr* and the commentaries of Peter Abelard (*Ab*) and Albert the Great (*Alb*), along with two conjectures not my own.⁴⁶ *Ab*, *Alb*, and *Pr* are cited when the MSS, especially in their uncorrected state, fail to provide anything superior, and no inference as to what is in them or *B D J N P* should be drawn on the basis of silence in the critical apparatus.

The apparatus is a mixed one, but with minor exceptions the readings of the main MSS can be determined throughout. Variants are reported negatively only where four criteria are met by the evidence: (a) there is only one variant for the word(s) at issue; (b) the range of text to which the variant applies is clear; (c) no carrier of the variant has been significantly corrected; (d) no more than three MSS carry the variant. Otherwise, variants are reported positively, either with or without a lemma. Corrections are signalled by either ^c or ²: the former if the correction is in the hand of the scribe, or of someone so closely contemporaneous with the scribe that it would be nugatory to distinguish between them; the latter if the correction is in a later and (or) quite distinct hand. This holds even where several correctors have been active in a MS. Interlinear additions marked in some witnesses as glosses but in others as corrections or variant readings have been retained; where it is difficult to determine whether unique additions are intended as corrections or glosses I report only what seems of importance for establishing the text. In the critical apparatus no distinction is made between emendations and variants, since it is generally impossible to be certain of the correctors' precise inten-

⁴⁴ "Text" 2, n.1; Komm. f. d. Gesamtk., *Gesamtkatalog* 296f. (no. 4511).

⁴⁵ Pozzi, *Trattato* v; Smith, ed. *Porph. fr.* xif.; xxiii.

⁴⁶ *Pr*: 14,18; 18,22/25; 32,17; 38,8f.; 46,14. *Ab*: 14,17f. twice; 18,22. *Alb*: 18,22; 46,9 twice. (In the apparatus no distinction is made between lemmata, citations, and paraphrases, and for *Alb* I take into account only what comes from the commentary itself, as the *textus praemissi* are of no independent value: "Text" 2, n. 1.) *Conjectures*: 4,8 = Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 120, n. 1; 18,5 = M. Asztalos, in a private communication.

tions. The punctuation is my own, and in both the text and apparatus the orthography has been silently normalized, with some exceptions. Finally, in an open tradition such as this one the critical apparatus is bound to be laden with many *lectiones singulares* that shed no light on the essential lines of transmission. In order to alleviate the situation I have relegated almost all of them to the Appendix, where again I have suppressed those that are especially trivial.

ANICII MANLII SEVERINI

BOETHII

DE DIVISIONE LIBER

SIGLA

Codices qui semper adhibentur :

- A* Orléans, Bibl. Mun., 267 (223), saec. x/xi
- C* Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 6400E, saec. xi/xii
- E* Leiden, Bibl. d. Rijksuniv., B.P.L. 84, saec. xi
- F* Bern, Burgerbibl., 300, saec. xi
- G* Rome, Bibl. Apost. Vat., Ottob. lat. 1406, saec. xi^{ex}.
- K* St Gall, Stiftsbibl., 830, saec. xi
- Q* Berlin, Deutsche Staatsbibl., Phill. 1786, saec. x/xi

Qui raro laudantur :

- B* Paris, Bibl. Nat., N.A.L. 1478, saec. x^{ex}.
- D* Valenciennes, Bibl. Mun., 406, saec. x/xi
- J* Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 11127, saec. x/xi
- N* Chartres, Bibl. Mun., 498, saec. xii^{med}.
- P* London, Lamb. Pal., 339, saec. xii

- Ab* Petri Abaelardi commentarii citatio vel paraphrasis, saec. xii
- Alb* Alberti Magni commentarii citatio vel paraphrasis, saec. xiii
- Pr* Editio princeps, Venetiis 1492

* * *

- A, C, etc.* = lectio originalis in *A, C, etc.*
- A^c, C^c, etc.* = correctio in *A, C, etc.*, utrum scribae ipsius sit an alterius fere eiusdem aetatis incertum
- A², C², etc.* = correctio manus recentioris in *A, C, etc.*

* * *

- [...] = litterae quasi tres quae legi nequeunt
- *** = lacuna quasi trium litterarum
- /// = rasura quasi trium litterarum
- ? = fortasse
- ... = usque ad

DE DIVISIONE LIBER

PL LXIV

- 875d Quam magnos studiosis afferat fructus scientia diuidendi quamque
apud Peripateticam disciplinam semper haec fuerit in honore notitia,
docet et Andronici diligentissimi senis *De diuisione* liber editus ; et hic 5
- 876d idem a Plotino grauissimo philosopho com|probatus et in Platonis
libri qui *Sophistes* inscribitur commentariis a Porphyrio repetitus, et ab
eodem per hanc *Introductionis* laudata in *Categorias* utilitas. Dicit enim
necessariam fore generis, speciei, differentiae, proprii, accidentisque
- 877 peritiam cum | propter alia multa tum propter utilitatem quae est 10
maxima partiendi. Quare, quoniam maximus usus est facillimaque
doctrina, ego id quoque sicut pleraque, omnia Romanis auribus
tradens, introductionis modo habitaque in eandem rem et
competenti subtilique tractatione et moderata breuitate perscripsi, ut
nec anxietas decisae orationis et non perfectae sententiae legentium 15

Fontes :5 *Andronici liber de diuisione non exstat*7 *commentarius Porphyrii in Sophisten non exstat*8 Porph., *Isag.* 1,3-6 B.

Titulus :

ANITII (-CII *p.c.*) MALLII SEVERINI BOETHII .V.C. ET ILLST. EXCONS.
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MARTIVS NOVATVS RENAT' .V.C. ET SP. RELEGI MEVM A : ANNICII
MALLII SEV. B. VIRI CLARISS. ET ILL'. EXC. ORD. P. LIB DIVISIONV
ICIP. C : INCIPIT DIVISIONIS LIBER EIVSDĒ BOECII E : ANITII MANLII
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MARCIV' NOVAT' RENAT' V.C ET SP RELEGIT MECV K : INCIPIT LIBER
DIVISIONIS Q

Varia lectio :

3 afferat A' C E² F G : eff- A E Q : effecerat K 5 diligentissimi] E' (*dist.*), K' : -mis
E K || senis] E' : eius E 6 comprobatus] A' : -tur A C Q 6/7 platonis libri
A' C E : li. pl. tr. F G : pl. -is A : -is pl. Q : pl. -um K 7 repetitus] -itur C : -itis E
8 hanc] diuisionem add. E : haec con. *Morax* || *Categorias*] E² F' (*ras.*) : -iis C E
10 cum A' E K Q' : tum A C F G Q 12 id quoque ego scr. : qu. id tr. *codd.*
13 eandem rem] E : eadem re C E' F

ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETHIUS

ON DIVISION

The book *On Division* published by Andronicus, a most diligent scholar of old, treats of the considerable advantages the science of dividing brings to scholars and of the high esteem in which this branch of knowledge was always held within the Peripatetic discipline. Plotinus, a most profound philosopher, thought highly of Andronicus' book and Porphyry adapted it in his commentary on Plato's dialogue entitled *The Sophist*. It was also Porphyry who acknowledged the utility of his *Introduction to the Categories* with reference to this science. For he says that a knowledge of genus, species, difference, property, and accident is a necessary prerequisite to, among several other things, partitioning, which is of the greatest utility. Because of its very great utility, therefore, and because the doctrine is very easy, I have written on this as on numerous other subjects, making all of them accessible to a Roman audience. I have kept within the confines of an introduction and made the treatment both subtle, as comports with the subject matter, and yet of moderate brevity, so that the anxiety that is caused by a curtailed discourse and incomplete line of argument should not be brought upon the minds

- mentibus ingeratur ; nec putet superuacuum loquacitatem harum rerum inexperiens, rudis, insolensque noui audientium mentes habere aequum, nec ullus lior id quod et arduum natura est et ignotum nostris, nobis autem magno et labore et legentium utilitate digestum, obliquis morsibus obtrectationis offuscet, dentque potius uiam studiis, nunc ignoscendo nunc etiam comprobando, quam
b frena bonis artibus stringant, dum quicquid nouum est imprudenti obstinatione repudiant. Quis enim non uideat plurimum ad bonarum artium ualere defectum si apud mentes hominum numquam sit desperatio displicendi ? <Sed si cui per haec quaedam paratur anxietas aut obscuriora sunt fortasse quam ipse desiderat, nihil ad me cognitionem facilem pollicentem, neque enim rudibus haec totius artis sed imbutis et ulteriore paene loco progressis legenda et discenda proponimus. Qui uero huius operis [id est dialectici] ordo sit cum *De ordine Peripateticae disciplinae* mihi dicendum esset diligenter exposui.> Sed haec hactenus.
- Nunc diuisionis ipsius nomen diuidendum est et secundum unumquodque diuisionis uocabulum uniuscuiusque propositi proprietates partesque tractandae sunt, diuisio namque multis dicitur modis. Est enim diuisio generis in species, est rursus diuisio cum totum in proprias distribuitur partes, est alia cum uox multa significans in significationes proprias recipit sectionem. Praeter has autem tres est alia diuisio quae secundum accidens fieri dicitur. Huius triplex modus est : unus cum subiectum in accidentia separamus, alius cum
c accidens in subiecta diuidimus, tertius cum accidens in accidentia secamus (hoc ita fit si utraque eidem subiecto inesse uideantur). Sed

15 *Boethii liber de ordine Peripateticae disciplinae non exstat*

1 nec ... aequum (3)] a correctore recentiore cod. A in margine repetita sunt, uocabulo aliter introducenti || putet] A : om. A²(mg.), F K 2 inexperiens] A K : -ntes A²(mg.), K^c : inexper... C || rudis] A : -es A²(mg.), K^c : -i K || insolensque] -ns A K Q : -ntes A²(mg.), K^c 3 aequum A^c(textu ipso), C E : om. G : esse praem. A²(mg.) : est add. A K Q : aequum est (ae. es. s.l.) aliter nec superuacuum loquacitatem harum rerum inexperientes rudes insolentesque noui audientium mentes habere aequum est (esse s.l.) F || lior] A² G(lib-) : labor A Q 4 et^l ma. tr. K || et^l la. ma. tr. F || ut. le. tr. F G 5 offuscet] A² : -at A K Q 9 defectum] E² : eff- E : prof- K 10 desperatio A^c(dis- a.c.), E² F G K : disputa- C E(? -pur-), Q || displicendi A² C E^c F G : -dis E K Q : -cidis A(vid.) 10-16 < > ab 24,6 huc transponenda duxi 12 pollicentem A² E F G : -ti A C K Q 14 [] ego secl. 19 multis] E² Q^c : -i E Q 22 has] A : eas A^c E K 24 alius] A : alter A² E K

of my readers. Nor should he who has no experience of these matters, who is uneducated and put off by what is new, consider it preferable that empty verbiage detain the minds of my audience, or any rabid and vicious sentiment of malice vilify this work, which I have most painstakingly (for the task is inherently arduous) digested with an eye to what would be of use to my readers (for what I present is unknown to our people). No, they should make way for scholarly pursuits in a spirit of generosity, indeed approval, and not rein the liberal arts in by spurning out of foolish stubbornness whatever is new. For who cannot see that it contributes greatly to the decline of the liberal arts if in the minds of men there is never any feeling of despair at the thought of causing displeasure? At the same time, it is no concern of mine if despite my promise of an easily mastered doctrine someone feels a certain anxiety owing to the subject matter or happens to find it more obscure than he wishes: it is not my intention that those who are altogether uneducated in the art should read and learn this material but that the initiates who have pretty well reached the higher levels do so. In the work which I thought it necessary to write *On the Order of the Peripatetic Discipline* I have diligently explained at what point the present treatise should be taken up for study.

So much for those matters. It is necessary now to divide the term “division” itself and to treat of the distinguishing property and members of each significate proposed, since “division” is predicated in more than one way. For there is “division” of a genus into its species and “division” when a whole is distributed among its proper parts, and yet another sense when a spoken sound signifying more than one thing is split into its proper significations. In addition to these three there is another kind of division, which is said to be made *secundum accidentis*. Of this there are three modes: one when we separate a subject into accidents, another when we divide an accident into subjects, a third when we split an accident into accidents, as occurs when it is evident that both inhere in a common subject. It is necessary to

harum omnium exempla subdenda sunt quatenus totius huius ratio diuisionis eluceat.

Genus diuidimus in species cum dicimus “animalis alia sunt rationabilia, alia irrationabilia ; rationabilium alia mortalia, alia immortalia” uel cum dicimus “coloris alia quidem sunt alba, alia nigra, alia media”. Oportet autem omnem generis in species diuisionem aut in duas fieri partes aut in plures, sed neque infinitae species esse possunt generis nec minus duabus. Hoc autem cur eueniat posterius demonstrandum est. Totum uero in partes diuiditur quotiens in ea ex quibus est compositum unumquodque resoluiamus, ut cum dico domus aliud esse tectum, aliud parietes, aliud fundamenta, et hominem anima coniungi et corpore, cumque hominis dicimus partes esse Catonem, Virgilium, Ciceronem et singulos qui, cum particulares sint, uim tamen totius hominis iungunt atque componunt ; neque enim homo genus nec singuli homines species, sed partes quibus totus homo coniungitur. Vocis autem in significationes proprias diuisio fit quotiens una uox multa significans aperitur et eius pluralitas significationis ostenditur, ut cum dico “canis” quod est nomen et hunc quadrupedem latrantemque designat et caelestem qui ad Orionis pedem morbidum micat ; est quoque alius, marinus canis, qui in immoderatam corporis magnitudinem crescens caeruleus appellatur. Sed huius diuisionis duplex modus est, aut enim unum nomen multa significat aut oratio iam uerbis nominibusque composita. Et nomen quidem multa significat ut id quod supra proposui, oratio uero multa designat ut est “aio te, Aeacida, Romanos uincere posse”. Et nominis quidem per significationes proprias diuisio aequiuocationis partitio nuncupatur, orationis uero in significationes proprias distributio ambiguitatis discretio est, quam Graeci amphiboliam dicunt, ita ut nomen multa significans aequiuocum, oratio uero multa designans amphibola atque ambigua praedicetur.

25 Enn., *Ann.* fr. 167 S.

1/2 di. ra. tr. F G 4 alia²] sunt add. E F G 5 quidem om. F G Q 8 duabus] A^c : -obus A K Q 9 uero] autem K : om. G || ea] A^c : eis C Q : eo A 11 aliud fundamenta C K : fu. al. tr. A : al. -um E F G : -um al. Q 12 co.¹ an. tr. F G Q 20 morbidum] -us E² : -ribundus C : -ribus E 21 in immoderatam A^c F G K : immoderatam A : in moderatam Q : immoderata C E(inm-) || magnitudine C E 22 es. mo. tr. F G Q 24 posui E F 25 Aeacida] K² : -de G K 28 amphiboliam K : -loiam A : -logiam A² E^c(-lag- inc.), cett. 30 amphibola] -logia F : -logica G

furnish examples of them all, in order that the rationale behind this general classification may become clear.

We divide a genus into species when we say, "Of animals some are rational, others irrational; and of the rational ones some are mortal, others immortal;" or when we say, "Of colors one is white, another black, others intermediate." Now every division of a genus into species necessarily entails either two or more members, although the species of a genus can be neither infinite in number nor less than two. Why this is so will be explained later.

A whole is divided into parts whenever we resolve one or another thing into those elements of which it is composed, e.g. when I say that of the things belonging to a house one is the roof, another the walls, another the foundation, or that man is composed of soul and body, or when we say that the parts of man are Cato, Vergil, Cicero, and the single men who, although being *particulars*, nevertheless combine to make up the sum total of man. For man is not a genus and single men are not species; they are rather the parts out of which the whole of man is composed.

Division of a spoken sound into its proper significations occurs whenever a single spoken sound is revealed as signifying more than one thing and its plurality of signification is shown, e.g. when I say "dog," a name that designates both this four-footed one capable of barking and the celestial one whose shining at the foot of Orion portends pestilence; also, the sea-dog, which grows to enormous proportions and is called the sea-green one. Of this last class of division there are two kinds, for either a single name or an expression already composed of verbs and names signifies more than one thing. I have given above an example of a *name* signifying more than one thing, and "Son of Aeacus, I predict that you the Romans can conquer" is an example of an *expression* designating more than one thing. The division of a name into its proper significations is called a partition of equivocation while the distribution of an expression into its proper significations is a separation of ambiguity, which the Greeks call amphiboly; hence a name signifying more than one thing is said to be equivocal while an expression designating more than one thing is said to be amphibolous or ambiguous.

- Eorum autem quae secundum accidens diuiduntur subiecti in accidentia diuisio est ut cum dicimus “omnium hominum alii sunt nigri, alii candidi, alii medii coloris”, haec enim accidentia sunt hominibus, non hominum species, et homo his subiectum, non horum genus est. Accidentis uero in subiecta sectio euenit ut est “omnium quae expetuntur alia in anima, alia in corporibus sita sunt”, animae namque atque corpori id quod expetitur accidens, non genus, est, et boni quod in anima et corpore situm est non sunt haec species, sed subiecta. Accidentis uero in accidentia diuisio est ut “omnium candidorum alia sunt dura”, ut margarita, “alia liquentia”, ut lac, liquor namque et albedo atque durities haec sunt accidentia, sed album in dura et liquida separatum est. Cum ergo sic dicimus, accidens in alia accidentia separamus. Sed huiusmodi diuisio uicissim semper in alterutra permutatur, possumus enim dicere “eorum quae dura sunt alia sunt nigra, alia alba” et rursus “eorum quae sunt liquida alia sunt alba, alia nigra”; sed haec rursus conuersa diuidimus: “eorum quae sunt nigra alia sunt dura, alia liquentia” et “eorum quae sunt alba alia sunt liquentia, alia uero dura”. Differt autem huiusmodi diuisio omnibus quae supra sunt dictae, nam neque significationem partiri possumus in uoces, cum uox in significationes proprias discernatur, nec partes in totum diuiduntur, quamuis totum separetur in partes, nec species secatur in genera, licet genus in species diuidatur. Quod uero superius dictum est, hanc diuisionem ita fieri si utraque eidem contingerent inesse subiecto, si attentius perspicitur liquet, nam cum dicimus eorum quae dura sunt alia esse alba, alia nigra, ut est lapis atque hebenum, manifestum est hebeno utraque inesse, et duritiem scilicet et nigredinem. In ceteris quoque id diligens lector inueniet.

Quibus autem summa ope ratio ueritatis inquiritur, his prius intellegendum est quae sit horum omnium simul proprietas quibusque inter se singillatim differentiis segregentur. Omnis enim uocis et generis totiusque diuisio secundum se diuisio nuncupatur, reliquae uero tres in accidentis distributione ponuntur. Secundum se autem diuisionis huiusmodi differentia est. Differt enim diuisio generis a uocis diuisione quod uox quidem in proprias semper significationes

1 Eorum] *A* : hor- *A*² *E G* 8 et] *A* : atque *A*^c *E K* || hae *C E* 9 accidentis *G* : -ium *cell.* 11 atque] et *F G* 13 accidentia *A*² *F G K* : *om. A C E Q* 15 alia²] sunt *add. A F Q* 16 alia] sunt *add. C F* 19 significationem] *C* : -es *C E* 22 secantur *C E F* 24 contingerent *G* : -ret *cell.* 28 ope ratio *A*², ?*F*² : ratio *F* : operatio *A*, ?*F*² *cell.* 28/29 intellegendum *K*^c *N* : -a *K cell.* 33 enim] autem *E G*

Examples of things divided *secundum accidens* are as follows. There is division of a subject into accidents when we say, "Of all men some are black, others white, others of an intermediate color," for these are accidents in, not species of, men, and a man is for them a subject, not a genus. "Of all the things that are sought after some are situated in soul, others in body" is an example of the splitting of an accident into subjects, for that which is sought after is an accident, not the genus, of soul and body, and soul and body are the subjects, not species, of a good that is situated in them. An accident is divided into accidents as in the following example: "Of all white things some are solid (e.g. pearl), others liquid (e.g. milk);" for liquidity, whiteness, and solidity are accidents, but the white is separated into solids and liquids. Hence in speaking thus we separate an accident into other accidents. But division of this sort is always reciprocally convertible from one thing to another. For we can say, "Of the things that are *solid* some are black, others white;" or conversely, "Of the things that are *liquid* some are white, others black." But we also convert and divide them: "Of the things that are *black* some are solid, others liquid," and, "Of the things that are *white* some are liquid, others solid." Now this kind of division differs from all those mentioned above in that we divide a spoken sound into its proper significations, a whole into parts, and a genus into species, but we do *not* divide a signification into spoken sounds, parts into a whole, or a species into genera. The point made earlier, that division of this kind occurs when both [accidents] happen to inhere in a common subject, emerges with clarity when examined more closely. For when we say that of the things that are solid some are white, others black, as e.g. stone and ebony, it is obvious that both, sc. solidity and blackness, inhere in the ebony. The diligent reader will find this in the other combinations as well.

Those who strenuously seek out the inner workings of truth must first understand what is the distinguishing property common to all of the things above and what are, in each case, the differences distinguishing them from one another. As to what is *common*: Every division of a spoken sound, genus, or whole is called a division *secundum se* while, on the other side, the three remaining ones concern the distribution of an *accident*. Between the *secundum se* divisions the *differences* are as follows. Division of a genus differs from division of a spoken sound in that whereas a spoken sound is separated always into its

separatur, genus non in significationes sed in quadam a se quodammodo creatione disiungitur, et genus semper speciei propriae
 879 totum est et univer|salius in natura, aequiuocatio uero uniuersalior
 quidem significata re dicitur, tantum uoce non etiam totum est in
 natura. Illo quoque a uocis distributione diuiditur, quod nihil habent
 commune praeter solum nomen quae sub uoce sunt, quae uero sub
 genere collocantur et nomen generis et definitionem suscipiunt.
 Amplius quoque non eadem apud omnes uocis est distributio : quod
 apud nos dicitur canis cum eius multae significationes in lingua
 Romana sint simpliciter fortasse praedicatur in barbara, cum ea quae
 10 apud nos uno nomine nuncupantur illi pluribus fortasse significant.
 Generis uero apud omnes eadem diuisio distributioque permanet,
 unde fit ut uocis quidem diuisio ad positionem consuetudinemque
 b pertineat, generis ad naturam, nam quod apud omnes idem est
 natura est, consuetudinis uero est quod apud aliquos permutatur. Et
 15 hae quidem sunt differentiae generis distributionis et uocis.

Generis quoque sectio totius distributione seiungitur quod totius
 diuisio secundum quantitatem fit, partes enim totam substantiam
 coniungentes actu aut ratione animi et cogitatione separantur,
 generis uero distributio qualitate perficitur. Nam cum hominem sub
 20 animali locauero tunc qualitate diuisio facta est, quale namque ani-
 mal est homo idcirco quoniam quadam qualitate formatur, unde
 quale sit animal homo interrogatus aut "rationale" respondebit aut
 certe "mortale". Amplius <quoque> genus omne naturaliter prius est
 propriis speciebus, totum autem partibus propriis posterius ; partes
 25 sunt quae totum iungunt, compositi sui perfectionem alias natura
 tantum, alias ratione quoque temporis antecedunt, unde fit ut genus
 in posteriora, totum uero in priora soluamus. Hinc quoque illud uere
 c dicitur : si genus interimatur statim species deperire, si species

1/2 quadam - creatione] A : quas - -nes FG : quan- - -nem A² 3 uniuersalior A²
 CE^c FG : -ior AEKQ || uero] om. A Q : autem E 4 significata re dicitur A^c
 CE^c F^c GK : si. res di. A Q : si. reducitur E : significare di. F || totum A²(bis), FG :
 -a A² CEK : quota A Q 6 quae¹] ea praem. F : ea add. G 8 quod] enim add.
 CF 12 distributioque] et distributio FQ : ac distributio G 16 hae FG : haec
 C : haeae E : haec AKQ 17 totius¹] A : a praem. A² F G
 22 quadam] A² : om. A Q 23 interrogatus F : -anti C : om. E : respondens E^c cett.
 24 < > ego suppl. 25 propriis¹] F² : omnibus E : om. F 26 sunt om. FG ||
 iungunt] A : sed add. A² C || perfectionem A² FG : -ne A cett. 26/27 ta. na. tr. E
 K

proper significations, a genus is broken up not into significations but in a kind of generation, as it were, extending from itself. Also, a genus is always a whole in relation to its proper species and more universal in nature whereas an equivocation, despite being more universally predicated than the thing signified, is a whole only in respect of the spoken sound, not in nature as well. The division of a genus is distinguished from the distribution of a spoken sound also by virtue of the fact that the things under a spoken sound have nothing except a mere name in common whereas the things situated under a genus take on the definition as well as the name of the genus. Third difference: The distribution of a spoken sound is not the same for all. For example, although our Roman expression *canis* ["dog"] has more than one signification, it may well be that in a foreign tongue the predication is made simply, since the different things which among us are called by a single name they may well signify by a number of names. The division or distribution of a genus, by contrast, remains unchanged for all, which is why the division of a spoken sound pertains to imposition and custom, that of a genus to nature. For that which is the same for all is by nature, while that which changes from one people to another is a matter of custom. These, then, are the differences between the distribution of a genus and a spoken sound.

The cutting up of a genus is differentiated from the distribution of a whole in that the division of a whole is made in respect of quantity; for the parts constituting a whole substance are separable in actuality or conceptually and in thought. The distribution of a genus, on the other hand, is accomplished in respect of quality. For when I locate man under animal a division is made in respect of quality, since man is animal *qualified* in the sense that it is informed by a determinate quality. That is why when asked what sort of animal man is one will reply either "rational" or, failing that, "mortal." Second difference: Every genus is by nature prior to its proper species whereas a whole is posterior to its proper parts. The parts, being what make up the whole, sometimes have only natural priority to the completion of that which they compose, sometimes temporal priority as well. In that sense we resolve a genus into things posterior but a whole into things prior. Hence it is true as well to say that if the genus is destroyed the species immediately perish, but that if a species is destroyed the genus

interempta sit non peremptum genus in natura consistere. Contra
euenit in toto, nam si pars totius perit totum non erit, cuius pars una
sit interempta ; sin totum pereat partes permanent distributae, ut si
de integra domo quis abstulerit tectum, totum quod ante fuit inter-
cipit, sed pereunte toto parietes et fundamenta constabunt. Amplius 5
quoque genus speciebus materia est, nam sicut aes accepta forma
transit in statuam ita genus accepta differentia transit in speciem ;
d totius uero partium multitudo materia est, forma uero earundem
partium compositio. Nam sicut species ex genere constat et differen-
tia, ita totum constat ex partibus, unde fit ut totum ab unaquaque 10
parte sua partium ipsarum compositione differat, species uero a
genere differentiae coniunctione. Amplius quoque species idem sem-
per quod genus est, ut homo idem est quod animal et uirtus idem est
quod habitus, partes uero non semper idem quod totum, neque enim 15
manus idem est quod homo nec idem paries quod domus. Et in his
quidem quae dissimiles partes habent hoc clarum est, sed non eodem
modo in his quae similes, ut in aeris uirgula cuius partes, quae sunt
continuae quia eiusdem sunt aeris, uidentur idem esse quod totum
880 est, sed | falso ; fortasse enim idem sint partes huiusmodi substantia,
non etiam quantitate. 20

Restat autem uocis et totius distributionis differentias dare. Dif-
ferunt autem quod totum quidem constat partibus, uox uero non
constat ex his quae significat ; et fit totius quidem diuisio in partes,
uocis autem fit non in partes sed in eas res quas uox ipsa significat,
unde fit ut sublata parte totum pereat, sublata una re quam uox 25
significat multa designans uox illa permaneat.

Nunc ergo quoniam secundum se diuisionis differentiae dictae
sunt generis distributio pertractetur. Primum quid genus sit definien-
dum est : genus est quod de pluribus specie differentibus in eo quod

29-16,2 Arist., *Top.* A 5, 102a31f.; Porph., *Isag.* 2,15f.; 4,2; 4,10; 11,21 B.

1/2 Contra euenit] $A^2(ras)$: co. ue- K : conuenit Q : non idem euenit G 2 cuius
 $A F G$: cum $A^c C E Q$: cui K 11 compositione] A^2 : -tio $A Q$ || a $A^2 E^c F$: om.
 $A E cett.$ 12 genere] A^2 : om. $A Q$ 15 id.¹ es. ma. tr. $F G$ 16 hoc ... est]
 E^c : ho. datum es. E : darum (*sic*) es. ho. K 17 similes] partes habent add. $E K$:
sunt add. C || ut in] A^2 : uti F : ut $A Q$ || quae²] A : -ia $A^2 A b$ 18 quia $F G$:
-oniam Pr : et $A^2 A b$: om. $A cett.$ || uidentur $A^2 F G$: -etur $A cett.$ || esse D :
partes add. $D^c cett.$ 19 sunt $F G$ 22 pa. co. tr. K || pa. qui. co. tr. E
23 totius quidem diuisio $C G$: to. di. qu. tr. $A F Q$: di. to. qu. tr. $E K$ 28 quid]
 F^2 : -od F : quidem *praem.* E

consists inviolate in its nature. Things are just the reverse in the case of a whole, for if a part of the whole perishes then that of which one part has been destroyed will not be *whole*, whereas if the whole perishes the parts remain, in separation. For example, if someone removes the roof from a house that is complete he destroys the continuity of the whole that existed before; but even though the whole perishes the walls and foundation will continue to exist. Third difference: A genus is matter in relation to its species. For just as bronze changes into a statue by receiving a form so the genus changes into a species by receiving a differentia, whereas in the case of a whole the multitude of parts is the matter and the composition of those same parts the form. For just as the species consists of a genus and differentia so the whole consists of parts, whence it happens that a whole differs from each and every part by virtue of its peculiar *composition* from those same parts whereas a species differs from its genus by virtue of the addition of a differentia. Fourth difference: A species is always the same as its genus. For example, man is the same as animal and virtue the same as a positive disposition; parts, on the other hand, are not always the same as their whole, for a hand is not the same as a man nor a wall the same as a house. And whereas this is obvious in those things whose parts are heterogeneous, it is less so in those whose parts are homogeneous, e.g. in a bronze rod: its parts, being continuous by virtue of being of the same bronze, appear to be the same as the whole. Yet it is not so, for such parts may well be the same in *substance*, but not in quantity too.

It remains to specify the differences between the distribution of a spoken sound and a whole. They differ in that whereas a whole consists of its parts, a spoken sound does not consist of the things it signifies; and whereas a whole is divided into parts, a spoken sound is divided not into parts but into the things which the spoken sound itself signifies. That is why the whole perishes when a part has been sublated, but a spoken sound designating more than one thing itself remains when one of its significates has been sublated.

Now that the differences within division in the *secundum se* sense have been indicated, the distribution of a genus should be given detailed treatment. First it is necessary to define what a genus is: A genus is that which is predicated of a number of specifically different

- quid sit praedicatur, species uero quam sub genere collocamus, differ-
b ferentia qua aliud ab alio distare proponimus. Et est quidem genus
quod interroganti quid quaeque res sit conuenit responderi, differen-
tia quae ad qualis percontationem rectissime respondetur ; nam cum
quis interrogatur “quid est homo ?” recte “animal”, “qualis est homo
?” conuenienter “rationabilis” respondetur. Diuiditur autem genus
alias in species, alias in differentias si species quibus genus oportet
diuidi nominibus carent, ut cum dico “animalium alia sunt rationa-
bilia, alia irrationabilia” rationabile et irrationabile differentiae sunt.
Sed quoniam speciei huius quae est animal rationabile nomen unum
non est, idcirco pro specie differentiam ponimus eamque superiori
generi copulamur, omnis enim differentia in genus proprium ueniens
speciem facit, unde fit ut materia quaedam genus sit, forma differen-
tia, cum autem propriis nominibus species appellantur, non in dif-
c ferentias generis fit recta diuisio. Vnde est ut ex pluribus terminis
definitio colligatur. Si enim omnes species suis nominibus appella-
rentur ex duobus solis terminis omnis fieret definitio ; ut cum dico
“quid est homo ?” quid mihi necesse esset dicere “animal rationale
mortale” si animal rationale esset nomine proprio nuncupatum, quod
cum reliqua differentia, id est mortali, iunctum definitionem hominis
uerissima ratione et integra conclusione perficeret ? Nunc autem ad
definitiones integras specierum diuisio necessaria est et forte in
eodem diuisionis definitionisque ratio uersetur, nam diuisionibus
iunctis una componitur definitio. Sed quoniam alia sunt aequiuoca,
d alia uniuoca, et quae sunt uniuoca ipsa in generum suscipimus sectio-
nes, quae uero sunt aequiuoca in his diuisio sola significationis est,
uidendum prius est quid sit uniuocum quid aequiuocum ne, cum ista
fefellerint, aequiuocum nomen quasi in species ita in significatiuas

3 quaeque] A^2 : quae $A Q$: quaequae E 4 percontationem $A C K Q$: -cunct-
 $A^2 E^c$ (-cunt- a.c.), $F G$ 5 quid est] -od est F : quidem G 6 rationalis $F K$
|| respondetur] QVOMODO GENVS DIVIDATUR add. A 6/7 al.¹ ge. tr. E
 K 7 alias] $G^2 Q^c$: -ius G : alias add. Q 9 rationale et irrationale $C F$
10 rationale $C F$ 11 specie] F^c : -iae $C F$ || eamque] F^2 : ea quae F : eam
quae G 12 enim om. $A F Q$ 13 speciem] A^2 (ras.), Q : definitionem Q^c (nunc
erasum) || qu. ma. tr. $F G$ 14 species appellantur $F^c G Q$: sp. -atur F : app. om.
 $A K$: sp. dicuntur C : sp. non carent A^2 : non carent sp. E 18 esset $A^c G Q^c$: est
 $A Q$ cett. 19 pr. no. tr. $C G$ || quod $C E$: ut F : om. cett. 20 reliqua $C E$
 $F K$: quoque add. $A C^c G Q$ 21 nunc $A^2 C E^c F G$: non $A E F^2 K Q$
23 uersetur] A : -atur $A^c F G$ 27 ae. qu.² (sit add. K) un. tr. $G K$

things in respect of what it is. A species, on the other hand, is that which we locate under a genus, a differentia that in respect of which we indicate that one thing differs from another. And the genus is that which is appropriately given in response to one who asks *what* any single thing is, the differentia that which is most correctly given in response to the question *of what sort* it is. For when one is asked "What is man?" the correct response is "Animal;" when one is asked "Of what sort is man?" the appropriate response is "Rational."

Now a genus is divided sometimes into species, sometimes into differentiae, if the species by which the genus ought rightly to be divided lack names. For example, when I say, "Of animals some are rational, others irrational," rational and irrational are *differentiae*. But since the species rational-animal has no single name, we posit a differentia in its place and combine the differentia with the superordinate genus. For every differentia produces a species when it comes into conjunction with its proper genus, which is why the genus is, as it were, matter and the differentia a form. But when species are designated by proper names it is incorrect to make a division of the genus into differentiae.

That explains why a definition is constructed from a number of terms. For if all species were designated by their own names, then every definition would consist of only two terms. For example, when I say, "What is man?" Why would it be necessary for me to say "A rational mortal animal" if rational-animal were designated by a proper name which, when joined with the remaining differentia, i.e. mortal, produced a perfectly sound and complete definition of man? But in fact division is necessary for complete definitions of species, and we may pretty well say that division and definition are in essence concerned with the same thing, since a unified definition is a conglomeration of linked divisions. But since some things are equivocal, others univocal, and univocals are precisely the things we assume for the cutting up of genera whereas with equivocals there is division only of the signification, it must first be determined what is univocal and what equivocal, lest we be deceived into resolving an equivocal name into significant spoken sounds as though into *species*. In this

uoces resoluamus. Vnde fit ut rursus ad diuisionem necessaria sit definitio, quid enim sit aequiuocum quid uniuocum definitione colligimus.

Sunt autem differentiae aliae per se, aliae uero per accidens, et harum aliae consequentes, aliae statim relinquentes. Statim relinquentes sunt huiusmodi, dormire uel sedere uel stare uel uigilare, consequentes uero ut capilli crispi (si non amissi sint) et glauci oculi (si non sint quadam extrinsecus debilitate turbati). Sed haec ad generis diuisionem sumenda non sunt, neque enim ad definitionem sunt commoda; omne enim quicquid ad diuisionem generis aptum est idem ad definitiones rectissime congregamus, illa uero quae per se sunt sola ad diuisionem generis apta sunt, haec autem informant perficiuntque uniuscuiusque substantiam, ut hominis rationabilitas et mortalitas. Sed has quemadmodum probare possimus utrum ex eo sint genere statim relinquentium an consequentium an in substantia permanentium hoc modo mihi uidendum est, neque enim sufficit scire quas in diuisione sumamus nisi illud quoque sit cognitum, quemadmodum easdem ipsas quae sumendae et quae reiciendae sunt rectissime cognoscamus. Videndum ergo primum est utrum proposita differentia omni possit et semper inesse subiecto; quod si ipsa uel actu uel ratione seiungitur, haec a diuisione generis separanda est. Si enim saepe et actu et ratione seiungitur, ex eorum est genere quae statim relinquunt, ut sedere quidem frequentius separatur et actu ipso a subiecto diuiditur. Quae uero ratione sola a subiecto diuiduntur ea sunt consequentium differentiarum, ut glaucis oculis esse a subiecto ratione seiungimus, ut cum dico "est animal quidem luminibus glaucis, ut quilibet homo", quod si hic non esset huiusmodi non eum

4/5 Porph., *Isag.* 8,18f. B.

2/3 collegimus ?A(a.c.), Q 5 aliae statim con. Asztalos : st. al. tr. codd. 6 uel^{1,2,3} om. F G Q 7 consequentes E F G Q; pers- A C K Q' || amissi sint A² Q: am. (a//m- E) su- E K: dim- su- G: si. amm- C: amisi si. A: calamistro add. F: dem- si. calamistro F² 13 perficiuntque] -iantque F: prof- G 15 consequentium F G Q; pers- Q' cett. 16 mihi om. C F 18 sumendae] sunt add. E G 19 primum est A² C F G: es. pr. tr. E: pr. om. A K Q 22 et²] ac E K: uel C || seiunguntur G K || eorum Pr: eo codd. || est D^c Ab Alb: sunt D cett. 23 relinquunt] -linquunt (sic) C: -liqunt (-inq- p.c.) E 24 a¹] E^c: om. E: ac K || a² C E^c G K: om. A E F Q 25 consequentium Pr: permanentium codd. || glaucis ... esse] A²: gl. uero es. oc. K: -cos uero (vid.) -los es. A Q: -cos -los es. Q^c 27 homo A² F² N: om. A F cett.

sense *definition* is, conversely, necessary for division, since it is by means of definition that we determine what is equivocal and what univocal.

Now some differentiae are *per se*, others *per accidens*, and of the latter some are consequent, others regularly departing. Examples of those that regularly depart are sleeping, sitting, standing, and being awake, while curly hair (assuming no hair loss) and grey eyes (assuming no extrinsically caused infirmity) are examples of those that are consequent. But such things are not to be adopted for the division of a genus, since they are unsuited to its *definition*. For we combine for definitions precisely everything that is suited to the division of a genus, and most rightly so; but only those things that are *per se* are suited to the division of a genus, and they inform and complete the substance of each and every thing, e.g. rationality and mortality in the case of man. Here is how I shall pursue the question of how we can determine whether the differentiae belong to the class of things that regularly depart, things that are consequent, or things that are permanent in the substantia—for it is not enough to know which differentiae we should adopt in a division unless it is also known how we may unfailingly recognize precisely the ones to be adopted *and the ones to be rejected*.

Well then, it must first be determined whether the proposed differentia meets the criteria of inherence in *every* subject and *at all times*; if the one in question is separable *either* actually *or* conceptually, it must be removed from division of the genus. Here is why. If it is often separated *both* actually *and* conceptually, then it belongs to the class of things that regularly depart, e.g. sitting is quite frequently separated and actually removed from the subject. Things that are *only conceptually* separable from the subject, on the other hand, belong to the class of consequent differentiae. For example, we conceptually separate being grey-eyed from the subject, as when I say, "There is an animal with grey eyes, e.g. one or another man:" but if *this* man were not

res aliqua esse hominem prohiberet. Aliud rursus est quod ratione
separari non possit, quod si separatum sit species interimatur, ut cum
dicimus inesse homini ut solus numerare possit uel geometriam
c discere. Quod si haec possibilitas ab homine seiungatur, homo ipse
non permanet ; sed haec non statim earum sunt quae in substantia 5
insunt, nam non idcirco homo est quoniam haec facere potest, sed
quoniam rationalis est atque mortalis. Hae igitur differentiae propter
quas species consistit ipsae et in definitione speciei [ut hominis] et in
generis eius diuisione quod continet speciem [ut ipsum hominem]
collocantur. Et uniuersaliter dicendum est, quaecumque differentiae 10
huiusmodi sunt ut non modo praeter eas species esse non possit sed
propter eas solas sit, hae uel in diuisione generis uel in speciei defini-
tione sumendae sunt. Quoniam uero quaedam sunt quae differunt
quae contra se in diuisionibus poni non debent, ut in animali ration-
d ale et bipes (nullus enim dicit “animalium alia sunt rationabilia, alia 15
duos pedes habentia” idcirco quod rationale et bipes, licet differant,
nulla a se oppositione disiunguntur), constat quaecumque a se aliqua
oppositione differunt eas solas differentias sub genere positas genus
ipsum posse disiungere.

Sunt autem oppositiones quattuor : aut ut contraria, ut bonum 20
malo, aut ut habitus et priuatio, ut uisus et caecitas, quamquam sint
et quaedam res in quibus discernere difficultas sit utrum in contrariis
an in priuatione uel habitu ea oporteat collocari, ut sunt motus quies,
sanitas aegritudo, uigilatio somnus, lux tenebrae—sed haec alias,
nunc autem de reliquis oppositionibus dicendum est. Tertia oppositio 25
882 est quae est secundum affirmationem et negationem, ut “Socrates
uiuít”, “Socrates non uiuít” ; quarta secundum relationem, ut pater
filius, dominus seruus. Secundum quas igitur harum quattuor op-

20 Arist., *Cat.* 10, 11b17-19

21-24 Boeth., *In Cat.* 274d-277c

4 seiungatur] E^c : seiug- E : -itur K 6 quoniam] quia $E K$ 7 Hae] K^c : haec
 K : hee C : haeae E || propter] $A^c F^c$: praet- $A F Q$ 8 consistit] A^c : non *praem.*
 Q^c : subs- G : non subs- $A Q$ 8/9 []^{1,2} ego *secl.* 10 collocantur] $A^2 E^2$: -atur
 $A E K$ 12 in² *om.* $F G$ 14 animali $A^c E G$: -is A *cett.* 15 dicat $C K$
17 disiunguntur $A^2(ras.)$, $E^2 F G Q$: et *add.* Q : -entur et $C K$: differunt -entur E
20 ut!] E^2 : *om.* E : in *add.* K 23 uel] $A C^2$: et $A^2 C G$ || habitu] E^c : ab- $E G$
24 lux] et *add.* $F G Q$ 28 igitur $A^2 E^c F G K$: iuncturas $A Q$: ig. iuncturas $C E$

grey-eyed, there would be nothing to prevent his being a man. Again, there is another thing, which is conceptually inseparable, the separation of which brings destruction of the species, e.g. when we say that it is inherent in man that he alone can use numbers or learn geometry. And if this capacity should be removed from man, then man himself no longer remains; and yet such things do not automatically belong to the class of differentiae that inhere in the *substance*, for it is not the ability to use numbers and do geometry that accounts for man, but rather being rational and mortal. Hence those differentiae on account of which the species consists are precisely the ones that are placed both in the definition of a species and in the division of the genus that contains the species. And it should be pointed out in general that all differentiae that are of such a sort that the species not only cannot be in separation from them but *is* on account of them alone—those are the differentiae to be adopted, whether in the division of a genus or in the definition of a species.

But since there are some things that differ which ought not to be placed in opposition to one another in divisions, e.g. rational and two-footed in the case of animal (for no one says, “Of animals some are rational, others two-footed,” since rational and two-footed, although different, are not separated from one another by any opposition), it is agreed that only those differentiae that differ from one another by some opposition can be placed under and divide a genus.

Now there are four oppositions: contraries, e.g. good-bad; possession and privation, e.g. sight-blindness—although there are certain cases in which it may be difficult to tell whether the things ought to be classified as contraries or under privation-possession (e.g. motion-rest, health-sickness, wakefulness-sleeping, light-darkness); but this is for another discussion and right now we must proceed to the remaining oppositions. The third opposition is that which is according to affirmation and negation, e.g. “Socrates is alive”-“Socrates is not alive;” the fourth is according to relation, e.g. father-son, master-slave. It is necessary, then, to show most accurately in respect of

positionum diuisio generis sit rectissima ratione monstrandum est, manifestum est enim et oppositiones esse quattuor et species et genera per opposita separari. Nunc ergo dicendum est secundum quam oppositionem harum quattuor uel quemadmodum species a genere disiungi conueniat.

Et prima quidem sit contradictionis oppositio, uoco autem contradictionis oppositionem quae affirmatione et negatione proponitur. In hac igitur negatio per se nullam speciem facit, nam cum dico "homo" uel "equus", et aliquid huiusmodi, species sunt, quicquid
b autem quis in negatione protulerit speciem non declarat, non esse
enim hominem non est species. Omnis enim species esse constituit, negatio uero quicquid proponit ab eo quod est esse disiungit, ut cum dico "homo" quasi si sit quiddam locutus sum, cum uero "non homo" substantiam hominis negatione destruxi. Sic igitur per se caret diuisio generis in species negatione. Necesse est autem saepe
speciem negatione componere cum ea quam simplici nomine speciem uolumus assignare nullo uocabulo nuncupatur, ut cum dico "imparium numerorum alii sunt primi", ut tres, quinque, uel septem, "alii non primi", ut nouem, et rursus "figurarum aliae sunt rectilineae, aliae non rectilineae" et "colorum alii sunt albi, alii nigri, alii
nec albi nec nigri". Ergo quando nomen unum speciebus positum non est, eas negatione proferre necesse est. Hoc igitur cogit interdum
c necessitas, non natura. In eodem quoque quotiens negatione facimus sectionem prius aut affirmatio aut simplex dicendum est nomen, ut est "numerorum alii sunt primi, alii non primi", nam si prius negatio dicta sit, tardior fit rei quam proponimus intellectus. Nam cum primum dicis esse aliquos numeros primos, cum quales sint primi exemplo uel definitione docueris, quales non sint primi mox auditor intelleget. Sin uero e contrario feceris, aut neutra subito aut tardius utraque cognoscet, diuisio uero quae propter apertissimam generis naturam reperta est debet potius ad intelligibilia deducere. Amplius quoque prior affirmatio est, posterior negatio, quod autem primum

1 sit FG : fiat B : fit *cett.* 8 negatio] $A^2 K^c Q^2$: -one $A K Q$ 9 et] uel $E G$
10/11 en.¹ es.¹ tr. CG 13 si *om.* EG 14 negatio FG || destruxi $A^c C E K^c$
 Q^2 : -it $A F G$, ? $K Q$ 15/16 saepe ... negatione] *om.* F : sa. sp. -em E : -em sa. sp.
 $F^2(mg.)$ 16 simplici] $A^c E^c$: -em $A Q$: simplicem uel *praem.* E
|| nomine] A^c : *om.* $A Q$ 18 uel *om.* $G Q$ 19/20 sunt rectilineae $A F^c G Q$:
re. su. tr. K : su. rectae lineae $C F$: rectae lineae su. E 20 rectilineae] rectae
lineae C : rectae E : *om.* Q 26 rei $A^2 C E F$: ei $A K Q$: rei eius G 28/
29 auditor intelleget] intellegit K : in. au. tr. C 30 cognoscet] -it K : -es $C F$
32 af. pr.¹ tr. FG || posterior] uero *add.* $F G Q$

which of these four oppositions there is division of a genus, for it is evident both that there are four oppositions and that species and genera are separated by means of opposites. So it is necessary now to explain in respect of which opposition among these four, i.e. *how*, species ought to be disjoined from a genus.

Let the opposition of contradiction be first. By "opposition of contradiction" I mean that which is put forward by means of affirmation and negation. With this form of opposition the negation does not strictly speaking produce any species, for when I say "man" or "horse" or anything of that sort there are species, but no matter what a person articulates in a negation he does not express a species, for not-being-man is not a species. For every species is constitutive of being whereas anything a negation posits it disjoins from being. For example, when I say "man," I have spoken in such a way as to suggest that there *is* something, but when I say "not-man" I have destroyed through negation the substance of man. So it is, then, that the division of a genus into species has strictly speaking nothing to do with negation.

Nevertheless, it is often necessary to construct a species by means of a negation, when the species we intend to apportion by a simple name has no word to name it. Examples: "Of odd numbers some are prime (e.g. three, five, or seven) others not-prime (e.g. nine);" or again, "Of figures some are rectilinear, others non-rectilinear;" and, "Of colours one is white, another black, others neither white nor black." Thus when a single name has not been imposed for one or another species it is necessary to express them by negation. And it is necessity that sometimes requires this, not nature.

Further, whenever we make a sectioning by negation the affirmation or simple name should be stated first, e.g. "Of numbers some are prime, others not-prime." For if the negation should be stated first, then one's grasp of the thing we intend is somewhat retarded. For when you state first that certain numbers are prime, once you explain by example or definition what sort are prime the hearer will immediately understand what sort are *not* prime. But if you do it the other way around, he will have either immediate recognition of neither or somewhat retarded recognition of both. But division, which was devised owing to the broadly indeterminate nature of a genus, ought instead to *reduce* the possibilities to things more intelligible.

Again, affirmation is prior, negation posterior; but that which is

d est in diuisione quoque oportet primitus ordinari. Necesse est quoque
semper finita infinitis esse priora, ut aequale inaequali, uirtutem
uirtutis, certum incerto, stabile fixumque mutabili. Sed omnia quae aut
definita parte orationis aut affirmatione proferuntur plus finita sunt
quam aut nomen cum particula negatiua aut tota negatio, quare 5
finito potius quam infinito est facienda diuisio. [Sed si cui ... dili-
genter exposui, *p. 6,10-16*]

883 Haec | quidem dicta sunt de oppositione quam affirmatio nega-
tioque constituit, illa uero quae secundum habitum priuationemque
fit ipsa quoque superiori uidetur esse consimilis. Negat enim quo- 10
dammodo priuatio habitum, sed differt quod semper quidem potest
esse negatio, priuatio uero non semper, sed tunc quando habitum
habere possibile est (hoc uero nos iam *Praedicamenta* docuerunt).
Quare forma quaedam intellegitur esse priuatio, non enim tantum 15
priuat sed etiam circa se ipsam priuatum quemque disponit. Neque
enim solum oculum caecitas priuat lumine sed ipsa quoque secun-
dum se priuatum luce disponit, caecus enim dicitur ad priuationem
quodammodo quasi dispositus et affectus (hoc quoque Aristoteles tes-
tatur, in *Physicis*). Vnde fit ut priuationis differentia ad generum diui- 20
sionem frequenter utamur. Sed hic quoque eodem modo sicut in
contradictione faciendum est, prius enim ponendus est habitus, qui
est affirmationi consimilis, post priuatio, quae negationi. Aliquotiens
tamen priuationes quaedam habitus uocabulo proferuntur, ut “or-
bus”, “caecus”, “uiduus”, aliquotiens cum particula priuationis, ut
cum dicimus “finitum” et “infinitum”, “aequum” et “inaequale”, sed 25
in his “aequum” et “finitum” in diuisione prima ponenda sunt, priua-
tiones secundae.

Ac de oppositione quidem priuationis et habitus haec dicta suf-
ficient, contrariorum uero oppositio dubitatur fortasse an secundum

13 Arist., *Cat.* 10, 12a29-31
18/19 Arist., *Phys.* B 1, 193b19f.
29-26,2 v. *ad loc.* 20,21-24

2 priora] *A* *E*² *Q* : potiora *A*² *E* *Q*^c 3 fixumque] et fixum *F* *G* *Q*
|| mutabili] *A* : instabili (-le *G*) et mu. (-le in eadem lect. *G*) *A*² *F* *G* 6/7 [] post
displendi (6,10) transposui 8 sint *A* *K* 15 Neque ... disponit (17)] *E*^c(*mg.*) :
om. *E* *G* 16 solum oculum *F* : solum *K* : oculum *A* *Q* : oc. so. *tr.* *C* *E*^c(*mg.*) :
tantum oc. *A*² 22 post] uero *add.* *F* *G* || quae negationi] qu. (*om.* *G* : est *add.* *F*)
ne. consimilis *F* *G* 25 aequum] -uale *C* *E* 26 ponenda] *A*^c : -ae *A* *Q*
29 dubitatur] *A* : -abitur *A*^c *F*

first ought to be ordered first also in division. In addition, it is necessary always that things finite be prior to things infinite, e.g. the equal to the unequal, virtue to vices, the certain to the uncertain, the stable and fixed to the mutable. But all things that are expressed by a part of speech that is *definite* or by an affirmation are more finite than a name with a negative particle or a complete negation, which is why division ought to be constructed on the basis of the finite rather than the infinite.

What I have been discussing concerns the opposition that an affirmation and negation constitute. The next opposition, which is constructed along the lines of possession and privation, looks very much like the previous one. For a privation in a sense negates a positive state of possession, the difference being that whereas there is always the possibility of a negation, the possibility of a privation is inconstant and depends upon that of possessing the positive disposition, as the *Categories* have already taught us. Hence privation is understood to be a kind of form, for it not only deprives but even positively disposes in accordance with itself each one so deprived. For not only does blindness deprive the eye of sight, it in fact positively disposes in accordance with itself one who is deprived of sight: he is called blind in the sense that he is in some way positively disposed and affected as to the privation (this too Aristotle affirms, in the *Physics*). So it happens that for the division of genera we often employ a privative differentia.

And the procedure here is just as it was with contradiction: the positive state of possession should be posited first, owing to its close similarity to an affirmation, the privation after, owing to its close similarity to a negation. In some cases, however, certain privations are expressed by a term of possession, e.g. "orphaned" ["bereaved"], "blind," "widowed," in others by a privative particle, e.g. when we say "finite-*infinite*," "equal-*unequal*." And in the latter cases "equal" and "finite" should be posited first in the division, their privations second.

Let that suffice for the opposition of privation and possession. As to the opposition of contraries, there is perhaps reason to wonder

priuationem et habitum esse uideatur, ut album et nigrum, an album
 quidem priuatio nigri sit, nigrum uero albi—sed hoc alias, nunc
 c autem ita tractandum est tamquam si sit aliud oppositionis genus,
 sicut est in *Praedicamentis* ab ipso quoque Aristotele dispositum. In
 contrariis autem generum multa diuisio est, fere enim cunctas diffe- 5
 rentias in contraria ducimus, sed quoniam contraria sunt alia medio
 carentia, alia mediata, ita quoque diuisio facienda est, ut “colorum
 alia sunt alba, alia nigra, alia neutra”. Fieret autem omnis definitio
 omnisque diuisio duobus terminis praedicatis nisi, ut supra iam dic-
 tum est, indigentia (quae saepe existit) in nomine prohiberet. Quo 10
 autem modo utraeque duobus terminis fierent erit manifestum hoc
 modo. Cum enim dico “animalium alia sunt rationabilia, alia irra-
 tionabilia” animal rationale ad hominis definitionem contendit, sed
 d quoniam animalis rationalis unum nomen non est ponamus ei no-
 men *a* litteram : “rursus *a* litterae”, quod est animal rationale, “alia 15
 sunt mortalia, alia immortalia”. Volentes igitur definitionem hominis
 reddere dicemus “homo est *a* littera mortalis”, nam si hominis defi-
 nitio est animal rationale mortale, animal uero rationale per *a* litte-
 ram significatur, idem sentit “*a* mortale” tamquam si diceretur “ani-
 mal rationale mortale”, *a* enim, ut dictum est, animal rationale 20
 significat. Sic ergo *a* littera et mortali, duobus terminis, facta definitio
 est ; quod si reperirentur in omnibus quoque nomina, duobus semper
 terminis tota definitio constitueretur. Diuisio uero nominibus positus
 quoniam semper in duos terminos secatur manifestum est si quis
 884 generi et diffe|rentiae cum deest ipse nomen imponat, ut cum dici- 25
 mus “figurarum quae sunt trilatrae aliae sunt aequilaterae, aliae duo
 latera habentes aequa, aliae totae inaequales”. Trina igitur ista
 diuisio si sic proferretur fieret duplex : “figurarum quae trilatrae

4 Arist., *Cat.* 10, 12b26f.

1 an] *A*² : ut *A*^c *Q* : in *A* 2 uero] *G*^c(-ri *inc.*) : *om.* *F* || haec *C E*
 6 contraria¹] -as *G K* || contraria²] -orum *F G* || al. su. *tr.* *F G K*
 7 mediata] *A E*^c : uel metata *A*(*mg.*) : uel metata *add.* *E* 8 alba - nigra *C E K* :
 ni. - al. *tr. cett.* 9 iam *om.* *E F* 12 rationabilia] *E*^c : -alia *A E G*
 12/13 irrationabilia] *E*² : -alia *A G* : *om.* *E* 13 contendit sed *C E*² *F* : -is sed *G Q*
 : -is set *A*²(*ras.*), *Q*^c(*vid.*) : -isset *E K* 14 non] *E*^c : *om.* *E K* 16 ho. de. *tr.* *E G*
 17 dicemus] -imus *G* : -eremus *E K* 19 significatur *F G* : ut est *add.* *A K Q* :
 -abatur *C E* 21 Sic] *A*^c *Q* : si *A Q*^c || duobus] ex *praem.* *C E* 25 ipse] -um
E : *om.* *F G* 26 aliae²] *C*^c *E*^c(-io *inc.*) : -ia *C*(*inc.*), *Q* 27 inaequales] sunt *add.* *F*
G 28 proferretur] *E*^c : -eretur *E F*

whether it should be viewed as coming under privation and possession. For example, white and black: is white the *privation* of black, and black of white? But that is for another discussion; for now we must operate on the assumption that it is a distinct class of opposition, as in the *Categories* Aristotle himself made it to be. Now a large part of the division of genera comes down to contraries in that we reduce nearly all differentiae to contraries. But given that there are some contraries that lack an intermediate, others that are mediated, it is necessary that division should be pursued with this consideration too in mind, e.g. "Of colours one is white, another black, others neither."

Now every definition and every division would be constructed of two predicated terms, if, as was already mentioned above, the lack of a name (a common phenomenon) did not prohibit it. How they both would be constructed of two terms will become clear as follows.

When I say, "Of animals some are rational, others irrational," rational-animal aims at the definition of man; but since there is no single name for rational-animal, let us give it the letter *A* as a name: "Of *A* (i.e. rational-animal), in turn, some are mortal, others immortal." Thus when we intend to give the definition of man we shall say, "Man is a mortal *A*," for if the definition of man is mortal rational animal and rational-animal is signified by the letter *A*, then "mortal *A*" means precisely what "mortal rational animal" would, since *A* (to repeat) signifies rational-animal. In this way, then, the definition is constructed of "*A*" and "mortal," two terms. And if *all* things were found to have names, then a complete definition would always consist of two terms.

That with the imposition of names *division* is always into two terms is made clear when one on one's own initiative imposes a name for a genus or differentia that has none. For example, the tripartite division, "Of figures that are three-sided some are equilateral, others have two equal sides, others are unequal throughout," would be made bipartite if expressed in this way: "Of figures that are three-

sunt aliae sunt aequales, aliae inaequales ; inaequalium aliae sunt duo latera tantum aequa habentes, aliae tria inaequalia”, id est omnia ; et cum dicimus “rerum omnium alia sunt bona, alia mala, alia indifferentia”, quae nec bona sunt scilicet nec mala, si ita diceretur gemina diuisio proueniret : “rerum omnium alia sunt differentia, alia indifferentia ; differentium alia sunt bona, alia mala”. Ita ergo diuisio omnis in gemina secaretur si speciebus et differentiis uocabula non deessent.

- b Quartam uero oppositionem diximus quae est secundum ad aliquid, ut pater filius, dominus seruus, duplex medium, sensibile sensus. Haec igitur nullam habent substantialem differentiam qua a se discrepent, immo potius habent huiusmodi cognationem qua ad se inuicem referantur ac sine se esse non possint. Non est ergo generis in relatiuas partes facienda diuisio, sed tota huiusmodi sectio a genere separanda est, neque enim hominis species est seruus aut dominus nec numeri medium aut duplum.

- c Cum igitur quattuor sint differentiae, affirmationis et negationis si non necesse est semper tamen relationis reicienda diuisio est, priuationis et habitus et contrariorum sumendae. Maxime autem contrarietas in differentiis ponenda est nec non etiam priuatio, idcirco quoniam contra habitum quiddam contrarium uidetur apponere, ut est finitum et infinitum ; quamquam enim sit priuatio, infinitum tamen contrarii imaginatione formatur, est quaedam namque, ut dictum est, forma.

Dignum uero inquisitu est utrum in species an in differentias recte genera diuidantur, definitio namque diuisionis est generis in species proximas distributio. Oportet igitur secundum naturam diuisionis et secundum definitionem in proprias species semper fieri generis disgregationem (sed hoc interdum fieri nequit propter eam quam supra reddidimus causam, multis enim speciebus non sunt nomina) atque ideo, quoniam quaedam sunt prima genera, quaedam ultima, quaedam media : primum quidem ut substantia, ultimum ut animal, me-

1 aliae¹ ... inaequalium *A*²(*mg.*), *C F G* : *om. A E K Q* 4 nec¹ ... mala] ne. ma. su. sc. ne. bo. *tr. E K* : scilicet nec bona nec mala *G* || diceretur *C F G* : -rentur *cett.* 6 sunt] *A*^c : *om. A E K* 9 diximus] dic- *F* : dicit *K* 10 sensibile *F G K* : -lis *cett.* 11 Haec] *A Q* : scilicet oppositio *add. A^c Q^c* || habent] *A*^c : -et *A Q* 15 enim *om. A G Q* || est²] *K*^c : esse *K* : *om. G* 17 sint] *Q*^c : su- *G Q(inc.)* || differentiae] oppositionis *add. C E* 21 qui. co.¹ ha. *tr. E K* 26/27 species proximas] *E* : proprias sp. *G* : sp. maximas *E*² 30 reddidimus] reddimus *F* : retulimus *E* : diximus *G* 32 animal] et *add. F Q*

sided some are equal, others unequal; of the unequal ones some have only two equal sides, others three (i.e. all) unequal." Similarly, the division, "Of all things some are good, others bad, others indifferent (i.e. neither good nor bad)," would become bipartite if stated thus: "Of all things some are different, others indifferent; of the ones that are different some are good, others bad." In this way, then, every *division* would be bipartite if the species and differentiae did not lack names.

As the fourth opposition we mentioned that which is according to relation, e.g. father-son, master-slave, double-half, sensible-sense. Well then, such things have no substantial differentia in respect of which they diverge from one another—indeed, the bond between them is such that they refer to and cannot exist in separation from one another. Hence a genus cannot be divided into correlative members, and this manner of splitting things must be kept apart entirely from the genus; for neither is slave or master a species of man, nor half or double a species of number.

Given, then, that there are four differentiae, division from affirmation and negation is to be rejected except where unavoidable, while that from relation is *always* to be rejected; divisions from privation and possession and from contraries are to be adopted. But above all contrariety is bound to play a role in the matter of differentiae, and privation as well in that it obviously posits something contrary to a positive state of possession, e.g. the finite and *infinite*. For although the infinite is a privation, it is nevertheless *informed* by our mental conception of its contrary and is (to repeat) a kind of *form*.

It is worth inquiring whether genera are rightly divided into species or into differentiae, since division is by definition the distribution of a genus into its *proximate species*. Well then, according to the nature and definition of division it is necessary that a genus always be split into its *proper species* (although this is sometimes made impossible owing to the reason mentioned earlier, for many species lack names), the reason being that certain genera are first, certain ones last, certain ones intermediate: substance is an example of one that is first, animal of one that is last, body of one that is intermediate. For body

d dium ut corpus, corpus namque animalis genus est, substantia corporis, sed neque super substantiam quicquam inueniri potest quod generis loco ualeat collocari neque sub animali, homo namque species, non genus, est. Quare antiquior uidebitur speciei diuisio si non sit indigentia nominum, quod si his non abundamus, prima genera usque ad ultima conuenit in differentias separare. Hoc autem fit hoc modo, ut primum genus in suas differentias disgregetur non in posteriores, et posterius rursus in suas sed non in posteriores. Neque enim eadem sunt differentiae corporis quae animalis, si quis enim dicat “substantiae aliud est corporale, aliud incorporale” recte diuisionem fecerit, hae namque differentiae propriae substantiae sunt ;
 885 si quis uero sic, “substantiarum alia sunt animata, alia inanimata”, hic non recte substantiae differentias disgregauit, corporis namque differentiae sunt, non substantiae, id est secundi generis non primi. Quare manifestum est secundum proprias differentias, non secundum posterioris generis, primorum generum diuisionem esse faciendam. Quotiens autem genus aut in differentias aut in species soluitur, post diuisionem factam mox definitiones aut exempla subdenda sunt, sed si quis definitionibus non abundet satis est exempla subicere, ut cum dicimus “corporum alia sunt animata” subiciamus “ut homines
 20 uel ferae, alia inanimata, ut lapides”.

b Oportet autem diuisionem quoque sicut terminum neque diminutam esse neque superfluum, nam neque plures species quam sub genere sunt oportet apponi nec pauciores, ut in se ipsa diuisio sicut terminus conuertatur. Conuertitur enim terminus sic : “uirtus est
 25 mentis habitus optimus”, rursus “habitus mentis optimus uirtus est”. Sic etiam diuisio : “omne genus aliquid eorum erit quae sunt species”, rursus “quaelibet species proprium genus est”.

Fit autem generis eiusdem multipliciter diuisio, ut omnium corporum et quaecumque alicuius sunt magnitudinis. Sicut enim circulum
 30 in semicirculos et in eos quos Graeci tomeas uocant (nos diuisiones possumus dicere) distribuimus, et tetragonum alias ducto per angu-

4/5 in. nom. non² sit tr. *E K* 8 posteriores¹ *A C Q* : -oris *cett.* || et ... posteriores² *om. G* || posterius *CF* : -riores *A Q* : -rioris *E K* || posteriores² -oris *E F* *K* : -teris *F* 9 enim¹ *A^c E^c* : *om. E* : ex ea *add. A Q* 15 secundum¹ *A² E²* : *om. A E Q* 16 posterioris¹ *A^c E^c (ras.)* : -es *A Q* 19 quis *A² C F^c (ras.)* : -id *E G K Q* : -i ?*A* || abundet¹ *E²* : -at *G* : -es *E* : -e est *K* 22 terminum *A^c C E^c F G* : -us *A E (vid.)*, *Q* : -os *K* : cernimus *A²* 23 sub] eodem *add. F G* 24 opponi *G K* 30 su. al. tr. *F G* || sicut *C* : sic *cett.* 31 quos] *A Q* : -od *A^c Q^c* || nos ... complecti (32,19] *G² (ras.)* 32 alias] *A^c* : ad *praem. A K Q* || ducto *F^c J* : -a *F cett.*

is the genus of animal, and substance of body; but there is nothing one could find to place as a genus above substance, and nothing below animal (for man is a species, not a genus). So while division by a species will seem the preferred course assuming no lack of names, if we *do* encounter such a lack it is appropriate to separate genera into differentiae, from the highest to the lowest. Here is how it is done. We divide the first genus into its own differentiae, not into those further down, and the subsequent genus in turn into *its* own, not into those further down. This is because the differentiae of body are not the same as those of animal. For if someone should say, "Of substance one sort is corporeal, another incorporeal," then he will have made the division correctly, since these are the differentiae proper to substance. But if someone says, "Of substances some things are animate, others inanimate," then he has incorrectly separated the differentiae of substance, since they are differentiae of body, not substance, i.e. of the second genus, not the first. It is evident, then, that the first genera are to be divided according to their proper differentiae, not according to those of a subordinate genus. And whenever a genus is resolved, into either differentiae *or* species, once the division has been made definitions or examples should at once be supplied. If one is short of definitions, then it is sufficient to furnish examples. For instance, when we say, "Of bodies some are animate," we should add, "such as men or beasts," and after "others inanimate" we should add, "such as stones."

Like a term, a division should be neither too narrow nor too broad, since the coordinate species should be neither more numerous nor fewer than are under the genus, so that the very division converts with itself in the manner of a term. A term converts as follows: "Virtue is the best mental disposition;" conversely, "The best mental disposition is virtue." Similarly, a division: "Every genus will be one of the things that are its species;" conversely, "Each and every species is its proper genus."

One and the same genus is divisible in more than one way just as all corporeal entities and all things of determinate magnitude are. For just as we distribute a circle into semicircles and into what the Greeks call *tomeis* (we can say "divisions"), or a square in one instance into

c lum diametro in triangula, alias in parallelogrammata, alias in tetra-
 gona separamus, ita quoque genus, ut cum dicimus “numerorum alii
 sunt pares, alii impares” et rursus “alii primi, alii non primi”, et
 “triangulorum alia sunt aequilatera, alia duo sola latera aequa habentia,
 alia totis inaequalia lateribus” et rursus “triangulorum alia sunt
 d rectiangula, alia acutos habentia tres angulos, alia obtusum”. Sic igitur
 generis unius fit diuisio multiplex. 5

Illud autem scire perutile est, quoniam genus una quodammodo
 multarum specierum similitudo est quae earum omnium substan-
 tialem conuenientiam monstret, atque ideo collectiuum plurimarum
 specierum genus est, disiunctivae uero unius generis species. Quae
 quoniam differentiis informantur, ut dictum est, idcirco sub uno
 d genere minus duabus speciebus esse non possunt, omnis enim differ-
 entia in discrepantium pluralitate constat. Sed de diuisione generis et
 speciei perplura dicta sunt. 10 15

Hanc igitur insistentibus uiam promptior per diuisionem generis
 ad speciei definitionem facultas aperitur, oportet autem non solum
 quas ad definitionem differentias sumamus addiscere, sed ipsius quo-
 que definitionis artem diligentissima cognitione complecti. Et illud
 quidem, an ulla possit definitio demonstrari et quemadmodum per
 demonstrationem ualeat inueniri, et quaecumque de ea subtilius in
Postremis analyticis ab Aristotele tractata sunt, praetermittam, solam
 tamen exsequar regulam definiendi. Rerum enim aliae sunt supe-
 riores, aliae inferiores, aliae mediae. Superiores quidem definitio
 886 nulla complectitur idcirco quod earum superiora genera inueniri non
 possunt ; porro autem inferiores, quae sunt indiuidua, [ipsa quoque]
 specificis differentiis carent, quocirca ipsae quoque a definitione
 seclusae sunt ; media igitur quae et habent genera et de aliis uel
 25

22 Arist., *An. post.* B 5-8; B 13

1 parallelogrammata A^c C(-l-lell-), F^2 (-rralell-), K : paralleo- $A E Q$: paral- F (-rralo-),
 G^2 : aequilineata K^2 (s.l., ? ut *glossema*) 3 alii¹] uero add. $F Q$ 6 obtusum] Q^c :
 -os G^2 : -a Q 7 di. fi. tr. $F G^2$ 8 una] A^c (ras.): -um E 14 constat] A^c Q :
 -et A Q^c : -sistit K 15 perplura] plura C : plurima G^2 17 autem Pr : enim *codd.*
 19 complecti] cognitione complecti add. *G manu prima, quae post paginae flexum de integro*
instaurat (cf. supra, ad loc. 30,31) 20 an ulla A^c (dist.), $F K$: anulla A *cett.* || possit
 definitio A^c K : de. po. tr. $F G$: po. -one $A C E Q$ || demonstrari] definitio add. C
 E 22 tractata] E^c : -cta $E G$ 23 tamen $A E K Q$: tantum A^c $C F^c$ G : tan F
 24 aliae²] sunt add. $F Q$ 25 quod] -ia C : -oniam G 26 quae $F G$: om. K : ut
 K^2 *cett.* || [] ego *secl.*

triangles (by drawing a diagonal through the angle), in another into parallelograms, in another into squares, so too we distribute a genus. For example, we say, "Of numbers some are equal, others odd;" or alternatively, "some are prime, others not-prime." Again, "Of triangles some are equilateral, others have only two equal sides, and others are unequal on all sides;" or alternatively, "Of triangles some have a right angle, others have three acute angles, others an obtuse one." In this sense, therefore, a single genus is divisible in more than one way.

It is particularly useful to know that a genus is in a sense a unified likeness between a number of species, a likeness such as points to the substantial agreement between them all. Hence a genus is *collective* of a plurality of species whereas the species are *disjunctive* of a single genus. And as has been pointed out, given that they are informed by differentiae the species under a single genus cannot be less than two, for every differentia consists among a plurality of divergent things. But concerning division involving a genus and species enough has been said.

For those who set out on this path that leads through the division of a genus a more ready access to the definition of a species is opened up. It is necessary, however, not only to learn which differentiae we should adopt for a definition, but also to take up most diligent study of the art of definition itself. I shall not consider here whether a definition can be demonstrated, how it can be discovered through demonstration, or any of the attendant issues handled with such subtlety by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*; I shall, however, give restricted consideration to the main rule of defining.

Of things some are higher, others lower, others intermediate. The higher ones no definition embraces since for them no higher genera can be discovered; at the same time, the lower things, i.e. individuals, lack specific differentiae, so that they too are excluded from definition. The intermediate ones, then, which both have genera and are

de generibus uel de speciebus uel indiuiduis praedicantur sub definitionem cadere possunt. Data igitur huiusmodi specie quae et genus habeat et de posteriori praedicetur, primo eius sumo genus et illius generis differentias diuido ; et adiungo differentiam generi, ac uideo
 5 num illa differentia iuncta cum genere aequalis possit esse cum ea specie quam circumscribendam definitione suscepi. Quod si minor fuerit species, illam differentiam rursus quam dudum cum genere
 b posueramus quasi genus ponimus eamque in alias suas differentias separamus, et rursus has duas differentias superiori generi coniungimus, et, si aequauit speciem, definitio speciei esse dicetur, sin minus, secundam differentiam rursus in alias separamus. Quas omnes coniungimus cum genere et rursus speculamur si omnes differentiae cum genere illi aequales sunt speciei quae definitur. Et postremo
 10 totiens differentias differentiis distribuimus usque dum omnes iunctae generi speciem aequali definitione describant.

15 Huius autem rei clariorem facient exempla notitiam hoc modo. Sit nobis propositum quod definire uelimus "nomen". Vocabulum ergo nominis de pluribus nominibus praedicatur et est quodammodo species sub se continens indiuidua. Definitio ergo nomen sic. Sumo eius
 c genus quod est uox et diuido : "uocum aliae sunt significatiuae, aliae uero minime". Vox autem non significatiua nihil ad nomen, etenim nomen significat ; sumo ergo differentiam quae est significatiua et iungo cum genere, id est cum uoce, et facio "uox significatiua" et tunc respicio utrum genus hoc et differentia nomini sint aequalia. Sed
 20 nondum aequalia sunt, potest enim et uox significatiua esse et nomen non esse, sunt enim quaedam uoces quae dolores designant, aliae quae animi passiones naturaliter quae nomina non sunt, ut interiectiones. Rursus ipsam uocum significantiam in alias differentias diuido : "uocum significatiuarum aliae sunt secundum positionem, aliae
 25

1 de¹ om. G || de² om. CG || indiuiduis] de *praem.* EG 1/2 definitionem C
 EK : -ne *cett.* 3 posteriori] Q^c : -oribus F^c G Q : -teribus F || eiusdem FG
 5 es. po. tr. FG 6 speciae CF || definitione] K^c : -em K Q || suscepi] A^c
 Q^c : -cipe A(*vid.*), Q 7 ru. di. tr. EK 8 di. su. tr. EFQ 10 speciem
 definitio EK : de. sp. tr. *cett.* || esse dicetur] es. -itur G : di. es. terminus C
 11 secundam A^c C^c E^c FG K^c : -um ACEKQ 13 sint FG || definitur] A² :
 -um AQ 15 generi CEGK : -is AE^c(-s *s.l.*, *nunc erasum*), FQ 16 facient] A²
 E^c(-ce- *a.c.*), Q : -cerent AQ^c || notitiam] A² Q² : -ia AQ 17 quod - uelimus
 om. FG 19 continens] AQ : -stituens A² Q^c || sumo AFQ : ergo *add. cett.*
 20 quod est uox] qu. uo. es. tr. A²(*s.l.*, *ut glossema*), C : om. AQ 21 autem FG : om.
cett. 23 et² om. CK 24 sunt EK 26 designant] E^c : aliaque designant
add. E : ut hominum *add. F* || alia EG 29 significatiuarum C : om. *cett.*
 || aliae¹ A^c FG : -ia A *cett.* || positiones GK || aliae² A^c FG : -ia A *cett.*

predicated of other things, be they genera, species, or individuals, *are* able to come under a definition. Hence, given a species of the kind that both has a genus and is predicated of something lower, I first take its genus and divide the differentiae of that genus; and I combine a differentia with the genus and see whether that combination of differentia plus genus can be equal to the species I have undertaken to circumscribe by means of a definition. But if the species is of narrower extension, then we in turn posit as a genus that differentia which we just posited in conjunction with its genus, separate *it* into its own further differentiae, and in turn combine our two differentiae with the higher genus. If this combination equals the species, then it will be said to be its definition; but if the species is of narrower extension, then we in turn separate the second differentia into further ones. We combine all the differentiae with the genus and look once again to see whether taken in conjunction with the genus they all equal the species that is being defined. In fine, we distribute differentiae by differentiae as often as necessary until the conglomeration of them all, together with the genus, describes the species in a definition that equals it.

The following illustration will provide a clearer practical understanding of this procedure. Let us select "name" as our definiendum. Well then, the word "name" is predicated of a plurality of names and is a species, so to speak, containing individuals under itself. Here, then, is how I define a name. I take its genus, i.e. "spoken sound," and divide: "Of spoken sounds some are significative, others not at all." Now a non-significative spoken sound has nothing to do with a name, since a name *signifies*. So I adopt the differentia "significative" and combine it with the genus, i.e. with "spoken sound," to produce "significative spoken sound." Next I look to see whether this genus and differentia are equal to a name. In fact they are not yet equal to it, since a spoken sound can be significative without being a name. For there are certain spoken sounds that designate states of grief, others that naturally designate passions of the mind and yet are not names, e.g. interjections. I divide in turn this significance of spoken sounds into further differentiae: "Of significative spoken sounds some

- d sunt naturaliter", et uox quidem significans naturaliter nihil ad nomen, uox uero significans positione hominum nomini congruit. Quocirca duas has differentias, significatiuam et secundum positionem, iungo cum uoce, id est cum genere, et dico "nomen est uox significatiua secundum placitum". Sed rursus mihi non aequatur ad nomen, sunt namque et uerba uoces significatiuae et secundum positionem ; non igitur solius nominis definitio est. Distribuo iterum differentiam quae est secundum positionem et dico "secundum positionem uocum significatiuarum aliae sunt cum tempore, aliae sine tempore", et differentia quidem cum tempore nomini non iungitur idcirco quod uerborum est consignificare tempora, nominum uero minime ; restat ergo ut congruat illa differentia quae est sine tempore. Iungo | igitur has tres differentias generi et dico "nomen est uox significatiua secundum placitum sine tempore". Sed rursus mihi non plena conclusio definitionis occurrit, potest enim uox et significatiua et secundum positionem et sine tempore esse et nomen non esse unum sed nomina iuncta, quae est oratio, ut "Socrates cum Platone et discipulis"—sed quamquam imperfecta quidem haec sit oratio, tamen est oratio. Quocirca ultima differentia quae est sine tempore aliis item differentiis diuidenda est, et dicemus "uocum significatiuarum secundum positionem sine tempore aliae sunt quarum pars extra aliquid significat", hoc pertinet ad orationem, "aliae quarum pars extra nihil significat", hoc pertinet ad nomen, nominis enim b pars nihil extra designat. Fit igitur definitio sic : "nomen est uox significatiua secundum placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars extra significatiua est separata". Videsne igitur quam recta definitio constituta sit ? Nam quod dixi "uocem" a ceteris sonis nomen disiunxi, quod "significatiuam" apposui nomen a non significatiuis uocibus separaui, quod "secundum placitum" et "sine tempore" a naturaliter significantibus uocibus et a uerbis proprietas nominis distributa est, quod eius partes extra nihil significare proposui ab oratione distinxi, cuius partes aliquid separatae extra significant. Vnde fit ut quodcumque nomen fuerit illa definitione claudatur et ubicumque haec ratio definitionis aptabitur illud nomen esse non dubitem.

1 sunt *om.* E G 2 positione E F K : -em A G Q : secundum -em C
 7 Distribuo] A¹ K² : -utio A K Q 7/8 differentiam] A² : -ia A Q 9 aliae²] -ia
 C : *om.* G 10 non iungitur] A : coniun- A² C : non coniun- E 13 igitur A² C
 E : *om.* A *cett.* 15 uox et E : et uox C G : et uox et A F Q : uox K 18 si. ha.
 tr. G 18/19 si.¹ ha. or.¹ qui. tr. C 22 aliae] sunt *add.* E G 23 pertineat
 A K

are by imposition, others by nature." And while a naturally significant spoken sound has nothing to do with a name, a spoken sound that is significant by human imposition does comport with a name. So I combine these two differentiae, "significant" and "by imposition," with "spoken sound," i.e. with the genus, and say, "A name is a spoken sound significant by convention." But once again I have not found what is equal to a name, since verbs too are spoken sounds significant by imposition, so that the definition does not pertain only to a name. Once again I distribute the differentia, i.e. "by imposition," and say, "Of spoken sounds significant by imposition some are with tense, others without tense." And the differentia "with tense" has no connection with a name, since it pertains to verbs, certainly not to names, to consignify times. It remains, therefore, that the differentia "without tense" fits. So I combine these three differentiae with the genus and say, "A name is a spoken sound significant by convention, without tense." But once again I have failed to bring the definition to its full conclusion, since it is possible for a spoken sound to be significant by imposition and without tense without being a name but a combination of names, i.e. an expression. For example, "Socrates with Plato and the students"—granted, it is an incomplete expression, but it is an expression nevertheless. So the last differentia, i.e. "without tense," must likewise be divided by further differentiae. We shall say, "Of spoken sounds significant by imposition, without tense, some have a part that independently signifies something, others have a part that independently signifies nothing." The first pertains to an expression, the second to a name, since a part of a name designates nothing independently. The definition, then, is constructed as follows: "A name is a spoken sound significant by convention, without tense, no part of which is independently significant when separated."

Do you see, then, how a correct definition is formed? By specifying "*spoken* sound" I have disjoined the name from other sounds; by adding "significant" I have separated the name from non-significant spoken sounds; with "by convention" and "without tense" the inherent property of a name has been set apart from naturally significant spoken sounds and verbs; by laying down that its parts signify nothing independently I have distinguished it from an expression, the parts of which *do* independently signify something when separated. From this it emerges that anything that is a name is included in this definition, and to whatever this definitional formula is applicable I will have no doubt that *that* is a name.

Illud quoque dicendum est, quod genus in diuisione totum est, in
 c definitione pars, et sic est definitio quasi quaedam partes totum con-
 iungant, sic est diuisio quasi totum soluatur in partes, et est similis
 diuisio generis totius diuisioni, definitio totius compositioni. Namque
 in diuisione generis animal totum est hominis, intra se enim com- 5
 plectitur hominem, in definitione uero pars est, speciem namque
 genus cum aliis differentiis iunctum componit, ut cum dico “anima-
 lium alia sunt rationabilia, alia irrationabilia” et rursus “rationabi-
 lium alia sunt mortalia, alia immortalia”, animal rationalis totum est
 et rursus rationale mortalis, et haec tria hominis. Si uero in defini- 10
 tione dicam “homo est animal rationale mortale” tria haec unum
 hominem iungunt, quocirca pars ipsius et genus et differentia reperi-
 d tur. Sic igitur in diuisione genus totum est, species pars, eodem quo-
 que modo differentiae totum, partes in quas illae diuiduntur. In defi-
 nitione uero et genus et differentiae partes sunt, definita uero species 15
 totum. Sed haec hactenus.

Nunc de ea diuisione dicemus quae est totius in partes, haec enim
 erat secunda diuisio post generis diuisionem. Quod enim dicimus
 totum multipliciter significamus : totum namque est quod continuum
 est, ut corpus uel linea uel aliquid huiusmodi ; dicimus quoque totum 20
 quod continuum non est, ut totum gregem uel totum populum uel
 exercitum totum ; dicimus quoque totum quod uniuersale est, ut
 hominem uel equum, hi enim toti sunt suarum partium, id est homi-
 num uel equorum, unde et particularem unumquemque hominem |
 888 dicimus ; dicitur quoque totum quod ex quibusdam uirtutibus con- 25
 stat, ut animae alia potentia est sapiendi, alia sentiendi, alia uege-
 tandi.

Tot igitur modis cum totum dicatur, facienda totius diuisio est
 primo quidem, si continuum fuerit, in eas partes ex quibus ipsum

3 sic] *A* : et *praem.* *A*² *C Q* || est similis] est *om.* *A Q* : si. es. *tr.* *A*⁴
 4 compositioni] *K*^c : -nis *G K* 7 iunctam *A Q* 8/9 et rursus rationalium
 (-abil- *ego scr.*) *A*² *Pr* : *om.* *A K Q* : et rursus *C E* : rationalium *F*(-nal-), *G* 9 sunt
om. *K Q* || animal *A C F G* : et *add.* *A E K Q* || rationalis] *A* : -li *A*⁴ *G*
 10 mortalis *A*⁴ *E F G* : animalis *add.* *A*⁴(*bis*), *C* : et animalis *add.* *A K Q* 13/
 14 eodem quoque] *A* : -demque *A*² *E K* 14 totum] sunt *add.* *F* : in *add.* *E*
 || illae *A*² *C*(-le), *F G* : -a *A E K Q* 21 continuum non] *A E*^c : non *om.* *E* :
 incontinuum *A*² 22 to.¹ (-to *a.c.* *E*) ex. *tr.* *C E* || quoque *G* : *om.* *cett.* || es. un.
tr. *F Q* 23 toti] *A C*^c *F* : -um *A*²(*s.l.*, ut *glossema*), *C F*² || suarum] *E*^c(*s/u/a-*) :
 earum *K* 26 ut *A*²(*ras.*), *C E*²(*mg.*), *F G* : *om.* *K Q* : cum autem dicimus *E* (*v. praef.*,
p. lxij) 26/27 uegetandi *A F G Q* : alia gustandi *add.* *K* : partes sunt (*animae add.*
E) non species *add.* *C E F*²

It should also be pointed out that in division the genus is a whole, in definition a part. And definition is such that it is as if parts of some kind are constituting a whole, division such that it is as if a whole is being resolved into parts: division of a genus resembles division of a whole; definition resembles the *composition* of a whole. For in division of a genus animal is the whole pertaining to man in that it encompasses man within itself, but in definition it is a part in that the genus in combination with the various differentiae constitutes the species. For example, when I say, "Of animals some are rational, others irrational," and then, "Of the rational ones some are mortal, others immortal," animal is the whole pertaining to rational as rational is in turn to mortal, and these are the three things pertaining to man. But if in a *definition* I should say, "Man is a rational mortal animal," then the three things combine to constitute the unified entity *man*, for which reason both a genus and a differentia is found to be a part thereof. In this sense, then, the genus is in division a whole, the species a part. Similarly, the differentiae are a whole whose parts are the species into which the differentiae are divided. In definition, by contrast, both the genus and differentiae are parts while the species defined is a whole.

So much for those matters. We shall now discuss that class of division which is of a whole into parts, since that was the second one, following division of a genus. For we use the term "whole" in more than one sense: The "whole" is that which is continuous, e.g. body, line, or anything of that sort. We speak also of a "whole" that is *not* continuous, e.g. a "whole" flock, population, or army. We speak also of a "whole" that is universal, e.g. man or horse—for these are wholes pertaining to their respective parts, i.e. men or horses, which also explains why we call this or that man a *particular*. And then there is "whole" in the sense of what consists of powers of some kind, e.g. in soul one potency is of understanding, another of sensing, another of imparting growth.

Given, then, that "whole" is applied in these different ways, let us suppose first a continuous whole, the division of which should be into

- totum constare perspicitur, aliter enim diuisio non fit. Hominis enim corpus in partes suas ita diuideres, in caput, manus, thoracem, pedes, et si quo alio modo secundum proprias partes fit recta diuisio. Quorum autem multiplex est compositio multiplex etiam diuisio, ut animal separatur quidem in partes eas quae sibi similes habent partes, in
 5
 b manus, in pedes, eodem quoque modo et nauis et domus. Librum quoque in uersus atque hos in sermones, hos etiam in syllabas, syllabas in litteras soluimus, itaque fit ut litterae et syllabae et nomina et uersus partes quaedam totius libri esse uideantur, alio tamen modo
 10 acceptae non partes totius sed partes partium sint. Oportet autem non omnia speculari quasi actu diuidantur sed quasi animo et ratione, ut uinum aquae mixtum diuidimus in uina aquae mixta, hoc actu, diuidimus etiam in uinum et aquam ex quibus mixtum est, hoc ratione, haec enim iam mixta separari non possunt. Fit autem totius
 15 diuisio et in materiam atque formam, aliter enim constat statua ex partibus suis, aliter ex materia atque forma, id est ex aere et specie.
- Similiter etiam illa tota diuidenda sunt quae continua non sunt
 c eodem quoque modo et ea quae sunt uniuersalia, ut "hominum alii sunt in Europa, alii in Asia, alii in Africa". Eius quoque totius quod
 20 ex uirtutibus constat hoc modo facienda est diuisio : "animae alia pars est in uirgultis, alia in animalibus" et rursus "eius quae est in animalibus alia rationalis, alia sensibilis est" et rursus haec aliis sub diuisionibus dissipantur. Sed non est anima horum genus sed totum, partes enim hae animae sunt, sed non ut in quantitate, sed ut in
 25 aliqua potestate atque uirtute, ex his enim potentiis substantia animae iungitur. Vnde fit ut quiddam simile habeat huiusmodi diuisio et generis et totius diuisioni, nam quod quaelibet eius pars fuerit animae praedicatio eam sequitur, ad generis diuisionem refertur, cuius ubi-
 d cumque fuerit species ipsum mox consequitur genus ; quod autem
 30 non omnis anima omnibus partibus iungitur sed alia aliis, hoc ad totius naturam referri necesse est.

2 manus] in *praem.* A F Q 3 quo¹] A^c E^c(*ras.*) : -od A : om. C 5 qui. se. tr. A F Q || eas] A : eas[.] Q : *del.* A^c || ea. pa.¹ tr. K 7 pedes] A : partes A² Q 14 hoc A² G K : hac A Q : animo hac (ac *p.c.*) E : sed C F 15 iam] C^c : om. C(*inc.*), Q 18 continua] A : inc- A² || non C E F G : om. A F^c K Q 20 af. -as. tr. A F Q 24 anima] A^c : -al A Q 25 ut²] A : om. A^c G 26 atque] et A F Q || enim C F G : ete- *cett.* || substantia] C^c G² : -ae C G 26/27 animae A² C F G : -alis A E K Q 27 huius E K 28 diuisioni] A^c : -nis A C Q || eius] A² : om. A Q || animae A^c F G K : si *add.* A C E Q 29 refertur A² F G : praef- A Q : prof- C E : qua prof- K 30 sp. fu. tr. A F Q

those parts of which it is observed to consist *qua* the actual whole (for otherwise the division is not accomplished). For you would divide a human body into the parts that are peculiar to it, the head, hands, chest, feet, or in any other way that makes a correct division in respect of the proper parts. Now the division of things whose compositional structure is multiplex is itself multiplex. For example, an animal is separable into those parts whose own parts are homogeneous, into flesh and bones, but also into those whose own parts are heterogeneous, into hands and feet, and the same would be true of a ship or house. A book, too, we resolve—into verses, then into words, then into syllables and letters. Hence the letters, syllables, names, and verses are perceived to be in one sense parts of the whole book, although taken in another way they are not parts of the whole but parts of the *parts*. Now we must not operate on the assumption that *all* things are divisible in actuality, but that they are divisible mentally or conceptually. For example, of wine that has been mixed with water we make an actual division into quantities of wine mixed with water; *conceptually* (for the two once mixed are inseparable) we divide it into the elements of mixture, wine and water. Moreover, a whole is divisible into matter and form, for a statue consists in one sense of its peculiar parts, in another of matter and form, i.e. of bronze and a shape.

Those wholes that are not continuous and those that are universal are to be divided in one and the same way, e.g. "Of men some are in Europe, others in Asia, others in Africa." And of the whole that consists of powers a division should be made as follows: "Of soul one part is in plants, another in animals;" and again, "of that which is in animals one part is rational, another sensible," and the latter are again dispersed under further divisions. But of these things soul is not a genus but the whole: they are parts of soul, not in the quantitative sense but in the sense of a certain faculty or power, since the substance of soul is composed of these potencies. So it is that this kind of division bears a certain resemblance to the division of both a genus and a whole. For in that each and every part of it entails the predicate "soul" it is brought into connection with the division of a genus, each and every species of which necessarily entails the genus itself. On the other hand, in that not every soul is composed of all parts but each one is composed differently, in this it is necessarily brought into connection with the nature of a whole.

Restat igitur ut de uocis in significantias diuisione tractemus. Fit autem uocis diuisio tribus modis. Diuiditur enim in significationes ut aequiuoca uel ambigua, plures enim res significat unum nomen, ut “canis”, plures rursus una oratio, ut cum dico Graecos uicisse Troianos. Alio autem modo secundum modum, haec enim non plura significant sed multis modis, ut cum dicimus “infinitem” unam rem quidem significat cuius terminus inueniri non possit, sed hoc dicimus aut secundum mensuram aut secundum multitudinem aut secundum speciem : secundum mensuram, ut est infinitum esse mundum, magnitudine enim dicimus infinitum ; secundum multitudinem, ut est infinitam esse corporum diuisionem, infinitam namque diuisionum multitudinem significamus ; rursus secundum speciem, ut infinitas dicimus figuras, infinitae enim sunt species figurarum. Dicimus etiam infinitum aliquid secundum tempus, ut infinitum dicimus mundum, cuius terminus secundum tempus inueniri non possit, eodem quoque modo infinitum dicimus deum, cuius supernae uitae terminus secundum tempus inueniri non possit. Sic igitur haec uox non plura significat secundum se sed multimode de singulis praedicatur, unum tamen ipsa significans. Alius uero modus est secundum determinationem. Quotiens enim sine determinatione dicitur uox ulla, facit intellectu dubitationem, ut est “homo”, haec enim uox multa significat, nulla enim definitione conclusa audientis intellegentiam multis raptat fluctibus erroribusque traducit. Quid enim quisque auditor intellegat ubi id quod dicens loquitur nulla determinatione concluditur ? Nisi enim quis ita definiat dicens “omnis homo ambulat” aut certe “quidam homo ambulat” et hunc nomine, si ita contingit, designet, intellectus audientis quod rationabiliter intellegat non habet. Sunt etiam aliae determinationes, ut si quis dicat “da mihi” quando uel quid dare debeat nullus intellegit nisi intellectus et certa

1 tractemus] DE VOCIS DIVISIONE *add. E* 3 significat unum nomen *C G K* : un. no. si. *tr. cett.* 4 cum *om. C K* 5 non plura] *E* : non *om. E* : no. multa *F* : pl. no. *tr. G* 14 etiam] *F*²(*ras.*) : enim *Q* 17 sic *F*² *G K* : si *A F Q* : *om. A*² *C E* 18 multimodae *A F G* 19 tamen] *A* : tantum *A*² *E* 20 sine *A*² *C E F*² *G* : *om. A F K Q* || ulla *N* : il- *cett.* 21 intellectu] *A C*, ?*G*² : in *praem. A*² *C*² : -um *G* 22 intellegentiam *F K* : -ia *cett.* 23 multis] -a *E* : per -a *C* : ad -a *E*² || raptat *A F K Q* : -atur *A*² *C E G* : -ptae *A*² *Q*² || fluctibus] efl- *Q* : erroribus *K* || erroribusque] *A*² : -bus *A Q* : fluctibusque *K* || traducit *A F K Q* : -itur *A*² *C E G* || Quid] ?*A* : -od ?*A C Q* 24/25 concluditur] ?*A*² : -it *A K Q* 26 si it. no. *tr. A E Q* || si it. co. no. *tr. F* || contingit] -at *G* : -tigit *C K* 28 qui *A K* 29 quando uel *C E* : *om. F G* : uel *A Q* : quid dicat da mihi uel (ue. *del. A*) *A*² *K*

It remains, then, for us to treat of the division of a spoken sound into significations. Now a spoken sound is divisible in three ways. *Qua* equivocal or ambiguous it is divisible into significations, for a single name such as "dog" signifies a number of things and a single expression does too, e.g. when I say that the Greeks the Trojans have conquered.

Another way is according to mode. Here the signification is not of a number of *things* but in a number of *modes*. For example, when we say "infinite" it in fact signifies a single thing the limit of which cannot be discovered, but we *apply* it in respect of either measure, multitude, or species: in respect of *measure*, as in the claim that the world is infinite, meaning that it is "infinite" in magnitude; in respect of *multitude*, as in the claim that the division of bodies is infinite, signifying that the multitude of divisions is "infinite;" again, in respect of *species*, e.g. we claim that [rhetorical] figures are "infinite" [indefinite], for the species of figures are infinite [indefinite]. We speak also of something's being "infinite" in respect of time, e.g. we call the world, the temporal limit of which cannot be discovered, "infinite;" in the same way we call God, of whose supernal life a temporal limit cannot be discovered, "infinite." In this way, then, this spoken sound "infinite" does not in itself signify a number of *things*, but it is predicated of single things in a number of *modes* despite itself signifying one thing.

Another way is according to a determination. For whenever any spoken sound is uttered without a determination it produces doubt as to what is to be understood. "Man" is a case in point, for it signifies more than one thing: without the restriction of any determination it tosses the hearer's understanding about on many waves of uncertainty and exposes it to wandering error. For what is each hearer to understand when the speaker's utterance is unrestricted by any determination? Unless one *makes* a determination and says, "*Every* man is walking," or indeed, "*A certain* man is walking," designating him if possible by name, the hearer's understanding has nothing that it might with good reason grasp. There are other determinations as well. For example, if someone says, "Give to me," no one understands when or what he is supposed to give unless the understanding

ratio determinationis addatur, uel si quis dicat “ad me uenite” quo
 ueniant uel quando nisi determinatione non cognoscitur. Est autem
 c omne quidem ambiguum dubitabile, non tamen omne dubitabile
 ambiguum, haec enim quae dicta sunt dubitabilia quidem sunt, non
 tamen ambigua. In ambiguis enim uterque auditor rationabiliter se
 ipsum intellexisse arbitratur, ut cum quis dicit “audio Graecos uicisse
 Troianos” unus potest intellegere quod Graeci Troianos uicerint,
 alius quod Troiani Graecos, et uterque hoc dicentis ipsius sermoni-
 bus rationabiliter intellegunt. Cum autem dico “da mihi” quid dare
 debeat nullus ex ipsis sermonibus rationabiliter auditor intellegit,
 quod enim ego non dixi ille potius suspicabitur quam aliqua ratione
 id quod a me prolatum non est perspicaciter uideat.

Tot igitur modis cum uocis diuisio fiat, aut per significantias aut
 per modum significationum aut per determinationem, in his quae
 d secundum significantiam diuiduntur non solum diuidendae sunt sig-
 nificationes sed etiam diuersas res esse quae significantur definitione
 monstrandum est. Aristoteles enim hoc in *Topicis* diligenter praecepit,
 ut in his quae dicuntur bona alia sunt bona, ut ea quae boni retinent
 qualitatem, alia quae ipsa quidem nulla qualitate dicuntur sed quod
 bonam rem faciunt idcirco bona dicuntur. Oportet autem maxime
 exercere hanc artem, ut ipse Aristoteles ait, contra sophisticas impor-
 tunitates, si enim nulla subiecta sit res quam significat uox, designa-
 tiua esse non dicitur, sin uero una res sit quam significat uox, dicitur
 simplex, quod si plures, multiplex et multa significans. Diuidenda
 890 igitur haec sunt ne in aliquo syllogismo capiamur. Sin | uero amphi-
 bola oratio [id est ambigua] est, euenit ut aliquotiens utroque modo
 25 possibilis sint quae significantur, ut id quod superius dixi ; potuit

17 Arist., *Top.* A 15, 106a6-8; 107a3-12; A 18, 108a18-22

21 Arist., *Peri H.* 6, 17a35-37; cf. *Top.* A 18, 108a26-37

1 uenite] A : -i A² G : -ito K 2 ueniant] A : -at A² G K || non om. F ||
 noscitur C G K 9 intellegunt A C K Q : -it A^e E G : -int (sic) F 10 auditor
 intellegit] A²(au. s.l., ut glossema) : intellegit cum autem dico A Q 11 ego] A², ?E^e :
 om. E : ergo A, ?E^e Q || quam] E^e : -i E : -ali K || aliqua] qua K
 17 monstrandum est C G K : es. mo. tr. cett. || Aristoteles ... hoc] aristoteles (a.c.)
 enim hoc E : hoc enim aristelis K 19 ipsa] Q^e : quae ipsa add. K Q 21 artem
 C F² G K : arte F : autem A Q : om. A^e E 23 sit re. tr. C G 26 oratio] E : est
 praem. E^e : est add. C G || [] ego secl. || est² A^e F K : om. A cett.

and reliable reason of a determination is added. Or if someone says, "Come to me," where or when they should come is unknown except in light of a determination.

Now although everything ambiguous is doubtful, not everything doubtful is ambiguous, for although the examples just given are doubtful, they are not ambiguous. For with ambiguous expressions each hearer has good reason to suppose that *he* is the one to have understood. For example, when someone says, "I hear that the Greeks the Trojans have conquered," one is entitled to understand that the Greeks have conquered the Trojans, another that the Trojans have conquered the Greeks, and given what the speaker himself has said each one has good reason for understanding what he does. But when I say, "Give to me," from just the words no hearer has a rational basis for understanding what he is supposed to give; for he will *guess* at what I have not said, as opposed to perspicaciously perceiving in some way that which has not been mentioned by me.

Given, then, that a spoken sound is divisible in these different ways, through either the significations, the mode of the significations, or a determination, in the case of those that are divided in respect of signification not only are the significations to be divided but it is necessary to show by way of definition that the things signified are different. Aristotle diligently laid this down in the *Topics*, with the illustration of things that are said to be good: some *are* good, e.g. those that possess the quality of the good, others are *called* good, not because of any quality of their own but because they are productive of something good. Now as Aristotle himself affirms, it is necessary above all to practice this art to counter the troublesome objections of sophists. For if a spoken sound signifies *no* subject thing, it is not said to be designative; but if it signifies *one* thing, it is called simple; and if *a number* of things, multiplex, i.e. signifying more than one thing. We must divide between them, therefore, in order not to be ensnared in some syllogism.

If, on the other hand, an amphibolous expression is at issue, it in certain cases turns out that the significates both ways are possible, as in the example given above: there was the possibility that the Greeks

enim fieri ut Graeci uincerent Troianos et Graecos Troiani supera-
rent. Sunt uero alia quae impossibilia sunt, ut cum dico hominem
comedere panem, significat quidem quod homo panem comedat,
rursus quod panis hominem, sed hoc impossibile est. Ergo quotiens
ad contentionem uenitur diuidenda et possibilia et impossibilia, quo-
tiens ad ueritatem sola possibilia dicenda, impossibilia relinquenda
sunt.

Quoniam ergo plures sunt species plura significantium uocum,
dicendum est quod aliae in particula multipliciter significationis
habent, aliae in tota oratione, et eorum quae in particula habent pars
b ipsa aequiuoca dicitur, tota uero ipsa oratio secundum aequiuoca-
tionem multiplex, illa uero quae in oratione tota significationis mul-
tiplicitatem retinet, ut supra iam dictum est, ambigua nuncupatur.
Diuiduntur autem significationes aequiuocarum secundum aequiuoca-
tionem unius particulae orationum definitione, ut cum dico “homo
c uiuit” intellegitur et uerus intellegitur et pictus ; diuiditur autem hoc
modo : “animal rationale mortale uiuit”, quod uerum est, “animalis
rationalis mortalis simulatio uiuit”, quod falsum est. Diuiditur qua-
libet adiectione quae terminet, uel generis uel casus uel alicuius ar-
ticipuli ; ut cum dico “Canna Romanorum sanguine sorduit” et cala-
mum demonstrat et fluuium, sed diuidimus sic : articulo quidem, ut
dicamus “hic Canna Romanorum sanguine sorduit” ; uel genere, ut
c “Canna Romanorum sanguine plenus fuit” ; uel casu uel numero, in
illo enim singularis tantum est, in illo pluralis, et de aliis quidem
eodem modo. Sunt autem alia secundum accentum, alia secundum
orthographiam, et secundum accentum quidem ut “poné” et “póne”,
secundum orthographiam ut “quaeror” et “queror” ab inquisitione et

1 graecos troiani *C G K* : tr. gr. tr. *cett.* 2 cum] *A*² : om. *A K* 3 co.² pa.² (et
add. *G*) tr. *C G* 5 et¹] sunt *praem.* *G* : sunt *F* || impossibilia] *A* : sunt add. *A*² *C* :
-ibia *K* : -ibia sunt *E* 6 sola possibilia *C G K* : po. so. tr. *cett.* 8 sp. su. tr. *F K*
9 in particula] imp- *F*² : in -lis *K* : imparticulis *F* || multipliciter *P Alb* : -catis
E : -catas *K* : -citatis *E*^c *cett.* || significationis *P Alb* : -es *K* : -em *cett.*
13 retinet] et add. *C* (v. *praef.*, p. *lxif.*) || ut ... est om. *F* || iam] *A* : om. *A*^c *F G*
|| ambigua nuncupatur om. *C E* 14 aequiuocarum *Pr* : -corum uel *codd.*
15 unius particulae *C E* : om. *cett.* || orationum *A*^c *N* : uel *praem.* *C E* : aut add. *A*
cett. || definitione *A*^c *E F G* : -em *A C K Q* 16 intellegitur² om. *C G*
18 mortalis *C G K* : om. *cett.* || simulatio *K* : simil- *A G* : assimil- *A*² *cett.*
18/19 qualibet adiectione *C G K* : ad. qu. tr. *cett.* 20/21 calamum - fluuium *C G*
K : fl. - ca. tr. *cett.* 22 sa. ro. tr. *A E* || ut] *A*² (*ras.*), *Q* : uel *Q*^c 24 singularis
(-lis *G*) tantum *C G K* : ta. si. tr. *cett.* 27 ut *A*² *K* : om. *A cett.* || queror] *E*^c :
quae- *E Q*

would conquer the Trojans *and* that the Trojans would overpower the Greeks. There are, however, other cases, which are impossible, e.g. when I say that man bread eats: it does indeed signify that man eats bread, but also that bread eats man, which is impossible. So when it comes to controversy division should be made for both the possibilities and the impossibilities; when it comes to *truth* only the possibilities should be stated, the impossibilities being put aside.

Given, then, that there are numerous kinds of spoken sounds signifying a number of things, it should be pointed out that some have their multiplicity of signification in a single part, others in the complete expression. And of the things that have it in a part, the *part* is called equivocal and the whole *expression* multiplex by virtue of the equivocation. That which retains its multiplicity of signification in the whole expression, on the other hand, is called ambiguous, as was already mentioned above.

Now the significations of expressions that are equivocal by virtue of the equivocation of a single part are divisible by way of definition. For example, when I say, "A man is alive," both a real man and the depiction of a man are understood. The division is as follows: "A rational mortal animal is alive," which is true; "The likeness of a rational mortal animal is alive," which is false. There is division by way of some addition that will provide a determination, whether of gender, case, or an article of some kind. For example, when I say, "Canna grew foul with Roman blood," it indicates both a reed and a river. Here is how we divide: With an *article*, so as to say, "The Canna [*hic Canna*] grew foul with Roman blood;" by *gender*, e.g. "Canna was full [*plenus*] of Roman blood;" or by case or number (for in the one instance there is only the singular, in the other the plural)—and similarly in other examples as well. Moreover, some things are according to accent, others according to orthography. *Poné-póne* ["behind"—"put"] is an example according to accent; *quaeror-queror*, from inquiry and complaint, is an example according to orthogra-

querela ; et haec rursus uel secundum ipsam orthographiam diuiduntur uel secundum actionem et passionem, quod “quaeror” ab inquisitione passiuum est, “queror” autem a querela agentis est. Ambiguarum uero orationum facienda est diuisio aut per adiectionem aut per diminutionem aut per diuisionem aut per aliquam transmutationem, ut cum dicitur “audio Troianos uicisse Graecos” ita dicamus, “audio quod Graeci uicerint Troianos”, haec enim ambiguitas quolibet eorum soluitur. Non tamen ita diuidenda est omnis uocum significatio tamquam genus : in genere omnes species enumerantur, in ambiguitate uero tantae sufficiunt quantae ad eum sermonem possint esse utiles quem alterutra nectit oratio.

Ac de uocis quidem significatione sufficienter dictum est, est autem et de generis totiusque diuisione propositum atque expeditum, quare de omnibus secundum se partitionibus diligentissime pertractatum est ; nunc autem de his diuisionibus dicemus quae per accidens fiunt. Harum autem commune praeceptum est, quicquid ipsorum diuiditur | in opposita disgregari, ut si subiectum in accidentia diuidimus non dicamus “corporum alia sunt alba, alia dulcia”, quae opposita non sunt, sed “corporum alia sunt alba, alia nigra, alia neutra”, eodem quoque modo in aliis secundum accidens diuisionibus diuidendum est. Atque illud maxime perspicendum, ne quid ultra dicatur aut minus, sicut fit in generis diuisione. Non enim oportet relinqui aliquod accidens ex eadem oppositione quod subiecto illi inest quod non in diuisione dicatur, neque uero addi aliquid quod subiecto inesse non possit.

Posterior | quidem Peripateticae secta prudentiae differentias diuisionum diligentissima ratione perspexit et per se diuisionem ab ea quae est secundum accidens ipsasque inter se disiunxit atque distri-

1 querela *C E^c F G K* : quae- *A E F² Q* || uel] *om. E G* : quae *F²(ras.)*
 2 quaeror *E K* : uel *add. A Q* : que- *C F G* 3 queror *A(-or////)*, *C E^c F* : quae-
E F² G Q : queri *A² K(?) -uae-)* || querela *C E^c F G K* : quae- *A E F² Q*
 4 adiectionem] ut audio troianos uinci graecos uicisse *add. F G*
 5 diminutionem] *E^c : om. E* : ut audio graecos uicisse *add. F G* || diuisionem] ut
 graeci uicerunt troiani uicti sunt *add. F G* 7 dicamus] *A²(ras.)* : -imus *E Q* : -atur
F || audio *om. E F* 8 eorum] modo *praem. G* : modo *add. F* 9 genus] *A* :
 generis significatio *A² E* || genere] enim *add. C G* 12 es.¹ di. tr. *G K* 14 se
 (sese *A²)* partitionibus *A² F G* : se partitione *C* : separationem *A(vid.)*, *E K Q*
 15 autem *om. F G* || dicemus *A²(s.l., ut glossema)*, *G K* : -imus *A E F Q* : -amus *C*
 17 disgregari] *K^c* : seg- *K* : oportet *add. F* 18 dulcia] *A² Q* : duc- *A Q^c*
 21 perspicendum] est *add. C E* 22/23 aliquid *E K* 23 illi ... subiecto (24)]
A²(mg.) : om. A Q

phy. And the latter are again divisible, according to either the actual orthography or action and passion, since *quaeror* ["I am being sought / investigated"], from inquiry, is passive whereas *queror* ["I complain"] derives from the complaint of an *agent*.

Ambiguous expressions, on the other hand, are to be divided through either addition, subtraction, division, or transposition of some kind. For example, for the statement, "I hear that the Trojans the Greeks have conquered," we could say, "I hear that the Greeks have conquered the Trojans," for this particular ambiguity is resolved in any one of those ways. However, not *every* signification of spoken sounds is to be divided, as with a genus: in the case of a genus all the species are enumerated whereas in the case of ambiguity as many significations as prove useful for the discourse linked together by one or another expression are sufficient.

Enough has been said about the signification of a spoken sound, and concerning the division of a genus and a whole the plan has been carried out, so that the treatment of all the *secundum se* partitions has been most diligently completed. We shall now discuss the divisions that are made *per accidens*. Now for them the common precept is that in connection with such things *everything* is divided into opposites. For example, if we are dividing a subject into accidents we should not say, "Of bodies some are white, others sweet," which are not opposites, but, "Of bodies some are white, others black, others neither." For the other *secundum accidens* divisions the procedure will be the same. Above all you should make sure that neither too much nor too little is stated, precisely as in the division of a genus. For not one of the accidents from the same opposition—not one that inheres in the subject at issue—is to be left unstated in the division, nor is anything incapable of inhering in the subject to be added.

The later sect of Peripatetic wisdom discerned in the most diligent manner the differences between divisions: it separated division *per se* and division *secundum accidens* from one another and distributed them

buit, antiquiores autem indifferenter et accidente pro genere et accidentibus pro speciebus aut differentiis utebantur, unde nobis peropportuna utilitas uisa est et communionem harum diuisionum prodere et eas propriis differentiis disgregare. Et de diuisione quidem omni quantum introductionis breuitas patiebatur diligenter expressimus.

5

1 accidente] *A*^e : -ter *A Q* 2 unde] ut de *Q* : at de *K* : at *G*

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both. Its predecessors, on the other hand, indiscriminately employed both an accident in place of the genus and accidents in place of species, or differentiae. For this reason the utility of both setting forth the common characteristics of these divisions and separating them according to their proper differences struck me as being particularly timely. And so concerning each class of division I have diligently presented as much as the brevity of an introduction would allow.

COMMENTARY

SYNOPSIS

- I. 4,3-6,16: **Proem.**
- II. 6,17-10,27: **The six modes of division, with examples:**
 - A. 6,17-8,2: Preliminary enumeration.
 - B. 8,3-30: *Secundum se* divisions.
 - C. 10,1-27: *Secundum accidens* divisions.
- III. 10,28-14,26: **Differences between *secundum se* divisions:**
 - A. 10,33-12,16: Genus / species vs. spoken sound / significations.
 - B. 12,17-14,20: Genus / species vs. whole / parts.
 - C. 14,21-26: Whole / parts vs. spoken sound / significations.
- IV. 14,27-38,16: **Genus / Species divisions:**
 - A. 14,27-18,3: Preliminaries.
 - B. 18,4-20,19: On differentiae.
 - C. 20,20-28,24: On opposition:
 - 1. 20,20-22,5: Preliminary enumeration of the four tropes, with examples.
 - a. 22,6-24,6: Contradiction.
 - b. 24,8-27: Privation.
 - c. 24,28-28,8: Contrariety.
 - d. 28,9-16: Relation.
 - 2. 28,17-24: Which divide(s) the genus?
 - D. 28,25-32,15: Final considerations:
 - 1. 28,25-30,21: Differentiae vs. species.
 - 2. 30,22-28: The convertibility of divisions.
 - 3. 30,29-32,7: Multiple divisions of the genus.
 - 4. 32,8-15: The genus as a collection of species.
 - E. 32,16-36,34: Definition of the species:
 - 1. 32,16-34,15: General precepts.
 - 2. 34,16-36,34: Illustration.
 - F. 38,1-16: Transitional.
- V. 38,17-40,32: **Whole / Parts divisions:**
 - A. 38,17-27: Enumeration of the four senses of “whole,” with examples.
 - B. 38,28-40,17: Continuous wholes.
 - C. 40,18-32: Discontinuous wholes.
- VI. 42,1-48,11: **Spoken Sound / Significations divisions:**
 - A. 42,1-44,12: Enumeration of the three modes.
 - B. 44,13-46,7: Division according to significations.
 - C. 46,8-48,11: Equivocity vs. ambiguity.
- VII. 48,12-25: ***Secundum accidens* divisions.**
- VIII. 48,26-50,5: **Conclusion.**

Note on citations. Citations from Migne, *PL* LXIV (1891), reflect the understanding that columns are usually divided thus: a1-15; b1-15; c1-15; d1-14. But since in many columns the letters are erratically positioned, the reader will encounter some apparent discrepancies of a line or two.

Title. The MSS divide between three versions and sometimes contradict themselves from incipit to explicit: (*liber* +) *de diuisione*, *diuisionum*, or *diuisionis* ("Text" 2f.). The index in the (pre-)archetype had simply *de diuisione* (above, lix); but at *Diff. top.* II 9,9 B. writes, *in eo libro ... quem de diuisione composui*, while at *Div.* 4,5 he recasts the title of Andronicus' treatise in the form, *De diuisione liber*. Abelard implies *de* + abl. but wavers between the sing. and plur., while John of Salisbury understands *liber diuisionum* (*Met.* III 9 [909a]). The gen. may have been prompted by *differentias diuisionum*, 48,26f., or *ratio diuisionis*, 8,1f., and the plur. at least would seem to be more consistent with a list of divisions such as those transmitted from the ancient Peripatos than with B.'s treatise (cf. Moraux, *Listes* 85; 209; Chrys., ap. DL VII 200). B. himself implies *de diuisione* (32,14; 38,17; 42,1; 48,13 [cf. 14f.]; 50,4), leaving the question of *liber* mere guesswork. Hence it is uncertain whether *liber* formed part of the original title, or if so, whether it stood before or after *de diuisione*. On B.'s name, see Usener, *Anecd.* 43f., n. 1; Brandt, ed. *In Isag.* vii, n. 1; Fortescue, ed. *CPh.*, xi; Chadwick, *Boethius* 1; Bagnall et al., *Consuls* 554f. (an. 510); Troncarelli, *Tradizioni* 27.

I. 4,3-6,16: Proem

The proem is in two parts, the purpose of the first being to furnish historical background (4,3-11), that of the second to situate B.'s contribution. This recalls the introductions to *Antepr.* and *Intr. cat. syll.* (761b10-762c11; 793c1-794d2; *Hyp. syll.* I 1,1-4 reverses the pattern). At *In Cic. top.* 1042d1-4 B. outlines three possible functions of an introduction, of which the second, the *praepraatio attentionis*, is at the forefront here. For as he explains at 1043c7f., it is the difficulty of a work that draws attention, and B. clearly expects that *Div.* will alienate some for its difficulty. As to style, B. is here at his most rebarbative.

4,3-11. *Andronicus' book On Division teaches of the utility of division and of the high esteem in which the Peripatetics always held the science. Plotinus looked favorably upon Andronicus' book, and Porphyry reworked it for his commentary on Plato's Sophist. Porphyry also acknowledged the utility of his Isagoge with reference to the science, saying that an understanding of the five predicables is a prerequisite to diaeresis, among other things.*

This passage is of great importance for its hints concerning two otherwise unattested works of Porphyry and Andronicus. B. has carefully framed the whole proem, especially the first two sentences, as is evident both from their internal structure and from comparison with the closing sentences of *Div.* Thus *utilitas* (4,8) complements *fructus* (4,3), and both are echoed by *utilitas*, 50,3, just as *apud Peripateticam disciplinam* and *diligentissimi* (4,4f.) are echoed by *Peripateticae secta prudentiae* and *diligentissima*, 48,26f. The opening sentence is in a kind of ring structure: (a) *Quam ... diuidenti* (Andronicus, on the utility); (b) *quamque ... notitia* (and on the Peripatos); (c) *docet ... editus* (Andronicus' book); (b') *et' ... repetitus* (Plotinus and Porphyry, on Andronicus); (a') *et³ ... utilitas* (Porphyry, on the utility).

Notice that B. mentions the ancient sources without saying what is at his disposal. He is not always so vague (cf. *In Cat.* 160a4f.; *In Perih.* II 4,3-7; II 321,20-24; *Diff. top.* IV 1,17 [with Arist., *Soph. el.* 183b34-184b8]), and for us matters are complicated by the fact that the Andronicean and Porphyrian works are no longer extant. What does emerge is the following: (a) With the exception of Plato, the authorities are arranged chronologically (Andronicus, Plotinus, Porphyry), i.e. B. is hinting at how information has been passed down. (b) *Quam ... notitia* represent Andronicus' own remarks, as interpreted by Porphyry. (c) Plotinus' opinion of Andronicus' book was mentioned by Porphyry, to whom Plotinus (Porphyry's teacher) recommended it.

4,3f. Quam ... disciplinam. Cf. *Inst. ar.* I 32,1: *Magnus quippe in hac scientia fructus est*; *In Perih.* I 31,1f.: *Magna quidem libri huius apud Peripateticam sectam probatur auctoritas. afferat.* Cf. *In Isag.* II 146,1f.: *accidentis quoque cognitio quantum afferat*; *In Cic. top.* 1107c1-3: *quantas ... uires afferat amicitiae contemplatio*; *CPh.* III 2,12: *iucunditatem animo ... afferre. fructus.* Although B. varies the terminology (*utilitas*, 4,8/10; 6,4; 50,3; *usus*, 4,11), the underlying concept is coherent throughout (cf. *In Isag.* I 23,3; II 140,6-9). This, one of the two didascaliae (τὸ χρήσιμον, ἡ τάξις, 6,14) mentioned, is the cornerstone of the prologue, linking B. with both the ancient Peripatos and the Roman

context. Cf. *In Isag.* I 4,17-5,10; I 23,2-16; II 146,26-153,6; *In Cat.* 161a7-162d6; *In Perih.* II 4,15-13,23. **apud Peripateticam disciplinam.** The pre-Andronicean Peripatos, for B. is repeating a point made by Andronicus (cf. Donini, *Scuole* 90). For the different senses of *disciplina*, cf. 6,15; *Inst. mus.* I 1 (181,1); I 34 (223,29, with 224,19); V 3 (354,26); *In Isag.* I 13,9f.; I 132,2). Here it anticipates *secta*, 48,26 (cf. *heres*, *Inst. ar.* II 27,2, *hereditas*, *CPh.* I 3,7, and *auctoritas*, *In Perih.* II 194,8). At times B. uses *Peripatetici* of the tradition generally (*In Perih.* II 193,26f.), at times he has in mind a commentator (e.g. Porphyry, *In Perih.* II 29,17-30,3 = II 36,10f.). Cf. *In Perih.* II 352,2: *apud Peripateticae sectae principes*; II 414,19: *Peripatetica disciplina*; *In Cic. top.* 1043c14: *ad Aristotelicae philosophiae disciplinam*; Gell. XVIII 1,1: *Peripateticae disciplinae sectator*; XIX 5,2: *uir ... ex Peripatetica disciplina*; Düring, *Biogr. Trad.* 404-11.

4,4f. semper ... in honore. Note the interlocking *semper haec ... in honore notitia*, a favorite device. Lucian pokes fun at the Peripatetic love of diaeresis (*Vit. auct.* 26; cf. on *quae expetuntur ... in anima ... in corporibus*, 10,5f.). **docet.** The tense is not evidence that B. has Andronicus' treatise to hand. B. often speaks this way (e.g. *In Cat.* 263a5; *In Perih.* II 40,30f.). **Andronici.** Mentioned by B. only three times, and the information here presented is unattested by any other source. See above, xxxvif.; cf. Prantl, *Geschichte* I 559; I 632; I 686f.

4,5. diligentissimi. Cf. *In Perih.* II 11,15-17: (*Andronicum*) *quem cum exactum diligentemque Aristotelis librorum et iudicem et repertorem iudicavit antiquitas*. Galen (*Scr. min.* II 44,12-17 M., if the text is reliable) praises Andronicus the thinker, while Themistius (*In De an.* 32,23) and B. praise Andronicus the scholar (cf. Littig, *Andr. v. Rh.* I 6, n. 2; II 14, n. 2; Plezia, *De Andr. stud.* 52; Düring, *Biogr. Trad.* 420; 434; Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 99). The adj. anticipates *diligentissima*, 48,27, suggesting Andronicus there and the "later" Peripatos here; it also anticipates *diligenter*, 6,15, which is in turn echoed at 50,5. Cf. *Inst. mus.* I 4 (192,20); II 7 (234,17); *Diff. top.* I 1,5; II 8,8; II 9,9; II 10,1, etc. **senis.** Andronicus is an ancient (Stump), not an old man (Albert). B. uses *senex* in this way at *CPh.* V m4,1f. (*Quondam Porticus attulit / obscuro nimium senes*—"obscure" in two senses), and at *In Cat.* 284a4-6 he explains (following Porphyry) that *senius* is for animate and *antiquius* for inanimate things (but cf. 50,1). The effect is to elevate Andronicus' status within the tradition, and the adj. is not evidence for his dates (Susemihl, *Geschichte* II 691, n. 340; cf. Littig, *Andr. v. Rh.* I 8, n.

2; II 14, n. 2). **De diuisione.** Hippolytus mentions an Andronicean λόγος apparently entitled Περὶ κράσεως καὶ μίξεως (*Ref.* V 21,1; Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 45, n. 3). **liber.** Although this could signify a codex or (improbably) a roll, the reference is just to an independent literary work. Cf. *In Perih.* II 207,21 (*Vergilii librum*); *In Cic. top.* 1043a7f. (*libros euoluerit*, with Pliny, *Epp.* I 13,2 and V 5,5); Brandt, ed. *In Isag.* x, n. 5; below, on 40,7. **editus.** The sense could be “published” (Stump) or “written.” Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1100b7f. (*in eo libro quem ... Victorinus edidit*); *Diff. top.* II 9,9 (*in eo libro ... quem ... composui*); Marrou, “Technique” 210f.; 221. Note the anaphoric series, *editus ... comprobatus ... repetitus* (cf. Bednarz, *De ... colore* 27).

4,5f. hic idem. Andronicus’ *liber*, not “the same point” (Stump). **a Plotino grauissimo philosopho comprobatus.** A unique reference to Plotinus, whose *Enn.* there is little evidence of B.’s having read (“Boethius ... and Andronicus” 554f., n. 45). The sense is clear (“über welches Plotin sich sehr positiv geäußert ... habe,” Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 120), and since the *Enn.* contain nothing corresponding to the remark here, we must conclude that B. acquired the information from Porphyry’s *Soph. prolegomena* (*pace* Stump, citing *Enn.* II 6 [? 1,13-22]; cf. Courcelle, *Writers* 282). The adj. contrasts with *diligentissimi*: Plotinus, an important (Platonic) philosopher, approved of a treatise written by the *Peripatetic scholar* Andronicus. Porphyry, in his eagerness to harmonize Plato and Aristotle, would not have ignored such praise coming from his teacher (see above, xliii, with n. 21). Porphyry is himself honored by B. with both *grauissimus* and *doctissimus* (*Intr. cat. syll.* 814c8; *In Perih.* II 276,9).

4,7. libri. As often (e.g. *In Perih.* II 93,1), although B. uses “dialogue” as well (e.g. *In Perih.* II 79,23). There is no reason to doubt, with *K*, the gen., although *commentarius in* + acc. is more frequent. Cf. *In Perih.* II 8,2f.: *in eius commentario*; II 79,17f.: *eorum omnium commenta*; *Antepr.* 764a10 = *Intr. cat. syll.* 795b13f.: *in commentario libri*; and on *Introductionis ... in Categorías*, 4,8. **Sophistes.** Referred to by B. only here, although *In Cic. top.* 1045b2-7 suggests the same dialogue. Cf. Ebbsen, *Commentators* III 118f. **commentariis.** I take B. at his word as to there having been a commentary; that it included prolegomena seems a necessary assumption, given the similarities between *Div.* and the *Isag.* B. indicates only that Porphyry reworked (*repetitus*) Andronicus’ treatise for his commentary, not that he is himself following the commentary proper. On this matter Littig was vague (*Andr. v. Rh.* II

12), while Plezia envisioned only B.'s use of a commentary (e.g. *De Andr. stud.* 12), and Moraux only that of an introduction (*Aristotelismus* I 120; I 123f. [misreading Plezia]; I 132). Cf. *In Isag.* I 15,7-11: *omnibus enim Porphyrii libris stilus hic conuenit. et mos hic Porphyrio est, ut in his rebus quae sunt obscurissimae, introducenda quaedam et praegustanda praecurrat, ut alio quodam libro de categoricis syllogismis fecit et de multis item aliis quae in philosophia grauius illustriusque uersantur. repetitus.* B. obviously means an adaptation of some kind, although there may be the added hint of a text rescued from obscurity (*OLD*, q.v. *repeto* 5).

4,8. hanc. The scribes were puzzled by this ("Text" 19f.). Albert and Pozzi give only loose renderings, Stump alters the syntax of *utilitas* ("as well as by the highly valued usefulness of his *Isagoge* to Aristotle's *Categories*"), and Moraux proposed *haec* (*Aristotelismus* I 120, n. 1): "(dies zeige ferner) sein (= des Teilens) Nutzen, den derselbe (Porphyrios) durch diese Worte aus seiner Einleitung zu den Kategorien lobte." At *In Isag.* II 150,7-9 B. writes, *et in ceteris quam sit utilis iste tractatus, cum de diuisione et demonstratione disputabitur, apparebit*, and his point is that the exposition of diaeresis will shed light on the utility of the *Isag.* With that remark, however, B. is not looking to *Div.* for an explanation of the utility of the *Isag.* but is referring ahead to *In Isag.* II 155,14ff. And Porphyry's point at *Isag.* 1,5f., which B. is just about to paraphrase, is in fact that the *Isag.* will assist toward the mastery of diaeresis. On this matter B. understands Porphyry perfectly: it is the utility of the *Isag.* that is acknowledged (*laudata*) with reference to (*per*) the science of diaeresis (*hanc*, sc. *scientiam diuidendi, notitiam*). Thus *hanc* is not only intelligible but necessary, and there is no support for Moraux's view that Porphyry praises the utility of diaeresis "through the following words from the *Isag.*" Moreover, *enim* will introduce a paraphrase, not a quotation. **Introductionis ... in Categorias.** Like *commentarius* (cf. on *libri*, 4,7), *introductio* is sometimes followed by the gen., e.g. *In Isag.* II 146,27: *ad introductionem Praedicamentorum*. Note the Grk. *Categoriae* (cf. 24,13; 26,4) alongside the Lat. *Introductio*. DeRijk makes the transliteration grounds for condemning *In Cat.* 160a6-9 ("Chronology" 134, n. 3). The restrictive *in Categorias* was not always employed, since Porphyry's *Isag.* was regarded also as an introduction to philosophy in general (Ammon., *In Isag.* 20,22; 23,1-11; Elias, *In Isag.* 38,34-39,3). Nevertheless, B. is fond of it: *In Isag.* I 4,13f.; I 15,2f./19f.; I 17,16; II 143,11f.; *In Cat.* 159a1f., etc. **utilitas.** Cf. on *fructus*, 4,3. On the utility of the *Isag.*, see *In Isag.* I 10,12-12,8 and II 151,10-158,20.

4,8-11. Dicit ... partiendi. = Porph., *Isag.* 1,3-6 (*AL* I 6, p. 5,2-7; cf. Ebbesen, “Boethius as ... Commentator” [1990] 375, n. 11): “Ὀντος ἀναγκαίου, Χρυσαόριε, καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει κατηγοριῶν διδασκαλίαν τοῦ γνῶναι τί γένος καὶ τί διαφορὰ τί τε εἶδος καὶ τί ἴδιον καὶ τί συμβεβηκός, εἰς τε τὴν τῶν ὀρισμῶν ἀπόδοσιν καὶ ὅλως εἰς τὰ περὶ διαιρέσεως καὶ ἀποδείξεως χρησίμης οὔσης τῆς τούτων θεωρίας = *Cum sit necessarium, Chrysaorie, et ad eam quae est apud Aristotelem praedicamentorum doctrinam nosse quid genus sit et quid differentia quidque species et quid proprium et quid accidens, et ad definitionum adsignationem, et omnino ad ea quae in diuisione uel demonstratione sunt utili hac istarum rerum speculatione. necessariam fore.* B. ignores his own remarks at *In Isag.* I 15,22-16,9, on the position of *esse*, and the ancient commentators, B. included, spill much ink over “necessary.” **cum propter alia multa.** Sc. definition, demonstration, categorical doctrine. **tum propter utilitatem.** An awkward but intelligible formulation. Porphyry does not refer to the utility of diaeresis, but to the utility of the predicables in respect of diaeresis. Hence B. probably means, “partitioning, which is of great utility” rather than “the great utility of partitioning.” **partiendi.** Not necessarily “distributing things into their parts” (Stump), for Porphyry means no particular class of division and B.’s terminology is in any case flexible (see above, xxiv, n. 29; *In Isag.* II 213,11; *In Cic. top.* 1109d12-1110a1).

4,11-6,16. *Since diaeresis is both useful and easy, I have written on it as on other subjects. The present work is brief yet comprehensive, and those who would criticize my brevity should understand that prolixity is a detriment to the arts: I write for the advanced, not tyros. I have discussed elsewhere the point at which this work should be taken up for study.*

B. turns to the contemporary setting and in so doing strikes a polemical tone. Strands of thought that run through his other prefaces are here interwoven: the immense labor of transmitting Grk. thought, the passion for balancing completeness and brevity, and the anticipation of detractors. Apart from its final words the passage contributes nothing of substance, hence worth noting is B.’s preparedness to indulge in matters strictly inessential. He obviously put care into the proem (the syntax is unusually strained), and the slightly paranoid touches may be more than a rhetorical conceit (cf. above, xxxif.). Cf. *Antepr.* 761c1-762c10; *Intr. cat. syll.* 793d3-794d2; *In Perih.* II 250,20-251,16; *CEut. praef.* 28-45; *Hebd.* 8-14; *Trin. praef.* 8-22; *Diff. top.* II 1,1-4; *In Cic. top.* 1063b8-d11; 1107c1-1108c6; 1157a2-12; *CPh.* I 3,5-14; I 4,13f.; Brandt, “Entstehungszeit” 269.

4,11f. maximus usus. Cf. on *fructus*, 4,3. **facillimaque doctrina.** B. has not said that diaeresis is easy to master, and twice he implies that it is not (6,3/11). But in the first case he stresses the difficulty of his own task of writing on the subject, and in the second he thinks of diaeresis as being difficult for *beginners*. **id quoque.** The archetype read *quoque id*, giving emphasis to *ego* (cf. Quint. I 5,39; Ter., *Ph.* 615). DeRijk ("Chronology" 48) explains *ego quoque id* as B.'s way of situating himself in line with Andronicus (but why not with Porphyry, who has just been mentioned?). Littig, on the other hand, paraphrased: "Boëthius sagt ... er wolle auch die Lehre vom Teilen, wie schon so vieles andere, für römische Leser übertragen" (*Andr. v. Rh.* II 12). Littig was right on this (hence *sicut pleraque*), and to the old epithet, "last of the Romans, first of the scholastics," B. might well have quipped that in this instance being *first* among the Romans had some advantage over being last in a long and distinguished line of Greeks (*pace* Stump, "I also have written this down"). I cannot believe that B. would have left the precise import of *quoque* in doubt. Cf. 24,18 (*hoc quoque Aristoteles*); *CPh.* I 4,32 (*idem de patribus quoque*, "but did I deserve the same from the *senators*?"); I 3,3/6; II 1,6; III 3,12; III 7,4; III 9,15; *In Isag.* II 223,4; *In Perih.* II 4,8; II 150,16; II 321,20; II 324,16; *CEut.* praef. 51; III 65/68; *In Cat.* 159a2f. (note *perscribens*); 294b3; *Intr. cat. syll.* 793c9 (with *Antepr.* 761c1f.). An exception is *In Cic. top.* 1152a12, *nos quoque Aristotelicam* (= *nos Aristotelicam quoque*), and a possible exception, *Hinc quoque illud ... dicitur*, *Div.* 12,28f. (where, however, no importance attaches to the word order). The passages listed in Brandt's index to the *Isag.* commentaries (q.v. *quoque*, 408, col. 1) are not all to the point, and neither is *CPh.* I 5,9, or II m5,11 (cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* II 11).

4,12f. sicut pleraque, omnia. For Brandt's interpretation see above, xvii. DeRijk's belief ("Chronology" 48) that the phrase indicates work not already written is possible, but Obertello may be right in thinking of it as a general formula meaning that most of what B. had already done entailed translation from Grk. (*Sev. Boez.* I 323). Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1157d9f.: *Sed ut hunc libellum M. Tullius scribens pleraque omnia Trebatio dedisse uideatur.* **auribus.** Thus *audientium*, 6,2, although note *legentium*, 4,15/6,4, *legenda*, 6,13, and *lector*, 10,27. Schenkeveld ("Usages" 133f., with n. 26) mentions Ammonius, *In De int.* 5,29 (ἀκούσας ... αὐτοῦ) and 90,30 (διδάσκοντος ἀκουσόμεθα τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους). Cf. *In Perih.* II 251,14f. (*dicta ... scripta*); *CPh.* I 1,1

(*dum ... stili officio signarem*). **introductionis modo**. Possibly translated from Porphyry, and a hint that his *Soph.* commentary included prolegomena: (a) Porph., *Isag.* 1,7f. (*AL* I 6, p. 5,8): διὰ βραχέων ὥσπερ ἐν εἰσαγωγῆς τρόπῳ = *breuiter uelut introductionis modo*. (b) B., *Intr. cat. syll.* 793c6-d3: προλεγόμενα ... *praedicta uel praedicenda ... nos id introductionis modo ... perquiramus*. (c) *Intr. cat. syll.* 829d12-14: *et aliqua de Theophrasto et Porphyrio mutuatus quantum parcitas introducendi permisit expressi* (cf. *Div.* 50,5). (d) *In Isag.* I 15,9f.: (*Porphyrius*) *introducenda quaedam et praegustanda praecurrat, ut alio quodam libro de categoricis syllogismis fecit*. *Modo* emphasizes the brevity: 4,14 (*moderata breuitate*); 50,5 (*quantum introductionis breuitas patiebatur*); cf. *In Isag.* II 158,22: *neque ultra quam institutionis modus est*; II 283,16f.: *quantum postulabat institutionis breuitas*; [Gal.], *Hist. ph.* 24 (613,5f. D.): ἵνα μὴ τὸν τῆς εἰσαγωγῆς τρόπον ὑπερβαίνειν δοκῶμεν; Brandt, “Entstehungszeit” 242; Minio-Paluello, “Formation” 144f.

4,13-6,1. habitaque ... breuitate. Balancing completeness and brevity. Cf. 50,4f.; *Inst. ar.* praef. 3; *In Cat.* 159a5-7; 250c10-15; *In Perih.* II 71,16-18; II 99,26f.; II 251,4-15; Curtius, *Europ. Lit.* 487-94. **eandem**. Anticipating *et ... et*, or accentuating *id quoque*? **ut nec ... ingeratur**. The subjv. is probably consecutive (“Text” 26), although in late Lat. the *ut non* / *ne* difference is often lost, as at *In Isag.* II 161,9f.: *ut nec [= ne] anxium lectoris animum relinquam*. Cf. *In Isag.* II 159,10f.; II 200,1f.; *In Cat.* 215b14f.; *In Perih.* II 147,6f.; Engelbrecht, “*Consolatio*” 35; Dienelt, “*Untersuchungen*” I 108; II 48 (but note Gruber on *CPh.* II m4,3); LHS II §348.III. **decisae ... non perfectae**. Contrasting with *competenti subtilique*. **legentium mentibus ingeratur**. The same phrase at *In Perih.* II 464,16. Cf. 6,2; *Inst. mus.* I 1 (180,26); *In Isag.* II 143,13; *Diff. top.* I 4,29; *In Cic. top.* 1043a1, etc.

6,1-3. nec putet ... aequum. Explanatory of *competenti subtilique tractatione*. Since the treatment is complete, the critic cannot complain that B. ought to have gone on longer. The *nec* in some sense coheres with *ut nec*, although there is a shift toward the jussive: the detractor’s belief that B. should sacrifice brevity to detail (i.e. verbosity) cannot be the *result* of B.’s having balanced the two concerns. Cf. *CPh.* I m4,13: *Nec speres aliquid nec extimescas*. This is one of the most disturbed passages in the whole of the transmitted text (“Text” 24-26). The main culprits are the attraction of *inexperiens, rudis, insolensque* to *mentes* and the adoption of (*aequum*) *est* over *putet*. The result of both is to make B. say that it is wrong for his readers, who are stubborn and

uncultivated, to be subjected to empty verbiage. But it is clear that with *inexperiens* etc. B. is anticipating the criticisms of a calumniator (or calumniators, cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* II 1), while (*aequum*) *est* would be at odds with the mood of *offuscet*, *dentque* and *stringant*. C E give the most consistently intelligible text: as *putet* must stand, so (*aequum*) *est* and the plur. *inexperientes* (etc.) must fall. The trouble probably originated in an explanatory gloss (sc. *est*, at “Text” 25 I overlooked an expunction in A) for the elliptical *aequum*, forcing an assimilation of *inexperiens* etc. to *mentes* (support for which I can find only at *In Cic. top.* 1152a1f., *Nec me scaevae [Orelli-Baiter] hominum mentes arrogantiae notent*). **superuacuam loquacitatem**. Probably = περιττολογίαν. The form of the adj. was censured by Varro (*OLD*, q.v. *superuacuius*; cf. *In Cic. top.* 1063b11; *Diff. top.* II 1,1). **harum rerum inexperiens ... insolensque noui**. Both expressions construe with *putet*. Note the rhetorical chiasmus, a favorite device (e.g. *CPh.* II 5,19; IV 6,47/54; cf. Bednarz, *De ... colore* 30). Evidently *inexperiens* (= *inexpertus*) occurs only twice (*TLL*, q.v. *inexperiens*). **rudis**. Emphasizing the notion of intellectual rawness. Cf. *Antepr.* 761c12-14: *neue si quid in ludo puerilium disciplinarum rudis adhuc et nondum firmus acceperit id amplexandum atque etiam colendum putet*. **insolensque noui**. Not exactly “unaccustomed to”—for no one is “accustomed” to novelty. **audientium**. See on *auribus*, 4,12. **habere**. To “lay hold of,” “detain,” or “hinder” (with *loquacitatem* as subj. acc.). Cf. *CPh.* IV 2,28: *Considera uero quanta sceleratos homines habeat impotentia*; more generally, *In Cic. top.* 1152c7f.: *neque pigrescere ac dilassari animos aequum [Orelli-Baiter] est*. **aequum**. Sc. *esse* (or *fuisse*), depending upon *putet* and in turn governing *loquacitatem ... mentes habere*. Ordinarily with acc. + infiniv., e.g. *In Isag.* II 198,12; *In Perih.* II 354,19 (cf. *Lucr.* V 1089; *Ter.*, *Ph.* 927; *Petr.*, *Sat.* 55,6,15), although the subjv. too is in evidence (*CPh.* IV 4,11; Bednarz, *De syntaxi* III 5; Dienelt, “Untersuchungen” I 109f.). The thought is polemical, for the presumed critic(s) would not complain that B. has failed to subject his readers to superfluous verbiage, only that he has made completeness the victim of brevity.

6,3-5. liuor. “Ill-will,” perhaps even “envy:” *CPh.* II 3,10: *liuenti oculo*; III m9,6: *liuore carens* (= *Pl.*, *Tim.* 29e2: *περὶ οὐδενὸς ... φθόνος*). The abstract suddenly vanishes, after which there is the plur. *dentque* with an unstated subj. B. may have had in mind all along a group of detractors. Cf. *In Perih.* II 80,7-9: *cum multa operis huius utilitate nec non etiam labore contenderim, qua in re faueant oportet, quos nulla coquit inuidia*; Bednarz, *De syntaxi* I 1-3. **arduum natura ... legentium utilitate**

digestum. Cf. on *facillimaque doctrina*, 4,11f. Note the interlocking pairs, *arduum natura ... ignotum nostris ... magno et labore ... legentium utilitate*, along with the rhetorical chiasmus, *ignotum nostris, nobis ... digestum*. The toils and the merits of the translator / commentator are recurrent themes: *Inst. ar.* praef. 4; *In Isag.* II 135,10-13; *In Cat.* 201b1-13; *In Perih.* II 79,1-9; II 421,2-422,6; *Hyp. syll.* I 1,1-3. It is senseless to restrict, with Littig (*Andr. v. Rh.* II 15), *magno et labore* to B.'s work in supplying Lat. examples. B. did more than that. **nobis.** Dat. of agent ("auctoris"), with *digestum* (some later MSS interpolate *ab*). The plur. may be under the influence of *nostris*, although B. moves freely between it and the sing. (4,12; 6,11/15; 16,18; 38,17, etc.). Cf. Pliny, *Ep.* II 11,11: *nobis ... me. obliquis morsibus obtrectationis*. For the metaphor, cf. *CPh.* I 4,13: *Palatinae canes ... ab ipsis hiantium faucibus*; IV 3,17: *Ferox atque iniquis linguam litigiis exercet: cani comparabis*; *In Cic. top.* 1107d2-4: *Nosti oblatrantis morsus inuidiae, nosti quam facillime in difficillimis causis liuor iudicium ferat*; Bednarz, *De ... colore* 17. Macrobius uses *morsus liuoris* in reference to the Epicureans (*In somn. Sc.* I 2,2f.), who mock what they cannot understand, and B., who must have known Macrobius' remark (*In Isag.* I 31,21-32,2; Courcelle, *Writers* 299), attacks Epicurus for his ignorance of dialectic (*In Isag.* II 138,12ff., with the hit at Lucretius, II 139,2; cf. *Cic., Fin.* I 7,22; *Acad.* I 2,5; *DL X* 31). And as *nudis* (cf. 6,2) is applied by Lactantius to Epicurus' followers (fr. 227a U.), it is tempting to find hidden meaning in B.'s words here. But B.'s obsession with living enemies (always unnamed, except at *CPh.* I 4,14) is sufficient to account for the tone of the passage (cf. *In Cic. top.* 1152a12), and he is perfectly open in his remarks against the (in his day) moribund sect of Epicurus. **dentque.** Plur. possibly for both *inexperiens* (etc.) and *liuor*, if not for a plurality of detractors.

6,6f. nunc ignoscendo nunc ... comprobando. Cf. *Trin.* praef. 29f.: *At quantum haec difficilior quaestio est, tam facilius esse debet ad ueniam*; Arist., *Soph. el.* 184b6-8: τοῖς μὲν παραλελειμμένοις τῆς μεθόδου συγγνώμην τοῖς δ' εὐρημένοις πολλὴν ἔχειν χάριν. **bonis artibus.** Cf. *In Cat.* 230c10: *studiis liberalibus*; Ennod., *Ep.* V 9,1: *felix auspiciū bonis non negetur studiis*; Pliny, *Ep.* V 17,1: *Scio quanto opere bonis artibus faueas*. **stringant.** Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1044b15-c2: *nec si quis haec apud Victorinum latius tractata repererit, nos neglectae [-ti Migne] integritatis stringat inuidia*. **dum.** Cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* III 8.


6,8-10. Quis ... displicendi. As against what B. says in his more esoteric mood, wherein brevity is a means of subterfuge (*Trin.* praef. 5-22; *Hebd.* 8-14; *CEut.* praef. 31-33; *Hyp. syll.* I 1,2 [204,14-17]), conciseness is here defended on the grounds that alienation of one's audience through tedium would amount to an assault on culture. Cf. Cic., *Tusc.* I 3,6: *sed mandare quemquam litteris cogitationes suas, qui eas nec disponere nec inlustrare possit nec delectatione aliqua allicere lectorem, hominis est intemperanter abutentis et otio et litteris*; B., *In Cic. top.* 1107c1-5; *CPh.* I 3,11 (*pessimis displicere*); Paul. Nol., *Epp.* XII 11; XIX 4; Prov. 10:19, etc. **ad bonarum artium ualere defectum.** To "be mighty against" belles-lettres. The infiniv. depends upon *uideat*. Cf. Dienelt, "Untersuchungen" I 119. **desperatio displicendi.** The fear of alienating one's audience. Without *numquam* the point would have been that an obsessive fear of *critics* is bound to detract from letters.

6,10-17. <Sed ... exposui.> Although these two sentences were dislocated in the archetype (see above, lxiii), it is obvious that they belong here: (a) The first completes the line of thought extending from 4,13 ("I shall try not to alienate my readers, although given the nature of the subject matter I can hardly fail to irritate the untrained and ignorant"). (b) The second concerns the didascalia of τάξις, discussion of which belongs in the proem. (c) The words *diligenter exposui* evidently balance *diligenter expressimus* at the end of *Div.*, while *Peripateticae disciplinae* echoes *apud Peripateticam disciplinam*, 4,4. Cf. on *diligentissimi*, 4,5, and *diligenter*, 50,5. **Sed ... desiderat.** Cf. *In Isag.* II 154,2-4: *sed si cui haec pressiora quam expositionis modus postulat uidebuntur, eum hoc scire conuenit*; *In Perih.* II 275,2f.: *cui si forte paulo obscuriora uideantur, rerum imputet difficultati*. **anxietas.** Sc. *decisae orationis* (4,15). **fortasse.** With indic. *sunt* because, despite B.'s best efforts, the subject is bound to prove unintelligible to some. **pollicentem.** Concessive in force, and referring back to 4,11f. Compendious treatment does not in itself mean a handbook for complete beginners (cf. *Diff. top.* IV 7,9, *doctis, non rudibus discenda proponimus*), and despite its brevity *Div.* is *ad doctiores*. B.'s shorter *commentaries*, on the other hand, are more in the "exoteric" tradition that is said to go back to Aristotle himself. **rudibus ... totius artis.** Cf. 6,2. **ulteriore paene loco.** The abl. may emphasize the notion of arrival, over that of approach. On *paene*, cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* II 10. **Qui ... exposui.** Having said that *Div.* is not for beginners, B. raises the question of the point at which it should be taken up for study. The fact that no such work has survived has given rise to the suspicion that B. is referring to *In Isag.*

I 12,17-14,7 and II 140,13-143,7. But in neither commentary, nor indeed in any extant work, does he discuss the *ordo* of *Div.* (pace DeRijk). I take *exposui* at face-value: B. composed a treatise *De ordine Peripateticae disciplinae*, and did so prior to writing *Div.* (cf. above, xxviii f.). The title of *Antepr.*, as also *In Isag.* I 12,10ff., *In Cat.* 161c2-8, 263b1-15 (cf. 162c7-15), and *In Perih.* II 79,14f., are evidence of his awareness of the ancient tradition of a systematically ordered Peripatetic corpus. Cf. Prantl, *Geschichte* I 680, n. 73; Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 265f.; Solmsen, "Organon;" DeRijk, "Chronology" 48, with n. 3; Obertello, *Sev. Boez.* I 323. As to the ordering of Aristotle's writings, I remark only that Andronicus probably discussed the problem in his *pinax* (Porph., *V. Plot.* 24; cf. Philop., *In Cat.* 5,18-23; Elias, *In Isag.* 117,22-24), as Adrastus certainly did in a separate treatise on the subject (Morau, *Aristotelismus* II 314-17). It is unlikely that B. had access to either. [**id est dialectici**]. Probably an interpolated gloss (cf. above, lxiv). B. would not have bothered with the point, but a corrector might easily have committed such a blunder. **Peripateticae disciplinae**. See on 4,4. **mihi**. Periph. dat. of agent, not "(told) to me" (Stump). Cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* I 13. **Sed haec hactenus. Nunc.** A favorite transitional formula (e.g. 38,16f.; *In Isag.* II 239,17; *In Cat.* 167a12f.; *In Perih.* II 184,1-3; *Antepr.* 762c10; *Diff. top.* I 7,28).

II. 6,17-10,27: The six modes of division, with examples

Having reached the actual subject matter, B. enumerates the different modes of diaeresis, giving examples of each. He will follow up with a treatment of the differences between tropes, and the general procedure is reminiscent of Porphyry (but cf. Arist., *Cat.* 1b25-2a4). B. follows the *enumeratio* + *exempla* method again at 20,20-22,5 and 38,17-27. The scheme here is:



It agrees with *In Isag.* II 154,9-157,6, but not with I 22,14f. (cf. above, xxvii; xlv). Essential is the main bifurcation, which B., no doubt following Porphyry, credits to Andronicus (cf. above, xxxviii). Absent is any discussion of ἀντι-, ἐπι-, or ὑποδιαίρεσις as such (cf. DL VII 61; Ammon., *In Isag.* 9,25-10,8; Talamanca, "Schema" 57-60). Di-aeresis itself B. defines only in passing, at 28,26f. (cf. *In Isag.* II 228,14-16).

II. A. 6,17-8,2: Preliminary enumeration

There are six senses of "division," i.e. division of: (a) a genus into species; (b) a whole into parts; (c) a spoken expression into significations; and in the incidental sense, of: (d) a subject into accidents; (e) an accident into subjects; (f) an accident into accidents (when two accidents inhere in the same subject).

For some reason it is not until 10,31 that the *secundum se* distinction is explicitly stated, although it is at work throughout *Div.* (cf. 14,27; 48,14/27; note the similar postponement at *In Isag.* II 154,22f.). The *secundum se* / *accidens* difference in its most general sense is as old as Aristotle (e.g. *Peri H.* 21a30f.; *Met.* 1015b16f.; Pl., *Euthph.* 11a7f., has οὐσία / πᾶθος) and is not distinctively Andronicean (cf. above, lf.). It is interesting to observe in another connection that at *Trin.* IV 26-105 B. carves things up in a very different way, placing quality and quantity alongside substance, as against all the "circumstantial" categories (cf. Them., *In De an.* 2,35f.).

6,17f. Nunc ... est. Cf. *In Isag.* II 154,12f.: *si diuisionem ipsam diuidamus, id est si nomen ipsum diuisionis in ea quae significat partiamur*; Gal., *Plac.* IX 9,43: τὸ τῆς διαίρεσεως ὄνομα λέγεται μὲν, κτλ. **diuisionis ipsius ... diuisionis.** Appositional or defining gen.'s, with *ipsius* transferred. Cf. 34,17f.; 40,28f.; *In Cat.* 294b15f.; *CPh.* III 6,7; Bednarz, *De syntaxi* I 5. **uocabulum.** B. means that the corresponding property and subdivisions (*partesque*) are to be assigned to each *signification* of the word "division." **uniuscuiusque.** Redundant, with *unumquodque*.

6,19f. multis dicitur modis. An instance of analogical equivocity (Arist., *Met.* 1070b25f.; cf. below, 42,17-19). So also in the cases of "whole" (38,19) and "infinite" (42,6). Cf. *In Cat.* 241a12-b13; 293b15-c2. B. does not logically deduce the six tropes of diaeresis or interconnect them on a general principal, but it is clear that he

regards the classification he is about to expound as exhaustive: *non perfectae* (4,15); *omnibus* (48,14); *omni* (50,4). **species.** = εἶδος (Aristotle), vs. μέρος or μόριον as in Plato (*Euthph.* 12c6), who sometimes employs μέλος (*Phdr.* 238a3; *Pol.* 287c3) and εἶδος too (*Soph.* 223c9; 267d6; *Pol.* 291e4; cf. Cherniss, *ACPA* 46; 265, n. 174; Talamanca, "Schema" 24, n. 103; Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 329). This is how B. regularly translates (e.g. *AL* I 6, p. 8,17 [Porph., *Isag.* 3,22]; *V* 1, p. 10,14 [Arist., *Top.* 102a32]—*forma*, *In Cic. top.* 1106a2ff., = Cic., *Top.* VII 30). The point is important, given that whole / parts diaeresis is by him regarded as a separate trope (*III.B.* 12,17-14,20). At *In Isag.* I 34,12-35,6 B. takes Victorinus to task for mistranslating related terminology. Cf. on *aut in duas ... partes aut in plures*, 8,6f.

6,23-8,2. secundum accidens. = κατὰ συμβεβηκός (e.g. *AL* II 1, p. 25,2 [Arist., *Peri H.* 21a13]). **alius.** = *alter* (cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* II 7). Note B.'s correction to *alterum* at *An. pr.* 24b27: *AL* III 1f., pp. 6,20f./144,6; cf. Levet, "Philologie," 20f. **subiecto inesse.** = ὑποκειμένῳ ὑπάρχειν (e.g. *AL* I 6, p. 15,23 [Porph., *Isag.* 9,12]; cf. *III* 1, p. 15,16 [Arist., *An. pr.* 28a10]; B., *In Cat.* 172b4-c6). The idea is explained at 10,22-27 (cf. Arist., *De an.* 425a30-b4). **Sed ... eluceat.** Cf. 22,28; 30,18f.; *Hyp. syll.* I 3,5 (218,46f.); *Trin.* IV 12f., etc.

II. B. 8,3-30: *Secundum se* divisions

Division of a genus may entail a substance (e.g. animal) or something incidental to a substance (e.g. color). There are always at least two, but never an infinite number of species. A whole is divided into parts as in the cases of a house, an individual human being, and the species man. A spoken expression is divided into significations as in the case of "dog," which means a four-footed creature that barks, a stellar body, and a sea creature. Here there are two modes: either an individual word (equivocity) or the syntax of a whole statement (ambiguity) gives rise to the multiplicity of meanings.

Examples of the three tropes of diaeresis *secundum se* (not yet so designated) are supplied and the third trope is subdivided (8,22-30; cf. 46,8-48,11). The second trope, whole / parts, on the other hand, is *not* subdivided but will be at 14,15-20 and 38,28-40,32. B. adds the example of the division of color in order to remind us that the first trope of diaeresis is unrestricted to substances. Hence the *secundum*

se / accidens difference is not tantamount to the divide between *substance* and accident (cf. Cherniss, *ACPA* 134; 337, on the two senses of "accident;" Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 95, n. 42; Simpl., *In Cat.* 202,11-18; B., *In Perih.* I 58,8-16). Also, the fact that Andronicus reduced the categories to two is not evidence that the *secundum se / accidens* difference necessarily goes back to him (which it still may, as B. believes it does; cf. above, xxxviii; lf.). Finally, Mansfeld suggests that Andronicus, as a good Aristotelian, may have treated definition and division primarily in connection with substance (*Heresiography* 74, n. 54; 329). If so, then the illustration from *color* is probably not Andronicean. But there can be no certainty, since B. does not give any information concerning his source here.

8,3-6. cum dicimus. Usually preceded by *ut* (cf. ὥς ὅταν φῶμεν, Alcin., *Didasc.* 5). **rationabilia ... irrationabilia.** = λογικά ... ἄλογα (e.g. *AL* I 6, p. 15,21 [Porph., *Isag.* 9,10]). Endings in *-alis* and *-ale* at 12,23, 20,7/14f., etc. Bailey (on *Lucr.* I 11) draws attention to the passive / active difference between the terminations, and I. Hadot discusses the forms as well (*Arts* 107; 307; cf. Prantl, *Geschichte* II 15, with nn. 45f.; Mohrmann, "*Rationabilis*" [1958] 180). B. evidently sees no difference in meaning between the endings in *-alis* and *-abilis* (note 26,12f.). At *CEut.* III 4, anyway, *rationabilis* is not passive in connotation (cf. *CPh.* V m4,10-29). This first example, it may be noted, is not in fact a case of division into species but into differentiae. B. will discuss that matter later. **quidem.** = μέν (solitarium). Cf. Levet, "Philologie" 9, and on 8,24. **media.** White and black are colors, more precisely, the extremes of color (*In Cat.* 255b2-c10; 283b13-c1; cf. *Arist.*, *Cat.* 9b9; 12a17-19; 14a19-22; *Pl.*, *Phil.* 12e4-6), and there is here no division of a quality into qualified *subjects* (10,5-9). Intermediate colors result from privation in respect of the extremes (*Arist.*, *Phys.* 188b24f.; *De sens.* 439b16-18; 442a12-27; *Pl.*, *Rep.* 585a3f.; cf. Cherniss, *ACPA* 323; Ross on *An. post.* 73b21f.), so that B. can legitimately substitute *neutra* at 26,8. (cf. 22,20f.). He also speaks of mixture (*In Isag.* II 336,13; *In Cic. top.* 1109b12-c1). But grey is not the unique result of black and white combined (*Arist.*, *Cat.* 12a21; B., *In Cat.* 267d2-268a8.; cf. *Inst. mus.* V 5; *In Perih.* I 89,13-16).

8,6-9. Oportet ... posterius demonstrandum est. On *oportet*, cf. Levet, "Philologie" 7; Bednarz, *De syntaxi* III 15; *AL* II 1, p. 5,3 (*Arist.*, *Peri H.* 16a1), etc. For the "demonstration," 32,8-15. The two

points stated here were probably in Porphyry's *Soph.* prolegomena (cf. *Isag.* 6,12; 7,1f.). There being only *one* species would collapse the distinction between it and the genus, which by definition is predicable of a multiplicity (14,29; cf. *In Isag.* II 226,1-228,2), while an *infinite* number would drag the division down to the level of unintelligible individuals (Porph., *Isag.* 6,12f.). On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent there being only one individual below the species (*In Isag.* II 215,2-8; II 218,1-219,22; *In Cat.* 177c3-d3). Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1109b6-8 (Cic., *Top.* VIII 33): *At si quis genus dividat, perniciosum est aliquam praeterire formam, quoniam formarum finita quantitas est; 1110a6f.: finitus formarum numerus.* On species of rhetorical figures, see 42,12f. **aut in duas ... partes aut in plures.** The "parts" are the branches of a division, i.e. the species under a genus. Cf. Cic., *De or.* I 42,189: *genus ... duas aut pluris complectitur partis. neque ... nec.* On the mixed formulation, cf. LHS II §283h (pure at 4,15-6,3; 22,21; 28,4); Bednarz, *De ... colore* 5.

8,9-16. Totum ... coniungitur. B. never acknowledges a separate species / individuals trope of diaeresis, precisely because he regards it as a case of the whole / parts mode. What he omits to explain, both here and at 12,24-14,5, is that genus / species is also a whole / parts relation (cf. 12,2f.; 38,1), the difference between them being that not every part is a species (*In Cic. top.* 1060d1-12; 1105b12-d3). **domus ... tectum ... parietes ... fundamenta.** A stock example (e.g. 14,3-5; *In Isag.* II 154,21f.). At *In Cic. top.* 1097a12f. and 1097d11-1098a9 B. discusses the definition of a house "according to its parts" (cf. on IV.E.1. 32,16-34,15). **hominem anima coniungi et corpore.** The form and matter (Arist., *De an.* 412a15-22), or parts (40,16). Littig took the dichotomic diaeresis as evidence that B. here alters Andronicean material (*Andr. v. Rh.* II 15). Cf. on IV.C.1.c. 24,28-28,8; "Boethius ... and Andronicus," 552, n. 25. **Catonem, Virgilium, Ciceronem.** The first of B.'s Roman examples. Porphyry instances Plato and Socrates (*Isag.* 5,4), and John Damascene Peter and Paul (*Dial.* 6 [65,54f. K.]). Cf. Richter, *Dialektik* 98, with n. 234; Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 95f., n. 44. **singulos ... particulares.** = *individa*, 32,26 (34,1/19), each term emphasizing a different aspect of the same reality. At 38,24 B. draws out the connection between *pars* and *particularis*. Cf. *In Isag.* II 195,12-16; II 235,11-236,3; *In Cat.* 182b10-183a9; *CEut.* II 44-49; III 31-35; *Diff. top.* I 4,9; Porph., *Isag.* 4,24f. (*AL* I 6, p. 9,22), οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἄνθρωποι = *particulares homines*.

cum ... tamen. The concessive force, given the play on *particulares*, is hardly felt. **uim.** Emphasizing the sum total of the universal (*OLD*, q.v. *uis* 8). Talamanca considers the possibility of an abstracted common *quality* ("Schema" 183, n. 522). Cf. on *quod uniuersale est*, 38,22. **atque componunt.** A vulgarism, according to Bednarz (*De ... colore* 19). Cf. on *diuisio distributioque ... ad positionem consuetudinemque*, 12,12f. **neque ... coniungitur.** Cf. Arist., *Met.* 999a5f.: οὐ γάρ ἐστι γένος ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων. Seneca divides first into nations then into individuals (*Ep.* 58,12), which is not a question here (cf. Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 94f., n. 42; B., *In Isag.* II 282,6 [Ethiopian = an incidental class]; Pl., *Pol.* 262d2-6; Cic., *Inv.* I 22,32; and on *Europa ... Asia ... Africa*, 40,20). Below the species there is division only into individual "parts:" *In Isag.* I 47,2-17; II 328,13-15; *In Cat.* 174b3-c1; cf. Porph., *Isag.* 5,2-21; Alex. Aphr., *In Met.* 208,8-25. With Aristotle matters are complicated by the fact that whereas the end of division ought to be the *infima species*, the form (soul) of the living organism is individual (Cherniss, *ACPA* App. V). At *In Perih.* II 136,17-137,26 (cf. *In Isag.* II 235,11-236,3) B. distinguishes between *humanitas* and *Platonitas* on the grounds that the latter is a collection of *incidental* properties (cf. Porph., *Isag.* 7,21-27), and in the theological tracts related considerations arise from his reflections on *persona* (cf. Nêdoncelle, "Variations;" P. Hadot, "Tertullien" 130; Micaelli, *Studi* 43-97). And for him the mule is not a case of an "individuated" species (*In Isag.* II 329,10-17; Porph., *Isag.* 19,1-3; Arist., *Gen. an.* 747b35-748a7). **neque ... nec.** See on 8,7f. **nec singuli homines species.** Cf. *In Cat.* 176c10-177a7.

8,16-22. Vocis ... appellatur. Throughout *Div.* "equivocal" is treated from the viewpoint of spoken (or written) expressions, whereas at *In Cat.* 164b1-5 (cf. Arist., *Cat.* 1a1f.) equivocals are *things* that have a name but no definition in common. That is as it must be, for in *Div.* the division is of spoken expressions into significations, and at *In Cat.* 166c14-d5 B. specifies in any case that things are "equivocal" while spoken expressions constitute "equivocations." **multa significans.** Cf. σημαίνῃ πλείω, Arist., *Soph. el.* 166a16. **canis.** A stock example: *In Isag.* II 154,17-19; *In Perih.* II 353,16-19; *Diff. top.* II 9,23; Arist., *Soph. el.* 166a16; Gal., *Capt.* 1f.; Sext. Emp., *AM* XI 29; Dexipp., *In Cat.* 19,20-22; Ammon., *In Isag.* 82,1; Simpl., *In Cat.* 26,22-26. To B.'s three significates (note the distribution, land-sky-sea; cf. *CPh.* II m8,7-15) is sometimes added the Cynic philosopher (Sext. Emp., loc. cit.; Ammon., *In Isag.* 49,4; Elias, *In Isag.* 68,17).

The example echoes a riddle in Aristophanes (*Vesp.* 20-23) and Athenaeus (X 453b). **hunc.** Fem. at *CPh.* I 4,13. **quadrupedem latrantemque.** Cf. *In Perih.* II 356,12: *terreno latrabili. caelestem.* Sirius, portending heat and pestilence (Hom., *Il.* XXII 26-31; Manil. I 396-411, with Housman ad loc.; David, *In Isag.* 123,2f.; B., *CPh.* I m5,22). **ad Orionis pedem.** Cf. Hom., *κύν' Ὠρίωνος*; Arat., *Phaen.* 338-41; Cic., *Arat.* XXXIII 120-23. **morbidum.** Adv., the idea being that the astral appearance portends disease (cf. Lucr. VI 1097, *fit morbidus aer*). **micat.** Often for the light of celestial bodies: *CPh.* I m3,9 (*emicat*); III m9,26 (figurative); IV m1,13; Manil. I 407; Cic., *Arat.* XXXIII 112. **caeruleus.** So called after the color of the sea. In myth, Scylla's dogs (Verg., *Ecl.* VI 77; *Aen.* III 432; Lucr. V 892).

8,22-30. Sed ... praedicetur. The distinction is between lexical and syntactical ambiguity (ἐν τινι τῶν ὀνομάτων / ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, Gal., *Capt.* 3), and from 46,8-13 it is clear that the former may, like the latter, affect whole sentences. The special formulation of the split here would appear to have come from Porphyry, for it is not exactly Aristotle's, and B. himself sometimes uses "equivocal" and "ambiguous" as near synonyms (*In Perih.* II 168,25f.; *CEut.* VII 40f.). On the other hand, the word / statement dichotomy is in Aristotle (*Soph. el.* 165b29; 166a15f.; cf. Pl., *Soph.* 262a1ff.), as is the homonymy / amphiboly one (*Soph. el.* 165b26/30; 166a6), explained by B. at the end of the paragraph. **quidem ... uero.** = μέν ... δέ (*AL* I 1, p. 5,18f. [Arist., *Cat.* 1a16f.]; Bednarz, *De syntaxi* II 13; McKinlay, "Tests" 124f.; Dienelt, "Untersuchungen" II 65f.; Levet, "Philologie" 9-11). **ut id quod proposui.** = 8,18. **aio ... posse.** = Enn., *Ann.* fr. 167 S., B.'s second Latinizing revision to his Grk. source. The fragment is quoted in a different context at *In Perih.* II 82,14, and by other authors (Courcelle, *Consolation* 281, n. 1; Skutsch, *Annals* 333). As Skutsch implies, the ambiguity rests with *uincere* and the interchangeable acc.'s. *Victurum* (not in its older uninflected form) or *uicturos* would have disambiguated the statement. On the Lat. verse illustration, cf. Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 261f., n. 15; *AL* VI 1, p. 10,9f. (Arist., *Soph. el.* 166b4f.). **aequiucationis partitio ... ambiguitatis discretio.** Appositional or defining gen.'s. Cf. *Diff. top.* IV 7,6: *cum scriptum de quo contenditur sententiam claudit ambiguum, haec suo nomine ambiguitas nuncupatur.* **amphiboliam ... amphibola.** Syntactical ambiguity is Aristotle's primary sense of amphiboly (*Soph. el.* 166a6-14/17-21). Cf. *DL* VII 62 (*SVF* III Diog. 23; *FDS* II 621); David, *In Isag.* 123,14f.; Ebbesen, *Commentators* I 195, with n. 5. To the Grk. adj. in

two terminations B. assigns the transliterated *amphibolus* in three (cf. *AL* VI 1, p. 41,7f. [Arist., *Soph. el.* 177a13f.]; *CEut.* VII 41), alongside the native *ambiguus*. Did B. write these words in Grk. characters? At *In Perih.* I 62,19, II 27,14-28,7, II 72,2f., and at eight points in *CPh.* (among others), he evidently penned untransliterated Grk., and at *Inst. mus.* IV 3 (309,13-15) he acknowledges the possibility of Grk. characters being jarring (although in a specialized context). As *E* is the only MS to attempt Grk. script, at 30,31 (Toqueac), I believe that the words before us, the adj. certainly, were originally written in Roman characters.

II. C. 10,1-27: *Secundum accidens* divisions.

The division of human beings into those that are black, white, etc., is an example of division of a subject into accidents. That of things sought some pertain to the soul, others to the body, may be taken as a case of distribution of an accident into subjects. In neither of the above tropes are we to confuse the dividendum with a genus or the dividendia with species. We divide an accident into accidents when we say that the white is solid or liquid. This final trope differs from all the others, for the dividendum and dividendia are convertible—if the former and one of the latter cohere in a single subject.

B. tacitly approaches the upcoming discussion, for in the course of furnishing examples he explains (if that is the word) what separates subject / accidents and accident / subjects from genus / species divisions, then points out that accident / accidents diaeresis is a thing *sui generis*. His purpose is clear. For most of *Div.* B. is at pains to show that Andronicus' great contribution was to remove everything accidental from division *per se*. But in the case of the latter there is again a weeding out, since only genus / species diaeresis leads to definition (which is why that trope takes up about half of *Div.*). B. therefore never bothers to explain how the first two incidental tropes (subject / accidents, accident / subjects) differ from the two remaining *secundum se* tropes (whole / parts [cf. *In Cat.* 172d8-12], spoken sound / significations) or from one another. He has his eye only on the thesis that the incidental must never form part of a definition.

10,1-4. Eorum ... est. Throughout we must understand the presence of a substrate: some class of things is qualified in respect of


differentiae under the same or opposed genera (cf. Arist., *Cat.* 14a19-25; *An. post.* 81b22-29; David, *Prol.* 67,11-15). In the present case, human beings are variously qualified as to the genus color. Hence we do not say that of human beings some are white, others walking, but that some are white, others black, or some walking, others standing (48,16-21). **secundum accidens**. Following up on 6,23 (cf. on II.A. 6,17-8,2 and *particularem*, 38,24). **medii coloris**. Cf. on 8,6. **non ... species ... non ... genus**. Drawing attention to the fact that the first incidental trope is not to be confused with genus / species division. B. is not saying that there is no genus / species division of accidents, for quantity, quality, etc. are themselves genera (see on II.B. 8,3-30; cf. *In Cat.* 178a2-4; 238c7-d3). Rather, he means that the dividendum falls under the category of substance and the dividendia under some *other* category, and that the things at issue are opposed only *incidentally* (*In Cat.* 211c7-d7; *In Perih.* II 483,13-16; cf. on 10,18-27; Alex. Aphr., *In Top.* 66,15-17).

10,5-8. Accidentis ... subiecta. We have here just the reverse of what has preceeded, and in that sense the difference between the two tropes is probably passed over by B. as being self-evident. (David rejects this trope too for its entailment of qualified entities: *Prol.* 67,1-11). **quae expetuntur ... in anima ... in corporibus**. Instead of recycling the previous example, i.e. "Of (things) white some are men, others horses," B. introduces this more subtle illustration. The idea is that an incidental attribute is divided by the things in which it inheres. In this case, the objects of choice (τὰ αἰρετά, cf. Arist., *Top.* 118b27 [*AL* V 1, p. 58,4]; B., *CPh.* III 10,37f.) pertain to either the formal or the material element in man (cf. on 8,12); B. ignores the "external" goods (*In Isag.* II 155,2f.; *DL* VII 62 [*SVF* III Crin. 2; *FDS* II 621]). Cf. Pl., *Lgg.* 697b2-6; Arist., *EN* 1098b12-14; *Pol.* 1323a25f.; Anon., *Divis. arist.* §1 [5], with Mutschmann ad loc.; Alcin., *Didasc.* 5; Luc., *Vit. auct.* 26; Iambl., *Protr.* 5 (56,5-12 d.P.); Rossitto, *Divisioni* 135-39; Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 147-49, etc. **non genus ... non ... species**. Cf. 10,3f.

10,9f. Accidentis. In all probability an archetypal error was corrected by *G* ("Text" 15). The sing. is attested at 6,25, 10,12, *In Isag.* II 155,5, and *Diff. top.* II 9,8, and is consistent with B.'s general usage (6,24-10,27; 10,32; 48,17). It is also adopted by Cassiodorus (*Inst.*, *PL* LXX 1187d8), the redactor of *Quom. argum.* (cf. above, lixf.), and most of the later Grk. sources (cf. above, xlv-xlviii). The cause of the error


is easy to see, for in the *examples* for each trope B. consistently shifts to the plur. (10,2-9). *G* is quick to spot such troubles (cf. 10,24; 16,18; 38,22). David rejects this trope on the grounds that no quality is ever *per se* another quality: whiteness is never heat, but white things are divided as to heat and coldness (*Prol.* 67,15-26). **liquentia, ut lac.** Under this rubric also fall air, water, and fire (*CPh.* III 11,29).

10,13-22. Sed ... diuidatur. Take two pairs (note the trichotomies at *In Isag.* II 155,6-8) of opposed accidents; out of the members of one pair make dividenda for two diaereses; then make them dividenda of the members of the remaining pair:



10,13f. uicissim semper in alterutra. This signifies the convertibility of dividendum and dividenda. Stump's "into one or the other of the two [preceding divisions in connection with accidents]" leaves the question of what becomes of the *subjects* in the first two incidental tropes.

10,18-27. Differt ... inueniet. The uniqueness of this final mode is at first inapparent, for there is implicit between the first two incidental tropes a similar permutation (cf. on *triangulorum*² ... *obtusum*, 32,5f.):



In fact, however, the cases are not analogous, and B. points to the reason why. He has already said that there must be inherence in a

common substrate (6,26) and has hinted that it is the dividendum and one of the dividenda that are to cohabit thus (cf. Arist., *Met.* 1017b27f.). Now black and white can inhere in solids or liquids, and solidity and liquidity in things black or white, but man and horse, which are not contraries in any case (Arist., *Cat.* 3b24-27; B., *In Cat.* 195d13-196a1; *In Perih.* II 488,1f.; II 489,8-11), inhere in nothing at all (Arist., *Cat.* 1b3-5; B., *In Cat.* 171a2-14). So the uniqueness of this trope, its convertibility, extends from the fact that with it alone both the dividendum and one dividens incidentally cohere in a subject (dividenda emphasized):

- (a) *solidity* + whiteness / blackness = pearl / ebony,
- (b) *liquidity* + whiteness / blackness = milk / pitch,
- (c) *whiteness* + liquidity / solidity = milk / pearl,
- (d) *blackness* + liquidity / solidity = pitch / ebony.

Because opposed qualities cannot simultaneously inhere in the same subject, the possibilities are exhausted thus.

10,18-22. Differt. Elsewhere both with (14,10f.; 20,17f.; *In Perih.* II 499,20) and without (*In Perih.* I 55,8; II 259,2f.) *ab*, so that Brandt's emendation at *In Isag.* I 105,19 (cf. his corrigendum to I 84,16) is unnecessary. Cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* I 8f.; McKinlay, "Tests" 125. **omnibus quae supra sunt dictae.** Note that B. goes on to mention only the *secundum se* modes, probably because the first two incidental modes imply a *de facto* conversion. **neque ... cum ... nec ... quamuis ... nec ... licet.** Note the *variatio* for the tricolon.

10,22-27. Quod ... superius dictum est. = 6,26. **utraque.** The quality divided, plus one of those that divide it (for the opposed dividenda are not simultaneously actualized in the same subject). **contingent.** Impf. owing to *dictum est*. Another instance of *G*'s perspicacity (cf. on *Accidentis*, 10,9); if the error arose from an omitted tilde, then the archetype may have been later than supposed above (lxv). **inesse subiecto.** Cf. on 6,26. Dienelt remarks B.'s "post-class." impers. usage ("Untersuchungen" I 116). Here the idiom is pure Grk., e.g. Arist., *An. pr.* 25b20 (*AL* III 1, p. 8,26f.): τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι ... τινὶ ... ὑπάρχειν = *contingere ... alicui ... inesse*. **In ceteris quoque.** B. leaves the reader to work out the possibilities. Cf. *Antepr.* 790d2-6: *in quibus ... propositionum tantum ordinem describemus, et quid eueniat sub breuitate monstrabimus, perquirenda atque examinanda singula lectoris diligentiae derelinqentes; Inst. mus.* II 29 (263,14-16): *eandem ... partem relinquimus lectorum diligentiae computandam.* *Div.* is succinct, but for ad-

vanced students. **diligens lector.** I.e. *neque rudis sed imbutus* (cf. 6,12f.). Cf. *Inst. mus.* II 8 (235,31); II 15 (245,28); II 27 (259,3); III 9 (279,20); III 10 (284,16).

III. 10,28-14,26: Differences between *secundum se* divisions

B. has already touched upon the differences between genus / species and the first two incidental tropes of diaeresis, saying that subjects and accidents are neither divided as genera nor divide as species. No supporting argument was supplied for the claims, but the burden of IV.B. 18,4-20,19 will be to show that no incidental differentia divides the genus or informs the species. Further, B. has just pointed out the feature in respect of which accident / accidents divisions differ from "all" other tropes; which, as noted, leaves a lacuna, since neither whole / parts nor spoken sound / significations diaeresis has been set against the subject / accidents or accident / subjects tropes, and the latter two modes have not been compared to one another. But that is none of B.'s concern. He moves on to comparison of the three *secundum se* tropes, pointing out first that their being *secundum se* is precisely what unites them. Both the general procedure and the mode of exposition are reminiscent of Porphyry (*Isag.* 13,9ff.), whose commentators rehearse the formulae for determining how many pairs result from a given number of comparanda (*Isag.* 17,14-18,9); *In Isag.* I 118,1-19; II 324,11-325,7 (cf. *In Cat.* 272c4-d7); Ammon., *In Isag.* 115,20-116,11; 123,6-124,7; cf. Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 128. Of course Porphyry was influenced by an older tradition (Pl., *Pol.* 285a7-b6 [cf. *Phil.* 16c10-18d2]; Arist., *Cat.* 12b16-13b35; Plot. I 3.4,3f.; Simpl., *In Cat.* 2,15-20, etc.).

10,28-33. *It is necessary to determine what is common to the different tropes of division and how they differ from one another. Three of them share being secundum se (genus / species, whole / parts, spoken sound / significations), while the other three share the fact of dividing in respect of what is incidental.*

We have at last the explicit designation of a superordinate class, *secundum se* (cf. *per se*, 48,27, and on II.A. 6,17-8,2), corresponding to that which is *secundum accidens*, and the first step is to outline what at 50,3 will be referred to as the *communiones*. B. begins with the bland observation that three tropes have being *secundum se* in common while the others share being *secundum accidens*. There is probably a Por-

phyrian echo here, for at *Isag.* 13,10 (*AL* I 6, p. 21,3f.) there is the equally bland articulation of a point which might reasonably have been assumed to be self-evident: Κοινὸν μὲν δὴ πάντων τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων κατηγορεῖσθαι = *Commune quidem omnibus est de pluribus praedicari*.

That is all B. has to say on the subject of the *communiones*, and we are left to speculate about the precise sense of *secundum se* and *secundum accidens*. The latter at least is clear. The three incidental tropes do not concern attributes *per se* but *per aliud* (cf. *In Cat.* 209b1-14; *Arist., De an.* 418a20-23). For we are not dividing (a) men into blackness and whiteness, (b) whiteness into men and horses, or (c) whiteness into solidity and liquidity. Rather, the emphasis is on (a) *things* qualified as either white or black, (b) *things white* as being either men or horses, and (c) *things* as either both white and solid or both white and liquid. That is, the concern is not for what accidents are in relation to themselves but for what they are in relation to other things (cf. *Pl., Soph.* 255c12f.). But it is unclear what underlying commonality makes the three *secundum se* tropes, and B. is of no assistance on the point. Genus / species and whole / parts diaereses share something in that there are two kinds of definition, one from the genus, the other from the parts (cf. on *IV.E.1.* 32,16-34,15), and in that every genus is a whole (cf. on *III.B.* 12,17-14,20). But what is the common point with spoken sound / significations diaeresis? Talamanca remarks *In Cic. top.* 1110b13-c2 ("Schema" 179, n. 512): *non substantialibus ... differentiis constituuntur, sed potius accidentibus explicantur, unde fit ut tum communis nominis in significationes partitio fieri uideatur, cum figura diuiditur*. Spoken sound / significations diaeresis is an *incidental* mode in that linguistic meaning is a matter of convention, not nature (1110b10f.; cf. *Div.* 12,8-15; 34,24-36,5). What, then, makes it *secundum se*? He also notes ("Schema" 183-88; cf. on *particularem*, 38,24) that the whole / parts trope straddles the *secundum se* / *accidens* divide, by including both genus / species and species / individuals divisions (8,12-16; 12,2f.; 38,1). Talamanca may be right in concluding that these problems reflect in B.'s exposition a tension between the theory and practice of diaeresis.

10,28-32. Quibus ... segregentur. At *In Isag.* II 285,6-10 B. observes that the investigation of common and differentiating properties concerns the *ad aliquid* as opposed to the *per se*, and other commentators stress the necessity of knowing first the separate natures of things; for to know the specific nature is to know already the ways in which

something stands with or apart from everything else (e.g. Elias, *In Isag.* 93,21-23). As to common and differentiating properties, it is important to put the former before the latter (David, *In Isag.* 208,12-19). **ope ratio ... intellegendum.** Possible points of trouble in the archetype, the latter involving an assimilation (*intellegenda*) to the subj. (*proprietas*) of the indir. question ("Text" 15). Stump's "in connection with things for which" (*quibus ... his*) and "(truth's highest) work" (presumably *operatio*) are indefensible, since *quibus* has as its antecedent the periphr. (and cumulative) dat. of agent *his* (cf. on *mihi*, 6,15), and *summa ope* is an abl. of manner (cf. Livy XXII 34,2, *summa ope obstant*; Paul. Nol., *Ep.* XXIII 27, *Summa ... ope enitatur*). **horum omnium simul.** B. never discusses the *whole* system of diaeresis (28,26f. is irrelevant here); indeed, he hardly explains the two superordinate classes. **inter se.** Cf. on 28,11-13. **secundum se.** Cf. on *per se*, 18,4. **reliquae ... tres.** In fact, the subject / accidents mode is not posited in *accidentis distributione*.

III. A. 10,33-12,16: Genus / species vs. spoken sound / significations

Division of a genus differs from that of an equivocal in three respects: (a) A genus (dividendum) is a whole to its dividenda, being more universal than they, but an equivocal (dividendum), although being more universal in signification than its dividenda, is not to them a whole. (b) Whereas the dividenda of an equivocal have only a name in common with the dividendum, in the case of a genus the dividenda share both the name and the definition of the dividendum. (c) While that which is equivocal (dividendum) in one society may be univocal in another, a genus (dividendum) never changes; for one is by convention, the other by nature.

Although the proper treatment of spoken sound / significations divisions is postponed to the end of *Div.*, the mode is brought to the forefront here, and B.'s line of thinking is easy to detect. At 16,24-18,3 he argues to the effect that ignorance of the difference between univocals and equivocals throws the division of a genus off course, since every genus is predicated univocally (cf. *In Isag.* II 305,20-22) but an equivocal signifies a multiplicity of things with no common definition; it is therefore necessary to determine first whether the terms at issue are univocal or equivocal (cf. *In Isag.* II 155,18-156,5; *In Cat.* 264c7-265b2; *In Perih.* II 16,7-18,26; Ammon., *In De int.*

15,20-30). And as he implies at *CEut.* I 4f., the number of definitions is equal to the number of ways in which a term is used, so that before dividing it is necessary to determine which sense is at issue. Noteworthy are the omissions here of differences discussed at: *Diff. top.* II 9,20, i.e. that whereas a genus is the differentia only potentially (cf. 14,5-7; 16,13f.), an equivocal is all of its significates at once; and at 48,8-11, i.e. that whereas all the species of a genus are to be enumerated, not all of the significates of an equivocal need (can) be.

10,33-12,2. enim. Otiose (cf. 38,18). **quod.** Cf. the Grk. idiom, e.g. Porph., *Isag.* 16,9 (*AL* I 6, p. 24,19f.): Διαφέρει δὲ ὅτι τὸ μὲν, κτλ. = *Differt autem quoniam genus quidem*, etc.; Arist., *Peri H.* 20a12 (*AL* II 1, p. 20,14f.): τὰ ὅλα γὰρ ἐκείνων διαφέρει τῷ μὴ καθόλου (sc. εἶναι) = *haec enim ab illis differunt eo quod non uniuersaliter sunt*. Also, McKinlay, "Tests," 125; Levet, "Philologie" 17f. **quadam ... quodammodo creatione.** Pleonastic and softening, for the metaphor (cf. *Inst. ar.* II 28,2; *In Isag.* I 87,13; II 274,12; *In Perih.* II 79,14; II 186,6; II 246,17, etc.). Similarly *quasi*, 24,18 (with note at loc.), and 38,2f. **B.** generally favors *procreatio* or *generatio*, but without attaching any difference in meaning to the change in terminology.

12,3f. in natura.^{1,2} The nature / convention antithesis discussed at 12,8-15 is here given a slightly different slant, and the point is clumsily stated. The oddity is that *in natura* attaches to *uniuersalius* in the first instance but to *totum* in the second. **B.** means that both a genus and an equivocal are "whole" and "more universal," but not in the same way. **aequiucatio.** I.e. a *uox aequiuoca* (see on *Vocis ... appellatur*, 8,16-22). **quidem.** = μέν concessive, and solitarium. **tantum uoce.** The punctuation is crucial. (a) If we punctuate after *uoce*, then **B.** is left restricting the universality to the signification, as though a genus too were *uniuersalius* in that respect. But a genus is nothing in respect of signification, and the intended contrast is between *uoce* and *in natura*. (b) Punctuating before *dicitur* would force it into competition with *est* (cf. Stump, who nevertheless captures the sense of the passage). **totum.** Attraction to *aequiucatio* in *A² C E K*; yet the point is not a "whole equivocation" but whether the equivocal is a whole.

12,5-7. Illo ... suscipiunt. Cf. on III.A. 10,33-12,16; Arist., *Cat.* 1a1-6. **quod.** Cf. on 10,34.

12,8-15. Amplius ... permutatur. The mark of something's being by convention is its not being "the same" for all (*In Perih.* I 39,10-12). Language is a case in point: Arist., *Peri H.* 16a5f.; Porph., *Abst.* III 3 (189,1-4 N.); cf. *B. on Signification and Mind* 9-14; 73-83. **Amplius quoque.** Again at 14,5f./12, and 22,31f. Another Porphyrian touch, for ἐντὶ is used in the same way at *Isag.* 15,16/21 (cf. 16,14/16, etc.; Arist., *Cat.* 5a15; 7b27, etc.; Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 128; McKinlay, "Tests" 129). B. often omits *quoque* (e.g. *Inst. ar.* II 27,5; *In Isag.* II 300,17; *In Cat.* 185b6; *In Perih.* II 190,24; *In Cic. top.* 1166a14), but in *Div.* he seems quite attached to it (hence my emendation at 12,24; cf. "Text" 21). **canis.** Cf. 8,18-22. **multae ... simpliciter.** Cf. *simplex ... multa*, 44,24. **diuisio distributioque ... ad positionem consuetudinemque.** Cf. Dienelt, "Untersuchungen" II 31-34, and on *atque componunt*, 8,14. **permutatur.** Probably middle.

III. B. 12,17-14,20: Genus / species vs. whole / parts

12,17-14,20. *Division of a genus differs from that of a whole in four respects: (a) A whole is divided in respect of quantity, a genus in respect of quality. (b) A genus (dividendum) is prior to its species, but parts (dividentia) are prior to the whole. So whereas a genus sublates its species, parts sublate the whole. (c) A genus (dividendum) acts as matter to its species, but parts (dividentia) act as matter to the whole. (d) Species (dividentia) are always the same as their genus, but parts (dividentia) are not always the same as their whole; this is obvious in the case of heterogeneous wholes, but more difficult to perceive in homogeneous ones, where there is substantial, but never quantitative, identity.*

A fifth difference, unmentioned here, is that every genus is a whole and every species a part, but not vice versa (cf. Pl., *Pol.* 263b7-9; Talamanca, "Schema" 47-51). At *In Cic. top.* 1060d1-12 and 1105b12-d3 B. explains that parts are not species, since they do not take the name of the whole as species do that of the genus. That is the point of (d) above. Cf. 38,1-16; *In Isag.* II 236,19-237,11; II 303,17-21; *Intr. cat. syll.* 810b10-c4; *Diff top.* II 7,6/9; Porph., *Isag.* 7,27-8,3; Cherniss, *ACPA* 252f.; 264f., with n. 174; Mansfeld, *Heresiology* 82, with n. 13; 328f. A sixth difference concerns exhaustion of the dividendum, which in genus / species divisions is both possible and necessary (cf. 30,22-28; 48,9f.; *In Cic. top.* 1108d8-1109c1).

12,17-20. quod. See on 10,34. **secundum quantitatem ... qualitate.** See on 16,2-6. Boethos' argument (ap. Simpl., *In Cat.* 78,17-20), that the εἶδος ought to come under some category other than substance (e.g. quality, quantity), is, according to Mansfeld (*Heresiography* 118; cf. 81), paralleled here and may therefore point back to Andronicus. But B. makes quantity and quality the point of *difference* between the two tropes, while there is so much uncertainty surrounding Boethos and Andronicus (Tarán, rev. of Moraux 733f.) that it seems best to refrain from speculation. **actu aut ratione animi et cogitatione.** Cf. 40,12f. **perficitur.** Cf. on *formatur*, below.

12,21-24. facta est. = *facta erit*, with *locuero*. **formatur.** Again (with *perficere*) at 18,12. The species is completed or informed by the specific difference (18,10-14; Porph., *Isag.* 11,10-17). **interrogatus.** With some hesitation I follow *F*. The only support I can find for *respondens* ... *respondebit* is Plato, *Chrm.* 164e4f., ἀνέθηκεν ὁ ἀναθεῖς, a more natural idiom. In such cases B. generally varies the voice or some other element from one phrase to the other (16,3-6; *In Isag.* II 182,1-9; *In Cat.* 189a3-10; *In Perih.* II 332,2-16; cf. Porph., *Isag.* 3,13; 11,11f.; 17,12), which of course is not proof that he did not countenance *respondens* here. In arguing that diaeresis is not a form of demonstration, Aristotle stresses its *dialectical* nature: each link in the concatenation of differentiae is determined only by the assumptions of a respondent who is faced with a choice between alternatives (Cherniss, *ACPA* 32; cf. on *sumamus* ... *sumendae*, 18,17f.). The mode of interrogation here, however, is not strictly dialectical, since it does not involve responses in the affirmative or negative (Arist., *Peri H.* 20b26-30; *Top.* 155b9f.; B., *In Perih.* II 359,7-361,22). At 34,16-36,34 the dialogue is internalized. **rationale.** Cf. on 8,3f. **aut ... aut certe.** Rational and mortal are not competing differentiae, and neither is unique to man. But whereas our mortality is something shared with beasts (*aut certe* = ἤ...γε), rationality is the more distinctive differentia, being shared with God and the angelic beings (*CEut.* II 24-28). Hence the *tantum* at *CPh.* V 5,4 marks a contrast with irrational creatures, restricting rationality to man and the higher beings (cf. *In Isag.* II 137,8/20).

12,24-14,5. Amplius ... constabunt. Cf. *In Perih.* II 124,22-27; *In Cic. top.* 1061b1-12; 1105d3-14; Arist., *Cat.* 14a29-35; *Top.* 111b17-23; 141b28f.; 150a33-36; Cherniss, *ACPA* 44-47. Natural priority entails the power to sublate without being sublated (*Inst. ar.* I 1,8; *In Cat.* 183b13-c2; *Diff. top.* I 5,45f.), and here that means the genus and

parts. But there is a sense in which things are reversed, for in relation to us species are prior to genera (*In Isag.* II 157,13-158,9; cf. Arist., *An. post.* 71b33-72a5; *Phys.* 184a16-19). Similarly, the parts in one sense follow the whole, for if there is a house there are walls, a roof, and a foundation (*Diff. top.* I 5,40). The suppression of these subtleties may be a reflection of the lost Porphyrian source, for the argument here stated recalls *Isag.* 15,16-20. <quoque>. See on 12,8. **natura tantum ... ratione quoque temporis**. Some parts are prior in time (a foundation is laid before a house is built) as well as in nature (without a foundation it would not be a house). Cf. *Hyp. syll.* I 3,6f.; *Diff. top.* III 3,22-24. **interimatur ... interempta**¹⁽²⁾ ... **peremptum**. = ἀναρπεῖν (cf. Porph., *Isag.* 14,10f.; 15,2 [*AL* I 6, pp. 22,13; 23,7]). **totum non erit**. Removal of a part does not destroy the entity *per se*, since the parts of a whole are not parts of the formula of the essence (cf. Arist., *Met.* 1035a3-9; Cherniss, *ACPA* 328). Hence the loss of a hand does not destroy Socrates *qua* man, although it does destroy him *qua* whole; and while the parts of a whole are *at least* conceptually separable (40,11-15), the “parts” of the formula (38,6-13) are not even that (20,10-13). **partes ... distributae**. The foundation after the roof (or walls) has been taken away. At *In Perih.* II 88,9-27 B. argues, against Syrianus, that their being parts is a consideration independent of the actuality of the composite. A foundation is still a foundation if the house is never built, or if it is torn down. Cf. *CPh.* III 11,12: *at si distributae segregataeque partes corporis distraxerint unitatem desinit esse quod fuerat. abstulerit*. Dienelt remarks B.’s tendency toward the perf. subjv. (“Untersuchungen” I 104-06), and this may be a case in point. But *locauero*, 12,21, suggests the fut. perf. indic., which would help to explain the apodotic *intercipit* (= *intercipiet*; cf. on *facta est*, 12,21). Bednarz (*De syntaxi* III 3; cf. III 9) notes *CPh.* I 5,5 (*quisquis ... desierit ... desinit*), III m1,9f. (*ut ... pepulerit ... agit*), III 11,12 (*si ... distraxerint ... desinit*), IV 4,3 (*necesse est ... cum ... perfecerint*), and V 2,10 (*ubi ... deiecerint ... caligant*). Cf. below, 40,30; *In Perih.* II 83,10.

14,5-12. Amplius ... coniunctione. The genus is analogous to matter, the differentia to form, the species to the hylomorphic entity (16,13f.; 18,12f.; *In Isag.* II 269,2-4; Porph., *Isag.* 11,12-17; 15,6f.; Arist., *Part. an.* 643a24, with Tarán, *Speusippus* 400, n. 215). At 16,13 B. qualifies *materia* with *quaedam* (cf. Porph., *Isag.* 11,13 [ἀνάλογόν]; [Alex. Aphr.], *Quaest.* II 28). The whole, on the other hand, stands above the elements of composition and is analogous to form rather than matter (*In Cic. top.* 1046d8-1047a2; 1161d7-14). Cf. *Trin.* II 32-

37; *CPh.* III 11,11f.; Arist., *Top.* 150a19 (σύνθεσις); 150b22-26; 151a23-26; *Met.* 1041b12-19.

14,12-20. Amplius ... quantitate. By *idem* B. means that the dividendum and dividenda share both a name and definition: man is, and is called, an animal (cf. 12,6f.; Arist., *Top.* 123a28f.; 127b6f.); but walls are not, nor are they called, a house. Cf. more generally, *In Isag.* II 156,9-157,1; *In Cat.* 167c2-9; *In Cic. top.* 1056d9-1057d1; 1105c1-6. **uirtus ... habitus.** Cf. 30,25f. **non semper idem.** A piece of bone is of the same nature as the whole bone, but bone is not the same as a hand. **neque ... nec.** Cf. on 8,7f. **quae dissimiles partes habent ... quae similes.** = τὰ ἀνομοιομερῆ ... τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ (with *sibi*, 40,5f.). Lucretius avoids the periphrasis by transliterating (I 830-34). Although the theory points back to Anaxagoras (DK 59A45f.), the terminology, which is standard among the commentators (e.g. Ammon., *In Isag.* 83,2-19), is Aristotelian (Cherniss, *ACPP* 3, with n. 9; rev. of Kranz 254). **continuae.** = συνεχεῖς (e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 13,20 [Arist., *Cat.* 4b20]). At 38,29-40,7 homo- / heterogeneous is a subdivision of continuous quanta. There is no telling where one part of a bronze rod ends and another begins, for they are all continuous and homogeneous. The ostensible conclusion (cf. *In Isag.* I 74,18f.; *In Cat.* 190c13-15) is therefore that the whole and parts are “the same.” But although they are the same in essence, they differ in quantity. **uidentur idem esse.** The text is troubled in three places (cf. “Text” 33): (a) *Quia* is necessitated by the exegetical nature of the relat. clause and gives the reason for the continuity of a bronze rod. (b) The parts are what “appear to be the same,” so that the plur. *uidentur* too is necessary. (c) (*Esse*) *partes* would be redundant with *partes*, 14,17; it was probably occasioned by the sing. *uidetur*. Cf. *In Isag.* II 215,9-11: *ut si aeris uirgulam diuidas, secundum id quod aes dicitur, idem et partes esse intellegitur et totum.* **substantia.** See on 18,13.

III. C. 14,21-26: Whole parts vs. spoken sound / significations

The dividenda constitute the dividendum in the case of a whole, but not in that of an equivocal; so although even one dividens sublates a whole, the same is not true in the case of an equivocal.

These two tropes interest B. only for the manner in which they intersect with genus / species divisions. So although he expends considerable energy on them in that connection, he is hardly bothered here with their standing relative to one another.

14,21-25. Restat. Here with the infiniv., but with the subjv. at 36,12 and 42,1. Cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* III 5; Dienelt, "Untersuchungen" I 117. Probably another Porphyrian echo, for at *Isag.* 21,18 (*AL* I 6, p. 31,5) practically the same formula introduces a final pair of comparanda (Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 128): λείπεται δὲ περὶ ἰδίου καὶ συμβεβηκότος εἰπεῖν = *Restat igitur de proprio et accidenti dicere*. Cf. Arist., *De an.*, 409b23: λείπεται δ' ἐπισκέψασθαι. **quod.** See on 10,34. **uocis ... non in partes.** To divide a spoken or written expression *qua* whole would be to break it up into words, syllables, and letters (40,7-9). **una.** Better suited to *sublata parte* (cf. 14,2), since there the point is that a single dividens sublates the dividendum, whereas here not even a number of them does. Language being an unstable and conventional phenomenon, new meanings are constantly coming into use for the same words.

IV. 14,27-38,16: Genus / species divisions

B. reaches the main subject of discussion, division of a genus, and it will emerge that driving his exposition is the problem of defining a species (cf. Plezia, *De Andr. stud.* 11). In fact, the difference between the two concerns amounts to that between divisive and systatic differentiae (Porph., *Isag.* 10,1-3), a distinction which B. strangely suppresses (cf. *In Isag.* II 260,15-19; II 261,9f.; II 299,8-16). His approach has two motivating concerns: to identify that in respect of which one species is said to *differ* from another under the same genus, and to find the mode of *opposition* characterizing that difference.

IV. A. 14,27-18,3: Preliminaries

14,27-16,6. *Genus is that which is predicated essentially of a multiplicity of things specifically different; species, what falls under a genus; differentia, that in respect of which things differ. A genus indicates the What, a differentia the Of-What-Kind, in respect of a species.*

Metaphysical issues are silently bypassed, and the notions of genus, species, and difference, all set in a starkly Peripatetic light, are taken for granted. Thus the ontological status of the dividendum and dividenda is nowhere discussed, which, given the facts that Porphyry's lost prolegomena were written with an eye to Plato's *Soph.*, and that at *Isag.* 1,9-14 Porphyry notoriously provokes broad metaphysical questions, gives rise to the question of the degree to which B. here retouched his source. Two considerations must be borne in mind.

First, whereas in the extant *Isag.* Porphyry worked more or less independently (he mentions no particular source, only οἱ παλαιοὶ ... ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου, 1,15; cf. 1,8), in composing prolegomena and a commentary to Plato's *Soph.* he adapted (*repetitus*, 4,7) Andronicus' treatise on diaeresis, which presumably treated the *Platonic* method from a *Peripatetic* point of view. We cannot know the precise truth of the matter, but it is conceivable that the downplaying of metaphysical concerns in *Div.* stems from any one, or a combination, of three sources: (a) The Peripatetic scholar *Andronicus* may have suppressed a number of Platonic themes or assumptions which would otherwise have arisen in a treatment of diaeresis. (b) *Porphyry*, whose task it was to introduce and expound Plato's *Soph.*, but who was also addicted to the project of harmonizing Plato and Aristotle, may have imported Aristotelian material from Andronicus (cf. *Isag.* 6,13-16, citing Plato in an introduction to Aristotle, and on the subject of diaeresis). (c) *B.*, who had to bring Porphyry's Platonic prolegomena back into the Peripatetic fold, may have revised the overall emphasis in light of what he knew about the Peripatetic tradition.

Second, the rather evacuated concepts here of genus and species may in fact be a non-problem, for in the *Soph.*, the work at the back of the whole tradition, Plato himself had handled the subject of diaeresis without seriously pursuing all that it implies philosophically (cf. Shorey, *Unity* 176f.; *What Plato Said* 294f.). Indeed, it would have been very much out of place for B. to entertain the questions of whether genera and species subsist, whether they subsist in or outside of the mind, whether the hierarchy they represent corresponds to an ontological reality, etc. B.'s immediate arena is a Peripatetic one, and so the "definitions" of genus, species, and difference here trotted out are Peripatetic as well (cf. Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 120f.).

14,28f. definiendum. What B. offers is really only a description (*In Isag.* II 180,20-181,15; cf. I 42,8-43,6; II 153,10-154,2; *In Cat.* 166a1-15; *Diff. top.* II 6,2; *In Perih.* II 28,28-29,6, with Ammon., *In Isag.*

54,23-55,14, and Porph., *Isag.* 2,15), but he is often imprecise in this way (e.g. *In Cat.* 246a8-b7, with 240a4-c3; cf. Ammon., *In Isag.* 64,11-15).

14,29-16,2. genus ... praedicatur. = Arist., *Top.* 102a31f. (Porph., *Isag.* 2,15f. [*AL V* 1, p. 10,14f.; *I* 6, p. 7,1f.]): Γένος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ πλειόνων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ εἶδει ἐν τῷ τί ἐστὶ κατηγορούμενον. Cf. *In Isag.* II 181,13-183,4; *In Cat.* 177b3-8; *Diff. top.* III 3,10; *In Cic. top.* 1065b12-c1; 1106b9-15. There is no hint here of Porphyry's first three descriptions (*Isag.* 1,18-2,13), and that they were omitted in his *Soph.* prolegomena is a distinct possibility. In any event, *Div.* is not about the predicables as such, so that there would have been no point in B.'s dwelling on the different senses of "genus" (cf. *In Isag.* II 171,9-179,17). What he might have explained is that subalternate genera, what he is most interested in, are in fact species as well (28,31-30,4; 32,23-34,2; cf. *In Isag.* II 307,8-13; *In Cat.* 244d10-245a1; Ammon., *In Isag.* 70,22-71,7; 76,19f.). **species ... collocamus.** = Porph., *Isag.* 4,2 (*AL I* 6, p. 8,19f.): λέγεται δ' εἶδος καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος; 4,10 (*AL I* 6, p. 9,4f.): εἶδος ἐστὶ τὸ ταπτόμενον ὑπὸ τὸ γένος. Cf. *DL VII* 61; *Cic., Top.* VII 31. Of Porphyry's different senses of "species" only one (*Isag.* 4,11f.) is not *ad aliquid* (cf. *Isag.* 4,4-9; B., *In Isag.* II 202,5-203,8; Ammon., *In Isag.* 74,8-76,10). The reason for its absence is that it applies only to the *infimae species*, whereas B. needs a description that is inclusive of the *subalterna*. **differentia ... proponimus.** = Porph., *Isag.* 11,21 (*AL I* 6, p. 18,20f.): διαφορὰ ἐστὶν ὅτῳ διαφέρει ἕκαστα (cf. *Pl., Tht.* 208c7f.). This "vicious" and tautological description (*In Isag.* II 270,11-271,23) is defended by David as the best of a bad lot (*In Isag.* 197,12-21). With David B. would not agree (18,10-12). He tolerates it knowing that there will be ample opportunity to explain later. The two unannounced "definitions" give us the order, genus, species, differentia (cf. 50,1f.). That is how Porphyry presents them (*Isag.* 1,17-12,11), although his commentators point out that differentia ought to precede species (*In Isag.* II 198,12-17; Ammon., *In Isag.* 102,1f.; Elias, *In Isag.* 60,29-61,8; David, *In Isag.* 99,10-16 [but cf. 172,24-173,9]; Porph., *Isag.* 18,19-23). **quidem.** = μὲν solitarium.

16,3f. quid. The *quid est* question is implicit in the "definition" above (cf. Porph., *Isag.* 15,2-4); and as Aristotle holds, one response is a genus or category (*Top.* 103b27-29; 108b22f.; 142b27-29; *Met.* 1030a18-20), even though a genus alone does not fully explain the

species (cf. *In Perih.* II 10,24-31; Arist., *Top.* 139a28f.). In Plato it is the question that motivates the search for a definition (e.g. *Euthph.* 11a7; *Mn.* 71b4). **conuenit**. I.e. a reply that comports with the bearing of the question; possibly translating ἀρμόττει (e.g. *AL* V 1, p. 10,16 [Arist., *Top.* 102a33]). Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1069c2-4: *In eo quod quid est praedicari dicitur, quod de qualibet specie interrogantibus quid sit responderi conuenit*; also, *conuenienter*, 16,6 (= οἰκειώς, e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 9,11 [Arist., *Cat.* 2b33]). **qualis**. Cf. Arist., *Top.* 122b15-17; 128a20-29; *Met.* 1020a33f.; 1024b5f.; Porph., *Isag.* 3,8-11; 11,7f.; 18,16-19. The differentia is a form or qualitative determination; B. speaks in terms of the substantial quality, at *In Cic. top.* 1073a12 (cf. *In Cat.* 195b1-5). Having found that *x* is included in *y*, we search next for its ποῖον (cf. *Pl.*, *Euthph.* 12d6f.).

16,4-6. cum quis. Cf. 44,6. At *Hyp. syll.* I 3,1/6 B. explains that *cum* can replace *si* (cf. Bednarz, *De ... colore* 4; *De syntaxi* III 8), although Obertello points out (ad loc. I 3,8ff.) that the equivalence is not fully justified. In any event, like (νι)si and *num*, *cum* sometimes cancels *ali-* (*CPh.* III 3,13; V 4,34; cf. LHS II §107). **homo**. Cf. Porph., *Isag.* 11,10-12 (*AL* I 6, p. 18,7-9): τί μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐρωτωμένων ἡμῶν οἰκεῖον εἰπεῖν ζῶον, ποῖον δὲ ζῶον πυνθανομένων λογικὸν καὶ θνητὸν οἰκεῖως ἀποδώσομεν = ‘quid est’ enim ‘homo’ interrogatis nobis conueniens est dicere ‘animal’; quale autem animal inquisiti, quoniam rationale et mortale est conuenienter adsignabimus. **recte ... conuenienter**. Chiastic, with *conuenit* (cf. on 16,3) ... *rectissime*. **rationabilis**. Cf. on *aut ... aut certe*, 12,23f. **respondetur**. Note the pattern, *conuenit responderi* (16,3) ... *conuenienter ... respondetur*.

16,6-15. *Both species and differentiae divide a genus, differentiae if the species are nameless. For instance, since there is no proper name for rational-animal we must divide by the differentia and employ the formula. But wherever possible division is by species.*

Strictly speaking, differentiae do not partake of the genus and therefore do not themselves divide it (Arist., *Top.* 122b20-24; cf. 144a31-b1), but B. recognizes the exigency driving the point here. He returns twice to this complex of themes (26,8-28,8; 28,25-30,6; cf. 22,15-23), each time acknowledging the element of repetition (26,9f.; 28,29f.); and with each pass he has a different objective in mind, so that Plezia erred in asseverating that B. became muddled in the process of reducing Porphyry’s *Soph.* commentary (*De Andr. stud.* 12). Having just “defined” the three things involved in this the main trope

of diaeresis, B. points out that differentiae as well as species can act as dividenda, and specifies the conditions under which they do so. What emerges is fundamental, for it is differentiae combined with a genus that produce a species; and, the complex of terms signifies the species, which is just the genus qualified or actualized in a determinate way (cf. Arist., *Met.* 1037b13-1038a35). At *Diff. top.* I 5,28 B. speaks of the constitutive difference as a genus (rational) and the divisive difference as a species (mortal). But in another sense things are reversed, for mortality, the final differentia, *constitutes* man.

16,8f. rationabilia ... differentiae. Cf. 18,13; 20,7; 38,8; and on 8,3.

16,11-14. superiori ... proprium. I.e. proximate, one link up in the chain of diaeresis (28,26f.; 30,7f./15; 34,9). **materia ... forma.** Cf. 14,5-12. Diaeresis is for Aristotle an "analytical diagram of the essential nature of each actual species showing the course of the actualization of the genus," i.e. of the generic *matter* (Cherniss, *ACPA* 60; cf. 175, n. 98; *ACPP* 91, with n. 386; 94, with n. 396; *Riddle* 41f.). Cf. Arist., *Met.* 1016a26; 1023b2; 1024b3. At *In Isag.* II 160,23-161,2 and *Trin.* II 48-56 B. brings a higher sense of *forma* into consideration. **propriis nominibus ... appellantur.** Cf. *In Cat.* 253d12 (254c11): *propriis nominibus carent*; 254c12: *suis uocabulis appellantur*; and on *anti-quior*, 30,4.

16,15-24. *Thus a definition consists of a multiplicity of terms. But if all species had names, then definitions would consist of only two terms. For example, if rational-animal had a proper name, then by combining it with "mortal" we would have a definition of man in two terms. But (since many species are nameless) division (by differentiae) is inevitable.*

Definition of a species is essentially division of a genus, so that in order to define we must know how to divide (cf. Elias, *In Isag.* 37,35-38; 44,9-11; David, *In Isag.* 103,13f.). Division by species does not produce *definitions* of the species but presupposes them; but a definition is what we are after, and the path thereto leads through the differentiae. If there were names for all proximate genera of definienda, we could combine them with the specific differentiae and definitions would always consist of only two terms. But if the proximate genus of a definiendum is nameless, i.e. is really a differentia, then the division must commence one step higher, with the genus of which the proximate genus (differentia) is a species, and the number

of terms in the definition will increase by one. If that genus too is nameless, the diaeresis will begin one step higher still, and so on. B. returns to the definition of man (it is not the only one, cf. *CPh.* V 4,35; I 6,15; Talamanca, "Schema" 103, n. 301): Where is our starting point on the "Porphyrian tree"? —The first properly named genus above the definiendum. We do not say, "man is a sensible, animate, corporeal (etc.) substance," because animal means *eo ipso* all higher differentiae and genera (cf. Them., *In De an.* 2,37f.). At the same time, since the "species" immediately below animal (rational-animal) is nameless, we cannot begin there either. The dividendum (genus) is therefore animal. Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1113c4-12: *Quo fit ut si ad speciem aptandum est genus, eorum quae superiora sint [Orelli-Baiter] aliquid aptemus, et non erit necesse ultimum semper genus adhibere; ut si homini genus proprium praeponere uelimus [Orelli-Baiter], non necesse est ut substantiam praeponamus sed uel corpus uel corpus animatum uel, quod maxime fieri oportet, animal. Illa enim semper genera sumenda sunt quaecumque proxima formis adhaerent eaque in definitione maxime requiruntur*, 1052c12-d2: *Nam differentiae continentes etiam genera communiter possunt uideri, ut irrationale, cum a rationali uelut diuisibili differentia dissideat, tamen equi uel canis et [Orelli-Baiter] differentia specifica est et ad eos locum generis tenet, namque animal irrationabile equi genus est*; below, 26,12-23.

16,15-17. Vnde est ut. *Esse* appears as part of this idiom only here; *fieri* is the vb. elsewhere in *Div.* Cf. 40,9 (*itaque fit ut*), and on *sit*, 22,1. **suis nominibus appellarentur.** Cf. on 16,14.

16,18f. necesse. Followed in *Div.* only by constructions with the infin. (cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* III 5/15; Dienelt, "Untersuchungen" I 109). **esset.**¹ Throughout the passage the conditions are pres. unfulfilled, so that the impf. subjv. is necessary here too. **esset**² ... **nuncupatum.** = *nuncuparetur* (cf. LHS II §178a). **quod.** A subj. is needed for *perficeret*, and the *ut* of *F* is weak ("Text" 27).

16,21-24. Nunc autem. Signifying the actual state of affairs, as opposed to unreal hypotheses (= $\nu\upsilon\nu\delta\acute{\epsilon}$, Bonitz, *Index* 492a61f.). **in ... uersetur.** Division and definition are two sides of the same coin, in that we make either one thing many or many things one (20,7-10; 38,1-16; Porph., *Isag.* 6,16-18; 10,18f.; Elias, *In Isag.* 37,24-27; David, *In Isag.* 207,31f.). Cf. Cic., *Fin.* IV 4,8: *qui et definierunt plurima et definiendi artes reliquerunt, quodque est definitioni adiunctum, ut res in partes diuidatur, id et fit ab illis et quemadmodum fieri oporteat traditur; item de contrariis, a quibus ad genera formasque generum uenerunt*, Mansfeld,

Heresiography 326-28. **diuisionibus iunctis una ... definitio.** The combined genus and differentiae, the "divisions," constitute an essential unity (*una* does not here mean "unique") over and above the fact of their juxtaposition, and the definiendum is a coherent and essential unity as well (cf. *unum hominem*, 38,11f.): *In Perih.* II 101,20-104,28; II 111,20-112,4; *In Cic. top.* 1101d9-13; Arist., *Peri H.* 17a13f.; 21a8-10; *Part. an.* 643b33f.; *Met.* 1030b7-10. Gottschalk, "Aristotelian Philosophy" 1115f., and Donini, *Scuole* 91, see an Andronicean symptom in B.'s linking of division and definition. But since Plato's *Soph.* (cf. *Pol.* 262b2-7) everywhere presupposes such a link, about all we can say is that recognition of the affinity stands at the back of the whole tradition (cf. Cherniss, *ACPA* 61).

16,24-18,3. *It must be borne in mind that not all terms are univocal and that equivocals do not divide a genus (with them there is a division only of signification). It is therefore necessary to distinguish between univocals and equivocals in order not to confuse the two tropes of diaeresis; but definition is requisite to the avoidance of such confusion.*

The precise point is obscured by the rather hapless mode of exposition: (a) B. *apparently* speaks of finding univocal dividenda for division of a genus (*uniuoca ... sectiones*), yet in the case of spoken sound / significations divisions it is the dividenda (terms), not the dividenda (significations), that are equivocal. (b) The reasoning is circular: B. says at 16,21f. that division is essential to definition (*ad definitiones ... diuisio necessaria*) but now reverses the relation (*ad diuisionem necessaria ... definitio*).

To begin with (a). The phrase, *uniuoca ... in generum suscipimus sectiones*, is susceptible of two interpretations: (i) *Species*: "We adopt univocals to divide genera." That is, the dividenda (species) must be univocal with the dividendum (genus), as B. maintains they are (12,6f.; 14,12-14; *In Cat.* 167c1-9). (ii) *Genera*: "For division of genera we adopt as dividenda things that are univocally predicated." The alternatives amount ultimately to the same thing, although with some difference in meaning. Hence the choice really hangs on our understanding of,

(b) It is clear from *aequiucum nomen* (16,28) that B. wishes to contrast the dividenda of each trope: we must not mistake equivocals for genera, which have a definition as well as a name in common with their dividenda. If we doubt whether the dividendum is an equivocal or a (univocal) genus, we must see whether its definition applies to the

dividentia, as e.g. animate sensible substance applies to man (cf. on III.A. 10,33-12,16). That is B.'s meaning, and it demands (ii) over (i) above. This does not, however, save him from the charge of circularity, for in order to obtain a definition of the dividendum we would have to divide some higher genus and be faced with the question of whether *it* was a true genus or an equivocal. But the circularity appears to be just what B. is after, for this passage follows hard on the heels of the observation that diaeresis and definition amount to the same thing; in *dividing* a genus we may first have to *define* it *qua* species of a higher genus; and, the differentia that constitutes one thing divides another.


16,24-26. aequiuoca ... uniuoca. "Terms," *nomina* (cf. 16,28), appears to be the idea, although B. may mean dividentia generally. **quae² ... in his.** Cf. *Quibus ... his*, 10,28. **sola.** Transferred (= *solius*). Cf. *CPh.* V 5,4: *intellegentia sola* [= *solius*] *diuini*.

16,28-18,3. fefellerint. Probably perf. subjv. (cf. on *abstulerit*, 14,4). **quasi ... ita.** I.e. to divide an equivocal on the false assumption that it is a (univocal) genus. **rursus.** Turning the tables on 16,21f. **definitione.** Cf. 44,16; 46,15. **colligimus.** Unlike at 16,16, the vb. here implies some formal process of reasoning. Although definition is not proof, it may nevertheless serve as a tool of inference. Cf. *CPh.* II 4,24: *Atque ut agnoscas in his fortuitis rebus beatitudinem constare non posse, sic collige* (cf. IV 3,8); III 10,20: *Atqui et beatitudinem et deum summum bonum esse colligimus*; IV 2,10: *rationibus esse collectum*; IV 2,39: *uti paulo ante colligimus*; *In Cic. top.* 1046b5-9: *Etenim cum definit aliquis uel rei propositae diuisionem facit, inuenit quidem diuisioni definitionique differentias accommodatas, sed an recte uel definiat uel diuidat iudicatione perpendit*; also, *In Isag.* II 157,10f.: *fit enim demonstratio, id est alicuius quaesitae rei certa rationis collectio*; *In Perih.* II 173,5-9.


IV. B. 18,4-20,19: On differentiae

B. turns his attention now to the question of what actually divides a genus (constitutes a species), and Porphyry's presence is again felt. At *Isag.* 8,8 Porphyry makes a preliminary classification of differentiae, κοινῶς, ἰδίως, ἰδιαιτάτα, and on the basis of his λεγέσθω Elias (*In Isag.* 79,10-14) and David (*In Isag.* 175,19f.) infer that the terminology originates with him (cf. Ammon., *In Isag.* 93,17-20; B., *In Isag.* II


240,1; II 241,18; *AL* I 6, p. 14,16). —That it does not is evident from Sextus, *PH* II 15 (cf. [Gal.], *Hist. phil.* 7; 12). Porphyry then reformulates the trichotomy in two dichotomic diaereses. At *Isag.* 8,18f. we have:




and at 9,7-11:



B.'s system corresponds to that of *Isag.* 8,18f.:



and the reason for its isolation is that the *per se* / *accidens* split reflects the fundamental corrective that B. attributes to Andronicus and the later Peripatos (48,26-50,1). *Isag.* 9,2-4, in which the ἄλλο ποιοῦσαι διαφοραί (= *per se*, ἰδιαιτάτα) are singled out as suitable for dividing a genus (cf. *Div.* 18,10-12), suggests that in his *Soph.* prolegomena Porphyry drew the same formulation into a position of prominence, possibly connected it with developments in the later Peripatos. In any case, *Div.* bypasses the first and third formulations and employs a new Lat. terminology (cf. *AL* I 6, p. 14,15f.; *In Isag.* I 85,20-91,15; II 240,14-258,8), but the doctrine and supporting illustrations are entirely consistent with what survives from Porphyry (*pace* Pozzi, *Studi* 29f.). At *AM* X 220f. Sextus quotes Demetrius interpreting Epicurus (cf. *DL* X 68-71) to the following effect:



which proves that Porphyry was not the first to formulate such a classification. Missing in *Div.* are: explicit recognition of (a) divisive and constitutive differentiae (Porph., *Isag.* 9,24-10,21) as sub-classes of the *per se* (cf. 16,12f.; 18,10-14), and distinctions between (b) natural and extrinsic *consequent* (cf. 18,7f.), and (c) natural and extrinsic *separable*, differentiae (*In Isag.* II 243,3-13). Stump's essay, *Diff. top.* 248-61, is a useful introduction.

18,4-14. *Of differentiae, some are essential, others incidental; of the incidental, some are inseparable (hair-texture, eye-color), others separable (physical or mental disposition). Incidental differentiae do not divide a genus, since they do not define a species; only essential differentiae (rationality, mortality) are suited to those functions.*

Attempts at a coherent notion of differentiae are ancient (e.g. *Simpl.*, *In Cat.* 55,22f.; 58,19-59,19; 97,28-33), but whereas B.'s system may or may not have been espoused by Andronicus, it is abundantly clear that it was known to Porphyry. B. is concerned first to isolate the *per se* differentiae, and his suggestion is that terms for the proof that a given differentia divides a genus reside in its capacity to define the species. The pattern of thought is circular in that the utility of *Div.* is promoted on the grounds that diaeresis is a tool for definition (32,16f.), yet for division there is needed some formal notion of the *dividens* (species) against which to test the applicability of competing differentiae (cf. Cherniss, *ACPA* 62f.). Since B. aims only at an abbreviated exposition of the rules of definition, he sidesteps epistemological aspects of the problem of locating essential differentiae (32,19-23), which, like that of the middle term (Arist., *An. post.* I 34; cf. 91b35-92a1), is really one of discovering causes. Cf. *CPh.* V m4,18-25: *Quae uis singula perspicit / aut quae cognita diuidit ? / Quae diuisa recolligit / alternumque legens iter / nunc summis caput inserit, / nunc decedit in infima, / tum sese referens sibi / ueris falsa redarguit ?* Also, on *interrogatus*, 12,23, and *sumamus ... sumendae*, 18,17f. Essential to the doctrine generally, but only hinted at in 18,12f., is the notion that differentiae successively and exhaustively actualize the potency of a genus (cf. 30,22-28; *In*

Isag. II 264,5-265,5; II 306,24-307,5). That is Aristotelian, and it entails a strict differentiation between the essential and incidental (cf. *Arist., An. post.* 75a28-37; *Part. an.* 643a27-31; *Met.* 1038a26-28; Cherniss, *ACPA* 61f.). Also, in this highly schematic treatment of differentiae B. leaves no room for discussion of incidental traits that pertain generally but not necessarily, e.g. greying with age (*In Perih.* II 240,14-18; II 248,14-22; cf. *Porph., Isag.* 12,16f.).

18,4. per se. = καὶ ὁ αὐτό (e.g. *AL* I 6, p. 15,22-16,4 [*Porph., Isag.* 9,11-17]; cf. *Arist., An. post.* 73a34-37). Elsewhere B. dubs these differentiae “substantial” (28,11; *In Isag.* II 250,8-18; *In Perih.* II 363,4; *In Cic. top.* 1118b8; 1165d9f.) and “specific” (e.g. *In Isag.* II 227,15; cf. *Porph., Isag.* 8,16; *Arist., Top.* 143b7f.). **per accidens.** Cf. 877b13.

18,5. consequentes. The term is used in this technical way only in *Div.*; it replaces ἰδίως (*proprie*, *Porph., Isag.* 8,8 [*AL* I 6, p. 14,15]). Cf. *Diff. top.* III 7,16: *Communiter* [= κοινῶς, *Isag.* 8,8 (*AL* I 6, p. 14,15)] *quoque accidentia, si inseparabilia sint, necesse est ut consequantur.* At *In Isag.* II 250,19, II 261,20-22, *In Cic. top.* 1118b9/1165d10 (etc.) B. calls them *secundum accidens inseparabiles*, i.e. *subiectum non relinquentes*. Such differentiae do not leave the subject, so that (e.g.) if it is Callias it is necessarily a case of being grey-eyed. Cf. more generally, *In Perih.* II 458,17-21; *Hyp. syll.* I 3,6; *In Cic. top.* 1124c2-4. **aliae statim.** The archetype read, (*aliae consequentes*) *statim*, *aliae (relinquentes statim. Relinquentes)*, etc. (“Text” 14). Prof. Asztalos has divined the true reading, in support of which I offer the following observations: (a) *Consequentes* elsewhere stands on its own (18,7 [cf. ad loc.]; 18,15/25), and *relinquentes* is preceded, not followed, by *statim* (18,15; cf. 18,23). (b) *Consequentes statim* makes little sense and is supported only by *Hyp. syll.* III 11,6: *Inuenias quoque per conexionem propositiones quae id intellegi uelint, ut a se nequeant separari, ut cum ita proponimus, “si est a, est b”. Id nimirum haec propositio intellegit, quod si esse potuerit a, statim consequatur ut sit etiam b.* But there *statim* is not postponed, and no technical phrase is in use. (The *mox consequitur* at 40,30 is irrelevant here.) **statim relinquentes.** = κοινῶς (*communiter*, cf. above, on *consequentes*). Separable in both actuality and concept because of their impermanence in relation to the subject (18,21-24; *In Perih.* II 367,22-30; *In Cic. top.* 1118b10f.; cf. *Porph., Isag.* 12,24f.; 13,3f.; *Arist., Top.* 102b5-9; *Phys.* 186b18-20).

18,6f. dormire ... sedere ... stare ... uigilare. Note the chiasmus. The opposed dispositions, each one equal as to its being or not (*In*

Perih. II 188,19-23; II 200,11-13), are never simultaneously actualized in a single subject (*Antepr.* 771b3-8; *Diff. top.* III 3,27; III 5,8). Cf. Arist., *Phys.* 186b21f.: οἷον τὸ μὲν καθῆσθαι ὥς χωριζόμενον. **consequentes**. Scribes here, as at 18,15/25, confused *con-* and *per-*, although there can be no mistaking B.'s intentions ("Text" 16f.). *Consequentes* is required, for B. has already instanced the *statim relinquentes*. This in turn secures *consequentium*, 18,25, where the same illustration is used. *Consequentium*, 18,15, is guaranteed by process of elimination, for there *in substantia permanentium* = *per se* (cf. *permanet*, 20,5; *In Isag.* I 86,4f.). B. does not unexpectedly shift from *consequentes* to *persequentes*, which is in any case unparalleled and nonsensical in this context.

18,7-9. capilli ... turbati. Cf. *In Isag.* I 28,11 (*capillum crispum*); I 86,2 (*caecis oculis uel crispo capillo*); II 242,22 (*caecis ... oculis*); II 243,7 (*caeci oculi*). At *Isag.* 8,14 Porphyry writes γλαυκότης (= *glauco oculi*), but at *AL* I 6, p. 14,23 and *In Isag.* II 240,9 B. translates, *caecitas oculorum* (= τυφλότης, ? γλαύκωσις, e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 31,4 [Arist., *Cat.* 11b22]). It is important to understand that both protases are parenthetical, serving as provisos against the objection that another circumstance might interfere with the entailment. We assume in the first case that there has been no hair loss and in the second that the eyes are unaffected by non-congenital deformities (*si* = εἴ γε, cf. *AL* I 1-5, p. 199, col. 2; "Text" 28). Given these conditions, the consequence holds: if it is Callias, then it is necessarily a case of being curly-haired and grey-eyed—assuming no baldness or eye injury. Cf. *In Isag.* II 242,23f.: *dum enim adest nasus atque oculi, ille caecus, ille erit semper incuruus*; *Diff. top.* I 5,38: *si Aethiops est, niger est*; Alex. Aphr., *De fato* 181,26f. At *In Isag.* II 243,3-13 B. explains that separable and inseparable accidents are of two kinds:

	<i>Separable</i>	<i>Inseparable</i>
<i>Natural</i>	ages of life	congenital blindness
<i>Extrinsic</i>	walking	scar from a wound.

In the present passage the provisos imply the natural / extrinsic distinction. **extrinsecus**. On the attributive usage, cf. Dienelt, "Untersuchungen" II 59. **haec**. Both incidental classes, not just the *consequentes*. **sumenda**. Cf. on 18,17f.

18,10. quicquid. = *quod*. Cf. Dienelt, "Untersuchungen" I 103. **aptum**. Cf. Porph., *Isag.* 11,18f.: διαφορά ἐστιν τὸ χωρίζειν πεφω-

κὸς [= *quod aptum natum est*, *AL* I 6, p. 18,17] τὰ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος. Cf. *In Isag.* II 248,5-7: *eo quidem quo aliud faciunt, diuisionibus aptae sunt, eo uero quo speciem informant, definitionibus accommodatae sunt.*

18,12f. informant perficiuntque. Cf. on *formatur*, 12,22. A kind of hendiadys, for the form (difference, 16,13f.) is the perfection (cf. *Arist.*, *De an.* 414a17). Cf. *Porph.*, *Isag.* 15,17 (*AL* I 6, p. 24,3): ἀποτελεῖν = *perficere*; *In Isag.* II 247,21: *speciem informant substantiamque perficiunt*; II 256,10: *rationem definitionis informant atque perficiunt*; II 260,14f.: *informant substantias easque perficiunt*; *CEut.* I 57f. (with *Arist.*, *Met.* 1015a5): *natura est unamquamque rem informans specifica differentia. substantiam.* The *esse* (e.g. *In Isag.* II 273,4-17). Cf. *B. on Signification and Mind* 123, n. 131.

18,14-20,13. *Essential differentiae should inhere in every member of the species at all times. Separability in both concept and act is the mark of the statim relinquentes; separability only in concept is the mark of the consequentes; complete inseparability is a mark of per se differentiae, but not the only one. For example, the ability to learn geometry sublates (is inseparable from) man and yet is not an essential difference, for it is rationality and mortality that actually constitute man. So inseparability alone does not reveal the essential difference; we must discover the causes of the species. Only then shall we have found the differentiae that divide the genus and define the species.*

The strategy of linking the discovery of divisive to that of systatic differentiae is spelled out, and *B.* proceeds in ascending order: (a) what is separable in both concept and act (*statim relinquentes*); (b) what is separable only conceptually (*consequentes*); (c) what is altogether inseparable. He then shows that (c) is not coextensive with the kind of differentia being sought, since there are *properties* that are inseparable from yet incidental to the essence. We therefore must discover the things that cause and explain the species, not just those whose absence it cannot tolerate. Cf. *In Isag.* II 274,5-13; II 276,18-277,7; II 279,7-9; *Arist.*, *Top.* 102a18-20; *De an.* 413a13-16; *Part. an.* 643a27-31; *Met.* 1025a30-32.

18,14f. has. Incorporated. = *Sed quemadmodum probare possimus utrum haec. consequentium.* See on 18,7.

18,17-19. sumamus ... sumendae. Selection of the appropriate genus and differentiae is a dialectical process (cf. on *interrogatus*, 12,23, and on 18,4-14). That is the reason for Aristotle's taxing the Plato-

nists with treating diaeresis as a kind of weak syllogism (*An. pr.* 46a31-39; *An. post.* 91b12-92a5; cf. *Top.* 153a9-11). Here, as at 18,9 and 34,3/19-22, B. probably renders λαμβάνειν: Arist., *An. pr.* 46b19-21 (*AL* III 1, p. 71,8-11); *An. post.* 91b19; Alcin., *Didasc.* 5. Cf. Cic., *Top.* VI 29: *cum sumpseris ea quae sint ei rei quam definire uelis cum aliis communia*; B., *In Cic. top.* 1101b4; Levet, “Philologie” 10. **ergo.** Resumptive (cf. *hoc modo*, 18,16). The sequence of thought is sloppy: (a) The question of how we are to determine under which class the differentia falls is settled as follows (*hoc modo*). (b) For we cannot know which differentiae to adopt in division without recognizing how we might know which are to be adopted or not. (c) We must first determine whether, etc. The point of (b) seems to be that determining which differentiae apply is partly a process of elimination (as the subsequent sentences show).

18,20-23. omni ... et semper. The ability to learn geometry (20,3f.) fails in respect of both criteria, for not everyone learns geometry, while those who have learned it are not always exercising their knowledge (Porph., *Isag.* 12,14; Arist., *De an.* 417a27f.). Rationality, on the other hand, actualizes the potency of the genus animal and is *always* present to *every* human being. We might quarrel with the last point (and cf. *In Isag.* I 9,2-6, *CPh.* III m11,9f., etc.), but B. means that the ability to learn geometry is *incidental* to the rationality that defines human beings. **uel actu uel ratione.** Failure in respect of either removes a candidate from the running. At *An. pr.* 24a20 (ñ) B. wavers between *aut* and *uel* (*AL* III 1-2, pp. 5,13f.; 143,11f.; Levet, “Philologie” 9f.). **et actu et ratione.** Being separable in the broadest possible sense, the *statim relinquentes* obviously fail to qualify (cf. *In Isag.* II 261,17-19). **eorum est.** *Sunt* cannot stand, since the understood subj. is the sing. *differentia*. The cause of the plur. may have been either *sint* (18,15) or *relinquunt* (18,23). As to *eorum*, the alternative would be emendation to, *ex eo est genere [quae] statim relinquentium* (cf. 18,14f.; “Text” 16). **actu ipso.** Actual entails conceptual separability (but not vice versa).

18,25-20,1. consequentium. See on 18,7. **glaucis oculis.** Contrary to what I said at “Text” 29, the erased character in *Q* is probably a tachygraphic *uero*. **homo.** The omission of this would leave *hominem*, 20,1, unprepared (“Text” 17). **quod si ... prohiberet.** Preparing for the next stage of discussion. Cf. *In Isag.* II 281,15-283,4.

20,1-7. Aliud ... mortalis. The species is sublated by both the differentia and property but explained or caused only by the differentia. Hence, *non modo praeter eas ... non ... sed propter eas*, 20,11f. Cf. *In Isag.* II 250,14f.: *homini enim huiusmodi differentia per se inest, idcirco enim homo est, quia ei rationabilitas adest*; *In Perih.* II 197,3f.: *hominis ratione sublata nec ipsa quoque humanitas permanebit*; Arist., *Top.* 145a5-7. The species or form is in fact separable, but only by a process of mental abstraction (*In Isag.* II 164,16-167,7; *Trin.* II 10-14; *Hebd.* 87-91; *CPh.* V 4,34-36). **solus numerare possit uel geometriam discere.** Cf. Porph., *Isag.* 12,13f. **statim.** Logical (cf. εὐθύς, e.g. *AL* III 1, p. 131,1 [Arist., *An. pr.* 67a24f.]): the power to sublate does not *ipso facto* amount to the power to constitute. **in substantia.** Replacing the dat. (20,3; 6,26, etc.). Cf. *In Perih.* II 161,14f.: *inest in natura hominis*; Lucr. III 634: *toto ... corpore inesse*.

20,7-13. propter.¹ *F* was originally in agreement with *A Q* (overlooked at "Text" 29). [**ut hominis**] ... [**ut ipsum hominem**]. Cf. above, lxiv. The demonstr. *ipse* often = αὐτός in the sense of an eternal idea (cf. *B. on Signification and Mind* 79, with nn. 43-45), and I cannot imagine why *B.* should be supposed to have hinted at such a contrast here: (a) The difference between definition and division (constitutive vs. divisive differentia) does not imply the species *qua* transcendent idea. (b) Given that *B.* mentions both definition and division, the reasonable expectation is that he should supply, if anything, *ut animalis* after *generis*. **collocantur.** In two senses: the juxtaposed differentiae in a definition, and coordinate differentiae dividing a genus. **solus.** At *In Perih.* II 109,1f. *B.* adds the phrase, *mentis et disciplinae perceptibile*, to the definition, *animal rationale mortale*, thus emphasizing the point that the multiplicity of terms, which with the added phrase constitute a superfluous expression, nevertheless signifies a unity (cf. on *diuisionibus iunctis una ... definitio*, 16,23f.). Aristotle marks τὸ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν (here = *numerare possit ... geometriam discere ... possibilitas*) as superfluous to the definition (*Top.* 140a35-37; cf. 142b25-27); at *Isag.* 9,12f. Porphyry places it alongside τὸ λογικόν and τὸ θνητόν as a καθ' αὐτό attribute. **uel ... uel.** For the two processes amount to the same thing (16,22f.; cf. *et ... et*, 20,8). **sumendae.** Cf. on 18,17f.

20,13-19. *Not all differentiae are coordinate, e.g. rational and two-footed are different but not opposed. What we are seeking is formal opposition.*

This point rounds out the discussion of differentiae and effects the transition to the next section of the treatise. Two-footed and rational do not exhaust the genus animal, for not every animal is either rational or two-footed, but human beings are both and horses neither (cf. Arist., *An. post.* 97a19-22); moreover, every genus is capable of division by more than one set of *opposita* (30,29-32,7). And whereas coordinate differentiae imply change in the genus between generation and destruction, rational neither arises from nor destroys two-footed (cf. *In Perih.* II 477,7-12; Arist., *Phys.* 188a35-b3).

20,14-18. contra se ... a se.^{1,2} Cf. on 28,11-13. **aliqua oppositione.** Precisely which kind(s), B. is now going to explain.

IV. C. 20,20-28,24: On opposition

At *Top.* 143a34-36 Aristotle argues that for every stated differentia there must be a corresponding and opposed member of division, otherwise there is no differentia at all. Having isolated the differentiae that are suited to divide a genus, and having pointed out that (divisive) differentiae are not randomly opposed to one another, B. is now prepared for discussion of the ways in which *per se* differentiae exhaust the potency of a dividendum. It is insufficient merely to discover two or more differentiae of a genus, even if they are essential to the species defined. For there is a necessary order to the descending divisions (28,31-30,17; 32,23-34,2), and for each stage it is obligatory to know the possibilities, one of which when actualized necessarily excludes the other(s). Consider again rational and two-footed. They do not exhaust the genus animal, since some animals are both rational and two-footed, while others are neither. We are therefore seeking coordinate differentiae that are both destructive of one another and exhaustive of the potencies in a common genus. Thus the emphasis throughout this section is on the potency of the dividendum (division) rather than on actualization of the dividens (definition).

IV. C. 1. 20,20-22,5: Preliminary enumeration of the four tropes, with examples

There are four modes of opposition, contrariety, privation, contradiction, relation. In some instances it is difficult to distinguish between the first two, although that is a matter for separate discussion. The task before us is to see which mode(s) will divide a genus.

The fourfold scheme of opposition is a regular occurrence in Aristotle (*Cat.* 11b15-14a25; *Top.* 109b17-20; 113b15-114a25; 135b7-136b13; *Met.* 1018a20-b8; 1054a23-26; 1055a38-b16) and is treated by B. at *In Cat.* 264c7-283d3, to which he thrice refers (20,24; 24,13; 26,2; cf. above, xxixf.). Cf. *In Isag.* II 152,17-153,1; *Diff. top.* II 8,10f.; *In Cic. top.* 1119b10-1122b4. Since there is no evidence to indicate that Andronicus actually athetized the so-called *Postpraedicamenta*, with which this section of *Div.* has much in common, there is no basis for concluding that B. is not heir to Andronicean material here. But neither is there any conclusive evidence to indicate that he is. Cf. above, xxxvii, with n. 6; lvii.

B. notes at *In Cat.* 264c7-265b2 that there was disagreement between the Stoics and Peripatetics, as also within the Peripatos, over the question of whether the four modes of opposition constitute a species / genus or a significations / equivocal relation. He follows Porphyry (cf. *Simpl.*, *In Cat.* 381,24) in taking the former position. Aristotle gives some hints to the opposite effect: *Cat.* 11b16f. (ποσαχῶς ... λέγεται ... τετραχῶς); 12b27 (λεγόμενα); *Met.* 1054a26 (λεγόμενα, λέγεται); 1055b6 (πολλαχῶς ... λέγομεν). Cf. *Simpl.*, *In Cat.* 381,26-31.

Once again B. pursues the *enumeratio* + *exempla* pattern (cf. on II. 6,17-10,27).

20,20f. oppositiones. B.'s usual translation of ἀντικείμεθα is *opponi* (e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 30,27 [Arist., *Cat.* 11b16f.]; *AL* V 1, p. 44,11 [Arist., *Top.* 114a11]), although in *Intr. cat. syll.* (cf. DeRijk, "Chronology" 20), and in *Diff. top.* (III 3,17) and *In Cic. top.* (1119c1f.; cf. 1120d14; 1165d12), where Cicero must be taken into account, the terminology shifts. **contraria.** = τὰ ἐναντία (e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 31,1 [Arist., *Cat.* 11b18]; *AL* V 1, p. 44,8 [Arist., *Top.* 114a7]). In the Ciceronian works mentioned just above, where *contrarium* = τὸ ἀντικείμενον, an accommodation is made by rendering τὸ ἐναντίον with

aduersum. But ordinarily B. translates as here. Cf. *In Isag.* II 265,9-12: *quae uero nos contraria diximus, Porphyrius opposita nuncupauit. est enim genus contrarii oppositum; omnia enim contraria, si sibi inmet ipsis considerantur, opposita sunt. habitus ... priuatio.* = ἔξις, στέρησις, a positive disposition or state of possession, and the lack thereof (e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 31,1 [Arist., *Cat.* 11b18]; *AL* V 1, p. 44,12 [Arist., *Top.* 114a11f.]).

20,21-24. quamquam ... alias. B. returns to the point at 24,29-26,4, where it is made clear that the “other” discussion is *In Cat.* (274d9-277c7; cf. 255d2-256a8; *In Perih.* II 466,21-24; above, xxixf.), and at 28,19-24, where privation is reduced to contrariety. At *Cat.* 12b26-13a36 Aristotle spells out the *differences* between privation and contrariety: (a) Whereas of *unmediated* contraries one or the other is always true of any subject naturally capable of receiving either, not every subject capable of possession is always in that or the privative state (e.g. new-born kittens neither possess sight nor are blind: *Cat.* 12a29-34, with B., *In Cat.* 269d4-9). (b) Whereas of *mediated* contraries it is unnecessary for one or the other extreme to inhere, when a subject is naturally capable of possession, then it necessarily is in that or the privative state (e.g. it is unnecessary that all colored objects be either black or white, but all full-grown cats must either have sight or be blind). (c) Whereas there is change both ways between contraries, from privation there is no return to possession. As to the similarity between the two modes, Aristotle points out at *An. post.* 73b21f. that the contrary is either a privation or a contradiction within the same genus, e.g. number, where even is the negation or complete absence of odd and everything not-odd is necessarily even (contradiction); or color, which is either black or not-black, i.e. is either black or else grey, red, white, etc. (privation). And at *Met.* 1055a33-36 (cf. 1055b11-14; 1063b17f.) he makes privation a kind of focal point for the predication of contrariety. B. declines to discuss the complexities but is content instead to “follow Aristotle” (26,2-4) in treating contrariety and privation as distinct modes of opposition. To do otherwise would be to indulge in discussion that is strictly irrelevant, a vice which B. has sworn off at 4,13-6,3. **uel.** *Et* is tempting but unnecessary. **ea.** The *ea*s of *G* is incorrect: there are certain cases in which (*quaedam res in quibus*) it is difficult to determine whether the things at issue (*ea*) ought to be, etc. **uigilatio somnus.** An example unparalleled in Arist., *Cat.* 10f., but quite old nevertheless (e.g. [Arch.], ap. Simpl., *In Cat.* 116,13; Pl., *Phd.* 71c11f.).

20,26. secundum affirmationem et negationem. = κατὰ κατὰ-φασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν (cf. *AL* I 1, p. 31,2 [Arist., *Cat.* 11b19]). With *secundum* B. intimates Aristotle's doctrine of spoken expressions κατὰ συμπλοκὴν (e.g. *Cat.* 1a16-18; *Peri H.* 16a9-18; 17a8-37), i.e. that involve both subject and predicate and are therefore either true or false. Cf. *contradictionis*, 22,6f. (= ἀντιφάσεως, e.g. *AL* V 1, p. 43,10 [Arist., *Top.* 113b16]).

20,27. secundum relationem. Possibly = κατὰ σχέσιν, which is ordinarily rendered *secundum habitudinem* (e.g. *AL* I 6, p. 10,16-11,2 [Porph., *Isag.* 5,7-13], although cf. *In Cat.* 218a6-13, with Porph., *In Cat.* 112,9). B. switches to the more usual *ad aliquid* (= πρὸς τι, e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 30,28f. [Arist., *Cat.* 11b18]; *AL* V 1, p. 44,14 [Arist., *Top.* 114a13f.]) at 28,9f., but not at 28,18. Conti discusses Neoplatonic usage and finds B. in close accord with Aristotle ("Teoria"). **pater filius.** See on *dominus ... sensus*, 28,10f.

20,28f. igitur. Like *ergo*, 22,3, this could = μὲν οὖν (e.g. *AL* II 1, p. 5,5 [Arist., *Peri H.* 16a3]; Levet, "Philologie" 8). If *CE* here represent the archetype, then *FGK* (etc.) and *AQ* have fragmented the most ancient reading; but *CE* may well have *uncturas* through contamination. In any event, *uncturas*, a somewhat specialized word (cf. Brink on Hor., *AP* 47f.), makes nonsense here. **harum ... oppositionum.** Cf. *AL* I 1, p. 14,28f. (Arist., *Cat.* 5a19f.); *In Cat.* 248b7; 290b11f.; 291a11f.; note the variation with *oppositionem*, 22,4. **sit.** Most early MSS have *fit*, which may well have been the reading of the archetype (see above, lxi, n. 10; "Text" 32f.). At any rate, *f* and *s* are similar in minuscule script, and *FG* have a pronounced tendency to clean up the text. The scribe of *B* in all probability recognized that B.'s normal idiom is *divisio + fieri* ("Text" 32, n. 58; cf. *Div.* 24,6; 28,14; 30,16f.; 40,21; 48,4; *In Isag.* II 157,2; *In Cat.* 288b5f.; *Diff. top.* II 9,8) and that the subjv. is required. But on mechanical grounds *sit* is preferable to *fiat*; it is also the *lectio difficilior* (cf. 10,2; 26,5). A similar shift to *esse* occurs at 16,15.

22,3-5. per opposita separari. Opposed *differentiae* divide the genus and constitute the various species. **oppositionem harum.** Cf. on 20,28f. There is a slight inaccuracy here, in that there is not just one kind of opposition to divide a genus (28,17-24). **uel quemadmodum.** This clumsy phrase is apparently epexegetic, if not an intrusive gloss. **species a genere disiungi.** See above, on *per opposita separari*. **conueniat.** See on 16,3.

IV. C. 1. a. 22,6-24,6: **Contradiction**

First, contradiction. (a) Although an affirmation constitutes a species, its negation does not, for "not-man" is not itself a species but rather sublates one. Nevertheless, when the species is nameless it is necessary to employ negative or privative terms, e.g. "not-prime," "non-rectilinear." This is because of the limitations of language, not nature. (b) Whenever a negation is required, we posit first the affirmative term, e.g. specify "prime" before "not-prime." This way the audience will understand what is being sublated; and the purpose of division is in any case to lead to something more intelligible than the undivided genus. Moreover, affirmation is prior to negation, and in division that priority is to be observed as well. For the finite is prior to the infinite and in speech definite expressions are more finite than negated ones. Hence in division the definite form of expression should be put before the indefinite one.

(a) At *Part. an.* 642b21-643a27 Aristotle taxes the practitioners of dichotomic diaeresis (Speusippus) with trying to divide what is in essence indivisible, the privative term. His thinking is that the privative term *qua* differentia ("not- x ") is an impossibility insofar as it necessarily embraces a multiplicity of species which are essentially different. But the same specific form (differentia) cannot belong to things that are essentially different, and in this sense dichotomic division will never lead to the *infimae species* (Tarán, *Speusippus* 398-401). Again, at *Top.* 143b11-32 he uses the method of dividing by negation as a means of refuting the Platonic ideas *qua* transcendent genera. The approach is dialectical: it is requisite to show that the ideas cannot sustain the requirements of genera and that those who try to make them do so "deprive themselves of their own method of defining by diaeresis" (Cherniss, *ACPA* 5-8; 27). Given that for Aristotle definition is both universal and affirmative (*An. post.* 90b3f.), such criticisms (the second is really only a dialectical gambit) of the Platonic method, the purpose of which he persistently misconstrues, are probably inevitable.

(b) Aristotle nevertheless maintains (*Peri H.* 19b8-10; *An. pr.* 51b25-27) that indefinite names such as "not-man" (16a32) signify a kind of unity and can therefore function as subjects of categorical propositions (19b16), and it is probably that doctrine that motivates B.'s remarks at 22,15-23 (cf. more generally, *In Isag.* II 283,4-14; *In Perih.* II 61,8-63,14; *Antepr.* 764b4-765a2; *Intr. cat. syll.* 795c1-d5). When dividing by a negated term we must state first the positive one (cf.

Arist., *Peri H.* 17a8f.) and then provide either examples or a definition, in order that the hearer may have a clear conception of what is removed (and a less vague idea of what is thereby established, cf. Pozzi, *Trattato* 14f.). B. sidesteps deeper philosophical problems with the assertions that (i) strictly speaking there is no division of genera by negation, and that (ii) nevertheless human languages, which are conventional systems of symbols, sometimes necessitate division by negation. Moreover, he leaves out some fundamental points, such as that contradiction entails dichotomy (Arist., *Cat.* 13a37-b35; *An. post.* 72a12-14; B., *In Cat.* 181a12f.; *In Perih.* II 134,13-16; II 166,16-19; II 205,8-13; II 214,30-215,10; *Diff. top.* II 9,15; *In Cic. top.* 1054c14f.), that each affirmation has but a single negation (*In Perih.* II 173,28-178,8), that the terms must be identical apart from the negative particle (cf. *In Perih.* II 154,10-15; II 325,25-326,22; *Antepr.* 778b8-c6; *Intr. cat. syll.* 803b14f.), and that they must be univocal (Arist., *Peri H.* 17a35; B., *In Perih.* II 408,20; *Antepr.* 778c6-d3; *Intr. cat. syll.* 803c1-d1).

22,6-8. prima ... sit. Subjv. for the arbitrary the order of exposition (cf. *Tertia*, 20,25). **contradictionis.**^{1,2} Cf. on *secundum ... negationem*, 881d14. Although there is no predication as such (Arist., *Peri H.* 16a31; 17a25-37; 20a31-36), B. nevertheless allows that a negated term functions as a kind of negation (22,12-14; cf. *In Perih.* II 337,21-338,25). **per se.** Again at 22,14, both times approaching the sense of *κυρίως*. Cf. 48,27 (*per se diuisionem*), with Ammon., *In De int.* 15,16 (οἱ κύριως λεγόμενοι τῶν διαίρέσεων τρόποι); *In Perih.* II 338,16/21.

22,9-11. species sunt. I have translated the vb. emphatically. The point is that the positive term *establishes* something. **quicquid ... quis.** The generalization brings the force of the protasis close to that of a conditional. Cf. on *cum quis*, 16,4f.; LHS II §108c. **protulerit ... declarat.** Cf. on *abstulerit*, 14,4. Pozzi and Stump understand an *id* before *speciem*, but the change of subj. is unnecessary. Cf. *negatio ... quicquid proponit ... disiungit*, 22,12; *AL* I 1, p. 9,10-13 (Arist., *Cat.* 2b32-35). **non esse ... hominem.** Cf. McKinlay, "Tests" 126f.


22,11-14. esse.¹ Here "being" (Stump), despite the facts that *esse* (τὸ εἶναι), like *substantiam* (22,14), could mean the essence (cf. on 18,13), and that the divisive terms are not actual predications (cf. on *contradictionis*, 22,6f.). **proponit.** Strictly speaking only the affirmative term "proposes" (cf. *In Perih.* II 174,24f.; II 338,11-15). **ab eo quod est esse.** Stump's "disjoins being from something that is" suggests *eo*

quod est in the sense of the *id quod est* at *Hebd.* 43. But here *eo quod est esse* probably translates a Grk. articular infiniv. τοῦ εἶναι (*In Perih.* I 62,17-23; cf. McKinlay, "Tests" 127; Levet, "Philologie" 23f.). **quasi si.** Cf. *In Perih.* II 371,7; II 395,25/28f. The pleonasm exists in class. Lat. (e.g. *Lucr.* IV 1014) and is akin to the *nisi si* of *In Perih.* I 103,3 (cf. *Petr.*, *Sat.* 58,10; *LHS* II §367c). With the softening expression B. implicitly acknowledges the difference between a negated term and a negation proper, in which being or some other predicate is involved. **substantiam hominis.** Probably = τὴν οὐσίαν (vs. τὴν ὑπόστασιν) τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 5,4-12 [*Arist.*, *Cat.* 1a2-10]; cf. *CEut.* III 43-45). **destruxi.** Cf. *In Perih.* II 262,20f.: *priuat ac destruit. per se.* See on 22,8.

22,16-23. cum. Explaining *saepe* (cf. *interdum*, 22,22; *saepe*, 26,10; *semper ... interdum*, 28,28f.). **ea quam ... speciem.**² Incorporated. = *ea species quam.* **simplici.** I.e. without either a privative prefix or negative particle. **assignare.** Unless this is a peculiar substitute for *designare* (perhaps B. is momentarily confused between assigning names to things and designating them), the idea is "to distribute as a portion" (*OLD*, q.v. 1). **imparium numerorum.** See on 22,25 (32,2f.). **non primi.** Cf. *Inst. ar.* I 15,1; *Diff. top.* III 1,2 (*secundi atque compositi*). **figurarum ... non rectilineae.** Euclid's definition (*El.* I Def. 19) was translated into Lat., I suspect by B. himself (cf. Folkerts, *Geometrie* 72; Pingree, "Geometry" 157ff.), as follows (179,28; cf. 115,36): *Rectilineae figurae sunt quae sub rectis lineis continentur.* **nec albi nec nigri.** The illustration is inapposite in that the intermediate species in fact have proper names (*Arist.*, *Cat.* 12a18-22). Cf. on *media*, 8,6, and *quamquam ... alias*, 20,21-24. **nomen unum speciebus ... eas.** The change in number is somewhat misleading. **positum.** After Plato at least (e.g. *Crt.* 388e7; *Arist.*, *Rhet.* 1414b16) τιθέναι can signify the act of naming (cf. 34,29-36,2; Ebbesen, *Commentators* I 144 ["Legacy" 150]). B.'s usual translation is in fact *ponere* (e.g. *AL* II 1, p. 13,3f. [*Arist.*, *Peri H.* 18a18f.]). **necessitas, non natura.** B. is not implying that there are no natural necessities, only that systems of language are conventionally determined. In fact, names can always be *invented*. Cf. 26,10-23; *Arist.*, *Top.* 143b33: ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἀποφάσει χρῆσθαι.

22,23-25. In eodem quoque. = *amplius quoque* (22,31f.; cf. on 12,8). **aut ... aut.** = *uel ... uel* (cf. on 18,20f.). The fact that B. uses only *negatio* at 22,25 suggests that he is ignoring the difference between an

affirmation and an affirmative term. **numerorum**. An *imparium* is missing. At 32,2f., where the point is to demonstrate multiple divisions of a single genus, B. divides number into equal / odd and prime / not-prime. At *Inst. ar.* I 3,2, however, he points out that equal / odd is the first division of number (cf. Pl., *Pol.* 262e4; Arist., *Cat.* 12a6-8), and from I 13,1 it is clear that he does not mean first in a list of competing, alternative divisions. That comports with *imparium*, 22,18:



B. is thus in the position of breaching his own rule of not missing out steps in the descending series of divisions (30,6-17). Although it is tempting to suppose an error in the archetype, the facts that the omission recurs at 22,27, and that 32,3 makes prime / not-prime an alternative division to equal / odd, suggest mere carelessness on B.'s part. Cf. on *aut*¹ ... *multitudinem*, 42,8.

22,26. intellectus. Generally, a clear and precise mental conception (cf. 42,21; *B. on Signification and Mind* 107-15); here, a grasp of what the negated thing is as opposed to wondering about all the things it is not. B. does not explain how the removal of *x* is really any clearer than the specification of everything except *x*, but it is evidently a problem of focusing the hearer's attention. If we commence the division of animal with not-rational, the listener will be left to ponder endless possibilities: is two-footed, mortal, winged, or some other division intended? But if we begin with rational, he will be in a position to search for the coordinate member. That will not change the fact that irrational is indefinite and embraces a multiplicity of species, but there will at least be a positive point of reference for classifying things on one side of the division. In fact some negative terms, as B. learns from Porphyry (*In Perih.* II 159,6-18), create no difficulty at all, since they signify contrariety, e.g. *non sanus* = *aeger*, or *homo non albus* = *homo niger*. At *In Perih.* II 28,28-29,10 B. distinguishes between the sensory (imaginative) faculties and *intellectus* by the metaphor of painting: the former lay down sketches to which the latter adds color (cf. Pl., *Pol.* 277b7-c3; Ammon., *In Isag.* 55,2-7); *intellectus* furnishes a kind of explanation or clarification, as in a definition (cf. *B. on Signification and Mind* 135-37, on *explicare*, with *In Cic. top.* 1062a9; 1088c15; 1091d1f.; Cic., *Brut.* XLI 152).

22,28-30. exemplo uel definitione. Cf. 30,18. Negated terms are indefinite (ἀόριστον, *infinitum*, Arist., *Peri H.* 16a32 [*AL* II 1, p. 6,16]). **docueris.** Fut. perf. indic., with *intelleget* (cf. on *abstulerit*, 14,4). **Sin uero e contrario.** Here *sin uero* forms an opposition to *cum* and *e contrario* signals the contrast in procedure. On related constructions, cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* II 13; III 11; Dienelt, “Untersuchungen” II 45f. **feceris.** Cf. above, on *docueris*. **aut neutra subito aut tardius utraque.** Either immediate failure to comprehend what the negated terms leaves for consideration and thus coming up empty-handed, or grasping both by the round-about process of discovering the positive from the negative term, then removing it (inferring “prime” from “not-prime,” then removing “prime”).

22,30f. propter apertissimam. Pozzi and Stump translate (emphasis added), “si revela a causa della chiarissima natura del genere,” and, “is sought after in order to reveal a genus as much as possible.” Stump errs in that it is not the purpose of division to reveal the nature of the dividendum (cf. on *sumamus ... sumendae*, 18,17f.); even in the case of the subalterna the genus is “revealed” only *qua* species of a higher genus. Pozzi, on the other hand, misses the mark with the superlative adj.: the genus is by nature wide open, an indeterminate potency; it is for diaeresis to reduce the possibilities and reveal the specific nature. **ad intelligibilia deducere.** The negative term controverts the purpose of diaeresis, for it obfuscates matters by introducing an indeterminate dividens. Although *intelligibilia* could signify either species, which are more intelligible ἡμῖν, or genera, which are more intelligible φύσει (*In Isag.* II 157,17-158,2; Arist., *Cat.* 2b8; 15a4f.; *An. post.* 72b26-30; *Top.* 141b3-14/29-34; 149a18; *Met.* 1029b3-12), only the former suits this context (see on the preceding lemma). The metaphor latent in *deducere* suggests the spinning of wool (Coleman on Verg., *Ecl.* VI 5). Cf *In Isag.* II 259,3-5: *neque enim hoc solum differentiae faciunt, ut genera partiantur, uerum etiam dum genera diuidunt, species in quas genera deducuntur efficiunt*; II 288,1-4; *In Cic. top.* 1107a3-9: *Sed quoniam similitum intelligentia est omnis notio, in rebus uero similibus necessaria est differentiarum discretio, idcirco indiget adhuc notio quadam enodatione ac diuisione; uelut ipse intellectus animalis sibi ipse non sufficit, nam mox animus ad aliquod animal ... deducitur inquirendum*; 1069c12-14; 1098d3; 1105d1f.; 1106c2f.; 1115a8f.; 1164b6-8; Victor., *Def.* 14,2f. S.: *aut speciebus aut partibus ad cognitionem rei ... notionemque deducimur*.

22,31-24,7. Amplius ... diuisio. (a) That which is prior generally should be prior in division; but affirmation is prior to negation; affirmation should therefore be prior in division. (b) The definite is prior to the indefinite (and should be prior in division); but an affirmative term is definite and a negative one indefinite; the affirmative term ought therefore to be prior (in division). **prior affirmatio ... posterior negatio.** As species of *enuntiatio* neither one is prior, although in *prolatione* affirmation is prior to negation (*In Perih.* II 16,20-18,21; II 98,14-99,21; cf. *In Cat.* 181b2-7; Arist., *Peri H.* 17a8f.; *An. post.* 86b27-30). **primum.** Implying *secundum* rather than *posterius* (for dichotomic diaeresis, cf. 24,26f.). **semper.** This is for the general principle, which is here applied to diaeresis. **fixumque mutabili.** The *et fixum instabili et* of *FG* is probably an attempt to create two neatly interlocking pairs ("Text" 29f.). Cf. Cic., *Acad.* II 9,27 (with Reid ad loc.): *stabile fixum ratum.* **aut ... parte ... aut affirmatione ... aut nomen ... aut ... negatio.** Cf. on 22,24. **definita parte orationis.** I.e. a *simplex nomen* (22,16/24). **particula negatiua.** In fact two of the four pairs just instanced involve privative terms, while the others consist of positive ones. B. is about to point out that privation is a kind of negation (24,10f./20-22). **quare ... diuisio.** The first member of diaeresis should be a positive ("affirmative") term. [*Sed ... exposui*]. See lxiiif., and on 6,10-16.

IV. C. 1. b. 24,8-27: Privation

Privation resembles contradiction in that it negates a positive disposition or state of possession. But there is a difference in that whereas every positive term can be negated, privation depends upon the possibility of possession. Privation is in fact a form or positive disposition and in that sense does more than simply remove or negate. It is a suitable mode of opposition for diaeresis, and as with contradiction so also here the positive term, indicating possession, is to be placed first. If the opposite term is not a simple name but entails a privative prefix, it must come second.

B. pursues the discussion of this mode of opposition in light of what he has just said about contradiction, and his purpose in putting the two modes in immediate succession may be to establish a bridge leading to the exposition of contrariety. For privation, Aristotle holds, is both a kind of negation (*Met.* 1055b3f.) and that in reference to

which contrariety is predicated (1055a33-36; cf. 1055b11-14; 1063b17f.). B. echoes the first view at 24,10f. and intimates the second at 20,21-24 and 24,29-26,2 (although at 26,5f. and 28,19-21 he reduces most differentiae to contraries). Cf. Pozzi, *Studi* 31f. Again, at *In Perih.* II 469,5-22 B. explains that privation and contradiction overlap in cases of unmediated opposition but diverge when the opposed terms are mediated, while at *In Cat.* 269b2-c7 he points out that, as with contrariety, opposite terms signifying privation and possession are always predicated in respect of one and the same subject (e.g. sight / blindness in respect of the eyes, as black / white in respect of body).

In general the exposition of this mode of opposition is compressed almost to the point of incomprehensibility, and B. merely leaves his advanced readers to fill in the gaps or find the unitive thread. His concern evidently is to articulate two points of *similarity*: (a) 24,10f.: Privation is a form of negation. (b) 24,20-27: Hence in division it ought to follow the term of possession (cf. 22,23-24,6). But also two points of *contrast*: (c) 24,11-13: Whereas any term can be negated, privation exists only where there is the possibility of possession. (d) 24,14-19: Whereas negation is mere removal and not strictly suited to diaeresis (cf. 22,14f.), privation is a positive disposition or form (and therefore a divisive differentia). Things would have been clearer had (b) not been postponed. Cf. in general, Arist., *Cat.* 12a26-13a36, with B., *In Cat.* 269b2-277c7; *Met.* 1022b22-1023a25; 1055a33-b29.

24,8-10. Haec ... uero. Cf. *Hyp. syll.* III 10,3: *Ac de his quidem ... haec dicta sunt, hi uero*, etc. **ipsa quoque.** Otiose (no other mode of opposition has been likened to contradiction).

24,10-13. quodammodo. Cf. Arist., *Met.* 1055b3f. (ἡ δὲ στέρησις ἀντίφασίς τίς ἐστιν); Cherniss, *ACPA* 269, n. 177. **quod.** Cf. on 10,34. **quidem.** = μέν concessive, answered by *uero*. **tunc quando.** Cf. Arist., *Cat.* 12a29-31 (*AL* I 1, p. 32,16f.); *Met.* 1022b27f.: τότε ... ὅταν ... ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν = *tunc ... quando ... quando natum est habere*. **nos iam Praedicamenta docuerunt.** = Arist., *Cat.* 12a26-34 + B., *In Cat.* 269b2-270b10. See above, xxvii and xxix. Although at 4,8 B. transliterates the title of Aristotle's treatise, both here and at 26,4 he uses the Lat. He has in mind his commentary as well as Aristotle. Cf. *Hyp. syll.* I 7,7: *de quarum natura diligentius persecuti sumus in his uoluminibus quae secundae editionis expositionum in Aristotelis περὶ ἑρμηνείας inscripsimus*; *In Perih.* II 172,9f.: *ut nos Praedicamentorum liber edocuit*; II 489,10f.: *hoc enim nos, si bene meminimus, Praedicamenta docuerunt*.

24,14-19. forma quaedam. The absence of one form amounts to the substrate's being differently or oppositely determined, and the privation is itself a difference or form (16,13f.): Arist., *Phys.* 193b19f. (cf. below, 24,19): καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις εἰδός πῶς ἐστίν; *Met.* 1019b6f.; 1032b3f.; B., *In Cat.* 270d12-14: *Quod si distat is, qui habet, eo ipso quod est habitum habere, distat et is, qui priuatur, eo quod est priuari*; Cherniss, *ACPP* 76, n. 307; *ACPA* 90; 269-71. **disponit**^{1,2} ... **quasi dispositus et affectus.** At *Top.* 148a3-9 and *An. post.* 79b23f. Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of ignorance (vs. the ἔξις that is knowledge, *Cat.* 8b29; 11a33f.): κατ' ἀπόφασιν and κατὰ διάθεσιν, the absence of knowledge (negative state) and error (positive state, cf. Cherniss, *ACPA* 26), which is probably akin to the legal distinction between not-guilty and innocent. B. uses both *dispositio* and *affectio* to render διάθεσις (e.g. *AL* I 1, pp. 17,27/18,10 [Arist., *Cat.* 6a32/b2f.]); often the notion of πάθος (*passio*) is nearby (cf. Arist., *Phys.* 193a25f.; *Gen. et corr.* 327b16; *De an.* 417b12-16; B. on *Signification and Mind* 106f.). **solum.** This is guaranteed by *non enim tantum*, 24,14. I suspect that *K* and *A Q* independently selected between readings (one of them possibly the remedy for an omission) in a common witness. That seems substantiated by the split between *F* and *C E*. **lumine ... luce.** Evidently = ὄψις (ordinarily *uisus*, e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 32,23 [Arist., *Cat.* 12a36]). Cf. *CPh.* III m11,3: *intimi lucem uisus*; V m2,2: *puro clarum lumine* [in two senses] *Phoebum*; V m3,9: *oppressi luminis igne*; Pliny, *Ep.* IV 22,5: *luminibus orbatus ... mala caecitatis*. **quodammodo quasi.** Possibly flagging translations from Grk. (cf. Reid on *quasi heredem*, Cic., *Acad.* I 4,17; also above, on *quadam ... quodammodo*, 12,1f.). Alternatively, it may be a way of accommodating the awkwardness of speaking of deprivation as a positive disposition (cf. *quasi si*, 22,13). **Physicis.** Cf. above, on *forma quaedam*; also, xxx; Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 237.

24,19f. Vnde ... utamur. Whereas negation merely removes and ought therefore to play no role in diaeresis (22,7-15), privation posits a form or differentia and as such is suited to division of a genus. Particularly striking given the fact that B. is just about to expose a second similarity between privation and negation is his failure to point out that Aristotle does not spare privative terms from the charges laid against negated ones: (a) that they signify only what the dividendum (potentially) and dividens (actually) are not; (b) that there is only incidental difference in the non-existent (*Part. an.* 642b22f.;

Phys. 191b13-16). Yet all incidental difference has been ruled out (18,11-13; cf. on IV.C.1.a. 22,6-24,6).

24,20-25. sicut in contradictione. Cf. 22,23-24,6. **negationi.** *Sc. consimilis est. uocabulo.* I.e. a *simplex nomen* (cf. 22,16/24). At *In Cic. top.* 1121c5-d1 B. notes Cicero's view that positive terms such as *caecus*, which the Peripatetics regard as privative, signify contrariety. Hence, as a Peripatetic he is careful here to specify both methods of signifying privation. Plato remarks (*Pol.* 262c10-263a1) the fallacy of thinking that a mere name will solve the problem of what is essentially an indeterminate class, e.g. that "barbarian" will give meaningful definition to non-Hellenic; Aristotle for his part attacks the theory of ideas with the argument that they lead to ideas of negations or heterogeneous classes, as e.g. not-horse leads to both line and man (Cherniss, *ACPA* 262-65). With these fundamental problems B. is unconcerned. At 22,23-31 he gave instructions on the use of definitions and examples as a way around the problem of negated terms, and at 28,20-24 he will say that a mental conception of the privative term is informed by imagining the significate in its contrary or positive determination. **particula priuationis.** The privative prefix, as opposed to the negative particle (24,5). At *In Perih.* II 382,20-383,4 B. implies that the difference between them comes down only to convention, e.g. *contingens* takes *non* but *possibile* becomes *impossibile*. Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1121b11-c5; *Simpl., In Cat.* 396,3-27, with Ebbesen, *Commentators* I 205, n. 9; *Arist., Met.* 1022b32f. **aequum et inaequale.** It is unnecessary to insist upon *aequale*, and *inaequum* = *iniquum*. Cf. 24,2; 26,27-28,2.

IV. C. 1. c. 24,28-28,8: Contrariety

It is not always obvious whether contrariety is not in fact predicated in respect of privation (e.g. the contraries black and white, where each is a privation of the other), but for now we shall treat them as distinct modes of opposition. Since almost all differentiae reduce to contrariety, much of division arises in connection with contraries; but contrariety is either mediated or unmediated, and divisions reflect this fact as well. Now definitions would always consist of two terms were it not for the fact that many things are nameless. Consider the definition of man. We use the formula "rational animal" because the proximate genus of man is nameless; but substitute the letter a for the formula, combine it with the specific differentia, mortal, and the definition will be in two terms. Division too will

involve two terms (be dichotomous) if we supply names where they are missing, as e.g. with "equal" and "unequal," which replace formulae that make a trichotomic division of triangle.

This section touches on a matter of special interest, the difference between dichotomy and trichotomy. B. does not explain that the two problems treated from 26,8 on are essentially unrelated, for constructing definitions from two terms is not the same as reducing trichotomic to dichotomic diaereses, and the burden of nameless species is not the same in each case. Three problems: (a) In reducing a trichotomy to a dichotomy it in fact makes no difference whether we divide by named species or by formulaic differentiae, since what is at stake is rather the method of grouping things. B. apparently means that any *division* in which the species (subalternate genera) have proper designators can be converted to a *definition* in only two terms by combining a species with a further differentia. *But:* the division need not be dichotomic. (b) Mediated contrariety does not *ipso facto* amount to trichotomy (there is not just one color between black and white), although the juxtaposition of the two ideas here creates the impression that B. is trying to forge a necessary link between them. (c) B. blunders in articulating the species of triangle. He ought to have said that triangles are either equal or unequal, and then gone on to specify either: that if *equal*, then so in either two (isosceles) or three (equilateral) sides; or that if *unequal*, then so in either one (isosceles) or three (scalene) sides.

Again, Aristotle's criticism of dichotomic diaeresis stems from his conviction that it inevitably breaks up homogeneous classes and forces heterogeneous ones into union (*Part. an.* 642b5-643a24; cf. on IV.C.1.a. 22,6-24,6). Most of the divisions transmitted under his name are trichotomic, and Littig, as was noted earlier (see li, n. 45, and on *hominem ... corpore*, 8,11f.), sought evidence for Andronicus' continuation of the Peripatetic tradition in the trichotomic diaereses employed in *Div.* But the fact is that B. purposefully avoids trichotomic divisions and here recommends a method of reducing them to dichotomic ones. So there is some likelihood that this passage, in which dichotomic diaeresis—which Porphyry would inevitably have considered in his *Soph. prolegomena*—is given preference, is indebted to Porphyry rather than to Andronicus (Pozzi's comparison [*Trattato* 15; cf. Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 83f.] of Cic., *Fin.* II 9,26, is not quite to the point). In any event, although at 8,7 B. concedes the possibility of


division into more than two species, he employs only three trichotomic diaereses of genera (*color*, 8,5f.; 22,20f.; 26,7f.; *triangula*, 26,26f.; 32,4-6; *res omnes*, 28,3f.), two of them just so as to illustrate the method of reduction. The remaining instances involve other tropes of division (8,10f./18-22; 10,2f.; 38,26f.; 40,19f.), where B. may well take a different view of the matter, although it should be pointed out that with one of them the opportunity is taken to effect just such a reduction as is recommended in the present passage (40,21-23 = 38,26f.). I do not believe, therefore, that we have here discernible traces of an "Andronican" passage: (a) Evidence for Andronicus' preference for trichotomy is at best slim, while of the two trichotomies in 26,26-28,6 one is Euclidean and the other in some sense Stoic; in any case, both are introduced only so as to be disposed of. (b) Boethius himself favors dichotomy and is plainly following Porphyry at least in his handling of differentiae, where what was originally trichotomic is reduced to a dichotomy (cf. on IV.B. 18,4-20,19). (c) To infer Andronicus' view of trichotomy from *Div.* would be question-begging even if B. took a more favorable view of the matter, for the extent of Andronicus' influence is the very thing at issue.

Finally, although B. has twice indicated that a genus (dividendum) stands as matter to the differentiae and species (14,6; 16,13), he does not connect that doctrine with what is here said about contrarily opposed differentiae. Yet that ought to have formed some part of the discussion. Cf. *In Cat.* 198d6-202a11; *In Perih.* II 238,3-22; *CEut.* VI 20-33; VI 49-52. For Aristotle's lost *Περὶ ἐναντίων*, cf. Ross, ed. *Arist. fr.* 105-10; Gigon, ed. *Arist. fr.* 335a9-336a5; 724a1-729a2; 731a38-732b47; Guariglia, *Untersuchungen* 5-46.

24,28-26,5. Ac de ... quidem. Cf. 48,12. **an secundum priuationem et habitum esse uideatur.** Cf. *Arist., Met.* 1055a33-b15; 1063b17f. **ut album ... albi.** See on *media*, 8,6. **sed hoc alias, nunc autem.** Cf. on *quamquam ... alias*, 20,21-24. **tamquam si.** A favorite form of expression, more frequent than the *quasi si* of 22,13. Cf. *In Isag.* II 337,19; *In Perih.* I 41,2-6; II 36,1, etc.; II 458,25-459,2: *sex motus species esse manifestum est, sicut in Praedicamentorum libro Aristoteles digessit, quamquam hoc in Physicis permutauerit. sed nunc ita ponamus tamquam si omnino sex sint.* **aliud oppositionis genus.** A distinct class of opposition. ***Praedicamentis.*** = *Arist., Cat.* 12b26-13a36. Cf. on 24,13. **multa diuisio.** In the division of genera most differentiae come down to a matter of contrariety. Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1109b8-cl (quoted below, on *nominibus positis ... semper*, 26,23f.). B. may have taken his

cue here from the *Cat.*, where Aristotle is at pains to explain that relation (11b32-38) and privation (12b26-13a36) are not the same as contrariety—as though *that* were the fundamental mode of opposition (cf. also ch. 11).

26,6-8. medio ... mediata. The complete scheme is laid out at *In Cat.* 267a10-269a12 (Arist., *Cat.* 11b38-12a25):



In the final split *propriis nominibus carentia* means division by negation of the extremes. Neither Aristotle nor B. restricts discussion to contraries with only one intermediate term: many species of color have proper names (*Cat.* 12a18-22; *In Cat.* 267d2-268a8), and there is nothing to prevent two or more intermediates being designated by formulae (e.g. blue-grey, yellow-green). **neutra.** Cf. on *media*, 8,6; more generally, *In Perih.* I 209,20-210,8; II 148,17-31.

26,8-10. omnis definitio omnisque diuisio. Anticipating the two stages of discussion to follow. Cf. 16,6-24. **praedicatis.** Differentiae are predicated of the species they define, not of the genus they divide (*In Isag.* II 287,21-288,1; II 298,15; II 299,10-16). **ut supra iam dictum est.** = 16,15-21 (concerning only definition; nor is the reference to 22,15-23).

26,12-23. enim. Otiose. rationabilia ... rationale.¹ See on 8,3f. **contendit.** What I reported at "Text" 30 has been more clearly defined. I note nearly the reverse pattern of error at Manil. V 1 (*finisset, finis sed*). *Contendere* can render συντείνειν (e.g. *AL* V 1, p. 16,22 [Arist., *Top.* 104b1]; cf. Burnet on Pl., *Euthph.* 12a6), and it amounts to *conari* (e.g. *In Perih.* II 172,18 = II 174,22). **ponamus.** Cf.

on *positum*, 22,21. **a litteram**. Although Aristotle thinks of formulae such as ζῶον ἡμερον as being unities (*An. post.* 96b33), he insists that names be used if possible (cf. *An. pr.* 49b5). **totā**. Although this could amount to *omnis* (16,17; Bednarz, *De syntaxi* II 2), B. intends it literally (hence the *semper* just before, answering to *in omnibus*). Cf. 16,21 (*integra*); 16,24 (*una*).

26,23-25. nominibus positīs ... semper. Cf. on *positum*, 22,21. In itself the imposition of names neither necessitates nor presupposes dichotomic diaeresis, for there are named species without dichotomy (cf. on *nec albi nec nigri*, 22,21) and dichotomy without named species (28,1f.). B's insistence on this point is strange, for even Plato, who uses dichotomy throughout the *Soph.* (222b2; 223c6/9; 225a4; 229b2, etc.), is prepared to abandon it if necessary (*Pol.* 287c3-5; Cherniss, *ACPA* 55; 252; Talamanca, "Schema" 23, with n. 100). And B. himself knows that division by three or more properly named species is possible (if undesirable): 8,6f.: *aut in duas fieri partes aut in plures*; *In Cat.* 267d2-5 (268a5-8): *Potest nanque inesse medietas, ut in colore, quoniam album atque nigrum contrarietatis uice diuersa sunt, habent autem medium, quod est rubrum uel pallidum*; *In Cic. top.* 1109b8-c1: *Nam quia semper in contrarium diuiduntur aut duae sunt semper species generis aut tres, et tunc tres cum ea tertia ... ex contrariorum permixtione perficitur, ut si colorem diuidamus dicendum est ita: coloris aliud est album aliud nigrum aliud medium. Id [Orelli-Baiter] medium ex albi coloris ac nigri commixtione coniunctum est, quamuis in quamlibet aliam coloris speciem transferatur, seu purpurei seu rubri seu uiridis. quoniam*. Cf. on *quod*, 10,34. **generi et differentiae**. Cf. on *speciebus et differentiis*, 28,7. **cum deest ipse nomen imponat**. Cf. Ammon., *In Isag.* 93,19: ὅταν δὲ αὐτοὶ ὀνόματα θῶσιν; and on *positum*, 22,21.

26,26-28,2. figurarum quae sunt trilaterae. The simple term *triangulorum* (32,4f.) would have been more to the point, since triangle is itself a species (*In Cat.* 250d9-14; Porph., *Isag.* 4,4; Anon., *Divis. arist.* §[64]). (?) B.'s Lat. translation of Euclid, *El.* I Def. 20f. (τῶν τριπλεύρων σχημάτων, τρίγωνον) employs both *triangulum* and *trilaterarum figurarum* (181,32-35; cf. 115,41-116,44). **aequilaterae**. The adj. translates ἰσοπλευρὸς already in Mart. Cap. (VI 712). **aequales ... inaequales**.² Note that the subdivision of the latter retains formulae. At *Inst. ar.* II 25,8 B. uses *gradatum* for scalene. Cf. (?) his Lat. of Euclid, *El.* I Def. 20 (181,32-34; also, 115,41-43): *Aequilaterum igitur triangulum est quod tribus aequis lateribus clauditur, isosceles uero quod duo tantummodo latera habet aequalia, scalenon uero quod tria latera inaequalia*

possidebit. B. does not explain how to find the pair of terms to replace the trichotomy. In the present instance it was necessary to divine that one species of triangle is characterized by complete equality as to length of sides. Hence it is not merely a problem of imposing names but of discovering a division to which there is some inherent necessity (cf. Pl., *Pol.* 262c10-263a1; Arist., *Cat.* 13b36f.). At 30,29-32,7, where it is argued that a single genus may be divided in more than one way, B. again skirts the issue of what constitutes a natural and necessary class. On the doctrine that dichotomy diminishes the number but augments the extension, cf. *Inst. ar.* I 4,2. **duo latera tantum aequa**. In the case of the trichotomy there is perhaps no difficulty, but here having *equal* sides is not a strict differentia of unequal. But B. follows Euclid, *El.* I Def. 20: ἰσοσκελὲς δὲ τὸ τὰς δύο μόνας ἴσας ἔχον πλευράς. Cf. Ammon., *In Isag.* 51,1-6.

28,3-7. indifferentia. Aristotle holds that of evil sometimes good and sometimes another evil is the contrary, and that since the intermediate term between good and evil is nameless it must be designated by negation of the extremes (*Cat.* 12a22-25; 14a1-6; *Top.* 123b27-30; cf. Pl., *Grg.* 467e4-468a4, with Mutschmann on *Divis. arist.* 24 [55]). Here *indifferens* (= ἀδιάφορον) is a Stoic echo (*In Cat.* 268b7-15; *Simpl.*, *In Cat.* 386,26; 410,29f.; 412,1-3; DL VII 104; Sext. Emp., *AM* XI 3f.; XI 11-16; XI 59). DL VII 61 makes not-good the genus of evil and indifferent. **diuisio omnis**. Cf. on *nominibus positus ... semper*, 26,23f. **speciebus et differentiis**. Note the difference to 26,25 ("species" for "genus"). This is the more accurate formulation (cf. 16,6-15; 28,30-30,6).

IV. C. 1. d. 28,9-16: Relation

Relation entails no substantial difference but has rather the effect of inextricably linking things together. It is for this reason that genera are not divided into correlatives. And, a correlative is never a species.

Aristotle's exposition of relation in the *Cat.* (6a36-8b24; 11b24-31; cf. *Met.* 1020b26-1021b11) is commented on at length by B. (*In Cat.* 216d10-238d14; 265b14-d8), and the doctrine comes up for consideration again at *Trin.* Vf. Here, however, we have only the most schematic account, in which two points are put across. Relation is a

form of opposition such that two things are (incidentally) *linked*, i.e. each is the correlate of the other; difference, on the other hand, is an essential *separation* of things. (a) Hence the “horizontal” consideration: coordinate species (cf. *in relatiuas partes*) are not linked to but independent of one another in that they actualize the potency of the genus in different ways. (b) And, the “vertical:” correlatives are not species under a genus. Apparently B.’s intention is to show that correlatives are neither differentiae nor species (cf. on *enim*), and that since only differentiae and species divide a genus (16,6f.; 28,7; 28,25-30,6; 50,2), relation therefore has no part in diaeresis. It is probably worth pointing out that B.’s remarks reflect nothing of the little that is known about Andronicus’ doctrine of relation (ap. Simpl., *In Cat.* 144,7-14; 151,5-7; 202,2-5; 203,2-5; cf. Tarán, rev. of Moraux 741f.).

28,9-16. diximus. = 20,27. **secundum ad aliquid.** Cf. on *secundum relationem*, 20,27. **dominus seruus, duplex medium, sensibile sensus.** Three examples taken from Aristotle (*Cat.* 6b29-36), father-son coming from *In Cat.* (e.g. 219d10f.). The latter can be traced back at least to Boethos (ap. Simpl., *In Cat.* 373,29). **nullam ... substantialem differentiam.** Why, B. does not explain. But cf. *In Cat.* 217a5-b10; *Trin.* V 11-16: *At in domino, si seruum auferas, perit uocabulum quo dominus uocabatur; sed non accidit seruus domino ut albedo albo, sed potestas quaedam qua seruus coercetur. Quae quoniam sublato deperit seruo, constat non eam per se domino accidere sed per seruorum quodam modo extrinsecus accessum; Inst. ar.* I 1,4: *Rursus multitudinis alia sunt per se, ut ... quilibet numerus qui ut sit nullo indiget, alia uero per se ipsa non constant, sed ad quiddam aliud referuntur, ut duplum, ut dimidium ... et quicquid tale est quod nisi relatum sit ad aliud ipsum esse non possit; Arist., Cat.* 8b15-18: τὴν δὲ γε κεφαλὴν καὶ τὴν χεῖρα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αἵ εἰσιν οὐσίαι αὐτὸ μὲν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ὠρισμένως ἐστὶν εἰδέναι, πρὸς ὃ δὲ λέγεται οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. **a se ... ad se inuicem ... sine se.** Reciprocals (cf. LHS II §103b). This would seem unremarkable were it not for the Loeb translation of *CEut.* praef. 56/59, where the Eutychian and Nestorian “errors” are made out to be self-contradictory rather than mutually opposed (cf. V 2-20). B. clarifies with *inuicem* (cf. *CPh.* III 10,33; III 11,5; Bednarz, *De syntaxi* II 4). **esse non possint.** Cf. Arist., *Cat.* 7b1-9. **ergo.** Only things substantially differentiated divide a genus; but correlatives are not substantially differentiated; therefore correlatives do not divide a genus. **partes.** Cf. on *aut*¹ ... *plures*, 8,6f. **neque ... nec.** Cf. on 8,7f. **enim.** This is unexpected, for it is one thing to

show that correlatives are not differentiae, another to show that they are not species. **hominis species**. Quite apart from the fact that man is not a genus (8,14f.), master is not a species.

IV. C. 2. 28,17-24: Which divide(s) the genus?

Contradictory differentiae sometimes, but correlatives never, divide a genus; with privatives and contraries there is no impediment to diaeresis. Differentiae are opposed above all by contrariety, but also by privation, which posits something contrary to a positive state of possession, as the infinite to the finite; for the infinite is a form, our conception of which is informed by the contrary state.

B. gives final consideration to what he has already hinted at, at 20,21-24 and 24,29-26,2. Fundamental to Aristotle's philosophy is the conviction that matter (genus, 14,6; 16,13) is the potentiality for receiving determinations (differentiae) the actuality of any one of which implies the *privation* or potential presence of its *contrary*. And in division just as the contrarily opposed differentiae are forms (14,6f.; 16,13f.), so the privative terms signify forms as well (24,14-18). B. has two purposes here, to bring the discussion back around to differentiae, and to reinforce the claim that virtually all division of genera is by contrarily opposed differentiae (26,4-6).

28,17-20. Cum igitur. Resumptive, the discussion of the four classes of opposition being an excursus. Cf. 38,28; 44,13. **differentiae.** As opposed to *oppositiones* (20,17f./20; 22,6; 24,8/28). **si non.** = *nisi*, possibly under the influence of εἰ μὴ (cf. LHS II §367). **necesse.** Cf. 22,22. **reicienda.** Cf. 18,18. **sumendae.** Cf. on 18,17f. **Maxime.** Cf. on *multa diuisio*, 26,5; *In Perih.* I 214,20-24: *maxime ponenda est contrarietas ... ex quibus generationes oriuntur ... generationes autem ex oppositis.* **nec non etiam.** The pleonasm occurs in B.'s writings at least nine times (cf. *Inst. ar.* II 43,6; *Inst. mus.* I 1 (179,27); *In Cat.* 293c5f.; 294a5; *In Perih.* I 34,11; I 58,2; II 80,7; II 86,2). It may be a late Lat. or vulgar symptom. Cf. more generally, Engelbrecht, "Consolatio" 21f.; Petr., *Sat.* 72,7 (*nec non ... quoque*); Cass., *Var.* IX 21,5 (*nec non et*).

28,21-24. contra ... contrarium. Pleonastic. Cf. on *multa diuisio*, 26,5, and *quamquam ... alias*, 20,21-24. **uidetur.** Cf. 26,1. **appondere.** The *opp-* of *E* is an obvious banalization (cf. 30,24). **infinitum.**¹

Since privation is for Aristotle a kind of contradiction (*Met.* 1055b3f.), it too posits something (cf. 22,15-23; 24,9-11/24f.; 42,5-19). B., on the other hand, is focusing here on the reduction of privation to contrariety. **contrarii imaginatione.** Cf. Arist., *Phys.* 192a14-16: ἡ δ' ἑτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναντιώσεως πολλάκις ἂν φαντασθείη τῷ πρὸς τὸ κακοποιὸν αὐτῆς ἀτενίζοντι τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδ' εἶναι τὸ παράπαν. But B.'s point here is that the privative is given content by the positive term (Arist., *Top.* 147b4-12). On imagination as a thinking faculty, cf. *B. on Signification and Mind* 103-13. **formatur.** Cf. on 12,22. **quaedam ... forma.** Cf. on 24,14.

IV. D. 28,25-32,15: Final considerations

B. has still four problems to consider before leaving the technicalities of genus / species diaeresis for the rules according to which species are defined: (a) He takes first the question of division by differentiae (as opposed to species), for which he has previously laid the ground-work. (b) He then considers the question of the extension of the dividendum and combined dividendia. (c) Next comes the problem of the multiplicity of divisions of which a single genus is susceptible. (d) There remains finally the question of why there are at least two species under every genus. Problems (b) through (d) are related, albeit rather remotely. The underlying rationale for their placement here appears to be as follows: the genus always encompasses a multiplicity of species (d), which multiplicity, however constituted (c), exhausts the full potency of the genus (b). The whole section creates the impression of tying up loose ends, and (d), at least, fulfills an earlier promise (32,12 = 8,8f.).

IV. D. 1. 28,25-30,21: Differentiae vs. species

28,25-30,21. *If division is by definition the distribution of a genus among its proximate species, is there division into differentiae? Now division is indeed into "proximate" species in the sense that genera are ranked in a determinate series. If (and only if) the species or subalternate genera are nameless, then the division is into differentiae, as follows. We select the highest ranked genus and divide it into its proper differentiae, thus constituting a second genus which is then divided in*


precisely the same way as the first. We do not skip the intermediate stage and divide the first genus by the secondary differentiae, but proceed stepwise. Whether dividing by species or differentiae, however, we should at each stage furnish definitions or examples of the dividenda.

The passage is marred by an interrupted train of thought which, once resumed, does not obviously cohere with its point of departure. The incoherence may stem from B.'s failure to make sense of Porphyry, or Porphyry himself may be at the root of the problem. The difficulty is *atque ideo*, 28,30f.: Do the words introduce a phrase the point of which is to explain the claim (a) that division is into proximate species (*Oportet ... disgregationem*) or (b) that division into species is in some cases impossible (*sed hoc ... nomina*)? The phrase at issue, which extends from *quoniam quaedam* to *quaedam media*, in fact explains neither, although it is thematically connected with the first of the two claims above. It is difficult in any case to conceive of the point that genera stand in a fixed hierarchy as explaining the impossibility of division into species, especially since for *that* B. specifies the cause: *multis enim speciebus non sunt nomina*. We are obliged therefore to take *quoniam quaedam ... quaedam media* as explanatory of *Oportet ... disgregationem* and to regard *sed hoc ... nomina* as a parenthesis the thread of whose thought is not picked up again until *Quare antiquior* (30,4).

How, then, do we connect the ideas that division is into proximate species and that genera stand in a fixed hierarchy? It is necessary to understand that B. introduces the general problem of division into differentiae as though it were a kind of puzzle: "differentia" does not appear in the formal definition of diaeresis, yet it is evident that we sometimes divide into differentiae. Now division is indeed by proximate stages, in that genera are ranked in such a way that directly under each one stands something which functions as a species (cf. *species ... collocamus*, 16,1) and is in turn the genus of something lower—and some of those species (genera) are in fact differentiae (cf. 16,11; 34,7f.). That is, B. is really explaining why the notion "proximate" should form part of the definition of diaeresis (cf. 30,6-17). Still, the question motivating the whole discussion was whether we do not sometimes divide into differentiae (28,25f.), and that thought is resumed only by two phrases (28,29f.; 30,4-6) interspersed in the discussion of ranked genera and proximate species (a problem not immediately relevant to the species / differentiae difference). So we have a cento of alternating ideas loosely stitched together:

- (a) 28,25-29, *Dignum ... disgregationem*: Is there division into differentiae if “differentia” forms no part of the definition of diaeresis but (“proximate”) “species” does?
- (b) 28,29f., *sed hoc ... nomina*: Nameless species do not divide a genus (but differentiae do).
- (a') 28,30-30,4, *atque ideo ... est*: “Proximate” appears in the definition of diaeresis because there is a natural hierarchy among subalternate genera, the lower levels of which are in fact species, *proximate species*, in relation to those directly above. (The highest genera, on the other hand, are in no sense species, just as the lowest species are in no sense genera.)
- (b') 30,4f., *Quare ... nomen*: We divide, if possible, into named species.
- (a'') 30,5f., *quod si ... separare*: If species are nameless, we divide into differentiae.

The “Porphyrian tree” may help to explain the bewildering interplay of themes here (Porph., *Isag.* 4,21-25 [*AL* I 6, p. 9,19-22]; B., *In Isag.* I 70,18-71,1; II 208,9-209,6; cf. *CEut.* II 13-37; Maioli, *Porfirio* 110-12, n. 10):



In this hierarchic taxonomy *substantia* is a highest genus and a species of nothing else; *corpus* and *animal* are subalternate genera (species);

homo is a lowest species and a genus of nothing else (cf. 8,14f.); *corpus animatum* and *animal rationale*, on the other hand, are cases of division into differentiae, where formulae take the place of proper names (cf. 16,10-12; 26,12-21). Division only into *species* would disrupt the continuity twice, leaping from *corpus* to *animal* and from *animal* to *homo*, and that is a mistake against which B. specifically cautions (30,6-8; cf. *In Isag.* II 145,5-8; Arist., *An. post.* 96b35-97a6).

That is how the themes of division into differentiae and of the hierarchy of genera appear to interlock in B.'s mind. Assuming that this interpretation is correct, it is understandable that at 30,8-14, the injunction against missing out steps, B. does not follow up on *differentiae corporis ... animalis* (both being genera of nameless species, i.e. of differentiae), but instances instead the jump from *substantia* to *animata* / *inanimata* (30,12), where a genus proper (*corpus*) is overstepped.

28,26-28. definitio ... distributio. Cf. DL VII 61: Διαίρεσις δέ ἐστὶ γένους ἢ εἰς τὰ προσεχῆ εἶδη τομή; Sext. Emp., *AM* XI 15: διαίρεσις γένους ἐστὶ τομή εἰς τὰ προσεχῆ εἶδη; Alcin., *Didasc.* 5: Διαίρεσις μὲν τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν γένους εἰς εἶδη τομή. But also Ammon., *In Isag.* 9,29f.: ἔστι μὲν οὖν διαίρεσις ἢ κατὰ πρῶτην ἐπιβολὴν τομή τοῦ πράγματος (= Olymp., *In Cat.* 85,1f.; Elias, *Prol.* 25,30f.; David, *Prol.* 55,8f., etc.; cf. on II. 6,17-10,27). B.'s definition echoes Diogenes and Sextus, while Alcinoos' omits *προσεχῆ*, which for B.'s purposes is important. Particularly striking is B.'s disregard for the fact that his definition isolates only one of the six modes of diaeresis (albeit the one he regards as being of primary significance; cf. on II.C. 10,1-27). The commentators, on the other hand, give a broader definition, but one that would not have suited here. **proximas.** Possibly a Porphyrian echo (cf. *AL* I 6, p. 13,4 [Porph., *Isag.* 7,3]), although the passages quoted above from Diogenes and Sextus show that the terminology antedates Porphyry. Aristotle appears not to have made a technical term of *προσεχής*, and elsewhere in *Div.* B. himself gives preference to *proprius*, -a, -um. Cf. on *in suas differentias*, 30,7. **secundum definitionem.** Sc. *diuisionis*.

28,28-30,1. semper ... interdum. Cf. on *cum*, 22,16. The hyperbole of the first word (attenuated by the second) underscores the generality of the definition. The idea is that practice does not always accord with theory. Cf. *necessitas, non natura*, 22,23. **hoc.** Sc. division into species. **quam supra reddidimus causam.** = 16,6-16. **atque ideo, quoniam.** Looking back past the parenthesis, to adduce

grounds or an explanation for the claim that division is into proximate species. Cf. Pozzi, *Trattato* 71: “il genere si divide preferibilmente nelle specie e Boezio giustifica questa preferenza per la naturale successione che troviamo negli universali.” (Stump’s parenthesis ignores the words under consideration.) Cf. *In Perih.* II 430,22; *FCath.* 187 (*hoc autem ideo, quia*). **ultimum ut animal.** The intermediate, *animatum corpus* (*Isag.* 4,23 [*AL* I 6, p. 9,20]), is unmentioned because it is a differentia. Cf., however, *In Isag.* II 145,6-8: *ut ne substantiae mox animal dicamus esse speciem potius quam corpus, aut corporis hominem potius quam animatum corpus*. For Aristotle, substance and animal are genera (*Top.* 143a32f.), as is body (Cherniss, *ACPA* 22). **medium.** Cf. Porph., *Isag.* 7,15: τὰ μέσα καὶ ὑπόλληλα, i.e. the *subalterna*, vs. the γενικώτατον (which is only a genus) or εἰδικώτατον (which is only a species: *Isag.* 5,17-23; cf. on *genus* ... *praedicatur*, 14,29f.; B., *In Cat.* 177d6-178a2). For some reason B. avoids *subalternus*, -a, -um in *Div.* (cf. *AL* I 6, p. 13,16f.; V 1, p. 26,16f. [*Arist.*, *Top.* 107b22]).

30,2-4. super substantiam. B. has in mind the doctrine that neither being nor unity is a genus: *In Isag.* II 221,18-222,11; *In Cat.* 166a5f.; 180c2f.; 181c8-10; *Arist.*, *An. post.* 92b14; *Top.* 127a26-34; *Met.* 998b22-27; 1045b6; 1053b16-24. In fact, he holds that *esse* is convertible with *unum* (*CEut.* IV 37-39) and stands above all things as the *sumum bonum*—but not as a genus (*Hebd.* 149f.; cf. *CPh.* III 11,5-13; Maioli, *Teoria* 14). (He considers astral divinities in relation to the “Porphyrian tree,” at *In Isag.* II 208,19-209,3; cf. II 184,20-22; II 257,2-7; II 259,19-21). Cf. 32,23-34,2. **inueniri.** See on 32,25. **sub animal.** Although *animal rationale* stands between *animal* and *homo* on the “Porphyrian tree” (*Isag.* 4,23 [*AL* I 6, p. 9,20f.]), it, like *corpus animatum* (see on *ultimum ut animal*, above), is here passed over as being a differentia, not a genus. **homo ... species, non genus.** Just as there is no genus above the *generalissima genera*, so there are no species below the *infimae species* (cf. 8,14f.; Porph., *Isag.* 5,1-3). The latter point is somewhat irrelevant in that B. is here talking about genera. But he is trying to show that the series of genera (species) is strictly ordered and finite (cf. *Arist.*, *An. post.* 83b1-8). **antiquior.** “Preferable” or “having priority” (in that the risk of omitting intermediate steps is thereby reduced). Cf. *Inst. ar.* I 1,11; I 23,1; *Inst. mus.* II 5 (230,23); *In Isag.* II 268,12; II 276,11; *In Cic. top.* 1040d8; *CPh.* III 10,9; V 6,11.

30,4-8. speciei diuisio. The gen. indicates the origin, not the object, of division. Cf. 32,15. **si non.** Cf. on *capilli ... turbati*, 18,7f. **his non abundamus.** Cf. Pl., *Soph.* 267d8: τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνάγκη μὴ σφόδρα εὐπορεῖν (the ancient indolence in diaeresis). **usque ad ultima.** Cf. Porph., *Isag.* 6,13-15: διὸ ἄχρι τῶν εἰδικωτάτων ἀπὸ τῶν γενικωτάτων κατιόντας παρεκελεύετο ὁ Πλάτων παύεσθαι, κατιέναι δὲ διὰ τῶν διὰ μέσου διαιροῦντας ταῖς εἰδοποιοῖς διαφοραῖς. **primum genus.** Cf. τὸ πρῶτον (λεγόμενον γένος), Arist., *An. post.* 91b30; 96b30; *Met.* 1037b29f. **in suas differentias.** Cf. 28,27 and 30,11 (*proximas, proprias*); also, Arist., *Met.* 1038a9-15; Alcin., *Didasc.* 5 (προσεχεῖς); Ammon., *In Isag.* 35,5 (οἰκείας). The procedure is the same whether we divide by proximate species or differentiae: no step is to be missed out. Although Aristotle grants that diaeresis may assist toward obtaining the correct order of terms (*An. post.* 96b25-32), his criticism is precisely that it cannot guarantee that steps will not be omitted (91b26f.). This is for him a serious complaint, since he insists on seeing Platonic diaeresis as a failed method of demonstration. **rursus.** Cf. Pl., *Pol.* 282c5/10 (Ἀϋθις ... πάλιν ... αὖ).

30,11-18. fecerit. Cf. on *abstulerit*, 14,4. **si quis uero sic.** The same ellipsis of *dicat* (and handling of mood) at *In Perih.* II 317,15f. **hic.** Pron. rather than adv., since the second *si quis* implies a new subj. **disgregauit.** Emendation to *-au<er>it* is unnecessary. **manifestum est.** Cf. on *aequum*, 6,3. **secundum posterioris generis.** Sc. *differentiam*. Cf. *In Cat.* 165b10f.: *illa enim secundum hominis nomen, ista secundum animalis est reddita.* **aut¹ ... aut.²** = *uel ... uel* (cf. on 18,20f.). **definitiones aut exempla.** Cf. 22,28; *Diff. top.* II 12,1: *Expeditis igitur locis et diligenter tam definitione quam exemplorum luce patefactis.* A definition, of course, presupposes division (cf. on 16,21-18,3).

IV. D. 2. 30,22-28: The convertibility of divisions

Division is like a term in that it must neither exceed nor fall short (in extension): the totality of the dividenda must convert with the dividendum. Terms convert as follows: "virtue is the best mental disposition," and "the best mental disposition is virtue." Likewise, in division: "every genus will be one of the things that are (its) species," and "each species is (its) proper genus."

B. is dealing with two considerations at once, and his method of blending them is confusing. Above all, his intention is to point out that a genus (dividendum) is perfectly coextensive with the totality of its species (dividentia): there is no generic potency unactualized by one or more of the species, and there are no essential specific characteristics beyond those of the generic potency. As Abelard, Albert, and Pozzi (*Trattato* 73f.) imply in their comments, this is the problem of determining that the dividentia in fact exhaust without outstripping the potency of the dividendum. *Every* animal is either rational or irrational, and at this level of division *everything*, rational or irrational, is an animal. Pozzi observes that the criterion for convertibility is that the totality of individuals of which the genus is predicable be the same as the totality of individuals of which the combined species under that genus are predicable.

More problematically, B. raises the question of the conversion of terms, which, as Abelard and Albert remark, means the convertibility of definition and definiendum. Pozzi rightly points out that the two kinds of conversion (term, division) are not really the same, as B. would have them appear to be. For *qua* matter a genus is only a *part* of the species (14,6; 16,13; 40,15f.) and its definition (38,14f.), but in division it is a *whole* the parts of which are species (38,13; cf. on III.B. 12,17-14,20). And a whole is coextensive not with any one of its parts, but with the conglomeration of them. Hence genus and species are convertible only in the sense that the totality of species (dividentia) is coextensive with the potency of the genus (dividendum), so that the characteristics of the combined species are predicable of the genus and it of them.

B. ignores what lies just beneath the surface here, viz. the idea that every division understood in the sense of a genus (dividendum) plus final differentia is convertible with a species (definiendum, dividens). That is acknowledged at 34,2-15 and 36,32-34. Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1054c1-3; 1059b6-9; 1093d3-1094a1.

30,22. sicut terminum. B. employs *terminus* as a translation of ὅρος (e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 13,26 [Arist., *Cat.* 4b26]; *AL* III 1, p. 6,10 [Arist., *An. pr.* 24b16]; *AL* V 1, p. 9,6 [Arist., *Top.* 101b33]). And since the Grk. can signify a definition (Arist., *Top.* 101b39; Porph., *Isag.* 20,23; cf. B., *In Cat.* 167b9) or a propositional term (Arist., *An. pr.* 24b16-18; cf. B., *In Perih.* I 77,6-13; *Intr. cat. syll.* 797a10-15; *Diff. top.* I 4,13-19; *In Cic. top.* 1050a1-13; *Hyp. syll.* I 5,3, with Obertello on I 5,25f.), the Lat. serves both purposes as well (cf. Arist., *Soph. el.* 169a8 [*AL* VI 1,

p. 17,17, ὅρος = *definitio*]; more generally, Einarson, "Terms" II 156-58). Every predicate is either greater than or coextensive with its subject (*In Perih.* I 91,10f.; Porph., *Isag.* 7,4-6); if the latter, then it is a definition or property, both of which convert (*In Isag.* II 153,20-24; II 196,18-197,12; II 309,10-15; *In Cat.* 165a7-b1; Arist., *Top.* 103b9f.; cf. *An. post.* 91a15f.). The definition is an essential, and the property an incidental, predicate (*Diff. top.* I 5,23f.). —The convertibility of descriptions and correlatives (*In Cat.* 222d2-8; cf. *In Cic. top.* 1093d9; Elias, *In Isag.* 90,17-28) is ignored here; B. is comparing division and definition, both of which preclude the incidental. What he does not point out is that the convertible definition is just the completed division in another guise (16,22-24).

30,22-25. neque diminutam ... neque superfluum. "The whole truth, and nothing but the truth," as we might say. B. may be translating οὔτε ἐλλιπὴ ... οὔτε περιττὴν. Cf. *AL* I 6, p. 8,16 (Porph., *Isag.* 3,20); *Diff. top.* III 1,3; Plezia, *De Andr. stud.* 10 (note διαίρησιν!). **neque³ ... nec.** Cf. on 8,7f. **apponi.** The coordinate species that divide a genus are set "alongside" or "against" one another (cf. 28,21). **conuertatur. Conuertitur.** *Conuersio* = ἀντιστροφή (e.g. *AL* III 1, p. 8,8 [Arist., *An. pr.* 25a40]; *AL* V 1, p. 76,11 [Arist., *Top.* 125a8]; cf. *AL* I 6, p. 13,5 [Porph., *Isag.* 7,4]). Simple conversion, Alexander explains (*In An. pr.* 29,23-27), is the interchange of subj. and pred. with the propositional determinant maintained. Cf. *Antepr.* 769d5f.: *cum in una propositione quod praedicatur in altera subiectum est; 785c3-7: Conuerti autem uel sibi uel aliis propositiones dicuntur quotiens mutato ordine terminorum, id est quod subiectum fuerat praedicato et quod praedicabatur ante subiecto, ueritatem simul obtinent uel falsitatem; Intr. cat. syll. 804a10-b4: simplex conuersio est ut si dicas, "omnis homo risibile" et conuertas, "omne risibile homo." Sed in illis terminorum tantum commutatio conuersionem facit, in quibus neque praedicat^a tum subiecto neque subiectum praedicato abundat, in hac enim propositione quae dicit, "omnis homo risibile," "homo" subiectum "risibile" praedicatum aequam uim habet et ideo conuerti potest, ut si "risibile" subiectum et "homo" praedicatum et dicatur, "omne risibile homo;" DeRijk, "Chronology" 33-37. On the question of actual word order, cf. *In Perih.* II 264,26-265,7; II 344,5-345,7; II 396,24-397,12, etc.*

30,25-28. uirtus est.^{1,2} As Pozzi observes (*Trattato* 74), the point would be clearer had B. written *omnis uirtus* in the first instance and *omnis habitus mentis optimus* in the second. Cf. [Alex. Aphr.], *Quaest.* IV 8 (128,19): ἡ πάσης λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἕξις ἀρίστη. [Alexander] is in-

quiring whether virtue is a genus, whole, or equivocal, from which Moraux inferred a common source in Andronicus (*Aristotelismus* I 126, n. 37). Moraux failed to note, however, that the passage in question stems from a later redactor and therefore cannot pass as *pre-Porphyrrian* evidence, sc. for Andronicus' lost treatise (cf. above, xlv, n. 28; lv, n. 62). In any case, the definition is commonplace and reflects Aristotle's own thought: *Top.* 121b38; 144a9-19; *EN* 1103a9f.; 1106a11-24; 1139a16; (?) *Arist.*, *EE* 1218b38; 1219a32f.; [Pl.], *Def.* 411d1; Cherniss, *ACPA* 18. On virtue as a species of *habitus*, cf. 14,13f.; *In Cat.* 220c12-14; 242c1-3; 281c4f.; *Diff. top.* II 7,10. **omne genus aliquid eorum erit quae sunt species.** A genus is the potentiality or matter (14,6; 16,13) actualized in its *own* species, not those of another genus, and once actualized as this or that species it is only potentially the others (animal *qua* man is only potentially horse). Hence the fut. *erit. quaelibet species proprium genus est.* Every species ("any one you wish," for the genus may be actualized in more than one way) is substantially the same as its proximate genus (14,12f.; 16,4f.).

IV. D. 3. 30,29-32,7: Multiple divisions of the genus


Genera are divisible in more than one way, just as corporeal and geometrical magnitudes are. For just as a circle is divisible into semicircles and sectors, and a square into triangles, rectangles, and squares, so too a genus. For example, number is divisible as both equal / odd and prime / not-prime, and triangles according to both length of side and degree of interior angles.

B. touches on one of the most difficult problems besetting the whole method of diaeresis: how to find among the various possibilities the point(s) at which division is possible or necessary. Ignorance of this, Plato warns, reduces the dialectician to "hacking like a clumsy butcher" (*Phdr.* 265e1-3; cf. *Pol.* 262c10-263a1); and, he maintains, it is important to know not only how to separate things but how to combine them (*Soph.* 227a10-b2; cf. B., *CPh.* V m4,18f.). Given a known class (genus), we must ask in how many ways it is susceptible of division. B. will go on in the next section to the issue of what constitutes a class or genus over a multiplicity of species.

At *In Isag.* II 249,12-14 B. writes: *nam si omnis diuisio differentiis distribuitur, quorum multae sunt differentiae, multas etiam diuisiones esse necesse*


est; at *Diff. top.* III 1,1f. he points out (with the same examples as here) that one and the same thing, because of its multiplicity of differentiae, is divisible in numerous ways; and at *In Cat.* 202d11-203a4 he gives as another example of the same idea three different divisions of *animal*: (a) *rationale / irrationale*; (b) *gressibile / non gressibile*; (c) *carnibus / herbis / seminibus uescentia*. Such multiplicity of divisions is in part what leads Aristotle to attack Speusippus at *Part. an.* 643a1-5: How can sanguineous or bipedal be a differentia common to birds and human beings, species *divided* under a common genus? Sanguineous could not be the same in man as in bird; or, it could not be an essential differentia, since the species differ in essence. The multiplicity of divisions—sanguineous, footed, etc.—will produce overlapping in some instances, while in others the differentiae will be further differentiated (biped, quadruped, etc.) and cease to be unities, making it impossible to account for the various species. But this is evidently none of B.’s concern. Cf. Talamanca, “Schema” 101-03.

30,30-32. quaecumque. = *omnium quae*. **Sicut.** This is necessitated by *ita quoque* (32,2) and is probably an emendation (in C) to an error in the archetype (“Text” 17). **circulum in semicirculos.** Cf. Eucl., *El.* I Deff. 17f. (Lat. 179,23-27). **tomeas.** E attempts to inscribe the word in Grk. characters (cf. on *amphiboliam* ... *amphibola*, 8,28-30). Pozzi prints *τομεῖς* (*Trattato* 76; *τομεῖς*, 120!), but the transliterated Grk. acc. is perfectly defensible (“Text” 22). B. has in mind a sector (Eucl., *El.* III Def. 10 [Lat. 187,82f.]). Hence Pozzi’s illustration, *ibid.* 76, n. 2, is incorrect (cf. *τμήμα / portio*, Eucl., *El.* III Def. 6 [Lat. 187,75f.]). The dividientia may be illustrated thus:



nos diuisiones possumus dicere. The asyndeton results in a mild anacoluthon (cf. 8,28f.), although there is no need to emend: *In Isag.* I 9,24f.: *necessarius ... fructus est artis eius quam Graeci λογικήν (nos rationalem possumus dicere), quod*, etc.; I 42,14-16: *horum ... quos Graeci ὑπογραφικοὺς λόγους dicunt (Latini subscriptiuas rationes dicere possunt) reddemus*; *Intr. cat. syll.* 793c6f.: *per ea quae illi προλεγόμενα uocant (nos praedicta uel praedicenda possumus dicere) ad*, etc.; *In Perih.* II 112,12f.: *quam*

categoricam Graeci dicunt (nos praedicatiuam interpretari possumus) semper, etc.; II 147,8f.: *quas categoricas Graeci uocant (nos praedicatiuas dicere possumus) quattuor, etc.;* Cic., *Acad.* I 8,30: *hanc illi ἰδέαν appellabant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere;* Jer., *Ep.* CXXXIII 1,2: *illi enim, quae Graeci appellant πάθη (nos perturbationes possumus dicere) ... adserunt extirpari posse de mentibus, etc.* Cf. "Text" 21f. **tetragonum**. Although the Grk. τετράγωνος (-ov) could signify either a rectangle or square (LSJ, q.v.; Pl., *Mn.* 82b9; Hicks on Arist., *De an.* 414b19-415a13), the context here demands the latter. Otherwise there is no point to the immediately following lines, wherein three *distinct* diuidentia are envisioned:




Why B. avoids the more precise *quadratum* is unclear. Cf. Eucl., *El.* I Def. 22 (Lat. 181,39f.): τετράγωνον μὲν ἔστιν, ὃ ἰσοπλευρόν τε ἔστι καὶ ὀρθογώνιον = *quadratum uocatur quod est aequilaterum atque rectiangelum*; B., *In Cat.* 231b2f. (258a10-12): *Quadratum ergo est quod aequalibus lateribus omnes quattuor angulos aequos habet, id est rectos*; *Inst. ar.* II 25,5: *Omnis enim tetragonus una quidem superficies est quattuor angulorum totidemque laterum.*

30,32-32,2. ducto. This may be yet another instance of emendation to the archetype. Whether *J* influenced the corrector of *F* or vice versa is uncertain (they may have divined the reading independently). Cf. *In Cat.* 231b7-9: *nam sicut, manente quadrato, linea per obliquum ducta, triangula figura producitur*; *Inst. ar.* II 6,2; II 18,1. **parallelogrammata.** Note the declension, vs. Eucl., *El.* II Def. 1 (Lat. 185,61): Πᾶν παραλληλόγραμμον = *Omne parallelogrammum*. **ita quoque genus.** Although plane surfaces or geometrical magnitudes fall, in one sense, under the category of quantity (Arist., *Cat.* 4b24; B., *In Cat.* 202c2f.; 209c9f.), the constitutive differentia of a square or triangle comes under the genus quality (Arist., *Cat.* 10a14f.; B., *In Cat.* 250d8-14). So whereas triangles (etc.) are in fact *species* (cf. 32,4-6; 26,26-28,2), the basis for comparison here is the fact that a triangle is also a potential *part*, e.g. of a square (cf. Arist., *De an.* 414b29-31). The appeal is to

common experience: mentally carving up plane figures requires only an intuitive grasp of the concept of species of geometrical shape (cf. *Pl.*, *Mn.* 82b9-85b7; *Rep.* 510d5-511a1); but with number or *per se* multitude (*Inst. ar.* I 1,4), where mental diagrams are of no use, the problem of genera and species is perforce dealt with more abstractly. I disagree with Pozzi's contention (*Trattato* 76f., n. 4) that the method in this passage is inductive. B. is following his usual pattern of laying down a general rule (*Fit ... diuisio*, 30,29) with examples (*ita quoque ... obtusum*, 32,2-6), the only peculiarity being the analogy (*ut omnium ... separamus*, 30,29-32,2).

32,2-6. numerorum ... non primi. As was pointed out in connection with 22,25, prime / not-prime ought to be a subdivision of odd (cf. *Arist.*, *An. post.* 73b18-22; *Top.* 120b4). But although *rursus* often has subordinating force (cf. on 30,8; also, 34,7-11), its purpose here is to coordinate the first and second divisions (cf. 32,5; 20,1; *In Cat.* 202d13f.; *Diff. top.* III 1,2 [*nunc uero*]; III 6,16). Another division of number would be *qua* multitude, which is either *per se* or *ad aliquid* (*Inst. ar.* I 1,4; *Inst. mus.* II 4 [229,2-5]). **triangulorum¹ ... lateribus.** Cf. on 26,26-28,2. **totis.** Evidently either for *omnibus* (cf. on 26,23) or transferred (note the interlocking word order, with *totae*, 26,27). Cf. *Diff. top.* III 6,15: *aliae ... totis inaequalibus lateribus iunctae*. **triangulorum² ... obtusum.** Cf. (?) B.'s version of *Eucl.*, *El.* I Def. 21 (181,35-38): *Amplius trilaterarum figurarum orthogonium, id est rectiangulum, quidem triangulum est quod habet angulum rectum; amblygonium uero, quod est obtusiangulum, in quo obtusus angulus fuerit; oxygonium uero, id est acutiangulum, in quo tres anguli sunt acuti.* The two methods of division reflect successive definitions in Euclid (*El.* I Deff. 20f.); at *Diff. top.* III 6,15-17 B. combines them as follows:



(which is curiously reminiscent of the inversion ruled out, at 10,18-22, for all but accident / accidents divisions). For some reason he twice misses the acute-scalene species; but be that as it may, it is essential that there be no confusion of the four ways of dividing:

triangles may be divided in respect of (a) the degree of the interior angles or (b) the pattern in length of sides; or, (c) those of a certain kind of interior angle may be divided according to length of sides, just as (d) those of a certain disposition as to length of sides may be divided in respect of the interior angles. But we do not say (e.g.) that triangles are either isosceles or obtuse. This is, in essence, the problem of properly opposed differentiae, which B. has discussed at 20,13-19 and to which he will return at 48,16-21.

IV. D. 4. 32,8-15: The genus as a collection of species

A genus is a kind of similitude underlying all its species and represents the substantial element in which they all converge. But since species are informed by differentiae, there are no fewer than two of them under any given genus.

Species are unified by a common genus but separated by differentiae: *qua* animal man and horse are the same; *qua* rational they differ. Since no species is distinct from itself in respect of essential differentiae, it follows that there are at least two species under every genus.

32,8-15. quoniam. Cf. on *quod*, 10,34. **una ... similitudo.** Cf. Porph., *Isag.* 2,11: καθ' ὁμοιότητα; B., *In Isag.* II 228,20-23: *similitudo uero nihil est aliud nisi quaedam unitas qualitatis. ergo substantialem similitudinem indiuiduorum species colligere manifestum est, substantialem uero similitudinem specierum genera contrahunt et ad se ipsa reducant*; *In Cic. top.* 1089a2-5: *Genus uero est quod cuiuslibet uniuersaliter substantiam monstrat et quod multorum specie diuersorum substantialis est similitudo*; 1106d4-10: *Nam cum homo atque equus differant rationabilitate atque irrationabilitate, horum intellecta similitudo efficit genus, nam similitudo equi et hominis substantialis in eo est quod uterque substantia est uterque animatus uterque sensibilis, quae iuncta efficiunt animal, est animal namque substantia animata sensibilis*; *CEut.* IV 106-09, etc. **quodammodo.** Cf. on 12,1f. **substantialem conuenientiam.** The *quid* or generic matter (16,2f./13). **collectium.** Probably = συλληπτικόν (cf. *AL* I 6, p. 12,20f. [Porph., *Isag.* 6,23]). Cf. Them., *In De an.* 3,32f.: τὸ μὲν γὰρ γένος ἐννόημά ἐστιν ἀνυπόστατον ἐξ ἀμυδρᾶς τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ὁμοιότητος κεφαλαιούμενον. **ut dictum est.** For the doctrine that differentiae inform species, see 18,12f. (cf. 12,22; 14,6f.; 16,13f.); for the doctrine that two or more species divide a genus, see 8,6-9. **speciebus.** Intrusive (cf. 8,8). **et speciei.** Cf. on 30,4; Gal., *Plac.* IX 9,44: τῆς τῶν γενῶν τε καὶ

διαφορῶν καὶ εἰδῶν διαίρέσεως. **perplura**. Often in B., but only here in *Div*.

IV. E. 32,16-36,34: Definition of the species

Having taken leave of the division of genera, B. turns to the related problem of the definition of species, which in fact has been at the back of his mind all along (cf. 16,22-24, and on IV. 14,27-38,16).

IV. E. 1. 32,16-34,15: General precepts

Through division of a genus is made possible definition of a species; for definition, however, it is necessary to know not only how to select differentiae but the general method. As to the questions of whether a definition can be demonstrated and how it can be discovered through demonstration, one must consult Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Here only the basic rules will be considered: (a) Because things are ranked such that there is definition of neither the highest genera (which lack higher ones) nor individuals (which are specifically undifferentiated), only the intermediates are definable. (b) First, find the proximate genus and its differentiae. Select the differentia and see whether it plus the genus is coextensive with the definiendum. (c) If together they exceed the extension of the definiendum, then, treating the selected differentia as a new genus, find its differentiae and select again. Continue in this way until you find a combination that is coextensive with the definiendum. (d) Combine the successive differentiae with the primary genus.

The utility of diaeresis lies in the fact that it leads to definition. But since definition is often more than merely combining a genus with a single essential differentia (for many genera are nameless, and it may be necessary to employ the nearest *named* genus plus several differentiae), there remains the question of how to formulate a definition from a genus and a multiplicity of differentiae. (a) We must determine whether the definiendum is really that, for if it is either a highest genus or an individual it is indefinable. (b) We must find the genus and its divisive differentiae. (c) If the combination of genus plus differentia is not coextensive with the definiendum, we are then faced with the situation outlined at 16,6-21, 26,8-23, and 28,25-30,17: the genus is not the next highest, but the next highest *properly named*, entity. Hence the formula or definition will consist of more than two

terms, and it will be necessary to treat the intermediate differentiae as genera (species) between the first genus and definiendum. (d) With the final differentia we have found the definiendum or formula that equals it. It remains only to combine the ordered differentiae with the genus.

At *An. post.* II 5 (cf. II 7f.; *An. pr.* I 31) Aristotle gives reasons for denying that diaeresis amounts to demonstration—as though that were the intended purpose of Plato’s method (καὶ δείξει τῇ διαίρεσει, ὥς οἴεται, 92a2f.). As demonstration of definitions is not the subject of *Div.*, the point is let go with the reference to *An. post.*, although Aristotle’s treatise does in fact inform B.’s words here in a positive way. At I 22 Aristotle discusses the impossibility of an infinite series of essential predicates, which B. recasts in terms of the descending series of genera through which, by division, the definiendum is attained. Again, at II 13 (97a23-26) Aristotle sets out three fundamental rules of defining by division which are either understood or intimated by B.: that the selection be of essential predicates; that the predicates be properly ordered; that none be omitted. And although Aristotle at *Met.* 1038a18-30 (cf. *Part. an.* 643b34-36) speaks of the genus and final differentia as sufficient to reveal the specific nature, B. follows *An. post.* 96b30-97a6 in emphasizing instead the process of selecting and ordering successive differentiae as the safest means of avoiding the omission of essential predicates. (In this connection it may also be noted that at *In Perih.* II 393,12-20 [*SVF* II 201; *FDS* III 982; Baldassarri, *Logica* 194; 205, n. 5] he takes the Stoics to task for failing to observe the proper hierarchy of divisions and thus making *possibile* into both the genus and a species of *non necessarium*. Cf. *In Isag.* I 22,16-22 [with Cic., *Inv.* I 9,12]; Arist., *Top.* 142b11-19.)

Aristotle has much to say about definition (*Top.* VI f., *Met.* Z 12, etc.) and brings into consideration metaphysical concerns for which *Div.* has no room. B. himself treats of definition more generally in his commentary on Cicero’s *Top.* (e.g. 1098a13-1104d1) and at *In Cat.* 166a1-15. At *CEut.* II 18-28 he puts theory to practice with the unusual exercise of pursuing differentiae under *contrary* lines of division (corporeal / incorporeal) in order to reach a definition of *persona* that meets the requirements of both the human and divine. That here in *Div.* B. ignores definition through enumeration of the parts (cf. Arist., *De an.* 403b5f.; *Met.* 1043a15; Pl., *Tht.* 207a3-208c4; Cic., *Top.* V 28 [with B., 1094b9-1098a9]) is owing to the fact that he has in mind genus / species divisions, the only ones leading to definition

in the true sense (cf. *In Cic. top.* 1096d10f.; Arist., *Top.* 150a16-21/b22-26).

32,16-19. insistentibus uiam. Note the hint of the notion of "method" (*OLD*, q.v. *uia* 10; cf. *artem*, 32,19). **autem.** An adversative particle is required: the phrase is not explanatory, and the idea is that a grasp of divisive differentiae is necessary but insufficient (*non solum ... sed ... quoque*) for knowing how to formulate definitions. The archetype evidently read *enim. sumamus.* Harkening back to 18,17f. **ipsius quoque definitionis artem.** For definition and diaeresis are, despite being closely connected (16,22-24), distinct dialectical methods (*In Isag.* II 148,3f./15; Elias, *In Isag.* 37,9f.; David, *In Isag.* 88,8f.). **diligentissima.** Without the special nuance of 4,5 48,27, etc.

32,20-25. an ulla. The archetype may have run these words together, although there is no evidence of continuous script. **demonstrari ... per demonstrationem.** Cf. Arist., *An. post.* II 7f. (esp. 93b15-20). **analyticis.** Transliterated Grk., vs. Lat. *resolutorius* (e.g. *In Perih.* I 135,7; *Intr. cat. syll.* 816b2/c6f.; *Diff. top.* II 2,22). Although B.'s translation of the treatise has not survived, there is no reason to doubt that he completed one, perhaps a commentary as well (cf. *In Cic. top.* 1051b2f.; Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 250). **tamen.** A similar tachygraph, combined with the neighboring *solam*, made *tantum* an almost inevitable copying error here. **Rerum.** B. avoids *generum* because he intends to follow the descent down to the level of *infimae species* and individuals. Moreover, it is in keeping with the tone of the passage that the principle is stated in the most general way. Whereas at 28,31-30,4 he raised the same points with an eye to the division of proximate genera on the "Porphyrian tree," now he looks instead to the problem of *definition*. **enim.** Otiose. **superiora genera.** See on *super substantiam*, 30,2. Since definition requires both a genus and differentiae, and since the highest things have neither superordinate genera nor constitutive differentiae, there can be no definition at that level, only description (*In Isag.* I 42,9-43,4; II 180,20-22; *In Cat.* 170d9-11; 181c6-10; cf. on *definiendum*, 14,28f.). **inueniri.**² B. is fonder of saying that they cannot be found than that they do not exist: 30,2; *In Isag.* I 52,8f.; I 69,14-20; I 71,17, etc.; cf. Hor., *Serm.* I 1,107 (*consistere*).

32,26-34,2. quae sunt indiuidua. Beneath the atomic species there is division only into individuals, which, differing from one an-

other only accidentally, are describable but indefinable *qua* individuals. With some hesitation I have adopted *quae* over *ut*: *indiuuidua* is expegetetic of, almost a gloss on, *inferiores*, not an *example* thereof (as though individuals were just one of many kinds of lower reality). But *ut* ought to signal an example (cf. 8,10-25, etc.). On individuals, cf. on *singulos ... particulares*, 8,13; also, *Inst. ar.* II 4,9; *In Isag.* II 195,12-18 (with *In Perih.* II 137,3-18); *In Cat.* 174b3-c1. [***ipsa quoque***]. There is no point to the comparison implied by these words. B. has said that *res superiores* lack higher genera, not specific differentiae. Thus both *generalissima genera* and *indiuuidua* are indefinable, but for different reasons: individuals under a common species do in fact have constitutive or specific differentiae (18,13f.), but it is matter, not the differentiae, that individuates them and makes them indefinable. The words were interpolated in the archetype possibly owing to the *ipsae quoque* immediately following ("Text" 14f.). **sub definitionem cadere**. It is noteworthy that passages with the abl. come from Migne's *In Cat.* (183d10; 257c11; 288d11). Cf. *Inst. ar.* I 32,1; *Inst. mus.* IV 16; *In Isag.* II 143,16; *In Cat.* 161a5f.; 202b1f.; *In Perih.* II 61,10f.; II 260,9; *Diff. top.* II 3,19; *In Cic. top.* 1052b15f.; 1098d5; 1108d12.

34,2-6. Data ... suscepi. The process of narrowing down by division Plato likens to smelting, removing the impurities (*Pol.* 303d9-e5). **primo eius sumo genus**. Cf. *In Perih.* II 53,12f.: *uolens ... definire ... prius eius genus sumpsit*; Arist., *An. post.* 96b36f.: τὸ πρῶτον ληφθῆ γένος; *Met.* 998b5f.: ἀρχαὶ δὲ τὰ γένη τῶν ὁρισμῶν εἰσὶν; 1037b29f.: τὸ τε πρῶτον λεγόμενον γένος; Alcin., *Didasc.* 5: τὸ γένος λαβεῖν ... ἔπειτα; above, on *sumamus ... sumendae*, 18,17f.; and more generally, B., *In Isag.* I 40,17-41,1; *In Cat.* 165b1-d3; *In Cic. top.* 1113c5-15. In *Top.* IV Aristotle furnishes practical guidelines for locating genera. **illius generis differentias diuido**. = *id genus differentis diuido* (cf. Arist., *Top.* 143a36f. [*AL* V 1, p. 124,21f.]). B. does not explain how to find the first differentia of a genus (note *sumere*, 18,9-18; *In Cic. top.* 1048b12), but the idea is to look for that which is implied by but does not imply all the others (cf. Arist., *An. post.* 97a29f.). **aequalis**. Cf. Arist., *An. post.* 97a35-39; below, 36,32-34.

34,7-14. fuerit. Cf. on *abstulerit*, 14,4. **posueramus ... ponimus**. Another example of B.'s disregard for strict sequence of tenses. *Ponere* here (cf. 16,11) approximates *sumere* (cf. on 18,17f.). **aequauit**. Cf. on *disgregauit*, 30,13. **sin minus**. = *sin species minor fuerit* (34,6f.). **speculamur si ... sunt**. Despite the decision taken at 22,1 I have

retained the indic. here: There the *lectio difficilior* was in one sense the indic. *fit* (vs. subjv. *sit*), but in another *esse* (vs. *fieri*); here there is only the question of mood to decide. Moreover, revealing parallels with *si* + indic. in indir. questions are found at *In Isag.* I 5,1f. (cf. *sit*, I 4,18; I 5,3; *In Perih.* II 206,8) and I 14,8. Cf. Brandt, ed. *In Isag.* 385, col. 2; Bednarz, *De syntaxi* III 13; Dienelt, "Untersuchungen" I 99-102; LHS II §§294b/295II.e. **usque dum**. Cf. *usque ad*, 30,6; *AL* I 6, p. 12,9 (= ἄχρι, Porph., *Isag.* 6,13); Cic., *Top.* VI 29 (with B., 1100d4-1102a14): *Sic igitur ueteres praecipiunt: cum sumpseris ea quae sint ei rei quam definire uelis cum aliis communia, usque eo persequi, dum proprium efficiatur, quod nullam in aliam rem transferri possit.*


IV. E. 2. 34,16-36,34: Illustration

Let us take as an example the definiendum "name." We combine the genus, spoken sound, with all the essential differentiae: (a) significant; (b) by convention; (c) without tense; (d) whose parts are not significant in separation. At each stage we look to see whether the new differentia renders a formula that is coextensive with the definiendum. If it exceeds the definiendum, we continue dividing. Here the definiendum is reached with (d): everything that is a name comes under the formula, genus + (a)-(d), and everything that comes under the formula is a name.

It is interesting that B. (? Porphyry) should have chosen this example, since for Aristotle definition is primarily of substances (*Met.* 1031a7-14; Pozzi's referring to the genus *uox* as an idea [*Trattato* 5] confuses matters). The definition of man, which until now has served B.'s purposes, would have been more to the point (note *quodammodo*, 34,18), although it entails only two differentiae and would perhaps not have been as useful for purposes of illustration. Moraux's conclusion (*Aristotelismus* I 128), that since Andronicus athetized Aristotle's *Peri H.* (the source of the definition) B. must therefore be following Porphyry, is plausible. If B. is indeed cribbing from Porphyry here, then this passage may be seen as symptomatic of Porphyry's predilection for harmonizing Plato and Aristotle (Aristotelian doctrine instanced in prolegomena to Plato's *Soph.*). And Plato's decision at *Soph.* 218e2-5 (cf. *Pol.* 279a7-b5), to define the angler before going on to the sophist, has, as Plezia noted (*De Andr. stud.* 11), a certain procedural echo in the present passage, where the point is to bring clarity and ease to the subject (*clariorem ... notitiam*; cf. τὸ πρότερον ἐν

σμικροῖς καὶ ῥάοσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελετᾶν, *Soph.* 218d1)—which may indirectly signify Porphyrian influence as well (cf. also *Isag.* 1,9 [ἀπλουστερών]; 4,21 [σαφές]). It is possible, however, that B., who in four other places treats of the definition of *nomen*, has chosen this example for himself, and there is at least this difference between the *Soph.* and *Div.*, that whereas in the latter the illustration is of a previously articulated set of rules, in the former the method emerges from two applications, one simpler, the other more complex.

B., as mentioned, is well-acquainted with Aristotle's definition of ὄνομα, and it is therefore not surprising that his exposition here constitutes the clearest and least problematical piece of writing in all of *Div.* The definition is as follows (*Peri H.* 16a19f. [*AL* II 1, p. 6,4-6]; cf. *Poet.* 1457a10-12): "Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἥς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον = *Nomen ergo est uox significatiua secundum placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significatiua separata.* And the division by which it is attained:



Apart from terminological discrepancies (cf. Brandt, "Entstehungszeit" 246-48; DeRijk, "Chronology" 10f.), the definition accords with what is in the two *Peri H.* commentaries (I 46,3-48,7; II 53,1-58,16). In the twin monographs on the categorical syllogism, however, two further differentiae are added (*Antepr.* 764a13-765c9; *Intr. cat. syll.* 795c1-796b4): (a) *aliquid (de)finitum designans* (or, *finita*); (b) *cum "est" uerbo coniuncta faciens enuntiationem* (or, *recta*). In fact, these are ways of addressing the problems of indeterminate names and nominal inflections, which do not form part of Aristotle's definition proper but are discussed by him at *Peri H.* 16a30-b5. Now with the added differentiae B. acknowledges the variation on both Aristotle's formal definition and his own explanations thereof (764a10-b4; 795b13-c4). And given that his dialectical monographs undoubtedly owe something to Porphyry (813c6; 814c8; 829d13), it is tempting to speculate that Porphyry—in whose *Peri H.* commentary (which B. used: II 7,5-7) the added differentiae probably appeared in the course of elucidating 16a30-b5 (cf. B., II 62,21-65,27)—that Porphyry in his own monograph on the categorical syllogism (cf. B., *In Isag.* I 15,9f.; Porph., 3aT/4T [8,8f./11,21 S.]) reworked Aristotle's definition so as to bring 16a30-b5 under 16a19f. Which, however, would not explain why the added differentiae are unmentioned in *Div.* About all we can say is that in his tract on diaeresis Andronicus probably did not rehearse Aristotle's definition. Assuming that Porphyry did make use of it in his prolegomena to the *Soph.*, some explanation of the difference between *Div.* and the twin monographs on categorical syllogisms is wanting.

34,16-19. clariorem facient exempla. Cf. 8,1f.: *exempla ... eluceat; In Cic. top.* 1101c3f.: *clarius fiat exemplo. nobis propositum.* Identifying the task to be done (cf. Burnet on Pl., *Euthph.* 9d8). **definire uelimus.** A favorite idiom (e.g. *In Perih.* II 53,4/12f.; II 126,1; *In Cic. top.* 1102a7 [*Cic., Top.* VI 29]; cf. above, 26,16; Them., *In De an.* 5,13, etc.). **nominis.** Appositional or defining gen. **quodammodo species.** Another softening expression (cf. on 12,1f.; *In Perih.* II 32,6), here to highlight the fact that the definiendum stands to the things below it as an atomic species, i.e. that the differences separating individual *nomina* are incidental, not essential. In fact, *nomen* is one of the eight parts of *oratio*, or one of the two parts of an affirmation or negation, which are species of *enuntiatio*: *In Perih.* II 14,28-15,5; II 18,18-21; *Antepr.* 766a9-c13; *Intr. cat. syll.* 796c7-797a3. (Since every

species is a part, B. refers, at *Intr. cat. syll.* 797c5, to affirmation and negation as parts of *enuntiatio*.)

34,19f. Selection of the genus, *uox* = *In Perih.* I 46,4-7; II 53,12-29; *Antepr.* 762d6-763a1; *Intr. cat. syll.* 794d10-795a2. **Sumo.** Cf. on 18,17f.


34,20-24. Selection of the first differentia, *significatiua* = *In Perih.* I 46,7-10; II 53,29-54,14; *Antepr.* 763a1-8; *Intr. cat. syll.* 795a2-5. **et enim.** In *Div.* only here and, as a variant, at 40,26. The particle is here practically indistinguishable in sense from *enim* (loss of *anknüpfende Bedeutung*, cf. *CPh.* III 10,19; LHS II §277); it probably does not render καὶ γὰρ (cf. Levet, "Philologie" 11f.). **id est.** Here and at 36,4 B. pursues the *notitia clarior*.

34,24-36,5. Selection of the second differentia, *secundum positionem* = *In Perih.* I 46,10-47,7; II 54,14-56,21; II 58,28-61,3; *Antepr.* 763a8-b2; *Intr. cat. syll.* 795a5-12; Engels, "Origine" 87-102. **dolores ... animi passiones naturaliter ... interiectiones.** It is in connection with natural vocal emissions that B. explains Aristotle's phrase, τὰ (τῶν) ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, *Peri H.* 16a3f.: *In Perih.* II 31,19-32,5; *B. on Signification and Mind* 42; 118; cf. Arist., *Peri H.* 16a27-29; *De an.* 420b29-33; Ebbesen, *Commentators* I 180, n. 2. **Rursus.** See on *Distribuo iterum*, 36,7. **significatiuarum.** B.'s intention is to draw strictly ordered divisions of successive differentiae, and the whole point of this illustration is to produce clarity. He has just indicated that he will divide the previous differentia (emphasized with *ipsam*), and his procedure is consistent throughout the passage. We are therefore obliged to follow *C* (probably another emendation to the archetype, "Text" 17f.). **secundum positionem**^{1,2} ... **secundum placitum.** Cf. above, xxv, and on *positum*, 22,21. According to Engels, *placitum* underscores the *bon plaisir individuel* ("Origine" 109). Although I am not fully persuaded of his account of *In Perih.* I 36-47, I agree that B. uses one term to explain the other ("il essaie de le combiner, tant bien que mal, avec POSITIO, et souvent explique un terme par l'autre," *ibid.* 110). **id est.** Cf. on 34,23.

36,5-14. Selection of the third differentia, *sine tempore* = *In Perih.* I 47,7-16; II 56,21-57,12; *Antepr.* 763b2-6; *Intr. cat. syll.* 795a12-15. **mihi.** Ethical dat. **Distribuo iterum.** The lack of illative particles (cf. *Quocirca*, 36,19) here and after *Rursus*, 34,28, makes for slightly clumsy transitions, although emendation is unnecessary. **quidem ...**

uero. The particles do not cohere, since *uero* pits *nominum* against *uerborum*. **uerborum est consignificare tempora.** Cf. Arist., *Peri H.* 16b6 (*AL* II 1, p. 7,1): 'Ρῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον = *Verbum autem est quod consignificat tempus*. **restat.** Cf. on 14,21.

36,14-24. Selection of the fourth and final differentia, *cuius pars extra nihil significat* = *In Perih.* I 47,16-48,7; II 57,12-58,16; *Antepr.* 763b6-764a10; *Intr. cat. syll.* 795a15-b13. Cf. *B. on Signification and Mind* 119, with n. 119. **mihi.** Cf. on 36,5. **Socrates cum Platone et discipulis.** As *B.* points out at *Diff. top.* I 4,20, such expressions function as propositional terms or parts. **imperfecta.** The diaeresis is (*In Perih.* II 8,30-9,18; II 95,9-27; *Antepr.* 767b6-13; *Intr. cat. syll.* 797b12-c3):



tamen. On the position (unique here in *Div.*), cf. *In Perih.* II 88,27; Bednarz, *De ... colore* 11f. **pars extra nihil ... pars nihil extra.** Aristotle in fact specifies that no part of a name signifies independently (μηδὲν μέρος = *nulla pars*; cf. 36,25/31). On adverbial *extra*, cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* III 2f.

36,24-34. Rehearsal of the completed formula. **extra² ... separata.** The pleonasm recurs at 36,32 but, to my knowledge, nowhere else in *B.*'s writings. Cf. above, xxivf. **Videsne igitur.** Cf. *Inst. ar.* II 18,5; *Inst. mus.* II 16 (247,15); *In Perih.* II 345,23; II 400,26f.; II 461,1; *CPh.* II 7,9; IV 3,1; V 4,38. *B.* often omits *-ne* or *igitur*. **quam.** = *quomodo* (cf. *LHS* II §244b). **quod.**¹⁻⁴ Cf. on 10,34. **apposui.** Used here in a slightly different sense ("added") than at 28,21 and 30,24. **partes extra nihil ... partes aliquid.** Cf. on *pars extra nihil ... pars nihil extra*, 36,23f. **separatae extra.** Cf. on 36,25f. **fuerit.** Fut. perf. indic. (cf. *aptabitur*, and on *abstulerit*, 14,4). The sense of *aequalis* that has been operative throughout is at last given substance: *everything* that is a name falls under the definition, and *everything* under the definition is a name. Cf. Arist., *Top.* 139a31/b4/12; 149b22. **ratio definitionis.** Slightly redundant, but understandable given that *ratio substantiae* (e.g.

Arist., *Cat.* 1a2 [*AL* I 1, p. 5,4]) would not suit here (cf. on IV.E.2. 34,16-36,34, and *quodammodo species*, 34,18f). **aptabitur.** = *aptata erit* (cf. *fuert*, 36,33).

IV. F. 38,1-16: Transitional

In division the genus is a whole but in definition a part, for the genus (whole) is divided into species (parts) but is one of the constituents (parts) of the definition (whole). What holds of the genus is true in both respects of the differentiae as well.


The transition recalls 20,13-19, where in concluding B. anticipated the subject to follow. It emerges at last that genus / species diaeresis is also a whole / parts relation (cf. on III.B. 12,17-14,20). The points B. makes are intimated elsewhere in *Div.* and are in accord with Peripatetic doctrine: (a) The species is a (qualitative) *part* or division of the genus (whole): 12,17-24; 16,5f.; Arist., *Phys.* 210a17f.; *Met.* 1023b18f. (b) The genus (*qua* matter) is a *part* of the species and its definition: 14,6; 16,13; Arist., *Phys.* 210a18-20; *Met.* 1023b22-25; 1037b29f. (c) The differentia *contains* the species (is to it a whole): 18,20; 34,6-9; Porph., *Isag.* 13,23-14,3. (d) The differentia (*qua* form) is a *part* of the species and its definition: 14,6f.; 16,13f./23f.; Arist., *Met.* 1037b29f.; 1057b7; Porph., *Isag.* 12,3f. Cf. more generally, Arist., *Top.* VI 13f.; *Met.* Z 10; B., *In Isag.* II 215,16-216,2; *In Cat.* 172b13f.; *In Cic. top.* 1062a6-b10; 1093d3-9; 1096c13-15.

38,1-17. dicendum est, quod. The recitative *quod* (ὅτι) is comparatively infrequent in *Div.* Cf. Bednarz, *De syntaxi* III 7; McKinlay, "Tests" 125, with n. 1; LHS II §312 Zus. δ. **quasi quaedam ... quasi.** Cf. on *quadam ... quodammodo creatione*, 12,1f., and *quodammodo quasi*, 24,18; Bednarz, *De syntaxi* II 6. **in diuisione generis.** Sc. *quod est animal.* **genus cum aliis differentiis.** Although some differentiae function as genera (34,8; cf. 16,11), B. means the genus proper plus *all relevant* differentiae (34,11-13; cf. 30,4-6). **iunctum componit.** Cf. 8,14: *iungunt atque componunt*; 16,24: *iunctis ... componitur.* **et rursus rationabilium.** A hint of independence between *C E*, *F G*, and *A K Q*. Cf. above, lxxi; on *igitur*, 20,28; "Text" 33. **haec tria hominis.** The essential human elements. **unum hominem.** Cf. on *diuisionibus iunctis una ... definitio*, 16,23f. **partes in quas illae diuiduntur.** = (*differentiae totum*) *cuius partes sunt species in quas ipsae diuiduntur.* Still, the thought is awkwardly expressed in that it is only in the

case of nameless genera that differentiae are “divided.” Cf. 34,3f.: *illius generis differentias diuido*; 34,8: (*differentiam*) *quasi genus ponimus*. **Sed haec hactenus. Nunc.** Cf. on 6,16f.

V. 38,17-40,32: Whole / parts divisions

The discussion of “essential” wholes (cf. Albert 72,13-25), i.e. species whose definitions are from genera and differentiae as from parts, has prepared the way for discussion of wholes understood in other senses, and of course the focus remains the problem of division. The treatment is in three stages: (a) 38,17-27. As he did in the cases of “division” (6,17-10,27) and “opposition” (20,20-22,5, cf. *uocis diuisio*, 42,2), so B. begins by enumerating the different senses of the term under consideration, furnishing examples for each. (b)-(c) 38,28-40,17; 40,18-32. He then proceeds to form the exposition, not according to the four senses outlined in (a), but according to a broader division taken over from Aristotle’s *Cat.* (4b20), viz. wholes *qua* (b) continuous and (c) discrete. The reason for abandoning the fourfold classification of wholes in favor of the twofold appears to be that the latter provides broader scope for exploration of such considerations as comport with the introductory nature of *Div.* Hence the exposition springs from a fundamental dichotomy, and under the rubric of (b) continuous wholes B. implicitly traces the descent through four levels of division: heterogeneous parts; homogeneous parts; the elements; form and matter. Along the way he touches also upon the question of conceptual as opposed to actual separability of parts from a whole. Under the rubric of (c) discontinuous wholes, on the other hand, are subsumed universal and “potential” wholes, so that the initial classification is exhausted thus by the reformulation:



Although B. does not say so, this dichotomic reformulation evidently provides the structure for the whole section, and its result is the isolation of continuous wholes for more detailed consideration. Pozzi’s speaking (*Trattato* 13f.) of a threefold classification—quantity (continuous, discrete), universal, faculty—hits just wide of the mark.

**V. A. 38,17-27: Enumeration of the four senses of “whole,”
with examples**

With this mode of diaeresis the dividendum can be understood in four senses, i.e. that which is continuous, discontinuous, universal, or composed of faculties.

This classification does not stem directly from Aristotle (cf. *Met.* Δ 26), although it reflects his doctrine. From the two ensuing paragraphs it will emerge that B. is really working with a basic dichotomy derived from *Cat.* 4b20, continuous vs. discrete quanta (“wholes”), universal and “potential” wholes being subsumed under the latter. Cf. more generally, *Diff. top.* II 7,14-21; III 3,4-6.

38,18-20. secunda diuisio. Cf. 6,20f.; 8,9-16. **enim.** Untranslated by both Pozzi and Stump, and rightly so (cf. 10,33). **multipliciter significamus.** Cf. on *multis dicitur modis*, 6,19, and Albert’s comment (74,23f.): *haec multiplicitas est analogiae et non omnino uniuocae communitatis.* **quod continuum est.** = τὸ συνεχές (e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 13,20 [Arist., *Cat.* 4b20]). This Aristotle defines in terms of the unity of the limits of constituent parts: *Phys.* 227a11-13; 231a22; *Met.* 1023b32-34. Cf. *Inst. ar.* I 1,3: *Essentiae autem geminae partes sunt, una continua et suis partibus iuncta nec ullis finibus distributa, ut est arbor, lapis et omnia mundi huius corpora quae proprie magnitudines appellantur. ut corpus uel linea uel aliquid huiusmodi.* Cf. Arist., *Cat.* 4b23-25; 5a1-6; *Met.* 1020a11f. Other examples include surfaces, time, and place.

38,21-24. quod continuum non est. = τὸ διωρισμένον, which B. in his translation of *Cat.* 4b20 renders with *disgregatum atque discretum* (*AL* I 1, p. 13,21). Nor does he follow up with Aristotle’s examples (number, language). Wholes are discontinuous when the limits of the parts are not unified. Cf. *Inst. ar.* I 1,3: *alia uero disiuncta a se et determinata partibus et quasi aceruatim in unum redacta concilium, ut grex, populus, chorus, aceruus et quicquid quorum partes propriis extremitatibus terminantur et ab alterius fine discretae sunt. gregem ... populum ... exercitum.* Each, as Albert remarks, under a unifying principle of governance (herdsman, political constitution, general). **quod uniuersale est.** = τὸ καθόλου (e.g. *AL* II 1, p. 10,1 [Arist., *Peri H.* 17a39]; cf. Arist., *Met.* 1023b29-32). This sense was intimated already at 8,12-16 and 38,1-16, and will return at 40,19f. **particularem.** Cf. on *singulos ... particulares*, 8,13. At 8,12-16 the emphasis was on individuals *qua* parts, and here it is on the species *qua* whole; hence B. does not

countenance species / individuals as a separate trope of diaeresis but subsumes it under that of whole / parts (cf. above, xlviff.). Talamanca draws attention to an incoherence in the treatment ("Schema" 183-88): division below the atomic species entails *incidental* considerations (cf. 10,2f. and 40,19f.), and in that sense whole / parts diaeresis, which is inclusive also of the genus / species trope, is a hybrid.

38,25-27. uirtutibus ... potentia. = δύναμις (e.g. *AL* II 1, p. 16,19 [Arist., *Peri H.* 19a17]; *AL* VI 1, p. 6,12 [Arist., *Soph. el.* 165a16]). B. generally prefers *uis*: *In Isag.* II 136,5/16; II 137,4/20-22; *In Perih.* II 5,29; II 23,29; *CPh.* V 4,31; V m4,18/31; V 5,1. Aristotle acknowledges the difficulty of distinguishing between parts of soul and raises the question of whether it is not better to distinguish between their functions (*De an.* 402b10-13). In this sense his psychology is an inquiry into the activities of the different *faculties* (415a18-20; 432a15; 433a31-b4; cf. Pl., *Tht.* 185c4), although he certainly speaks in terms of parts as well (413b13f.; 432a23; *De sens.* 436a2/b17; *Part. an.* 641b5; *EN* 1102b4). **constat, ut.** Cf. above, lxif. **sapiendi ... sentiendi ... uegetandi.** Echoing Aristotle (*De an.* 413b12f.; 414a31f.; 433b2f.; cf. *Part. an.* 641b4-7), and discussed by B. at *In Isag.* II 136,2-137,21 (cf. *Diff. top.* III 3,5). The relevant fragments (ap. Gal., *Scr. min.* II 44,12-15 M. [if the text is reliable]; Them., *In De an.* 31,2; 32,23; Aspas., *In Eth. nic.* 44,21/33) give no indication of Andronicus' view of this tripartitioning, although Aspasius hints (44,23f.) at a division of soul into the rational and irrational elements. Cf. Talamanca, "Schema" 186, n. 527; and on *animae ... divisionibus*, 40,21-24.

38,28-40,17. *Continuous wholes are divided into their constituent parts, and of those it is necessary to distinguish between the heterogeneous and homogeneous. That holds for artificial as well as for natural entities. A book is composed of verses, words, syllables, and letters, i.e. of parts and of parts of parts. Not every whole is divisible in actuality. Consider, for example, wine blended with water: although we can siphon off portions of the actual mixture, we can only conceptually separate the constituent elements. Another (conceptual) division is that of a whole into its matter and form, e.g. the bronze and shape in a statue.*

The concern is continuous wholes, and there are five points, arranged in descending order: that a whole is divisible only into its proper constituents; that there is a difference between heterogeneous and homogeneous parts; that there are parts of parts, down to the

level of the elements (here = alphabetic symbols); that not every whole is divisible in actuality; that the final (conceptual) division is (of the elements) into matter and form. The progression of thought is clear, if elliptical: heterogeneous parts resolve into homogeneous ones, which reduce to the elements, beyond which remain matter and form. Cf. Ammon., *In Isag.* 36,5-7: οἷον τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰς κεφαλὴν καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας, καὶ τὰυτα εἰς ὅσῳ καὶ σάρκας καὶ νεῦρα, καὶ τὰυτα εἰς τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, καὶ τὰυτα εἰς ὕλην καὶ εἶδος.

38,28-40,3. Tot igitur modis cum. Cf. 44,13, and on *Cum igitur*, 28,17. **continuum.** Cf. on 38,19. **fuerit.** Cf. on *abstulerit*, 14,4. **ex quibus ipsum totum constare perspicitur.** Division is into those parts in respect of which a whole is said to be *continuous* (Abe-lard, Albert), for there is a conceptual difference between the whole *qua* continuum and (e.g.) *qua* substance (cf. *ex partibus suis*, 40,16f.). B. has his eye on the idea that each sense of “whole” implies a different internal structure or relation between parts. So we do not simply divide the human body into hands and flesh, but into organs, or into tissues. **diuideres.** Concealing a protasis (“If you were to divide ... you would do so,” etc.). **manus.** Cf. 14,15; Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 82, n. 13. **et si quo alio modo.** The division is carried further at *In Cic. top.* 1094d8f., and at 1108d8-1109a14 B. points out that the parts of a body are for the most part distinguishable, but that since parts in general are numerically indefinite (*infinitior*, Cic., *Top.* VIII 33) difficulties increase as the division progresses. Missing out some parts is, in fact, inevitable. Cf. on *Oportet ... posterius demonstrandum est*, 8,6-9.

40,4-6. compositio. = σύνθεσις (e.g. *AL* II 1, p. 5,14 [Arist., *Peri H.* 16a12]). The idea is of composition along more than one line, a bronze rod being precisely the sort of thing ruled out of consideration. **quae sibi similes (non) habent partes.**^{1,2} B. recalls the periphrases used earlier, adding *sibi*, which could be reflexive, reciprocal, or perhaps both: (a) an animal is divisible into (flesh and) bones, but a bone is divisible into parts which are like one another and like the whole bone; (b) an animal is divisible into (feet and) hands, but a hand is divisible into flesh and bone, which are unlike one another and unlike the whole hand. Cf. 14,14-20; Arist., *Hist. an.* 486a15 (τὰ μόρια τὰυτὰ ἀλλήλοις); more generally, 486a5-23; *Part. an.* 640b17-22; [Arist.], *Meteor.* 390b2-22; Elias, *In Isag.* 68,1-8. **rursus.** As at

32,3, the word here serves to coordinate rather than subordinate the two divisions; it in effect corresponds to *quidem* (cf. 46,3f.). For Aristotle holds that division is first into heterogeneous then into homogeneous parts, more precisely, that composition ascends from the simple to the complex (*Hist. an.* 486a13f.; *Part. an.* 646a12-24). So the *organs* (hands, feet) are not parts of the *tissues* (flesh, bones), but vice versa.

40,7f. et naus et domus. Artificial, vs. natural, wholes (cf. *In Perih.* II 97,9f.). A ship is a bow, stern, hull (etc.), but also timber, pitch, fabric (etc.); and a house is a roof, walls, and foundation (8,10f.), but also clay, mortar, timber (etc.). **Librum.** Although it seems clear what B. is after here, his way of putting things is problematical. Had he continued with his initial illustration he would have said that the homogeneous parts of an animal (flesh, bone, etc.) consist of the elements, earth, air, fire, and water (cf. *Arist., Part. an.* 646a12-20); but instead he takes “elements” in the sense of alphabetic symbols or letters (cf. on *litteras ... litterae*, 40,9). Now the heterogeneous parts of a book *qua* codex are its boards, spine, gatherings (etc.), and the homogeneous ones the parchment, ink, hemp (etc.); yet the whole B. has in mind is not the physical artifact, but an ordered collection of verses, words, syllables, and letters, e.g. a book of the *Aeneid* (or indeed the whole poem, in which case the first division would be into other “books”). With that, however, comes the obvious difficulty that the *oratio* that constitutes such a whole is a *discrete* quantum not made continuous by its signification (*Arist., Cat.* 4b32-37; *Porph., In Cat.* 102,2-9; B., *In Cat.* 203b13-204a2; cf. 208b10-c11; *B. on Signification and Mind* 119, with n. 119). On alphabetic “elements,” cf. *Inst. ar.* II 1,1; *Pl., Tht.* 203b2-204a3; *Tim.* 48b7-c2; *Arist., Met.* 1041b11-33; *Poet.* 1456b22-38, etc. **uersus.** B. is fond of illustrations implying poetry (as probably here): *In Perih.* II 207,21f. (*ut hodie me Vergilii librum legere*); II 234,12f. (*ut cum dico me hodie esse Theocriti Bucolica relecturum*); *Hyp. syll.* I 9,5 (*si possibile est legi librum, possibile est ad uersum tertium perueniri*).

40,9. litteras ... litterae. Written symbols, vs. spoken *elementa* (*In Perih.* II 23,14-22; cf. II 33,6-20; *Prisc., Inst.* I 2,4f. [*GL* II 6,24-7,5]; *Ammon., In De int.* 23,16-22; *Sext. Emp., AM* I 99; *DL* VII 56). **itaque.** Only here in *Div.*, and in this idiom generally less common than *ita*. Cf. above, xx, n. 16; *In Isag.* I 6,12. B. now takes the parts in ascending order of composition. **nomina.** A misleading substitute for *sermones* (cf. on *quodammodo species*, 34,18f.).

40,11. partes partium. This is applicable to *uersus* in the sense that the verse, *Arma uirumque cano, Troiae qui primus ab oris*, is part of a collection (“book”) of verses, which is in turn part of a whole literary work (“book”). Albert brings the words *partium partes* (77,6f.) into his discussion of homogeneous body parts, as though B. intended them to signify natural tissues as well. But although homogeneous parts do indeed indirectly constitute a whole (flesh is part of a hand, which is part of a body), that is not exactly B.’s point here. Aristotle says that λόγος is a significant spoken sound of which some part is independently significant ὥς φάσις, not as an affirmation (*Peri H.* 16b26-28). As to the words ὥς φάσις (*ut dictio*), Alexander evidently held (*In Perih.* II 82,27-83,21) that had Aristotle written ὥς λόγος (*ut oratio*) he would have invalidated the definition, since even simple statements would then reduce to other ones and there would be no primary *oratio* made up of things prior in the order of composition—the result being the destruction of all *oratio*. This is obviously a nod in the direction of Anaxagoras’ theory (DK 59B10; cf. on *quae dissimiles partes habent ... quae similes*, 14,16f.), precisely what Alexander denied in the *partium partes* idea: the parts of simple *orationes* are not other, “homogeneous” *orationes* but names and verbs. Hence *partium partes* at *In Perih.* II 83,8 signals a doctrine which B. rejects, and the *partes partium* in hand denotes secondary but not necessarily homogeneous parts: different letters constitute words by way of different syllables; different syllables constitute verses by way of different words; different words constitute a book by way of different verses. Cf. *Hyp. syll.* II 1,5; *Simpl.*, *In Phys.* 551,18-20.

40,12f. non ... actu ... sed ... animo et ratione. Cf. 12,19; 18,21f.; *Hebd.* 87f.; *In Isag.* II 164,12-165,8. **uinum aquae mixtum.** Cf. *SVF* II 471 (153,21f. = Diels, *Dox. Gr.* 464,5): οἶνον ὕδατι κεκραμένον. According to Aristotle, mixture is a reciprocal alteration between elements in a common substrate: *Gen. et corr.* 328b20-22: ἀλλ’ ἔστι μικτὸν μὲν ὃ ἂν εὐόριστον ὄν παθητικὸν ἦ καὶ ποιητικόν, καὶ τοιούτῳ μικτόν ... ἥ δὲ μίξις τῶν μικτῶν ἀλλοιωθέντων ἔνωσις. Cf. *CEut.* VI 29-33: *nec quodlibet aliud corpus in quodlibet aliud transfigurari potest, nisi et eadem sit materia rerum in se transeuntium et a se et facere et pati possint, ut cum uinum atque aqua miscentur utraque sunt talia quae actum sibi passionemque communicent*; VI 69f.: *Quorum enim communis nulla materia est, nec in se uerti ac permutari queunt.* The elements are by blending destroyed in favor of something new: VI 87-91: *ueluti cum mel aquae confunditur neutrum manet sed alterum alterius copulatione corruptum quiddam*

tertium fecit, ita illud quidem quod ex melle atque aqua tertium fit constare ex utrisque dicitur, in utrisque uero negatur. In heterogeneous wholes, on the other hand, the elements retain their proper form (VII 13-18). According to Stobaeus and Philo, the Stoics held wine and water to be so preserved in mixture as to be separable by means of an oiled sponge (*SVF* II 471f.). Although B. apparently would deny that, his doctrine nevertheless reflects some Stoic as well as Peripatetic influence (cf. Alex. Aphr., *De mixt.* 216,22-25 [*SVF* II 473]; 232,1-5).

40,16f. materiam atque formam. In an animal, body and soul (8,11f.), body being divisible first into heterogeneous organs (head, feet, hands, etc.) then into homogeneous tissues (bones, flesh, nerves, etc.) and the elements (earth, air, fire, water), and soul being divisible into faculties and sub-faculties (38,26f.; 40,21-24). The four elements themselves reduce to four primary qualities or forms (Arist., *Gen. et corr.* 330a24-b7; *Part. an.* 646a12-20; 648b9f.; [Arist.], *Meteor.* 378b10-13). Cf. *Trin.* II 21-28: *Omne namque esse ex forma est. Statua enim non secundum aes quod est materia, sed secundum formam qua in eo insignita est effigies animalis dicitur, ipsumque aes non secundum terram quod est eius materia, sed dicitur secundum aeris figuram. Terra quoque ipsa non secundum ἄποιον ὕλην dicitur, sed secundum siccitatem grauitatemque* [but cf. Arist., *Gen. et corr.* 330b5: ἡ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρόν] *quae sunt formae.* In a different sense, the genus and differentiae are the matter and form (14,5-12; 16,12-14). **statua.** Another break with examples drawn from natural organisms. Cf. *Inst. ar.* praef. 1: *Nam in effigiendis marmore statuīs alius excidendae molis labor est, alia formandae imaginis ratio, nec eiusdem artificis manus politi operis nitor exspectat.* **ex partibus suis.** The parts peculiar to it *qua* continuous whole, not *qua* substance (matter plus form). Cf. *in partes suas*, 40,2; and on *ex quibus ipsum totum constare perspicitur*, 38,29f.

40,18-32. *Universal and discontinuous wholes are divided in similar fashion, e.g. in the case of human beings (man), who are partly in Europe, Asia, and Africa. For an example of division according to faculties we may revert to soul: part is in plants, part in animals; and of the latter, part is rational, part sensible, and so on. These are indeed parts, not species, of soul, although parts not in the quantitative sense. There is this similarity with genus / species divisions, however: that each part entails the whole; for wherever there is a species there is also its genus, and wherever there is a part of soul there is soul. The difference is that not every soul possesses all parts of soul, but different souls are differently composed.*


Discontinuous parts imply spatial separation, even in the case of psychic parts, which are *in* plants or animals; so too in the case of rational soul, which is in a body and comprehends lower faculties (*CPh.* V 4,34; *intellegentia*, on the other hand, is not soul: V 4,30-32; V 6,15; *Trin.* IV 54-59). B.'s analogy requires consideration. Species are sublated by a genus but parts sublata a whole (12,28-14,5), and species are the same as a genus but parts are at least quantitatively different from a whole (14,12-20). In these ways species and parts have been said to *differ*. B. now shifts ground: potential parts, *like species*, illate a whole, e.g. sentient soul entails soul in the universal sense, just as man entails animal. What distinguishes a part from a species, B. says, is the fact that it does not in itself comprise all others.

This is a difficult and elliptical argument, and on one point at least Abelard and Pozzi (*Trattato* 87f.) are probably right: B. is working with two senses of "soul," one at the level of the various faculties or parts, the other at the level of the universal or whole. So whatever is true of soul universally is true of every faculty or part, whether it stands alone or with others in a living organism. That comports with what B. says at *In Cat.* 165b1-11 and 167c1-9 about univocity *secundum commune nomen*: the definition of a genus is predicable of, i.e. is *entailed by*, every species under that genus; similarly, "principle of life" (Arist., *De an.* 402a6f.) or "first entelechy of the natural organic body" (412b5f.) is predicable of, i.e. is *entailed by*, every faculty or part of soul. The problem arises with the final sentence, since the function of essential differentiae is to separate species in such a way that none by itself exhausts the potency of the genus (cf. 8,6-8), and yet it is just some such differentiation that B. seems to envision as making soul divisible into *parts* rather than species. What he perhaps ought to have said, and may have meant, is that each *species* partakes of some but not all differentiae under its genus, and that in that sense genus / species diaeresis is also a whole / parts relation.


40,18-20. Similiter etiam ... eodem quoque modo et. Possibly = ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ... καὶ. **continua non.** Cf. on 38,21. *C E F G* point in the right direction. **uniuersalia.** Cf. on 38,22. **Europa ... Asia ... Africa.** According to Abelard, a case of subject / accidents diaeresis. That is partly correct, in that place is an incidental cause (*In Isag.* II 174,18-175,4); but it does not exclude the universal sense: if this man is in Africa, then *man* is partly in Africa. At *ND* II 66,165 Cicero indicates that the tripartition is exhaustive: *sin autem consulunt qui quasi*

magnam quandam insulam incolunt quam nos orbem terrae uocamus, etiam illis consulunt qui partes eius insulae tenent, Europam Asiam Africam. ergo et earum partes diligunt, ut Romam Athenas Spartam Rhodum, et earum urbium separatim ab uniuersis singulos diligunt, ut Pyrrhi bello Curium Fabricium Coruncanium, etc. Cf. on neque ... coniungitur, 8,14-16, and particularem, 38,24.

40,21-24. animae ... sensibilis. The trichotomic division of 38,26f. is reduced to a dichotomy:



At *Inst. mus.* I 2 (189,2f.) B. ascribes to Aristotle a division of soul into the rational and irrational parts, as at *EN* 1102a27f., *Pol.* 1333a17f., and 1334b18f., and Aristotle (*De an.* 432a24-26, cf. *Pl.*, *Tim.* 69c5-8) and the author of *MM* (1182a24f.) recast Plato's tripartite soul (*Phdr.* 253c7-254a7; *Rep.* 436a9f.; 550b1-3; 571d6-572a6) according to that dichotomy. In the present context the rational / irrational split would imply the following reduction:



aliis sub diuisionibus. Under the sentient part come the five faculties of perception (*In Isag.* II 136,13f.); between the sentient and rational come imagination, memory, etc. (II 136,17-137,3); with the vegetative come the powers of generation, nutrition, and growth (II 136,4/6f./13; cf. Ammon., *In Isag.* 77,18-20). The *scala cognitionis* of *CPh.* V 4,27-37 builds on the scheme here and at *In Isag.* II and presupposes the principle that higher powers embrace lower but not vice versa: *In Isag.* II 136,12-17: *omne enim animal quod sensu uiget, idem et nascitur et nutritur et alitur ... itaque quicquid tantum alitur, non etiam sentit, quicquid uero sentire potest, ei prima quoque animae uis, nascendi scilicet atque nutriendi, probatur esse subiecta*; II 137,4f.: *sed uis animae tertia, quae secum priores alendi ac sentiendi trahit hisque ... utitur*; *CPh.* V 4,31: *superior compre-*


hendendi uis amplectitur inferiorem, inferior uero ad superiorem nullo modo con-surgit. Cf. Arist., *De an.* 414b28-415a11.

40,25f. sed non ut in quantitate. The *sed* is awkward but tolerable (cf. Pl., *Euthph.* 15d1). One of the dilemmas worked up by Aristotle against Plato (? Xenocrates) proceeds from the assumption that soul is a magnitude (*De an.* 407a2-10; Cherniss, *ACPA* 401). Cf. Porph. 253F (esp. 274,63ff. S.). **potestate atque uirtute ... potentiis.** Pace Dane, "Potestas" 89, these terms appear to be on practically equal footing. Cf. on 38,25f., and on the pleonastic *atque componunt*, 8,14.

40,28-32. quod.^{1,2} Cf. on 10,34. **fuert.**^{1,2} = *sit*. Cf. on *abstulerit*, 14,4. **animae.** Appositional or defining gen. **ubicumque.** = *quaelibet*. **mox.** Logical (cf. εὐθύς, e.g. *AL* I 1, p. 37,16 [Arist., *Cat.* 14a32]; *In Perih.* II 21,30-22,1; more generally, on *Amplius ... constabunt*, 12,24-14,5). **non omnis anima omnibus partibus iungitur sed alia aliis.** Soul is composed of parts in a peculiar sense. Every living being embodies more than one faculty or part, in that even plants nourish themselves, grow, and reproduce (*In Isag.* II 136,6-9). How these parts are interconnected B. does not explain, and in higher organisms things become more complex, since even irrational animals variously embody the imaginative, sensitive, and vegetative powers (*In Isag.* II 136,10-137,4; *CPh.* V 5,3). **hoc.** Probably = *eo*, with *quod*. **necesse est.** With an infiniv., vs. noun clause in the subjv. (as e.g. at *CPh.* V 4,39). Cf. on *aequum*, 6,3.

VI. 42,1-48,11: Spoken sound / significations divisions

The last of the *secundum se* tropes of diaeresis (so also at 6,21f. and 8,16-30). B.'s plan is first to enumerate three ways in which spoken sounds are divisible (42,1-44,12), then to select one for detailed consideration (44,13-48,11). The mode selected is in turn divisible (46,8-48,11), so that the general scheme is as follows:



It is noteworthy that the fragments for Andronicus' thought on homonymy (ap. Dexipp., *In Cat.* 21,19; Simpl., *In Cat.* 21,22-24 = 26,17-19 = 30,3-5) bear no special affinity with B.'s exposition here. Nevertheless, Moraux implied a connection between Andronicus and this section of *Div.* For at *Aristotelismus* II 293 he states, presumably in part on the strength of the fact that B. discusses equivocity here, that in his treatise on diaeresis Andronicus dealt with πρὸς ἓν and ἄφ' ἑνός equivocals. But although B. discusses *ad unum* and *ab uno* equivocals at *In Cat.* 166b12-c3, in *Div.* he is silent about them. And if Moraux based his claim not on *Div.* in particular, but on non-Boethian sources, then he overlooked the fact that at I 130f., to which II 293, n. 238 evidently refers, he himself had traced specialized treatment of πρὸς ἓν / ἄφ' ἑνός division back to Philoponus, not Andronicus. B. followed Porphyry for this material; whether or not Porphyry in turn cribbed it from Andronicus is impossible to say (cf. above, xlviii f.; Littig, *Andr. v. Rh.* II 14; Plezia, *De Andr. stud.* 7; 37).

Aristotle, *Soph. el.* 4, furnishes the essential background to B.'s doctrine, although there has occurred between him and B. some reorganization of material (cf. Ebbesen, *Commentators* I 234); of his *Sophistical Divisions* nothing survives (DL V 22; cf. Moraux, *Listes* 51f.). B.'s discussion of homonymy at *In Cat.* 163d1-167a13, which is indebted to Porphyry (*In Cat.* 60,15-68,3), sheds interesting light on the problem but is constructed along lines different from those governing the treatment here. Simplicius notes the *utility* of knowing the difference between homonymy and synonymy (*In Cat.* 21,2-22,13), and Alexander points out that in *diaeresis* is the key to the disambiguation of homonymous expressions (*De fato* 166,20-22). Both ideas are at the back of B.'s exposition.

Finally, although B. places this trope under the rubric of *uox*, it is clear that he regards some divisions as involving the *written* word. Ebbesen, *Commentators* I 141-69 ("Legacy" 146-71), and Atherton, *Stoics on Ambiguity*, furnish useful background information.

VI. A. 42,1-44,12: Enumeration of the three modes

Spoken sounds are divisible according to: (a) signification, when a word (equivocity) or the syntax of a statement (ambiguity) occasions multiple meanings; (b) mode, when there is a single signification but a variety of applications; (c) a determination, which lends precision to an utterance whose precise sense is doubt-

ful. Examples: (a) “dog,” and, “the Greeks the Trojans have conquered;” (b) “infinite” (*sc. in measure, multitude, species, time*); (c) “man” (*sc. every one, a certain one*), and, “give to me” (*sc. this, that*).

The first mode was discussed at 8,16-30 and 10,33-12,16 and will be given special consideration again in the two paragraphs that follow (44,13-48,11); thus it is only briefly touched upon here. The second and third are treated only here.

These three tropes bear only limited resemblance to the ones outlined by Aristotle at *Soph. el.* 166a14-21. First, whereas Aristotle subsumes his three tropes under the general heading of homonymy and amphiboly, B. makes the latter into special cases of *diuisio uocis secundum significationem*. Second, Aristotle’s second trope (ὅταν εἰωθότες ὦμεν οὕτω λέγειν,) is without examples, so that the connection between it and B.’s *modus secundum modum* is obscure. From *In Cat.* 166b10-12 it is clear that B. at least has in mind analogical equivocal. Third, Aristotle’s third trope does not correspond to B.’s *secundum determinationem* mode but rather to his notion of *ambiguitas*. The stages of reorganization between *Soph. el.* and *Div.* are uncertain, although it seems likely that both Andronicus and Porphyry had a hand in the process. Indeed, it appears as though with *Div.* B. himself either ignores or has not yet begun work on *Soph. el.*

42,1-5. Restat. Cf. on 14,21. **modis.** Cf. 6,19; 44,13; 46,8 (*species*). **ut aequiuoca uel ambigua.** Cf. on 8,22-30; also, Arist., *Soph. el.* 165b30-166a21. **canis ... Graecos uicisse Troianos.** Cf. on 8,18 and *aio ... posse*, 8,25.

42,5-7. non plura ... sed multis modis. Whereas “dog” and “the Greeks the Trojans have conquered” are divisible according to the multiplicity of things each signifies, “infinite,” an analogical equivocal (cf. on *multis dicitur modis*, 6,19), has an unbroken unity of signification in all its applications. At *In Cat.* 166b10-12 B. instances *principium*, which in number is unity and in lines a point (cf. Porph., *In Cat.* 65,31-66,2); *infinitum* is a similar case in that the core sense, “lacking limit,” governs all contexts. Sirius, sea-dogs, creatures that bark, and Cynic philosophers, on the other hand, are united only in a name (cf. 12,5f.). So there is a real difference between a word’s signifying numerous things and its signifying in numerous ways. This recalls *Peri H.* 20a9f., where Aristotle distinguishes between signifying a universal and signifying universally, the “what,” we might say, and

“how” of signification. Cf. Atherton, *Stoics on Ambiguity* 144; 341. **unam rem ... significat cuius terminus inueniri non possit.** This is the core sense, at work in all contexts (note esp. 42,15-17). The Lat. is misleading, for B. does not mean that “infinite” signifies one limitless thing, but that it always conveys the same meaning, “(that of which) the limit cannot be discovered.” Cf. on *inueniri*², 32,25.

42,8. aut secundum mensuram aut secundum multitudinem. The more common distinction is between *magnitude* and *multitude* (continuous, discrete quanta), the former being infinitely divisible, the latter capable of infinite increase (*Inst. ar.* I 1,6; *Inst. mus.* I 6 [193,9-22]; II 3 [228,5-23]; Arist., *Met.* 1020a8-11; cf. *Phys.* 232b24f.). Here *mensura* is in effect *magnitudo* (cf. 42,10), giving the expected contrast. Still, the examples are slightly odd, for the world is used to illustrate a magnitude of infinite extension, i.e. something capable of infinite *increase*, while the infinite divisibility of bodies is offered as an instance of *multitude*. It may boil down to an unreconciled difference between sources. Cf. on *numerorum*, 22,25.

42,8-15. aut secundum speciem^{1,2} ... figuras ... species figurarum. That B. means the atomic shapes, which Epicurus thought to be numerically indefinite (DL X 42; cf. Democr., ap. Them., *In De an.* 9,10) is improbable; rather, he has in mind rhetorical figures (*In Cic. top.* 1110a11-c11; cf. on *Oportet ... posterius demonstrandum est*, 8,6-9). **mundum¹ ... corporum diuisionem.** Cf. on *aut secundum mensuram aut secundum multitudinem*, 42,8. **secundum tempus.^{1,2}** This looks like an afterthought, for it is not part of the initial enumeration and leaves two unresolved problems: (a) B. explains at *CPh.* V 6,2-14 (cf. *Trin.* IV 54-77) that the world and God are incomparable in that the one is perpetual, the other eternal (cf. on *eodem quoque modo*, 42,15f.). (b) The temporal infinitude of the world in fact resembles infinitude *secundum mensuram*, i.e. temporal duration *qua* what is capable of infinite, measurable increase (cf. *In Perih.* II 463,18-22). **cuius terminus ... inueniri non possit.** Cf. 42,7.

42,15-19. eodem quoque modo. Hence the two occurrences of the phrase, *cuius terminus secundum tempus inueniri non possit*, are to be understood in the same way, so that the second evidently cannot be taken as emphasizing the eternity (vs. perpetuity) of God. B. should have specified that God is, not *secundum*, but *praeter, tempus*. **cuius ... terminus secundum tempus inueniri non possit.** Cf. 42,7.

supernae uitae. Cf. *CPh.* V 6,2-4: *Deum igitur aeternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium commune iudicium est ... Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis uitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.* **multimode.** = *multimodis*. **unum tamen ipsa significans.** Cf. *unam rem ... significat*, 42,6f., and, on the punctuation, Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 122, n. 14.

42,19-21. secundum determinationem. Cf. *In Perih.* II 142,20-22: *determinationes autem dicuntur quae rem uniuersalem uel in totum fundunt, ut omnis, uel in partem contrahunt, ut quidam.* Which are not, of course, the only determinants (although cf. 42,25f.). **sine determinatione ... uox ulla.** *N* is on the right track. Cf. *nulla*, 42,22/24; “Text” 15f. **intellectu.** Cf. *In Perih.* II 342,11f.; *In Cic. top.* 1108d11; 1112d4, etc.

42,22f. intellegentiam ... raptat ... traducit. *Conclusa* stands for *uox* (42,20f., cf. *concluditur*, 42,24f.), the subj.; hence the acc. and the act. vbs. (“Text” 30f., correcting here for *Q*). Note the pattern: *audientis intellegentiam ... auditor* (42,23f.) ... *intellectus audientis* (42,27) ... *auditor* (44,5). Cf. 6,2; *In Perih.* II 469,20: (*potest*) *audientis animus suspicari.* **multis ... fluctibus erroribusque.** For the imagery, cf. *In Cat.* 263c12 (*falsis opinionibus traductus*); *In Perih.* II 215,19 (*tantis raptarentur erroribus*); *CPh.* I 3,11f. (*in hoc uitae salo ... errore ... raptatur*); II 1,6 (*quasi fluctu ... animorum*); III 9,4 (*error ... traducit*); Calc., trans. *Tim.* 43a6-b2 (*torrenti rapido defluoque ... raptaretur*); Ammon., *In Isag.* 48,22-49,2 (ἡ γὰρ ὁμω-
νυμία εἴωθεν ... πλάνην γεννᾶν ... πλάνην ἐμποιήσῃ τῷ ἀκροατῇ).

42,25f. omnis homo ambulat ... quidam homo ambulat. Universal and particular affirmatives. Cf. *In Perih.* II 137,26-138,24; *Hyp. syll.* I 7,6; *Diff. top.* I 4,6f.; *In Cic. top.* 1051b14-c5. There is a certain obscurity to the argument, in that *B*. begins by instancing *homo* as an equivocal (*multa significat*) but then disambiguates with the determinants. *Homo* is both indeterminate and equivocal: it may or may not signify *this* man, and it may or may not signify a rational mortal animal. *Omnis* and *quidam* address the first problem, but *ambulat* only implicitly addresses the second (cf. 46,15-18). Hence *definiat* (and *definitione*, 42,22) = *determinet* (*determinatione*), without anticipating *definitione*, 46,15. **aut certe.** Unlike at 12,23f., since one is as good as the other for purposes of disambiguation.

42,27-44,2. audientis. Cf. on 42,22f. Atherton considers the possibility of a similar Stoic emphasis on audience response (*Stoics on Ambiguity* 341f.). **quando uel.** The choice is between *CE* and *FG*, since *K* commits a dittography and *AQ* cannot be right. The *uel* in *AQ*

and *uel quando*, 44,2, support *C E*, although cf. 44,9f. ("Text" 31). **cognoscitur**. *Non* may have tended to suppress *cog*-; if so, then *F* allowed just the reverse. Cf. *non iungitur*, 36,10.

44,3f. omne ... ambiguum dubitabile, non ... omne dubitabile ambiguum. Why this contrast, to the exclusion of *aequiucum*? B.'s attention is now on statements, not terms, and on two kinds in particular: those which admit of two, and those which admit of countless, interpretations. "I hear that the Greeks the Trojans have conquered" is an instance of the former, "Give to me" of the latter. Neither comes down to a problem of *definition* (equivocity), but each is disambiguated by means of a determinant. So although even two possibilities (ambiguity) means doubt, doubt is unrestricted to there being only two possibilities.

44,5-12. uterque auditor ... arbitratur. With statements such as "You will return from the war with the Romans victorious" the champion of each interpretation is entitled to think *he* has grasped the speaker's meaning. **cum quis**. Cf. on 16,4f. **quod**.^{1,2} Cf. on 10,34; 38,1. **uterque**² ... **intellegunt**. Cf. *CPh.* III 5,11 (*uterque ... uoluerunt*); Bednarz, *De syntaxi* II 7. **ipsius**. Possibly transferred (= *ipsis*, cf. 44,10). **potius suspicabitur quam ... perspicaciter uideat**. Not "multiple choice" with half a chance of being right, but mind-reading or clairvoyance.

VI. B. 44,13-46,7: Division according to significations

With the first of the three modes it is necessary not only to divide the spoken expression into its different significations but to show that the things signified are essentially different. For example, some things are said to be good because they are good, others because they are productive of good. This mode of division is most useful against sophistical arguments; for if a term signifies nothing, it is not significative; if one thing, it is simple (univocal); if more than one, multiplex (equivocal). Our not being taken in by an argument depends upon our ability to determine how words are used. With ambiguous expressions you may be able to avoid being taken in just by determining what is possible or impossible. For example, with "I hear that the Greeks the Trojans have conquered" both meanings are possible, but with "Man bread eats" only one is.

The main distinction is between the expression and thing(s) ex-

pressed: the unity or multiplicity of an expression is a function of its significate(s). This is considered from two points of view: (a) If a *term* signifies two or more things, then arguments built on statements that employ it can be evaluated only after its range of meanings has been surveyed (divided) and the meaning at issue identified. (b) A *statement* that signifies more than one thing owing to its syntactical ambiguity may likewise induce assent to a false conclusion by concealing the intended significate. If the impossibility of one or more significates is detected, the risk of deception is diminished. The difference between (a) and (b) echoes faintly what B. says at *In Perih.* II 199,1-14 about propositional *uis*: in some cases it comes down to signification in the strict sense, in others to internal or syntactic structure.

In fact things are more complex than B. lets on. For example, there is always a mental content mediating the spoken expression and thing signified. Herminus evidently considered the question of how words can be equivocal if they signify mental contents which reflect common realities: if thoughts reflect reality and yet the expressions that signify them do not always mean the same things, it must be because the thoughts somehow change (*In Perih.* II 39,26-30; *B. on Signification and Mind* 10f.; Moraux, *Aristotelismus* II 374f.). But in *Div.* B. is interested in the “what,” not the “how,” of equivocality and ambiguity. Similarly, according to B. Porphyry was the first to discover that a statement’s being *una* (or *multiplex*) is not the same as its being *simplex* (or *composita*): the first boils down to the question of signification, the second to how statements are constructed (*In Perih.* II 106,19-114,26; cf. Ebbesen, *Commentators* I 161f. [“Legacy” 164f.]). But this complexity is irrelevant to *Div.*, and for that reason *simplex*, 44,24, evidently takes the place of *una*.

44,13-17. Tot igitur modis cum. Cf. 38,28, and on *Cum igitur*, 28,17. **definitione monstrandum est.** The division amounts to showing that the significates differ in essence, e.g. that “dog” *qua* four-footed animal capable of barking is not the same as “dog” *qua* celestial body positioned at the foot of Orion. Cf. 46,14-18, and on *definitione*, 46,15. **in Topicis.** = Arist., *Top.* 106a6-8; 107a3-12; cf. *EN* 1096a19-29; (?) Arist., *EE* 1217b25f.

44,19-25. ipsa. With *quae*, and emphasizing the idea that their being deemed good is incidental to the qualities that make them to be what they in essence are. **contra sophisticas importunitates.** = Arist., *Peri H.* 17a34-37 (*AL* II 1, p. 9,17-20): λέγω δὲ ἀντικεισθῆαι

τὴν τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, — μὴ ὁμωνύμως δέ, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν τοιούτων προσδιορίζομεθα πρὸς τὰς σοφιστικὰς ἐνοχλήσεις = *dico autem opponi eiusdem de eodem, non autem aequiuoce et quaecumque cetera talium determinamus contra sophisticas importunitates*. Cf. *Top.* 108a18-37; *Soph. el.* 165a3-17; B., *In Perih.* II 130,14-131,19; II 132,9-134,5; Ammon., *In De int.* 84,26-86,7; Simpl., *In Cat.* 22,9f. **simplex**. Cf. on VI.B. 44,13-46,7. B. evidently has in mind “simple” terms, but the point holds also for statements. **et multa significans**. Epexegetic (*et = id est*). Cf. 8,29f., and on 8,17. **ne in aliquo**. The *in* may account for *ali-*, as also at *Inst. ar.* I 32,18 (*Inst. mus.* V 2 [354,1f.]; *In Perih.* II 332,14): *si ... aliquis*; *In Cic. top.* 1046b5 (and on 16,4f.): *cum ... aliquis*; *Cic., Acad.* II 41,127: *si ... aliquid*. But at 14,3f. and 42,25 B. writes (*ni*)*si ... quis*, and at *In Perih.* II 316,11 *si aliquis*. Cf. Bednarz *De syntaxi* II 5; LHS II §107.

44,26f. [id est ambigua]. Almost certainly an intrusive gloss, for the Grk. has been explained at 8,28-30, while at 42,3 B. uses only *ambigua*. I note similar interpolations in Moerbeke’s translations (e.g. Them., *In De an.* 69,9 [CLCAG I 158,44f.]) and (?) B.’s Euclid (cf. on *triangulorum*² ... *obtusum*, 32,5f.). Cf. above, lxiv; “Text” 22. **utroque modo possibilia**. The success of each is possible until one or the other side actually wins (cf. Arist., *Peri H.* 19a12-18).

44,27-46,6. id quod superius dixi. = 44,5-9; cf. 8,25; 42,4f. **hominem comedere panem**. Cf. Arist., *Soph. el.* 166a6-14/18-21; Atherton, *Stoics on Ambiguity* 314f.; 322. **quod**.^{2,3} Cf. on 38,1. **rursus**. Cf. on 40,6. **quotiens ad contentionem ... quotiens ad ueritatem**. Given that necessity (truth) entails possibility (cf. Arist., *Peri H.* 23a16-18), what is the point of this distinction? Evidently, that the *detection* of fallacy or impossibility is the first step toward discovery of the truth. The controversialist keeps impossibilities in play, the dialectician targets possibilities (cf. Arist., *Top.* 108a33-37; Atherton, *Stoics on Ambiguity* 480, n. 13).

VI. C. 46,8-48,11: Equivocity vs. ambiguity

Multiplicity of signification comes down to one of two considerations: either some part of a statement signifies more than one thing (equivocity), or the statement as a whole does (ambiguity). What is the method of division for each? In the first case the equivocal term must be divided according to the definitions of the different

significates. Another method is to add a determination (number, gender, case, accent, etc.) in order to identify the precise significate. Ambiguous statements, on the other hand, are divided by adding or by removing something, or by reconfiguration of some kind (e.g. "I hear that the Greeks have conquered the Trojans" rather than "I hear that the Greeks the Trojans have conquered"). This kind of division differs from that of a genus in that the dividenda need not exhaust the dividendum.

Disambiguation means identifying (dividing) as many meanings as are necessary to avoid being taken in by a paralogism, i.e. detecting the meaning intended. Ultimately one must know, of course, whether the intended meaning is possible. If the speaker's intention is to take advantage of the fact that *homo* is equivocal, then we must know (a) all the significations of any statement in which *homo* appears, (b) the one intended, and (c) whether the intended signification holds in context. Note that the methods of division imply written texts as well as *uoces* (46,25-48,3; cf. Arist., *Soph. el.* 166b1-3; 177b4-7).

46,8-13. ergo. Cf. *igitur*, 38,28; 44,13. **species.** Cf. *modis*, 42,2 (44,13), and *Non ... tanquam genus*, 48,8f. **quod.** Cf. on 38,1. **multiplicitatem significationis.** The MSS almost unanimously attest *multiplicitatis significationem*, and even *E K* suggest *multiplicitatis* over *multiplicitatem*. But at 46,12f. B. writes *significationis multiplicitatem*, at 8,17f. *pluralitas significationis*, and at *In Perih.* II 111,10f. *significationis pluralitatem*. The point is, not that an equivocal signifies a multiplicity, but that its signification is *multiplex*. Hence Sirius, one of the significates of *canis*, is a *unique* entity. Cf. "Text" 18. **eorum.** The awkward but tolerable neut. may have affected *aequi-uocarum* at 46,14. *F* may have wavered in the direction of *earum* before settling on the neut.; the fem. is implied by *Alb* (86,20) and is in *Pr.* Cf. 48,8 (*quolibet eorum*); 48,16 (*quicquid ipsorum*); *CPh.* II 2,3 (*horum*). **multiplex.** Cf. 44,24; *In Perih.* II 106,23-107,9. **illa.** Sc. *uox*. **retinet, ut supra iam dictum est.** = 8,27-30. Cf. above, lxif.

46,14-18. aequiuocarum ... unius particulae orationum. *Aequiuocorum* (cf. on *eorum*, 46,10) is almost certainly an error, for the contrual is with *orationum*. *Vnius particulae* is both required by sense and supported by *in particula*, 46,9f.: such expressions are equivocal "in accordance with the equivocality of a single part," e.g. the *homo* in *homo uiuit*. *Vel* and *aut* may be symptoms of tampering or correction ("Text" 18f.). **definitione.** Cf. 18,2; 44,16. An erased tilde is faintly

visible in *A* (overlooked at “Text” 19). **et uerus ... et pictus.** Cf. Mart. Cap. IV 355: *aliter uerus definitur, aliter pictus*. A case of equivocity *secundum similitudinem*: In Cat. 166b8f.; Porph., In Cat. 66,23-28; Simpl., In Cat. 31,27-32. B. at In Cat. 165a1 substitutes *uiuus* for *uerus* and at 167a8-12 invokes the same example in connection with *translatio*. **quod uerum est ... quod falsum est.** By dividing and settling on the formula (signification) that comports with the predicate *uiuit* we shall avoid assenting to what is false or intended to mislead. **simulatio.** Cf. In Perih. II 121,15-17: *si quis hominem definire uolens dicat: homo est aut animal rationale mortale aut huius coloribus uel metallo facta simulatio*; Porph., In Cat. 65,29 (66,27): ὁμοίωμα ἐστὶ τοῦ ζῶντος ἀνθρώπου.

46,18-22. qualibet adiectione. Having already discussed some determinants (42,25f.), B. now makes further recommendations. **Canna Romanorum sanguine sorduit.** Another Latinizing of the Grk. source. The Apulian town of Cannae was the site of a brutal defeat at the hands of Hannibal (cf. In Perih. II 221,19f.), and the sing. *canna* was apparently used to signify the nearby river Aufidus (Liv. XXV 12,5-7) as well as and a kind of swamp reed (*TLL*, q.v.). Hence the equivocity. (It prejudices the issue to capitalize as I have done, but B.’s intention is obvious.) The hyperbole of the bloodied river is very ancient (Hom., *Il.* XXI 21; Verg., *Aen.* VI 86f.). Cf. Sil. Ital. I 50f.: *dum Cannas ... campumque cruore / Ausonio mersum*; IX 365f.: *tum turbine nigro / sanguinis exundat torrens*; X 319f.: *sanguineus tumidas in campos Aufidus undas / eiectat*; and, on solecisms of case, gender, and use of the article, Arist., *Soph. el.* 173b26-174a9. **articulo ... hic Canna.** Aristotle observes that the demonstrative “this” adds no more to one signification than to the other (*Soph. el.* 175b18-27). — Or it adds something incidentally, by way of the gender. Stump’s “the Canna” is probably the best way around the problem in Eng., although Lat. really has no such article.

46,22f. genere ... plenus. *Fluuius* (46,21) is masc.; *plena* would imply a reed. **uel casu.** It is unclear how case inflection would disambiguate the expression, given that *canna* means only one pattern of declension (*pace* Albert 87,12-14). The idea is that (e.g.) *maris* could be mistaken as implying either *mas* or *mare*, as *auctorum* could either *auctor* or *auctus* (-a, -um), and *moris* (ignoring the final quantity) either *mos*, *morus*, or *morum*. On the syntactic ambiguity of cases, cf. Arist., *Soph. el.* 180a8-22.

46,26. secundum accentum ... poné ... póne. Aristotle's fifth linguistic mode of fallacy, *παρὰ τὴν προσῳδίαν* (*Soph. el.* 166b1-9). Aristotle acknowledges the use of diacriticals (e.g. 177b6; cf. 177b35-178a3), although formalized written accents appear to stem from Aristophanes of Byzantium and are common in MSS only from about AD 600 on (Pfeiffer, *History* I 178-80; Smyth, *Grammar* §161; Reynolds-Wilson, *Scribes* 4; 9; cf. Ebbesen, *Commentators* I 187f.); on the Lat. side, the apex dates from the 1st c. BC but never attained really widespread use (LHS I §14; Lindsay, *Lat. Lang.* 4; 161f.). Our example (cf. *CEut.* III 9-11) turns on the difference between the sing. imperat. of *ponere* (initial oxytone) and the adv. or prep. (final oxytone) meaning "behind" (Prisc., *Inst.* VIII 5 [*GL* II 372,15]; LHS I §237.1a). Atherton misleads in implying a shift in quantity (*Stoics on Ambiguity* 232; cf. LHS I §422.2). How B. actually wrote and pronounced the words we cannot say. In Eng. can be compared expressions which sound alike but are differently written (there-they're-their, scene-seen, weight-wait), and ones which both look and sound different (in turn-intern); Germ. *wiederholen* comes closer to B.'s example. Cf. more generally, Ammon., *In Cat.* 17,18-18,6.

46,27. secundum orthographiam ... quaeror ... queror. Under *παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως* Aristotle discusses what is probably at the back of B.'s mind here (*Soph. el.* 166b10-19), although B. puts the emphasis on orthography. The conjugated pass. of *quaerere* is easily confused with the deponent *queri* owing to assimilation of the first element of the diphthong to the second (cf. Lindsay, *Lat. Lang.* 42f.; Palmer, *Lat. Lang.* 218). Pompeius specifies the *ae* / *e* confusion as a spoken barbarism (*GL* V 285,5-9), but the scribes who copied our MSS must have been influenced not only by what they heard within as they copied but by what they actually saw in their exemplars, which would have been subject to the same confusion, so that the order of vbs. in this passage can be detected only from context. The idea is again that what can mislead when spoken will not do so when correctly written. This is not, therefore, the same thing as the equivocality of *complector* (*a*) *te*, which B. discusses at *In Cat.* 164b5-12 and *Diff. top.* II 9,20 (with Stump 125f., n. 115).

48,4-11. adiectionem ... diminutionem ... diuisionem. It seems clear that *F G* have interpolated glosses, thereby preempting 48,6f. and overlooking *quolibet eorum*, 48,8 ("Text" 32). B.'s four terms recall ancient classifications of barbarisms (e.g. Quint. I 5,6-14;

Charis., *Inst.* IV 1 [GL I 265,10-266,14]; Diom., *Ars* II [GL I 451,32-453,2]; Donat., *Ars* III 1 [GL IV 392,9]. Ebbesen hesitates over reading them back into Porphyry, inclining instead toward a Stoic source (*Commentators* I 33, with n. 19 ["Legacy" 163]), but Atherton and Ax are dubious (*Stoics on Ambiguity* 329, n. 101; "*Quadripertita Ratio*" 30). Given that throughout this section B. is speaking of division, the third mode looks redundant: *Ambiguarum ... orationum facienda est diuisio ... per diuisionem*. B. may be thinking of *Soph. el.* 166a33-38, in which case Atherton and Ax are probably correct. As to Usener's belief that Tyrannion is at the back of the classification ("Lehrgebäude" 628ff., esp. 638), the evidence is slim; in any event, since Tyrannion's connection with *Andronicus* rests on slender evidence (cf. on *Posterior* ... *Peripateticae secta prudentiae*, 48,26), there seems to be no reason to think of this as an "Andronicean" passage. **quod**. Cf. on 38,1. **quolibet eorum**. I understand this to mean that B. did not illustrate the four methods individually; instead, what he gives combines *adiectio* and *transmutatio*. Cf. also on *eorum*, 46,10. **tamquam genus**. Cf. on IV.D.2. 30,22-28; III.B. 12,27-14,20; also, III.A. 10,33-12,16. **tantae ... quantae**. Sc. *significationes*. Cf. *In Cic. top.* 1110c2-4: *omnia uero significata cuiusque nominis diuisione includere difficile est, quia noua plerumque finguntur*. **alterutra ... oratio**. Cf. Atherton, *Stoics on Ambiguity* 318: "sc. one or other interpretation of the ambiguity, but it is worth noting that Boethius does not distinguish bearer from meaning." —Perhaps; the problem is that *tantae* suggests a multiplicity of significations, whereas the cases of *ambiguity* B. has instanced admit of only two each (8,25; 44,6f.; 46,1-4).

VII. 48,12-25: *Secundum accidens* divisions

The whole treatment of genus / species divisions was informed by the conviction, preeminent among whose proponents B. believes Andronicus to have been, that diaeresis is unconcerned with incidentals. In that sense the problem of incidental divisions has been at the back of B.'s mind all along. But the present paragraph and 10,1-27 constitute the only formal discussions of the subject, and the one in hand forms a suitable bridge to the concluding paragraph of *Div.*, where the later Peripatos (Andronicus) is brought to the forefront. D'Onofrio misinterprets in stating that this "fourth" trope (lumping the three incidental ones together) proves that definition is unre-

stricted to substances (*Fons scientiae* 194). Division within the *incidental* categories of being is in fact genus / species diaeresis, to which, however, the discussion here of *secundum accidens* division is unrelated. Moreover, it is precisely with their confusion of genera (species, differentiae) and accidents that B. taxes the earlier Peripatetics (50,1f.). In his view, definition, whether of a substance *or* accident, necessarily proceeds from a genus and is completely intolerant of anything incidental to the species or definiendum (cf. on II.B. 8,3-30).

Common to the three incidental tropes is the precept that division is always into opposites. For example, to take the subject / accidents trope, we do not say that of bodies some are white, others sweet, but that some are white, others black, others neither. Furthermore, as with genus / species divisions, so also here the combined dividendia must be coextensive with the dividendum. That is, incidental traits qua coordinate dividendia and inherent in a subject should all be stated; none should be omitted, nothing else added.

This treatment presupposes the enumeration at 10,1-27 and falls back on two precepts laid down in connection with genus / species diaeresis. Some confusion arises from the fact that B. concentrates only on the subject / accidents trope. Why he does so is unclear, but Talamanca may be right in drawing attention to a *practical* connection with genus / species diaeresis, of which the subject / accidents trope is a kind of shadow ("Schema" 98): after the atomic species division descends to the level of accidents—what color men are (10,2f.), where they reside (40,19f.)—, i.e. descends beyond what is definable to what is suitable only for description (cf. on *particularem*, 38,24, and *Europa ... Asia ... Africa*, 40,20; also, *In Cic. top.* 1096d11-1097a9). On the other hand, *In Isag.* II 157,2-6 suggests that the accident / subjects trope is what is most likely to intrude upon genus / species diaeresis.

48,12-16. Ac de ... quidem ... sufficienter dictum est. Cf. *Hyp. syll.* II 2,7 (266,70-73); II 4,3 (276,25-27); II 9,1 (302,1-3); II 11,7 (318,59f.); also I 4,1 (220,9f.); I 6,3 (234,32); and above, 24,28f.; below, 50,4. **propositum atque expeditum.** A kind of hendiadys (vs. pleonasm, as e.g. with *atque componunt*, 8,14). Cf. 18,12f. (*informant perficiuntque*); 34,17 (*nobis propositum*). **se partitionibus.** Cf. "Text" 32 (correcting here for *A E*). **diuisionibus ... Harum.** But note that the illustration targets only subject / accidents diaeresis. **commune praeceptum.** The same point was made at 20,13-19, in connection

with genus / species divisions. **quicquid ipsorum**. Cf. on *eorum*, 46,10.

48,18-20. alba ... dulcia ... alba ... nigra. Cf. Arist., *De an.* 426b8-427a16; *De sens.* 447b26-28. It is the function of a common faculty of perception to discriminate between objects (white, sweet) proper to separate faculties, and of each faculty to discriminate between objects (white, black) proper to itself. But again, B. is not concerned with *how* we find the point of division. **neutra**. Cf. on *media*, 8,6. **eodem quoque modo in aliis secundum accidens diuisionibus**. In fact the precept does not generally apply to the accident / subjects trope, since subjects are not *opposed* to one another (except perhaps in the case of soul and body, 10,6). Cf. on *Differt ... inueniet*, 10,18-27.

48,21-25. Atque illud. Announcing a related precept: a properly formulated *opposition* should exhaust the dividendum. —But how are we to identify all of the accidents inherent in a subject (cf. on *Europa ... Asia ... Africa*, 40,20), or all of the subjects in which an accident inheres? The practical solution would appear to be division by negation: (a) Of bodies some are white, others not-white; (b) Of (things) white, some are men, others not-men; (c) Of (things) white, some are solid, others not-solid. **sicut fit in generis diuisione**. Cf. on IV.D.2. 30,22-28. **aliquod accidens ex eadem oppositione**. Specifying the subject / accidents trope. **subiecto ... inest ... subiecto inesse**. Cf. on 6,26.

VIII. 48,26-50,5: Conclusion

This is a passage of some complexity, whose meaning is most clearly revealed in light of the proem, of which it is a kind of reflection. Its historical implications have been discussed above, xxxivff.

The later Peripatos carefully distinguished between, and subdivided, per se and secundum accidens diaeresis, whereas the older school promiscuously employed accidents in place of a genus and in place of species or differentiae. Hence the utility of laying down the properties common to the various modes of division and of distinguishing the modes according to their differences.

48,26. Posterior ... Peripateticae secta prudentiae. Whereas at 4,4 B. merely said, *apud Peripateticam disciplinam*, meaning the school before Andronicus, he now introduces this distinction between a later

and earlier Peripatos. At *CEut.* I 39 he uses *sectatores* to signify Peripatetic and unspecified philosophers, while at praef. 59 and VII 75 he uses αἵρεσις (*haeresis*) to designate the *theological* “heresies” of Eutyches and Nestorius (cf. *In Perih.* II 352,2; Mansfeld, *Heresiography* 11, with nn. 49f.); and at *Inst. ar.* II 41,2 he uses *posterī* in reference to thinkers after Aristotle, while at *In Cat.* 268b8-14 he uses *posteriores* for the Stoics. Which, unfortunately, sheds no useful light on the passage in hand. In fact this recognition of a later phase within the Peripatos is not unique to B., for both Strabo (XIII 1,54) and Aspasius (*In Eth. nic.* 44,20f.) downgrade the earlier in favor of the later school, and some such distinction is implicit in Plutarch (*Sulla* XXVI 1f.) and Apuleius (*Peri H.* 13) as well. Strabo thinks of the earlier Peripatetics as those “after Theophrastus” and the later as those from about the time of Apellicon, Sulla, and Tyrannion. Plutarch connects the earlier Peripatetics with the poor condition of the books in Neleus’ estate and mentions Sulla’s transferring of Apellicon’s library to Rome, which he associates with both Tyrannion and Andronicus; this may, in his mind, serve to link Andronicus with a later Peripatos, although any inference drawn from the anecdote must be attenuated in consideration of the λέγεται with which Plutarch introduces it. Aspasius explicitly links the later Peripatos with Andronicus and Boethos but is vague about the earlier. And, Apuleius speaks of *Aristo ... et nonnulli Peripatetici iuniores*, possibly linking one with the other. Thus Strabo and Aspasius date the later Peripatos to the first century BC, while Aspasius, perhaps Plutarch as well, associates it with Andronicus. (Apuleius is too elliptical to be of any use here.) I share Tarán’s skepticism about the coherence of the reports in Strabo and Plutarch (rev. of Moraux 727-30; cf. Donini, *Scuole* 82f.) and hold that with the later / earlier distinction B. is witness to an ancient school tradition which *may* have some connection with Andronicus. At any rate, B. evidently thinks that the later sect and Andronicus form a unity (see next lemma), although the historical accuracy of his view is in the end a question of the reliability of his source, Porphyry, or of his interpretation thereof.

48,27. diligentissima ratione. At 4,5 *diligentissimus* described Andronicus reporting on the past history of diaeresis within the school, which suggests that Andronicus is the figure intended here as well. If so, then *Posterior ... secta* (48,26) has the force of an allusive plur. The facts (a) that Andronicus is in the proem interpreted as having spoken of the high esteem in which his predecessors had always held diaer-

esis, and (b) that he is there described as *senex*, an ancient, do not argue against reading him into context here: (a) It appears to be B.'s understanding that Andronicus mentioned his predecessors, i.e. their esteem for diaeresis, without thereby praising them. (b) B.'s calling Andronicus an ancient does not rule out his thinking of him here as a later *Peripatetic*; note that at *In Perih.* II 11,17 he uses *antiquitas* in reference to those *after* Andronicus. **et.** Epexegetic (= *id est*).

48,28f. ipsasque inter se disiunxit atque distribuit. The interlocking order indicates that, in B.'s view, the later Peripatos (Andronicus) made not only the *secundum se* / *accidens* distinction but also the respective tripartitions = *et per se diuisionem ab ea quae est secundum accidens inter se disiunxit ipsasque (atque) distribuit*. Cf. Littig, *Andr. v. Rh.* II 13: "die divisio per se ... von der secundum accidens ... und dieser wieder unter sich unterschieden und getrennt;" Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 122: "die Teilung *per se*, die Teilung *secundum accidens* sowie deren diverse Formen auseinanderhielten." On the word order, cf. "Boethius ... and Andronicus" 537 (correcting here for *inter se*); *CEut.* I 27f. (*in corpore et a corpore et facit et patitur*); Bednarz, *De ... colore* 8. On (*inter se*, cf. on 28,11-13.

50,1. antiquiores autem. The corresponsive particle (with *quidem*), and *Peripateticam*, 4,4, indicate *Peripatetici* here. At *Diff. top.* I 1,1 and *In Cic. top.* 1045a7 B. speaks vaguely of *Peripatetici ueteres*; otherwise, *antiquiores* may for him signify those up to and including Aristotle: *Inst. ar.* II 41,1 (cf. II 52,1); *In Perih.* I 52,27; I 59,20-25; II 24,15f. Aristotle taxes Speusippus with the same error (Tarán, *Speusippus* 401). **et accidente pro genere.** Sing. for the dividendum.

50,1f. et accidentibus pro speciebus aut differentiis. *Aut* attenuating (cf. *antiquior*, 30,4; LHS II §269b), and plur.'s. for the dividendia. The two errors are distinct: to replace the genus with an accident is to destroy the quiddity (cf. on *quid*, 16,3); to replace the species (differentiae) is to destroy the distinction between them and individuals (cf. on VII. 48,12-25).

50,2f. unde. That *Div.* is a reply to the earlier Peripatetic error does not mean that B. claims the later Peripatetic corrective for himself. The phrase, *et per se ... atque distribuit*, earlier in the paragraph, indicates that Andronicus' reworking concerned the whole system of diaeresis, which may imply that the earlier Peripatetics erred in connection with more than just the genus / species trope. If so, then B.'s

failure to say so is probably a reflex of the special status accorded by him (and Porphyry) to that trope (cf. on II.C. 10,1-27). But it is also possible to interpret B. as meaning that the earlier Peripatetics erred, and Andronicus corrected, only in connection with accidents, genera, species, and differentiae, in which case the working out of a general system of diaeresis would by B. be regarded as a kind of *parergon* on Andronicus' part. Far from knowing the facts of the matter, we cannot even be certain of what, if anything, B. *thinks* the earlier Peripatos did beyond dragging genera, species, and differentiae down to the level of accidents. Cf. Talamanca, "Schema" 93, with n. 282; 99, n. 295. **nobis**. Plezia's interpretation requires that this be one of the words cribbed from Andronicus by Porphyry then translated by B. (*De Andr. stud.* 14). But it is unreasonable to suppose that Porphyry revised or misconstrued Andronicus so as to render the earlier / later Peripatos distinction as in the first half of the paragraph, then simply aped Andronicus for the thought here, without adjusting his ἡμῶν to context. Moreover, on Plezia's theory B. too must be supposed to have failed to notice that *nobis* refers to someone other than himself. The fact is that B. constructed both the proem and conclusion in such a way as to emphasize his own role as inheritor and transmitter of the later Peripatetic wisdom. Thus the concluding sentence of *Div.* expresses his *own* thought, for it echoes the proem, where a point is made of his work as a translator; and, the final *expressimus* is unlikely to be at odds with *nobis* here, which too, by way of the *utilitas* theme, reflects the proem. **peropportuna**. The later Peripatetic corrective is appropriate to the deteriorated conditions of B.'s own time (cf. *In Cat.* 230c6-10).

50,3. utilitas. Echoing the proem: *fructus* (4,3); *utilitas* (4,8); *utilitatem* (4,10); *usus* (4,11); *utilitate* (6,4). **communiones**. Cf. 10,30-32; 40,27-30; 48,16-25. **harum diuisionum**. I.e. all six tropes. Cf. 10,29 (*horum omnium*); 50,4 (*omni*).

50,4. eas. Sc. *diuisiones*. **propriis differentiis**. Cf. 10,3f.; 10,6-9; 10,18-22; 10,28-14,26; 40,24-27; 40,30-32; 48,8-11. **Et de ... quidem**. Cf. on 48,12. **omni**. Cf. *competenti subtilique*, 4,14.

50,5. introductionis breuitas. Cf. *introductionis modo ... moderata breuitate*, 4,13f. **diligenter**. The parallelism with the proem is now complete: *diligentissimi / diligentissima ratione* = Andronicus / later Peripatos (4,5/48,27); *diligenter* = Boethius (6,15). Note that each paragraph

begins with Andronicus (later Peripatos), i.e. the superlative adj., and ends with B., i.e. the adv. That is B.'s way of subordinating himself to the ancient tradition. This concluding sentence is very characteristic of B. and is, *pace* Moraux, *Aristotelismus* I 124, unlikely to be mere mimicking of Porphyry. Cf. *Inst. ar.* I 19,1; *In Isag.* I 66,12f.; I 131,18f.; II 143,8; II 283,16f.; *In Cat.* 194b4f.; *In Perih.* I 88,12; I 225,12f.; II 132,23f.; II 172,28; II 250,15f.; II 453,9f.; *Intr. cat. syll.* 809b5; 829d13f.; *Hyp. syll.* II 2,7 (266,70-73), etc.

APPENDIX

ELENCHVS LECTIONVM SINGVLARIVM SELECTARVM

4,5 et¹ an. do. tr. G 8 utilitas] est add. C 9 accidentisque]
E^c(-ensque a.c.) 10 peritiam] *E*^c(-ae inc.) 10f. tum - quo-
niam] tunc - quia *F* 11f. fa. do. es. tr. *E* 12 doctrina] est add.
K 15f. me. le. tr. *K* 6,3 es. na. tr. G 4 et¹] cum *C*
5 obtrectationum *K* || potius] *E*^c(-is a.c.) 7 bonis] *F*^c(hoc a.c.)
|| quicquod *G* || impudenti *F* 9 ualere] *Q*: uellere *Q*^c
|| de. ua. tr. *C* || si] si/ *A* 10 qu. pe. ha. tr. *E* 13 lo. pa.
tr. *C* 14 id est] uel *C* 15f. esse - hoc *G* 17f. unumquod-
que] *F*(-quid- p.c.) 18 diuisionis om. *G* || uo. di. tr. *F*
19 modis] *A*^c(mul- inc.) || mo. di.² tr. *G* 23 Huius] autem add.
E 23f. es. tr. mo. tr. *G* 24 unus] est add. *G* 26 ita] itaque
F 8,1 exempla] diuisionum add. *F* 4 rationalium *G*
5 su. qu. tr. *C* 6 autem] *E*²(om. a.c.) || di. in¹ sp. tr. *E*
7 plures] *Q* (-is p.c.) 8 ueniat *G* 9 in¹ pa. ue. tr. *C*
10 resoluimus] *C*^c(-itur inc.) || cum] *E*^c(om. a.c.) 11 aliud²]
esse add. *K* 12 cum *Q* || pa. di. tr. *K* 14 uis - iungitur -
componitur *G* 15 singuli] *Q*^c(-is inc.) || species] sunt add. *F*
16 pr. si. tr. *K* 18 est] *E*(nunc erasum) 19 latrantemque ... pe-
dem (20)] *E*²(mg., om. a.c.) || latrabilemque *K* || designo *F*
22 aut] *F*^c(at a.c.) 24 idem *F* 26 nominis] *F*^c: omnis *F* ||
per] in *C* 27 uero om. *F* 30 ambigua] *E*^c(-atas a.c.) ||
praedicaetur *F* 10,2 dicimus] dominus *F*(comp.) || sunt om. *C*
3 alii¹] sunt add. *K* || candidi] albi *E* 4 subiectus *C* || est
om. *G* 5 subiecti *C* 6 corpore *F* 10 alia²] *A*^c: est add. *A*
12 dura] *K*²(-um a.c.) 12f. in alia accidentia accidens tr. *F*
13 sed om. *K* 15 sunt¹ om. *C* 16 diuidimus] dicimus
F(comp.) 17 alia¹] nigra add. *C* || li. -du. tr. *E* || et om. *C* ||
et ... dura (18) om. *E* 18 sunt om. *G* || huiuscemodi *F*
19 omnibus] *A*: ab praem. *A*² || di. su. tr. *E* 20 pr. si. tr. *G*
21 neque *E* || diuiduntur om. *G* || in² pa.² se. tr. *E* 22 di.
in² sp.² tr. *G* 23 su. ue. tr. *C* 24 at tensius *G* 25 alia²]
esse add. *F* 31 totiusque] et totius *G* || diuisio¹ om. *F*
32 au. se tr. *F* 12,1 separatur ... significationes om. *G* ||
genus] uero add. *F* 2 propriae] *F*(-ie p.c.) 2f. to. es. pr. tr.

K 4 quidem *om.* *G* || uoce] in *praem.* *G* 5 illa *E* || a]
E: quae *E'* || diuiditur, quod] diuiduntur *E'*(*ras.*) 11 fortasse
om. *G* 15 consuetudinis] *A'*(-do *inc.*) || uero] *E'*(*om. a.c.*) ||
quod] *F'*(*om. a.c.*) 16 ge. dif. *tr.* *K* 17 distributione] *E'*²(-ni
a.c.) 19 ratione] *C'*(cog- *inc.*) 22 quoniam] -od *C* || qual.
quad. *tr.* *E* || unde] unum *G* 23 quale] *Q'*(-li *a.c.*) || anima
Q 25 autem] enim *E*: uero *E'* || posterius] est *add.* *E*
26 iungitur *G*(*sic*) || compositum *C* 27 qu. te. ra. *tr.* *K*
|| unde] unum *G* || genus] *Q'*: ut genus *add.* *Q*(*vid.*)
28 totum] *K'*(-ius *a.c.*) 29 sp.¹ st. *tr.* *E* **14**,1 consistit *G*
2 non] *K'*(*om. a.c.*) || un. pa.² *tr.* *G* 3 remanent *G*
4 do. in.¹ *tr.* *E* 4f. interimit *F* 5 paries *G* 6 queque *G*
7 in¹] *E'*(*om. a.c.*) || ita *om.* *G* 8 totus *G* 10 unde] unum
G 11 ipsa *G* 12 quoquae *A* 13 quod¹ *om.* *K*
|| id.² es.² ui. *tr.* *C* 15 qu.¹ ho. es. *tr.* *K* || nec idem] neque
idem est *G* || domus] est *add.* *E* 18 sunt] *Q'*(*om. a.c.*)
19 est *om.* *E* || substantia] *F*: in *praem.* *F'* 21f. Differunt] *F'*
(-ent// *a.c.*) 24 aut *F* || fit *om.* *G* 25 parte] una *praem.* *F*
|| re] parie *K* 27 igitur *K* || dif. diu. *tr.* *E* 28 pertracte-
tur] *Q'*(-atur *a.c.*) 29 pluribus] et *add.* *C* ||
speciae *F* || di. sp. *tr.* *C* || quod²] *F'*²(*om. a.c.*) **16**,1 species]
C'(-em *inc.*) 1f. differentia] est *add.* *E* 3 quid] *F'*²(-od *a.c.*)
5 interrogat *G* || recte *om.* *E* 7 differentias] in differentias
add. *K* 9 su. di. *tr.* *E* 10f. non - nom. *tr.* *G*
12 ueniens] *F'*²(-es *a.c.*) 15 diuisio] *Q*: definitio *Q'* || est] fit *K*
16f. appellarentur] *C'*(-antur *a.c.*) 17 de. fi. *tr.* *E*
18 quid est] quidem *G* 19 nu. pr. *tr.* *E* 20 mortali] *A*(-le
p.c.) 21 perficere *K* 22 ne. di. *tr.* *G* || et] ne *K*
25 ipsa *om.* *F* || suscipimus] *C'*(susp- *inc.*) 27 prius *om.* *K* ||
es. pr. *tr.* *C* || uniuocum] et *add.* *C* 28 fefellerint] *K'*(-it *a.c.*)
18,5 aliae² ... Statim²] *E'*(*mg., om. a.c.*) || statim² *om.* *K*
6 ui. - se. - st. *tr.* *C* 8 sunt *K* 8f. di. ge. *tr.* *E* 10 ap. es.
ge. *tr.* *E* 11 definitionem *C* 13f. rationabilitas et mortalitas]
rationalitas *F* 14 possumus] *F'*²(-umus *a.c.*) 15 an¹] ac *K*
|| substantiam *E* 16 est *om.* *G* 17 in diuisione] in defini-
tione *praem.* *E*: in definitione *E'*² 18 reticendae *C* || sunt *om.* *G*
23 fr. qu. *tr.* *E* || segregatur *F* 26f. lu. gl. qu.¹ *tr.* *C*
27 hoc *C* **20**,1 pr. es. ho. *tr.* *C* 2 sit] est *K*
3 dicimus] *Q'*: ut cum dicimus *add.* *Q* || solus] *C'*(-um *inc.*)
5 haec] *E'*(-ee *a.c.*) 6 insunt] sunt *F* || haec] hoc *G* 7 est

om. F 8 in² *om. E* 11 ut] dum *add. C* 12 propter] per *C*
 || heae *Q* || in¹ *om. K* 12f. de. sp. *tr. K* 13 sumenda est *K*
 || sunt² *om. Q* 14 po. in¹ di. *tr. K* 17 appositione *G* ||
 aliqua *om. C* 20 qu. op. *tr. E* 21 malum *C* || abitus *G*
 22 et *om. F* || dif. dis. *tr. E* 23 an] aut *F* || eas *G*
 24 hoc *G* **22,5** conueniat] *A*(uen- *p.c.*) 6 primo *C*
 6f. contradictionis²] *E*^c(-es *a.c.*) 7 affirmatiue - negatiue *C*
 8 igitur] *A*: oppositione *add. A*² || nam] ut *G* 9 aequus *G*
 || su. sp. *tr. K* 11 ho. en.¹ *tr. K* || est] *F*^c(esse *a.c.*)
 12 negatione - proponitur *E* || est] *E*^c(*om. a.c.*) || esse *om. K*
 || disiungitur *E* || cum] *E*^c(*om. a.c.*) 13 quoddam *F*
 15 Necesse ... autem] *F*²(*mg., om. a.c.*) 16 quam] *F*²(-od *a.c.*)
 16f. uo.¹ as. sp.² *tr. C*(*a.c.*) 18 numerorum] *E*^c: nostrorum *E* ||
 quinque] *C*^r: a *praem. C* || septem] sex *K* 19 figurarum]
E^c(-atum *a.c.*) 20 aliae non *om. Q* || alii³] uero *add. F*
 21 nec¹ ... nigri] medii *Q* || un. no. *tr. C* 22 in. co. *tr. K*
 23 eodem] *Q*^c(-dem *s.l.*) 24 affirmatio] aut posterior negatio *add.*
C 25 est *om. C* 26 quam] cui *K* || praeponimus *G*
 27 numeros primos] pr. nuntios *K* || sunt *C* 28 non] *K*^c(*om.*
a.c.) || sint] *Q*^c(su- *a.c.*) || primi] exemplo *add. K*
 31 deduceret *G* 32 es. af. *tr. E* **24,3** uicus *K* 4 plus]
*F*²(pri- *a.c.*) 8f. negatio quae *G* 10 ui. su. *tr. C*(*a.c.*)
 || nega *C* 11f. es. po. *tr. F* 13 docuerunt] *A*²(-int *a.c.*)
 15 qu. pr.² *tr. C* || disponit] *C*^c(red- *inc.*) 17 lumine *K*
 || di.² en. *tr. E* || a priuatione *G* 18 dispositus] *E*^c(-situr *a.c.*)
 19 generis *G* 20 utatur *F* 21 es.¹ fa. *tr. C* || habitus] *E*^c:
 est *add. E* 21f. qui est *om. G* 24 priuationis] *C*^r: negationis *C*
 26 finitum] *A*^c: inf- *A* || in² *om. G* 26f. priuationes secundae]
 primae priuationes *Q* 28 Ac] hac *E*: haec *E*^c || oppositione]
Q^c(-es *inc.*) || haec *om. E* 29 uero *om. K* **26,1** uideatur *C*^c
 (-antur *a.c.*) || et² *om. Q* 2 priuatio] *K*^c(-oni *a.c.*)
 || sit] an *add. K* 5 autem generum] generis *E* || est] *C*^c(fit
a.c.) 9 praedicatis *om. G* 10 exstat *F*^c(*ras.*) 12 enim *om. F*
 || dicis *G* || alia²] *E*²(*om. a.c.*) 14 ra. an. *tr. E*
 14f. ponam - littera¹ *G* 17 littera] *F*(del. *p.c.*) 19 si *om. E*
 21 ergo] cum *add. F* || littera] -ae ex animali *K* 21f. es. de. *tr.*
E 22 reperirentur] *F*²(-ientur *a.c.*) 22f. te. se. de. to. *tr. E*
 23 definitio constitueretur - uero] fieret de. - quoque *G* 27 ista]
 haec *F* **28,1** sunt² *om. F* || aequales] -quilatrae *A*²(*mg.*) ||
 inaequalium] *C*^c(-les *inc.*) 2 aequa] *Q*^c(*om. a.c.*) || ha. ae. *tr. C*

4f. gemina] in *praem.* C 6 differentium] *E'*(-ia a.c.)
 || alia²] sunt *add.* C 6f. om. di.² *tr.* F 10 fi. pa. *tr.* G ||
 duplum dimidium G 11 igitur *om.* F || su. di. ha. *tr.* G
 12 discrepent] *A'*(-et a.c.) || potius] *E(nunc erasum)* 13 possunt
 G || er. es.² *tr.* C 17f. si non] *Q'*: sicut Q 18 es.² di. *tr.* C
 19 su. et² co. *tr.* C(a.c.) || sumenda K 21 quoddam F
 || opponere E 22f. co. ta. inmaginatione G 26 di.¹ ge.¹ *tr.*
 K 28 definitionem] *E*: eius *add.* E² 28f. disgregationem - hoc]
 diuisionem - haec E 29 in. ho. *tr.* F || nequid G 32 ut²]
 uel ?C 30,2 supra G || substantia F 3 lo. ge. *tr.* E
 4 es. no. ge. *tr.* G 5 abundamus] *A'*(-antius a.c.) 6 ad] *A(a*
p.c.) 8 sed *om.* C 10 esse K 11 substantia K || su. sub.
tr. E 12 animata] *E'*(*om.* a.c.) 13 segregauit E
 14 secundi] E²(-o a.c.) 15 est] *A'*(*om.* a.c.) 17 aut¹] *E'*(ut a.c.)
 || dissoluitur G 18 facta G || definitiones] *C'*(-em a.c.) ||
 sunt] F²(*om.* a.c.) 20 al. co. *tr.* E 23 nam *om.* E
 24 neque E || ipsam K 24f. co.¹ si.¹ te.¹ *tr.* G 25 sicut
 K || si. te.² *tr.* C || est] *A'*(ut *glossema*, *om.* a.c.) 26 ha.¹ me.¹
tr. G || rursus ... optimus² *om.* K || est *om.* G 28 rursus ...
 species²] F²(*mg.*, *om.* a.c.) 29 aut Q || ei. ge. *tr.* C 32 et] ut
add. F 32,3 pa. su. *tr.* G² 3/5 rursum^{1,2} G²
 10 monstret] Q(-ent *p.c.*) 11 ge.² un. *tr.* F 13 speciebus *om.*
 K 17 ad] ac G² 22 sola C 23 sunt] *A'*: sunt *praem.* A
 24 Superiores²] *E'*(-oris a.c.) 26 possent G 27f. ipsa - seclu-
 sa C 28 media] *C'*(-io *inc.*) 34,2 speciae C 4 generis *om.*
 G || et *om.* E || ac] et G 5 num] F: utrum F²
 6 circumscriptam G || minor] *C'*(-us *inc.*) 8 eam quae G
 9 differentias] *E'*(*om.* a.c.) 10 speciei] -iaei C || sin] si Q
 11 alia G 12 di. *om.* *tr.* G 13 genere illi] -rae -lae E: ge. -lo
 E² 14 coniunctae G 16 sic E 17 igitur G 18 et] E²
 (ut a.c.) || est *om.* G 19 si. no. *tr.* G 21 minimae A
 22 igitur G 24 hoc] *E'*(*om.* a.c.) 25 su. ae. *tr.* G || et¹ *om.*
 G 26 dolorem G 36,1 na.² si. *tr.* G 2f. uero - has *om.* K
 5 aequat K || no. ae. mi. *tr.* E 8f. positionem²] F²(*om.* a.c.)
 9f. sine tempore *om.* G 12 ergo *om.* G 16 placitum E
 18 imperfectam G 20 item *om.* K || et dicemus *om.* F ||
 uox K 22 pertinet] K(-eat *p.c.*) 23 extra nihil] aliquid ex.
 non K 24 significat E || Fit] sit G || definitio] *A'*(-nio a.c.)
 26 significatam C || uides G 27 disiunxi] K²(-it a.c.)
 30 uocibus *om.* Q 33f. ra. ha. *tr.* E 34 oratio - dubitetur G

38,2f. iungant *F* 5 in] *E*^c(*om. a.c.*) 6 definitionem *G* ||
 uero *om. F* || est *om. E* 8 sunt] *A*^c(*om. a.c.*) 10 rationale]
 animalis -lis *E* || tria] sunt *add. G* 11 ratione *A* 12 pars]
 hominis *add. F* 14 differentiae] in diuisione *add. C* 16 totum]
 est *add. F* 24 hominem *om. G* 26 animate *G* || es. po. se.
 al.² sa. tr. *C*(*a.c., vis correctionis dubia*) **40**,1 enim²] *C*^c: partes *add. C*
 2 corpus] si *add. F* || ita diuides in¹ partes suas *G* 3 alio]
 -iquo *F* || fit] sit *C* 4 multiplex²] est *add. F* || diuisio]
 est *add. G* 5f. sim. sib.^{1,2} tr. *G* 7 et¹ *om. K* 8 at *G*
 8f. syllabas²] *E*²(*om. a.c.*) 9 ita *G* 10 partes] etiam *add. C*
 11 sunt *C* 12 diuideant *G*(*sic*) 13 aqua¹ *C*
 13f. diuidimus ... diuidimus] hae (-oc *p.c.*) actu non diuidimus *C*
 16 materia *G* 17 forma] formam aliter enim constat statua ex
 partibus suis aliter ex materia atque forma *G* || speciae *C*
 18 etiam] autem *praem. G* 19 ea] *E*^c(-am *a.c.*) 21 ex] *A*^c: per
add. A 22 in²] in *add. K* || eius *om. G* || est²] eius *K* ||
 in³] *E*^c(*om. a.c.*) 23 rationali *G* || sub] *A*^c(*om. a.c.*) 25 in²
om. E 28 pa. ei. tr. *C* 29 eam] *E*^c(*om. a.c.*) || ad *om. K*
 29f. ubicumque] *Q*^c(ubi- *a.c.*) 30 sequitur *G* 31 aliis alia
 tr. *G* || ad] *Q*^c(at *a.c.*) **42**,2 enim] *C*^c: autem *C* 4 plures]
 enim significat *add. C* || rursus] res *add. G* || un. or. ru. tr. *C*
 4f. dico ... Troianos] aio te eademcida (eac- *p.c.*) romanos uincere
 posse *C* 5f. significat *F*^c(*ras.*) 7 inuenire *G* || di. ho. tr. *F*
 8 aut³] autem *F* 10 magnitudinem *K* 11 infinitum¹ esse
 corporeum diuisione¹ *G* 13 sp. su. tr. *E* 14 al. in.¹ tr. *F*
 18 singul/s praedica//tur *C* 19 significat *F* 21 homo] *A*:
 ambulat *add. A*² 22 definitione] *A*: determinatione *A*^c
 24 intelletget *E* 26 hunc] *F*^c(huc *inc.*) 27 quid *G*
 28 Sunt] *A*: sic *A*² 29 de. da. tr. *G* **44**,1 dicit *K*
 6 ipsum] *E*^c(*om. a.c.*) || uicisse] romanos uel *add. C* 7 unus ...
 intellegere] alius putat *G* || uicerunt *F* 9 quod *F*
 13 significatiuas *F* 19 nu. qu.² tr. *K* 21 exercere] et certe *C*
 || hanc] *Q*^c(-aec *p.c.*) 23f. si.³ di.² tr. *K* 25 si *C* 27 sunt
F **46**,3 quod] ut *G* 4 hoc] *E*^c(*ras.*) 8 uocum] *E*^c(lo- *inc.*)
 10 in particula] imp- *F* 16 intellegitur¹] -atur *G* || pictus]
G^c(-um *inc.*) 17 es. ue. tr. *G* 19 qua *E* || casus] *F*: uel
 numeri *add. F*² 20 cum *om. C* 22 sordu[...]*F* 24 pluris
E 26 et² *om. C* **48**,1 ipsam *om. Q* 2 uel] etiam *F*²(*ras.*)
 || actione *G* 5 aut per¹] *E*^c(*om. a.c.*) 6 dico *K*
 7 uicerint] *C*^c(-unt *a.c.*) 9 omnes] *K*^c(-is *inc.*) 11 quam *E*

12 significatione] *F*^c(-ne *s.l.*) || aut *C* 13 et *om.* *G* || totius
 quae *G* || quare] -oniam *F* 14 omni *C* || pertractum *Q*
 16 diuiditur] *C*^c(-unt *inc.*) 17 si] *E*^c(*om. a.c.*) 20 mo. qu. *tr.* *F*
 21 quid] *G*(-it in *eadem lect.*) 22 re. op. *tr.* *G* 23 subiecto] de
praem. *G* 24 al. ad. *tr.* *K* **50,2** aut] ac *K* 4 de] *A*^c(*om. a.c.*)

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